What could possibly be the make-up of the subsequent Iraqi authorities, as geopolitical drama continues to play out throughout the Center East?
As Iraq gears up for its pivotal parliamentary elections on Nov. 11, the environment is charged with anticipation. With regional volatility, the fracturing Iran-led resistance axis, and unprecedented divisions throughout the Shi’a majority, the elections carry immense significance for the nation’s trajectory, 20 years after the landmark “purple finger” elections of 2005. But, regardless of the noise round electoral campaigning and registering partisan lists of candidates (checklist formations), the true drama unfolds post-election, when the ability performs and alliances take form.
Candidates representing every of Iraq’s three foremost ethno-sectarian blocs — Shia, Sunni, and Kurds — will maneuver to achieve leverage, minimize offers, and construct consensus within the run-up to the election. Whereas politicians of all stripes will participate within the motion, the competitors is arguably probably the most intense throughout the Shia powerhouse (al-bayt al-shi’i).
Iraq’s final parliamentary election, in October of 2021, resulted in a tumultuous 12-month authorities formation course of. This era featured a failed try at a majority authorities that excluded a big portion of the Shia parliamentarians (and events), a mass resignation of Sadrist (Shia) members of parliament, and the eventual formation of a authorities beneath Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al Sudani — although not with out a gun battle between Sadrist supporters searching for to storm the parliament constructing and paramilitary factions linked to the opposite Shia events. Hopefully, the subsequent authorities formation will contain much less violent score-settling.
We interviewed a number of knowledgeable observers inside Iraq to achieve an insider’s perspective on the electoral panorama within the weeks and months earlier than and after the November election.
The Kurdish Query
The Kurds of Iraq held their long-delayed regional elections in October of 2024. These elections might be seen as a litmus check for the anticipated nationwide elections this fall. The Kurdish Regional Authorities parliament has 100 seats, making the variety of seats and the odds conveniently an identical. Within the regional elections, the Kurdish Democratic Occasion took 39 seats, down six from the final election, whereas the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan took 23, gaining two. The opposition New Technology Occasion took 15 seats, with the Kurdish Islamists taking seven. Smaller events and minority quota seats crammed the rest.
Barring some geopolitical shock occasion within the spring or summer time — resembling a U.S. assault on Iran — an identical breakdown might be anticipated from Kurdish seats within the fall. The Kurdistan Democratic Occasion will in all probability as soon as extra about one and a half instances as many seats because the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, whereas opposition and Islamist events taking — in complete — in regards to the common of the 2 foremost events.
Two main elements can clarify the Kurds’ position in negotiating power-sharing settlements. First, it appears more and more seemingly {that a} regional authorities will probably be introduced in Erbil earlier than the nationwide elections happen in November. The distribution of workplaces throughout the regional authorities is anticipated to characteristic a possible deal between the Kurdistan Democratic Occasion and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan for dividing the Kurdish “share” of the nationwide authorities. Thus, within the frenzy of presidency formation that follows the election, the Kurdish “grand discount” will add one other layer to the horse-trading part on the nationwide degree.
A second query is whether or not the Kurds will kind a unified bloc for presidency formation. Bafel Talabani, the president of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, publicly proposed a unified Kurdish bloc when talking on the Baghdad Dialogue conference on Feb. 23 of this 12 months. This is able to be a U-turn from the final electoral cycle in 2021, when the Kurdistan Democratic Occasion banded with the Sadrists and Mohammed al Halbousi’s Taqqadum social gathering to attempt to kind a majority authorities. In opposition, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan social gathering joined a gaggle of Shia and Sunni Arab events wanting to hinder that majority authorities initiative. A unified Kurdish bloc would have extra leverage over authorities formation and will — if unified — be a deciding vote on which bloc of majority Iraqi Arab events could be endorsed to kind the federal government. This is able to, presumably, enable the Kurds to carve out extra coverage concessions, particularly relating to sustainable wage distribution and a say on oil exports from the Kurdistan area. Nonetheless, regardless of the optimistic alerts from the newest strategic meeting on March 16 between Talabani and the Kurdistan Regional Authorities Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, in addition to Talabani’s last statement about reaching a governance settlement with the Kurdistan Democratic Occasion, tensions between the 2 main Kurdish events could forestall this in any other case logical transfer.
