Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, and George Barros
March 16, 2024, 5:20pm ET
Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date every day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cell system) is strongly beneficial for utilizing this data-heavy device.
Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces every day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.
Word: The information cut-off for this product was 1:30 pm ET on March 16. ISW will cowl subsequent reviews within the March 17 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.
The Ukrainian State Safety Service (SBU) reportedly carried out a collection of profitable drone strikes towards three Russian oil refineries in Samara Oblast on March 16. Sources in Ukrainian particular companies advised Ukrainian outlet RBK-Ukraine that the SBU struck the Novokuibyshevsky, Kuibyshevsky, and Syzran Rosneft oil refineries in Samara Oblast.[1] RBK-Ukraine reported that the three refineries course of an estimated 25 million tons of oil per 12 months, or 10 % of Russia’s annual oil refinement output.[2] Geolocated footage revealed on March 16 reveals a hearth on the Syzran oil refinery following the drone strikes, and Samara Oblast Governor Dmytro Azarov said that there was additionally a hearth on the refinery in Novokuibyshevsky.[3] Russian outlet Kommersant reported on March 13 that Russian authorities not too long ago strengthened anti-drone safety on the Novokuibyshevsky, Kuibyshevsky, and Syzran oil refineries following earlier Ukrainian drone strikes concentrating on Russian oil infrastructure and reported on March 14 that Russian oil and fuel and industrial enterprises are at present the primary purchasers of anti-drone methods in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast.[4] Kommersant additionally reported that Rosneft has not restarted operations on the Tuapse oil refinery following the January 25 Ukrainian drone strike towards the power, indicating that the January 25 strike probably considerably broken the power.[5] Russian milbloggers deliberated whether or not the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) or Rosgvardia are in charge for not defending Russian oil refineries and criticized normal Russian paperwork for delaying the deployment of anti-drone countermeasures and air protection methods to defend Russian important infrastructure operators towards Ukrainian drone strikes.[6] One Russian milblogger requested why Russia has not been in a position to implement even an “elementary determination,” equivalent to copying Ukraine’s cell fireplace teams, to defend towards drone strikes.[7]
All-Russian pro-Ukrainian volunteers proceed restricted cross-border raids into Belgorod and Kursk oblasts. The all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) said on March 16 that it’s persevering with a “restricted navy operation” in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts and denied earlier Russian claims concerning the RDK, Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR), and Siberian Battalion struggling heavy losses in raids in latest days.[8] The RDK posted footage of alleged Russian prisoners of conflict (POW) that it not too long ago captured and known as on Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov to fulfill with a view to negotiate the change of 25 Russian POWs.[9] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled the cross border raids close to Popivka, Sumy Oblast, and within the course of Spodaryushino and Kozinka in Belgorod Oblast.[10]
Russian authorities appointed Boris Kovalchuk, the son of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reported “private banker” Yuri Kovalchuk, to a place inside the Russian Presidential Administration. Russian information outlet RBK, citing sources acquainted with the matter, reported on March 15 that Russian authorities appointed Boris Kovalchuk the deputy head of the Presidential Management Directorate, a division of the Russian Presidential Administration that screens how Russian federal and regional authorities implement Russian President Vladimir Putin’s orders and directives.[11] Russian outlet Kommersant reported on March 6 that Kovalchuk left Russian vitality firm Inter RAO, which he headed for 15 years, and that Russian authorities initially gave Kovalchuk 4 positions to select from – head of Russian state-owned vitality firm Gazprom, head of Russian state-owned oil firm Rosneft, Deputy Prime Minister for the Gasoline and Power Complicated, or governor of St. Petersburg.[12] Bloomberg additionally reported on March 12 that Russian authorities have been contemplating appointing Kovalchuk as Russian Minister of Power.[13] The Kovalchuks are additionally longtime pals of Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko, who has gained elevated affect with Putin for the reason that begin of the full-scale invasion.[14] Boris’ Kovalchuk’s new place inside the Russian presidential administration means that each the Kovalchuk household and even Kiriyenko’s wider faction are gaining elevated affect inside the Kremlin and with Putin himself.
