Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter
Might 6, 2025, 7:45 pm ET
Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cell gadget) is strongly really useful for utilizing this data-heavy device.
Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.
Notice: The info cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on Might 6. ISW will cowl subsequent reviews within the Might 7 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.
Ukrainian forces continued restricted assaults throughout the worldwide border close to Tetkino and Novyi Put, Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed on Might 6 that Russian forces repelled the Ukrainian assaults close to Novyi Put and Volfino (southwest of Glushkovo) and that preventing continued close to the railway station in southern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[1] A number of Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces seized as much as two streets in southwestern Tetkino, however ISW has not noticed affirmation of this declare.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that components of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division), and 56th VDV Regiment (seventh VDV Division) are defending close to Tetkino.[3]
Ukrainian forces additionally continued drone, air, and artillery strikes geared toward isolating Russian models in and close to Tetkino. Geolocated footage revealed on Might 6 reveals Ukrainian forces conducting a Joint Direct Assault Munition (JDAM) guided munition strike on a Russian place in southwestern Tetkino, indicating that Russian forces preserve positions close to the Tetkino Railway Station.[4] Russian milbloggers continued to assert that Ukrainian forces are conducting drone and artillery strikes in opposition to Russian floor traces of communication (GLOCs) to isolate Russian models close to Tetkino.[5] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones have interdicted and maintained hearth management over an unspecified part of the 38K-040 Tetkino-Karyzh freeway.[6] Russian milbloggers claimed on Might 5 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a bridge over the Seim River between Zvannoye (northwest of Glushkovo) and Tetkino.[7]
Kremlin officers are persevering with to leverage the mythos of the Soviet Union’s function within the Second World Warfare to type the premise of a brand new state ideology that may span generations and that Russia intends to leverage to justify a future navy battle in opposition to the West. Russian Safety Council Secretary and former Protection Minister Sergei Shoigu revealed an op-ed within the official Russian authorities newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta on Might 6, arguing that navy and political unity in opposition to a typical enemy is Russia’s solely path to a robust and victorious future.[8] Shoigu repeatedly juxtaposed the Pink Military’s defeat of Nazi Germany within the Second World Warfare (known as the Nice Patriotic Warfare in Russia) with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Shoigu extolled the Soviet State Protection Committee’s (an govt governing physique established following Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union) “strictly centralized framework” that ensured efficient coordination and implementation of orders on the frontline and the house entrance. Shoigu said that Russian public consciousness skilled a nationwide identification disaster following the autumn of the Soviet Union and underscored the significance of preserving and strengthening conventional Russian non secular and ethical values to resolve this disaster and type an unofficial Russian state ideology (the Russian structure forbids the adoption of a proper state ideology).[9] Shoigu reiterated Russian narratives designed to justify Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and accused the collective West of making ready for a direct navy battle with Russia and searching for to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia.
The Kremlin seems to be consolidating round a casual state ideology predicated on perpetuating the idea that the West is set to encircle and defeat Russia. The Kremlin is leveraging government-wide initiatives to position veterans of the warfare in Ukraine in positions of energy in Russia and long-term rhetorical campaigns to disseminate the idea that the world is split into two teams (the West and the Russian-led “multipolar world”) searching for to destroy each other — mirroring the Soviet Union’s framing of geopolitics as an existential battle between communism and capitalism.[10] Russia’s evolving casual state ideology contains points of the Soviet Union’s ideology, resembling a robust centralized authorities and a unified notion of the state enemy, however lacks the better justification for why Russia should destroy its enemies.[11] The Kremlin is trying to unify Russian society, notably elites, below this world view with a purpose to make sure that any successor to Russian President Vladimir Putin will embody equally aggressive and harmful beliefs that perpetuate everlasting battle with the West and NATO.
Putin’s envisioned casual state ideology is considerably at odds with that being developed by Russian ultranationalists — considered one of Putin’s key constituencies. Putin is selling a casual state ideology that helps a civic Russian identification and a multiethnic and religiously numerous inhabitants.[12] Russian ultranationalists, whose perspective is usually voiced most clearly by Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin, seem extra inquisitive about an ideology predicated on a Russian state primarily led by and comprised of ethnic Russians that defends and platforms Russian Orthodoxy.[13] Putin is probably going immune to such an ideology because it dangers fragmenting Russia’s multiethnic and religiously-diverse inhabitants and will pose a risk to regime stability. Russian officers are struggling to steadiness placating the more and more influential ultranationalist group with offsetting crucial financial points and labor shortages with migrant labor, and the warfare in Ukraine and a attainable future battle with the West will solely exacerbate these points.[14]
Shoigu additionally underscored the significance of the Kremlin’s improvement of military-patriotic teaching programs — such because the Volunteer Society for Help to the Military, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF), Yunarmiya, and the Russian Army Historic Society — and famous that they’re designed to arrange Russian residents for navy service.[15] ISW has lengthy reported on the Kremlin’s efforts to centralize management over and broaden multi-generational youth applications as a part of Russia’s long-term drive era efforts and multi-pronged efforts to militarize Russian society.[16] The Kremlin might intend to leverage these military-patriotic teaching programs to workshop a future state ideology and socialize Russian residents to this ideology from a younger age.