The Sunni Element
If this 12 months’s electoral politics for Iraq’s Sunni Arabs had been summarized in a single query, it is likely to be, “How a lot energy will diffuse from Halbousi’s Taqqadum social gathering to smaller events?”
The 2021 elections cemented Halbousi because the main determine within the Sunni Arab group. Along with his social gathering securing 37 seats, nearly 3 times greater than the closest Sunni competitor (the Azm Alliance of Khamis al Khanjar and Muthana al Samarrai, with 14), Halbousi loved main of place as each chief of the biggest Sunni bloc (once more, by far) and in workplace because the parliament’s speaker, the Sunni leg of Iraq’s “Three Presidencies” system.
This primacy all got here crashing down for Halbousi in November of 2023, when he was faraway from the parliament, in a controversial judicial ruling, for reportedly forging the resignation letter of one other member of parliament who was equally ejected by the courtroom. Whereas Halbousi stays the top of his social gathering, with out the workplace and skill to grant favors, endow workplaces, and direct contracts of the speakership, his energy is undeniably weakened. The query is, how severely and the way deep?
In line with knowledgeable observers, it’s anticipated that rival Sunni blocs will chip away at Halbousi’s seat complete, leaving him with the biggest variety of Sunni seats however a much less overwhelming majority than in 2021. Certainly, our sources on the bottom anticipate that Azm will acquire a number of seats, whereas the Decisive Reform checklist of Protection Minister Thabit al Abbasi ought to enhance its seats from three to between 5 and 7. Moreover, the brand new checklist of Salahaddin tribal chief Yazan al Jabouri, partnered with former Speaker Salim al Jabouri and Anbari tribal leaders (together with Sattam Abu Risha, the son of America’s main companion through the “Anbar Awakening”), may acquire 5 to eight seats. These positive aspects will seemingly come on the expense of Halbousi’s Taqqadum candidates. A diffusion of energy amongst Sunni lists may thus complicate authorities formation in unexpected methods.
The Shia Home
With the breakdown of the negotiated ceasefire in Gaza, pro-Iranian factions in Iraq are vying for dominance whereas searching for to keep up their credentials as champions of the Islamic resistance in opposition to Israel. These teams, loosely aligned beneath the Shia Coordination Framework, are struggling to refocus on preserving their hard-fought positive aspects throughout the Iraqi state. This balancing act between transnational resistance and home politics happens amid an evolving political panorama, marked by the unprecedented overthrow of Bashar al Assad’s regime in Syria — as soon as a significant ally. The electoral success of anti-Hizballah President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam in Lebanon additional underscores the precarious place of Iran-backed forces. These forces discover themselves at a crossroads, realizing that revolutionary fervor should yield to a extra astute strategy to governance and diplomacy in the event that they want to preserve management.
Amongst these actors is Nouri al Maliki, a veteran Shia politician who more and more feels threatened by Sudani, who has been known as Maliki’s protégé or “general manager.” Because the Hamas assault of Oct. 7 and Israel’s retaliatory campaign against Gaza, Sudani has navigated the turbulent waters of Iraqi politics, striving to maintain the nation out of the geopolitical crossfire between Washington and Tehran whereas managing relationships with each U.S. and Iranian interlocutors. As formidable challenges come up, together with debates over electoral law amendments, a important query looms for Iraq’s ruling elites from the Coordination Framework: Which state of affairs poses a better menace to their long-term pursuits? Is it the prospect of a second time period for a politically empowered Sudani or one other shock resurgence of the Sadrists, who may rally final minute help from disaffected Sunnis and Kurds?