Russian authorities threatened Russian election disruptors and a few Russian residents’ continued makes an attempt to disrupt voting within the Russian presidential election on March 16. Russian opposition outlet Sever Realii reported on March 16 that Russian authorities have opened no less than 15 legal instances throughout Russia for makes an attempt to disrupt the election and despatched no less than two individuals to pre-trial detention facilities.[15] Russian Central Election Fee (CEC) Chairperson Ella Pamfilova said that “simple-minded individuals” tried to disrupt the voting course of by committing arson or damaging poll containers at 29 polling stations in 20 Russian federal topics.[16] Russian Safety Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitri Medvedev claimed that Russian residents who try and disrupt the election are “scoundrels” and “traitors” who can face legal fees for obstructing the train of electoral rights.[17] Medvedev threatened that makes an attempt at election disruption are a type of “direct” help to Ukraine and the perpetrators might face fees of excessive treason. Russian State Duma deputy Yana Lantratova advised Russian state information outlet RIA Novosti on March 16 that Duma deputies are making ready a invoice that will enhance the sentencing severity for Russians who try and disrupt elections and are allegedly appearing on directions from a international state opposing Russia throughout wartime.[18] The invoice reportedly imposes stricter sentences of 5 to eight years in jail for disrupting elections. Lantratova said that Duma deputies are making ready the invoice as rapidly as potential so Russian lawmakers have time to undertake it earlier than the 2026 Russian legislative elections. Remoted public protests towards the Russian presidential election and Russian President Vladimir Putin are extremely unlikely to influence the course or end result of the choreographed Russian presidential election, however Kremlin officers could also be rapidly responding to those incidents out of considerations that continued disruptions will tarnish the Kremlin’s effort to painting the election as Russia unifying round Putin.
Group of Seven (G7) international locations issued a joint assertion on March 15 warning Iran towards transferring ballistic missiles or associated expertise to Russia.[19] The G7 said that it’s ready to reply swiftly and in a coordinated method ought to Iran present Russia with ballistic missiles or associated expertise, together with new and “important measures” towards Iran.[20] The G7 assertion didn’t specify what these measures could also be, however a senior US official reportedly advised journalists that one choice into account is an efficient ban on Iran Air flights to Europe.[21] Reuters reported in late February 2024 that Iranian sources said that Iran had begun ballistic missile transfers to Russia and that Russia has already acquired 400 Iranian short-range ballistic missiles.[22] Western media reported on March 15 that the senior US official said that the US and its allies haven’t confirmed that Iran has transferred the missiles to Russia, nevertheless.[23] Russia and Iran have been reportedly negotiating transfers of the Iranian short-range ballistic missiles in latest months as Russia continues to more and more depend on Iran for key parts and weapons for its conflict effort in Ukraine.[24]
Key Takeaways:
- The Ukrainian State Safety Service (SBU) reportedly carried out a collection of profitable drone strikes towards three Russian oil refineries in Samara Oblast on March 16.
- All-Russian pro-Ukrainian volunteers proceed restricted cross-border raids into Belgorod and Kursk oblasts.
- Russian authorities appointed Boris Kovalchuk, the son of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reported “private banker” Yuri Kovalchuk, to a place inside the Russian Presidential Administration.
- Russian authorities threatened Russian election disruptors and a few Russian residents’ continued makes an attempt to disrupt voting within the Russian presidential election on March 16.
- Group of Seven (G7) international locations issued a joint assertion on March 15 warning Iran towards transferring ballistic missiles or associated expertise to Russia.
- Russian forces made confirmed advances close to Avdiivka and within the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border space.
- A Russian insider supply claimed on March 16 that Rosgvardia Director Viktor Zolotov revoked a reported settlement permitting former Wagner Group models to function independently inside Rosgvardia.
We don’t report intimately on Russian conflict crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t straight have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We’ll proceed to judge and report on the consequences of those legal actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity despite the fact that we don’t describe them in these reviews.