Russian officers additionally seem like leveraging the story of the Second World Warfare (known as the Nice Patriotic Warfare in Russia) to dismiss Russia’s early failures within the warfare in Ukraine and current the false picture that Russian victory in Ukraine is as inevitable because the Soviet overcome Germany grew to become on the finish of World Warfare II. Shoigu famous within the Might 6 article that the Soviet Union made “errors” when planning for a warfare with Nazi Germany, together with failing to correctly equip and handle Soviet troops, and suffered from poor strategic planning and ineffective navy doctrine.[17] Shoigu claimed that Nazi Germany was capable of exploit these errors to make important advances early within the warfare (to the gates of Moscow, in truth), however that the Soviet Union was capable of enhance its capabilities and mobilize society to help an eventual victory. Shoigu’s article notably ignores the function that the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, which Joseph Stalin used to grab the Baltic States and a part of Poland whereas Adolf Hitler invaded the remainder of Poland in 1939, performed in Stalin’s unwillingness to arrange for warfare with Nazi Germany. Shoigu’s feedback are possible an try to make use of references to the Second World Warfare to tacitly acknowledge the Russian navy’s shortcomings at the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, for which Shoigu was to a substantial extent accountable as Protection Minister. Shoigu’s retelling of the Second World Warfare mirrors Russia’s unpreparedness for a protracted warfare at the beginning of the full-scale invasion and important setbacks in 2022 when Ukraine pressured the Russian navy to withdraw from round Kyiv and from northern Ukraine and liberated important swathes of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts. Shoigu can also be trying to attract parallels to the Second World Warfare to border the Russian navy as having secured the everlasting initiative on the battlefield and painting a Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable to each the worldwide group and the home Russian populace. Shoigu is probably going trying to attract on the mythos of the Second World Warfare to sign to home audiences that Russian victory is close to and requires united societal help, regardless that Russia has no important battlefield successes to flaunt on Victory Day 2025.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov expressed his want to resign from his publish however acknowledged that solely Russian President Vladimir Putin can approve this request. Kadyrov has helped stabilize interethnic tensions within the North Caucasus, and leaving his publish with out a appropriate successor might threaten the steadiness of Putin’s regime. Kadyrov instructed Chechen information outlet Chechnya Segodnya on Might 5, in response to rumors of his resignation, that he requested to be “relieved” from his publish as Chechen Republic head and hopes that his request “might be supported” however that unspecified others “can have their very own initiatives, their very own imaginative and prescient.”[18] Kadyrov said on his Telegram channel on Might 6 that “many” misunderstood his Might 5 assertion and clarified that solely Putin can determine whether or not Kadyrov can depart his publish and that Kadyrov can solely ask to depart or supply his resignation.[19] Kadyrov emphasised that he’s a “group man” and can observe Putin’s orders, implying that he’ll retain his publish if that’s what Putin decides.[20] It’s at the moment unclear how severe Kadyrov is about this request, as Kadyrov has periodically expressed his want to resign as Chechen Republic head since 2016 and has constantly walked again these statements.[21]
Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on March 27, citing a supply within the Russian Federal Safety Service (FSB), that Kadyrov’s relations with Putin have deteriorated in latest months as Putin was displeased with Kadyrov’s “frequent and uncoordinated negotiations” with monarchies in Center Jap international locations.[22] One supply instructed investigative outlet Novaya Gazeta that Kadyrov helped Putin negotiate with Qatar in regards to the destiny of Russian navy bases in Syria and that Kadyrov “carried out much more delicate orders from the Kremlin” within the Center East, nonetheless.[23] Kadyrov has acted as a stabilizer throughout the Chechen Republic and elsewhere within the North Caucasus throughout notably tense moments because the early 2000s, notably moments that might pose threats to the steadiness of Putin’s regime.[24] Kadyrov’s dying or departure from workplace, ought to it happen throughout or instantly after the warfare in Ukraine, might depart Putin’s pursuits within the North Caucasus unguarded except Kadyrov and Putin appoint an appropriate successor.
It stays unclear who would possibly succeed Kadyrov within the occasion of his resignation or dying. Novaya Gazeta reported on Might 5, citing a Russian Telegram channel and a number of other different sources conversant in the matter, that Kadyrov has “modified priorities” and spent a whole lot of time receiving well being remedy and largely delegated his exterior engagements since February 2025.[25] Novaya Gazeta reported that Kadyrov’s daughter and former Chechen Deputy Prime Minister and Tradition Minister Aishat Kadyrova abruptly resigned in early February 2025 and that sources within the Chechen authorities reported that Kadyrov’s different two daughters, Khutmat and Khadizhat Kadyrova, additionally stopped working in civil service positions on the similar time. Novaya Gazeta reported that Aishat Kadyrova travelled to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in late February 2025 to determine funding alternatives for the Kadyrov household within the wake of Kadyrov’s reportedly declining well being.