Sadr unexpectedly introduced as soon as once more that he’s stepping back from politics and refusing to take part within the upcoming parliamentary elections as a consequence of what he sees as a tainted political panorama rife with corruption and partisanship. Having initially forbidden his supporters from voting or working for workplace, Sadr has nonetheless urged his base to replace voter IDs “even within the occasion of a boycott” of the election.
Reportedly, the Sadrists are wanting to study from the strategic missteps made through the post-2021 elections authorities formation disaster. In line with an knowledgeable interviewee, who wished to stay nameless, the Sadrists could also be inclined to welcome disillusioned cadres from the broader Coordination Framework alliance, offered they aren’t perceived as corrupt. This is able to align with the Sadrists’ public emphasis on reform and transparency, regardless of being no strangers to clientelist practices themselves.
Traditionally, the Sadrists have favored taking part in the opposition card whereas reaping the advantages from the prevailing political system. Ought to he take part and win, Sadr could endorse a candidate exterior his motion for the prime minister’s place, probably securing high-ranking bureaucratic roles for his allies by way of positions under the deputy minister degree to revitalize his weakened patronage networks. Relying on whether or not Sadr decides to make a shock comeback himself or use his leverage not directly, he could navigate post-election negotiations to beat the blocking-third barrier that had hindered his nationwide unity bloc’s efforts to pick out a parliamentary speaker in 2022. Nonetheless, it stays unclear whether or not Kurdish and Sunni politicians who initially backed Sadr will re-align with him after the abrupt resignation of his candidates from parliament in June 2022 within the unlikely occasion that he opts to endorse an electoral checklist. The management of the Kurdistan Democratic Occasion, comparatively supportive of Sudani, had expressed frustration over his makes an attempt to barter oil offers in the UK with out its consent. Whether or not Nechirvan Barzani and Sudani would handle to keep the oil revenue dispute between the Kurdistan Regional Authorities and Baghdad resolved will thus influence how the Kurdistan Democratic Occasion would react to Sadr’s potential outreach.
On this politically charged atmosphere, figures like Qais al Khazali and his Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq community emerge as key gamers, wielding appreciable affect over Iraq’s electoral politics. Khazali’s community contains the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq Sadiqoun political wing, army brigades registered with the Standard Mobilization Forces, and an array of social and cultural establishments. Their collective capacity to play kingmakers and energy brokers may decide the destiny of Iraq’s ruling coalition main as much as the nationwide elections.
As discussions about important amendments to Iraq’s electoral legislation proceed, Khazali offered readability in a public interview on March 2 relating to his political motion known as al-Sadiqoun. Having beforehand entertained the choice of forming an alliance with elements of the Coordination Framework, Khazali declared that his motion has determined to take part within the upcoming elections with an unbiased checklist of candidates beneath the al-Sadiqoun identify. Earlier, Khazali had implied that the Coordination Framework may field candidates on multiple lists whereas protecting the door open for post-electoral coordination to kind profitable coalitions.
One other key benefit in Khazali’s arsenal is his ties with Bafel Talabani, who views him as a invaluable ally. Their joint efforts through the Dec. 2023 municipal elections considerably bolstered the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s place within the politically contested metropolis of Kirkuk.
Moreover, Khazali had affirmed that Sudani has every right to pursue reelection regardless of Maliki’s endeavors to curb Sudani’s ambitions for reappointment. This implies Khazali will not be solely dismissing the potential of aligning with Sudani if he improves his prospects for a second time period. Notably, earlier than a current eavesdropping scandal implicated members of Sudani’s cupboard in hacking units belonging to distinguished Coordination Framework politicians, together with Khazali himself, each leaders had a mutually beneficial relationship. Sudani relied on Khazali’s affect throughout the Standard Mobilization Forces, whereas Khazali benefited from his affiliation with the prime minister, casting himself as a statesman advocating for Iraqi sovereignty and stability.