- Russian Most important Effort – Japanese Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate essential efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #1 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #2 – Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Power Era Efforts
- Russian Technological Variations
- Actions in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Protection Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Info Operations and Narratives
- Important Exercise in Belarus
Russian Most important Effort – Japanese Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
The Ukrainian Normal Workers reported on March 16 that Ukrainian forces repelled two Russian sabotage and reconnaissance teams that attempted to cross the worldwide Russian-Ukrainian border into Sumy Oblast close to Stara Huta and Brusky.[25]
Positional engagements continued alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 16, however there have been no confirmed modifications to the frontline on this space. Ukrainian and Russian sources said that positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk close to Synkivka, southeast of Kupyansk close to Tabaivka, west of Kreminna close to Terny, and south of Kreminna close to Bilohorivka.[26]
Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Positional combating continued close to Bakhmut on March 16, however there have been no confirmed modifications to the frontline. Positional combating continued northeast of Bakhmut close to Rozdolivka; northwest of Bakhmut close to Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut close to Ivanivske and east of Chasiv Yar; and southwest of Bakhmut close to Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[27] Parts of the Russian 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk Individuals’s Republic [DNR] Military Corps [AC]) are reportedly working close to Ivanivske, and parts of the Russian “Vostok” Volunteer Reconnaissance Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly working within the course of Chasiv Yar.[28]
Russian forces probably captured Tonenke (west of Avdiivka) and Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka) no later than March 16. Geolocated footage revealed on March 15 reveals {that a} Russian armored column not too long ago superior west of Tonenke, and extra geolocated footage revealed on March 16 reveals parts of the Russian one hundred and tenth Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) advancing into and elevating a flag in Nevelske.[29] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed on March 12 that Russian forces captured Nevelske.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior in Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka) and between Berdychi and Orlivka (west of Avdiivka).[31] A distinguished Russian milblogger claimed that an armored Russian group superior west of Tonenke and reached the outskirts of Semenivka (west of Avdiivka) however didn’t advance additional.[32] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are struggling on the northern flank of Berdychi close to Stepove (each northwest of Avdiivka) as a result of Ukrainian forces nonetheless management tactical heights and conduct counterattacks within the space, however that it’s tougher for Ukrainian forces to counterattack close to Orlivka and Tonenke (each west of Avdiivka). Positional combating continued west of Avdiivka close to Semenivka and southwest of Avdiivka close to Pervomaiske and Novokalynove.[33] Parts of the Chechen “Zapad-Akhmat” Battalion are reportedly working close to Orlivka.[34]
The commander of a Ukrainian battalion working close to Avdiivka said on March 15 that Russian forces close to Avdiivka are innovating and altering classical Wagner Group-style infantry-led “meat assaults” with assaults utilizing armored autos to extend and preserve fixed stress on Ukrainian forces.[35] The Ukrainian commander said that Russian forces are attacking with a number of “divisions” – probably referring to parts of divisions which might be unlikely to be staffed and outfitted at full end-strength – and that Russian forces purpose to attain a ten to 1 numerical superiority over Ukrainian forces within the Avdiivka course. The commander said that Ukrainian forces have slowed the Russian advance however can not say confidently that the state of affairs is secure. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian counterattacks close to Avdiivka have misplaced momentum and advised that Ukrainian forces both lack reserves or are withdrawing to strains additional again, although ISW has not noticed affirmation of those claims.[36] A distinguished Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recovered “rapidly sufficient” following the autumn of Avdiivka and asserted that Ukrainian forces achieved numerical superiority within the Avdiivka course, nevertheless, ISW is unable to verify this declare because the tactical state of affairs west of Avdiivka stays dynamic.[37]
Positional combating continued west and southwest of Donetsk Metropolis on March 16, however there have been no confirmed modifications to the frontline on this space. Positional combating continued west of Donetsk Metropolis close to Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk Metropolis close to Novomykhailivka and Volodymyrivka (southeast of Vuhledar on the T0509 Vuhledar-Volnovakha-Mariupol freeway).[38] Parts of the Russian thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Japanese Army District [EMD]) are reportedly working close to Novomykhailivka.[39]