Khazali’s partnership with Sudani was strengthened by their mutual rivalry with Maliki. Regardless of showing aligned, Khazali and Maliki have competed for affect over Iraq’s intelligence agency and the Standard Mobilization Forces since Sudani’s premiership. Al-Sudani has additionally labored to distance himself from Maliki, striving to rebrand himself as greater than a normal supervisor of state affairs — a characterization typically leveled in opposition to him in western and Iraqi public discourse.
Even Khazali’s and Maliki’s shared frustration over the eavesdropping scandal — casting doubts on Sudani’s potential complicity — doesn’t presume that the 2 would work collectively to kind a brand new authorities. Thus, it’s no shock that Khazali could think about cooperating with Sudani sooner or later. In a Jan. 11 interview, he emphasised that “the Prime Minister had the proper to hunt a second time period.”
To understand the shifting dynamics, you will need to word that earlier in January, a photo of the three political rivals — Sudani, Maliki, and Khazali — had circulated within the Iraqi media, sparking hypothesis a few potential reconciliation between the three. This doesn’t counsel that efforts to undermine one another’s political prospects will come to a halt.
Maliki has emerged as a key proponent of amending the electoral law to divide provinces into a number of districts. He had been advocating for a clause that might have barred present officeholders from collaborating within the elections except they resign not less than 5 months earlier than the poll date. Whereas many politicians and activists who typically help the multi-district strategy consider it may gain advantage smaller and fewer established political events, some have publicly acknowledged that the present push for amendments could not solely purpose to empower these underdog lists. Moreover, the previous head of the Iraqi Bar Affiliation, Diaa al Saadi, called on the Iraqi legislature to “confront amendments to the electoral legislation if they’re supposed to limit freedom of selection or create obstacles that profit political events or teams.”
Maliki’s issues about Sudani’s electoral prospects are well-founded. Earlier than the eavesdropping scandal, Sudani’s reputation was reportedly gaining momentum, notably following provincial elections the place some observers predicted he may safe not less than 50 seats beneath the modified Sainte-Laguë legislation within the subsequent election. Because the Oct. 7 assault and amidst current energy shifts in Syria and Lebanon, Sudani has emphasised Iraq’s dedication to regional peace and stability. He has promoted the federal government’s effort to carry weapons under state control and to maneuver from a U.S.-led coalition presence to a bilateral security partnership. Whereas visiting Iran and the UK, Sudani reiterated Iraq’s readiness to mediate key regional dialogues between rival powers. Moreover, he ramped up outreach to Gulf companions and neighbors, endorsing a late December go to by Iraqi intelligence chief Hamdi Shatri to Syria, the place Shatri met with the controversial Syrian chief Ahmed al Sharaa. It stays to be seen whether or not Sharaa will attend the Arab League summit in Baghdad in Might 2025 as a consequence of his perceived association with terrorism. Each Khazali and Maliki oppose Sharaa’s participation within the summit.
All these government-backed initiatives counsel that Maliki fears that Sudani, probably allied with the Standard Mobilization Forces’ Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh — who enjoys appreciable reputation amongst a number of Sunni tribal leaders from Ninewa and Anbar — may severely jeopardize Maliki’s plans for the upcoming elections. To counter Fayyadh’s affect, Maliki had once more teamed up with Khazali to push a complete Service and Retirement law for the Popular Mobilization Forces that features setting the retirement age for the drive’s workers at 60, which might mechanically compel Fayyadh to resign because the paramilitary’s chairman.
In the meantime, Maliki should additionally account for the Sadrists’ but unlikely, although not unthinkable, return to the electoral race, knowledgeable by their earlier failed try and kind a majority authorities with Sunni and Kurdish allies. Because of this, Maliki and his allies face a dilemma. Whereas amending the electoral legislation with the proposed clauses may probably diminish Sudani’s prospects, introducing a multi-district distribution could disproportionately profit the Sadrists, who confirmed their adeptness at campaigning and outmaneuvering rivals through the 2021 elections. This raises issues domestically that any modifications designed to weaken Sudani may, in reality, bolster the Sadrists’ possibilities of success within the occasion of a last-minute resolution to reenter the race.
Consequently, the competition to form the electoral legislation forward of the elections will seemingly reveal whether or not Maliki and his allies within the Coordination Framework view Sadr’s motion (be that quickly sidelined), or a rival faction inside their ranks, because the better menace to their state seize. Whatever the election end result, the quota-based muhasasa power-sharing system will present proportional authorities illustration among the many nation’s ethno-sectarian partisan factions. Thus, vote counts hardly ever decide who governs. As an alternative, a ruling coalition emerges from a posh interaction of calculated coercion, incentivization, and behind-the-scenes negotiations. Establishments just like the judiciary could also be weaponized or co-opted to legitimize the positive aspects of sure events whereas abusing the political guidelines to freeze the method.
Relating to the judiciary, Choose Faiq Zaidan’s influence in Shia-dominated politics shouldn’t be ignored. Individuals on the bottom report he’s nonetheless disenchanted with Sudani as a result of eavesdropping scandal, and due to this fact Zaidan may pursue some mode of cooperation with Maliki, in line with our interviews. Nonetheless, Zaidan’s speculated involvement in former Prime Minister Mustafa Kadhimi’s return to nationwide politics nonetheless principally advantages Sudani’s administration, which is raring to leverage Kadhimi’s reported ties with quite a lot of U.S. policymakers to protect Iraq from President Donald Trump’s so-called “most strain marketing campaign” in opposition to Iran. Given Kadhimi’s ties to U.S. intelligence providers as former director of the Iraqi Nationwide Intelligence Service and his attraction to Western policymakers, he may harbor ambitions to be greater than a bargaining chip within the international coverage methods of Iran-aligned events. Kadhimi’s current meeting with Hikma’s leader, Ammar al Hakim, means that Kadhimi could search to align with reasonable, reform-oriented factions resembling Ayad Allawi’s newly introduced Iraqi Nationwide Civil Gathering coalition. That stated, regardless of his curtailed time period as prime minister, Kadhimi — in line with our conversations with political insiders — continues to be seen as a “burned card” with out his personal political base and is due to this fact too weak to defend Iraqi nationwide pursuits in opposition to international — primarily Iranian — strain.
Conclusion
The ramifications of strategic cross-sectarian alliances and partisan maneuvering will considerably form Iraq’s political panorama within the coming months. The flexibility of key gamers, together with Sudani, Maliki, Khazali, and the Sadrists, to navigate this internet of pursuits will decide who emerges not solely profitable within the elections however in controlling the levers of state energy within the aftermath.
As Iraq’s nationwide elections come into focus, the dynamics of ambition, rivalry, and opportunism among the many nation’s partisan factions will unfold in opposition to a backdrop of regional volatility and inside complexities. Whether or not by way of formal alliances or covert sabotage, every faction from throughout the Sunni, Kurdish, and the Shia element will search to safe its place and maintain patronage networks. On this polarized atmosphere, the stakes are unprecedented and the journey to political dominance is fraught with each dangers and alternatives for these keen to navigate the intricate panorama of Iraqi political horse-trading. Predicting Iraqi electoral outcomes and paths for presidency formation is a idiot’s errand, however understanding who the ability gamers are and the way they intend to jockey for place helps clarify the stakes concerned as occasions unfold.
Inna Rudolf, Ph.D., is a senior analysis fellow on the Worldwide Centre for the Research of Radicalization and a postdoctoral analysis fellow on the Centre for the Research of Divided Societies. Inside the Cross-Border Battle Proof, Coverage and Tendencies (XCEPT) consortium, she research identification politics and the mobilization of violent recollections in conflict-affected borderlands. Observe her on X at @inna_veleva.
Douglas A. Ollivant is a former Nationwide Safety Council director for Iraq. He’s a senior fellow at each New America and the International Coverage Analysis Institute. He’s additionally a managing companion at Mantid Worldwide, which has U.S. and Western purchasers in Iraq. Observe him on X at @DouglasOllivant.
Picture: Zoheir Seidanloo through Wikimedia Commons.