Russian forces not too long ago superior southwest of Velyka Novosilka amid continued positional combating within the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border space on March 16. Geolocated footage revealed on March 16 reveals that Russian forces not too long ago superior to a windbreak west of Pryyutne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior one kilometer in depth north of Shevchenko (southeast of Velyka Novosilka), although ISW has not noticed visible affirmation of this declare.[41] Positional combating continued south of Velyka Novosilka close to Staromayorske.[42] Parts of the Russian fifth Tank Brigade and thirty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (each of the thirty sixth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], EMD) reportedly not too long ago attacked west of Staromayorske and north of Novodonetske, respectively, and parts of the sixtieth Motorized Rifle Brigade and of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (each of the fifth CAA, EMD) reportedly supported these assaults.[43]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions and safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes)
Positional combating continued close to Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne) in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 16.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that parts of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (seventh VDV Division) superior as much as a kilometer in depth north of Verbove, though ISW has not noticed affirmation of this declare.[45]
Positional engagements continued within the east (left) financial institution of Kherson Oblast, together with close to Krynky, on March 16.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces additionally preserve positions close to the Antonivsky Bridge, however didn’t specify whether or not he was referring to the Antonivsky railway bridge or the Antonivsky roadway bridge.[47]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces carried out a restricted collection of drone and missile strikes towards targets in Ukraine on the evening of March 15 to 16. Sumy Oblast Army Administration reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Konotop, Sumy Oblast with an unspecified missile on the night of March 15.[48] Kharkiv Oblast Army Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian forces struck important infrastructure in Kozacha Lopan with an unspecified variety of Shahed-136/131 drones and Zolochiv with an Iskander missile on March 16.[49] Ukrainian officers in Donetsk Oblast reported that Russian forces struck Slovyansk with an unspecified missile and Myrnohrad with 4 S-300 missiles.[50]
Odesa Oblast Army Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported on March 16 that the demise toll from a Russian Iskander missile strike on Odesa Metropolis on March 15 has risen to twenty.[51] Russian sources asserted that Russian forces struck a sanatorium in Odesa Metropolis on March 15 and killed as much as 550 Ukrainian Ministry of Inner Affairs (MVD) personnel, though ISW has not noticed any proof of those Russian claims.[52]
Russian Mobilization and Power Era Efforts (Russian goal: Develop fight energy with out conducting normal mobilization)
A Russian insider supply claimed on March 16 that Rosgvardia Director Viktor Zolotov revoked a reported settlement permitting former Wagner Group models to function independently inside Rosgvardia.[53] The insider supply claimed that Zolotov disbanded the previous Wagner base in Kazachi Lageri, Rostov Oblast, which Wagner reportedly retained management over when working as a part of the Rosgvardia Volunteer Corps. Rosgvardia authorities reportedly assured former Wagner personnel that there can be “a brand new gathering” following the Russian presidential election, however that their models would now not be thought-about “separate and unbiased.” Russian sources broadly speculated a few reported settlement between the Wagner Council of Commanders and Rosgvardia that will enable Wagner to retain its present command construction and independence whereas subordinated to Rosgvardia following the demise of Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and founder Dmitry Utkin in September 2023.[54] Zolotov reportedly reneged on the purported settlement after studying that Wagner Commander Anton Yelizarov (name signal “Lotos”) severely overestimated his potential to persuade further former Wagner personnel to hitch Rosgvardia.[55]
Russian opposition outlet Mobilization Information reported on March 15 that Russian officers are now not offering fight veteran certificates for veterans of Russian “Storm Z” convict models within the Southern Army District.[56] Mobilization Information reported that Russian officers refused to situation fight veteran certificates to “Storm Z” veterans in Krasnodar Krai, Kabardino-Balkaria Republic, and Astrakhan and Volgograd oblasts. This variation, if confirmed, is probably going a cost-saving measure to forestall ballooning prices associated to offering Russian veterans service advantages.
Russian Technological Variations (Russian goal: Introduce technological improvements to optimize methods to be used in Ukraine)
Nothing important to report.
Ukrainian Protection Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian goal: Develop its protection industrial base to grow to be extra self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and worldwide companions)
Word: ISW will probably be publishing its protection of Ukrainian protection industrial efforts on a weekly foundation within the Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation. ISW will proceed to trace developments in Ukrainian protection industrial efforts every day and can refer to those efforts in assessments inside the every day Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation and different ISW merchandise when crucial.
ISW just isn’t publishing protection of Ukrainian protection industrial efforts at present.
Actions in Russian-occupied areas (Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian residents into Russian sociocultural, financial, navy, and governance methods)
Word: ISW will probably be publishing protection of actions in Russian-occupied areas twice per week within the Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation. ISW will proceed to trace actions in Russian-occupied areas every day and can refer to those actions in assessments inside the every day Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation and different ISW merchandise when crucial.
ISW just isn’t publishing protection of actions in Russian-occupied areas at present.
Russian Info Operations and Narratives
Russian authorities proceed efforts to painting the Russian presidential election as a well-liked and bonafide election and claimed that Western states are interfering within the election. The Russian Central Election Fee said that 51.77 % of all eligible voters had voted as of 1620 Moscow time on March 16.[57] Kremlin newswire TASS said on March 16 that international observers from a number of dozen international locations are reportedly observing the elections.[58] Russian sources have reported on instances of irregularities and voting violations, nevertheless. Stanislav Andreychuk, the Co-Chairperson for the Russian “Golos” Motion for Protection of Voters’ Rights, reported on March 16 that “Golos” had noticed footage of poll stuffing in Krasnodar Krai.[59] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories) reported on March 16 that observers in Moscow Oblast reported variations between information on claimed and precise voter turnout numbers and that Russian authorities registered on common 100 extra ballots than have been really solid.[60] Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Tatyana Moskalkova claimed on March 16 that she appealed to the United Nations Excessive Fee about the best way Estonian authorities are allegedly obstructing Russian “compatriots” from voting there.[61] Russian Ministry of Overseas Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on March 16 that some “unfriendly international locations” are threatening Russian residents and bodily obstructing them from voting overseas.[62] Zakharova additionally claimed that the Russian MFA might summon the British ambassador to Russia if alleged, unspecified makes an attempt to intervene within the election don’t cease.[63]
Russian actors are reportedly trying to take advantage of the family of Ukrainian prisoners of conflict (POWs) to incite home discontent in Ukraine, probably as a part of the broader “Maidan-3” Russian data marketing campaign. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets said on March 16 that unspecified Russian actors are calling family of Ukrainian POWs and claiming that Russia is able to return Ukrainian POWs however that the Ukrainian management is stopping this. The Russian actors reportedly encourage the family to protest about this situation. Lubinets said that Ukraine has by no means stopped POW exchanges. These Russian data operations are probably a part of the “Maidan-3” data marketing campaign, which Ukraine’s Safety Service (SBU) beforehand reported intends to sow home discontent in Ukraine and drive a wedge between civilians and navy and political management.[64] Russia has efficiently used data operations, together with direct correspondence through mobile phone to Ukrainian civilians, to foment violent protests in Ukraine earlier than.[65]
Important exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group exercise in Belarus)
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov said on March 16 that Russian President Vladimir Putin held a phone name with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and mentioned bilateral points and the regional state of affairs.[66] Russian and Belarusian sources have but to supply additional particulars concerning the name.
Word: ISW doesn’t obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly accessible data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially accessible satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the premise for these reviews. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.
[1] https://t.me/RBC_ua_news/87584
[2] https://t.me/RBC_ua_news/87584
[3] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1768873567549100245?s=20; https://x.c… ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/54823 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/118386 ;… ; https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1769007568456733178 ; https://t.me… https://mil dot in.ua/uk/information/u-rf-drony-atakuvaly-vidrazu-dva-naftozavody/ ; https://t.me/news63ru/49396 ; https://t.me/admsyzran/11982 ; https:/…
[4] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6562980?from=63_top_main_1 ; https://www.idelreal dot org/a/v-samarskoy-oblasti-usilili-zaschitu-neftezavodov-ot-atak-bespilotnikov/32859732.html ; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6563929?from=52_top_main_3
[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012524 ; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6562980?from=63_top_main_1 ; https://www.idelreal dot org/a/v-samarskoy-oblasti-usilili-zaschitu-neftezavodov-ot-atak-bespilotnikov/32859732.html
[6] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/15008 ; https://t.me/rusengineer/3172 ; h…
[7] https://t.me/rusengineer/3172
[8] https://t.me/russvolcorps/910 ;
[9] https://t.me/russvolcorps/910
[10] https://t.me/mod_russia/36675
[11] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/15/03/2024/65f46d159a79474774463907 ; https://udprf dot ru/content material/glavnoe-kontrolnoe-upravlenie
[12] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6559757?tg
[13] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-12/russia-elections-no-s…
[14] https://meduza dot io/en/characteristic/2022/06/10/the-viceroy; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign… https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign…
[15] https://t.me/severrealii/23770
[16] https://t.me/tass_agency/237016
[17] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/466
[18] https://ria dot ru/20240316/gosduma-1933436741.html
[19] https://www.reuters.com/world/g7-warns-iran-not-give-russia-ballistic-mi…
[20] https://www.reuters.com/world/g7-warns-iran-not-give-russia-ballistic-mi… ; https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/15/politics/g7-iran-russia-missile-warning/i…
[21] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-15/g-7-allies-warn-iran-… https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/15/politics/g7-iran-russia-missile-warning/i…
[22] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-sends-russia-hundreds-ballistic-missi…
[23] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-15/g-7-allies-warn-iran-… https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/15/politics/g7-iran-russia-missile-warning/i…
[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030824 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgr…
[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wnuE1gj2oefHym4w8Ex…
[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HLHSnxdB1tENwMYGDKh… ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FH2YCt6P5MrfW6adhyq… ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36675 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36683 ; http…
[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wnuE1gj2oefHym4w8Ex… https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HLHSnxdB1tENwMYGDKh… ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FH2YCt6P5MrfW6adhyq… https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8353
[28] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63818 (Ivanivske); https://t.me/dva_majors/36972 (Chasiv Yar); https://t.me/dobrovolecvostok/73
[29] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4772; https://t.me/PUMBAZSU19/169; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1768748375531241774?s=20; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1768751685969539558?s=20; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4773?single; https://t.me/nm_dnr/11977; https://x.com/DrazaM33/status/1768911490843640118?s=20; https://x.com/DrazaM33/status/1767281700231434314?s=20 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63816
[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign…
[31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/26297
[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wnuE1gj2oefHym4w8Ex… https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HLHSnxdB1tENwMYGDKh… ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FH2YCt6P5MrfW6adhyq… https://t.me/mod_russia/36675 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36685; https://t.me/rybar/58209
[34] https://t.me/z_arhiv/26297 (Orlivka)
[35] https://suspilne dot media/706672-rosijski-vijskovi-namagalis-zaihati-na-tankah-v-orlivku-na-avdiivskomu-napramku-komandir-bataljonu/
[36] https://t.me/wargonzo/18767
[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wnuE1gj2oefHym4w8Ex… https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HLHSnxdB1tENwMYGDKh… ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FH2YCt6P5MrfW6adhyq… https://t.me/mod_russia/36676 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36686
[39] https://t.me/voin_dv/7520; https://t.me/voin_dv/7526 (Novomykhailivka)
[40] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/12355; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1522968731599822
[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/36950
[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HLHSnxdB1tENwMYGDKh… ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FH2YCt6P5MrfW6adhyq… https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1710
[43] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1710 (Staromayorske and Novodonetske)
[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wnuE1gj2oefHym4w8Ex… https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HLHSnxdB1tENwMYGDKh… ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FH2YCt6P5MrfW6adhyq… https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7219
[45] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8337
[46] https://t.me/dva_majors/36950 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff…. https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HLHSnxdB1tENwMYGDKh… ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FH2YCt6P5MrfW6adhyq…
[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/36950
[48] https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/24951
[49] https://t.me/synegubov/8738 ; https://t.me/synegubov/8738
[50] https://t.me/VadimFilashkin_donoda/1380 ; https://dn.npu.gov dot ua/information/voroh-atakuvav-11-naselenykh-punktiv-donechchyny-ie-poranenyi
[51] https://t.me/odeskaODA/4462
[52] https://t.me/dva_majors/36950 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8334 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/116640 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/36941 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/36955 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/116628; https://t.me/tass_agency/236932 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/116738
[53] https://t.me/vchkogpu/46642
[54] https://isw.pub/UkrWar092623 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgr…
[55] https://t.me/vchkogpu/46642 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/46355
[56] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/17962
[57] https://t.me/tass_agency/237020
[58] https://t.me/tass_agency/237006 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/236993
[59] https://t.me/sandreychuk/474 ; https://meduza dot io/information/2024/03/16/dvizhenie-golos-poluchilo-pervoe-video-vbrosa-golosov-na-vyborah-prezidenta-rf
[60] https://t.me/istories_media/5516
[61] https://t.me/tass_agency/236936; https://t.me/tass_agency/237052
[62] https://t.me/tass_agency/236929
[63] https://t.me/tass_agency/237002
[64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign…
[65] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/viral-disinformation-kreml…
[66] https://t.me/pul_1/11701 ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/239951 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/237054