Novaya Gazeta reported that solely two of Kadyrov’s 14 kids “play a big function” in Kadyrov’s future plans: 26-year-old Aishat Kadyrova and 17-year-old Adam Kadyrov.[26] A Novaya Gazeta supply reported that Kadyrov wouldn’t have “had the headache of appointing a successor” if “Aishat [Kadyrova] had been born a person,” given Aishat’s success in political and enterprise roles. Novaya Gazeta reported that Kadyrov has positioned Adam Kadyrov as his apparent successor, together with by instructing Chechen officers to deal with Adam as Kadyrov’s principal inheritor. ISW has beforehand noticed reviews of Kadyrov giving favorable appointments to Adam, arranging conferences between Adam and Putin, and showing to desire him as inheritor over his elder son, Akhmat Kadyrov.[27] Adam Kadyrov famously stoked interethnic tensions after footage emerged in September 2023 of Adam beating a detained man accused of burning a Quran, an act which Ramzan Kadyrov praised and subsequently rewarded.[28]
Ukraine and Russia performed a 205-for-205 prisoner of warfare (POW) alternate on Might 6. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on Might 6 that Ukrainian authorities returned 205 Ukrainian POWs, comprising members of virtually all branches of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[29] Zelensky thanked the United Arab Emirates for mediating the POW alternate with Russia. The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) additionally reported on Might 6 that Russia and Ukraine performed a 205-for-205 POW alternate.[30]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces continued restricted assaults throughout the worldwide border close to Tetkino and Novyi Put, Kursk Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces additionally continued drone, air, and artillery strikes geared toward isolating Russian models in and close to Tetkino.
- Kremlin officers are persevering with to leverage the mythos of the Soviet Union’s function within the Second World Warfare to type the premise of a brand new state ideology that may span generations and that Russia intends to leverage to justify a future navy battle in opposition to the West.
- The Kremlin seems to be consolidating round a casual state ideology predicated on perpetuating the idea that the West is set to encircle and defeat Russia.
- Russian officers additionally seem like leveraging the story of the Second World Warfare (known as the Nice Patriotic Warfare in Russia) to dismiss Russia’s early failures within the warfare in Ukraine and current the false picture that Russian victory in Ukraine is as inevitable because the Soviet overcome Germany grew to become on the finish of World Warfare II.
- Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov expressed his want to resign from his publish however acknowledged that solely Russian President Vladimir Putin can approve this request. Kadyrov has helped stabilize interethnic tensions within the North Caucasus, and leaving his publish with out a appropriate successor might threaten the steadiness of Putin’s regime.
- It stays unclear who would possibly succeed Kadyrov within the occasion of his resignation or dying.
- Ukraine and Russia performed a 205-for-205 prisoner of warfare (POW) alternate on Might 6.
- Russian forces superior close to Kupyansk, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.
We don’t report intimately on Russian warfare crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t straight have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those felony actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes in opposition to humanity regardless that we don’t describe them in these reviews.
- Alleged Ceasefire Violation
- Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Major Effort – Jap Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate principal efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis
- Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
- Vital Exercise in Belarus
Alleged Ceasefire Violations
There are not any lively ceasefires in Ukraine.
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
See topline textual content for updates in Kursk Oblast.
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces preserve restricted positions in northwestern Belgorod Oblast close to Demidovka on Might 5.[31]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the first Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Russian thirty fourth Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty ninth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly placing Ukrainian forces close to Demidovka.[32]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Sumy Metropolis)
Russian forces continued restricted offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on Might 6 however didn’t advance.
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Sumy Metropolis towards Bilovody and Loknya.[33]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and drone operators of the 83rd VDV Brigade are reportedly working within the Sumy route.[34]
Russian Major Effort – Jap Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk on Might 5 and 6 however didn’t advance.[35]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces superior within the Kupyansk route, however this advance is probably going not latest.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on Might 5 signifies that Russian forces superior within the fields west of Kyslivka (southeast of Kupyansk), possible in late March or early April 2025.[36]
Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka and southeast of Kupyansk close to Stepova Novoselivka and Hlushkivka and towards Novoosynove on Might 5 and 6.[37]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Kontora” Detachment of the 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (forty seventh Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Military [GTA], Moscow Army District [MMD]) are reportedly working within the Kupyansk route.[38]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova route on Might 6 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova close to Zahryzove and southeast of Borova close to Novoserhiivka and Hrekivka on Might 5 and 6.[39]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Lyman route on Might 6 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Lyman close to Olhivka, Ridkodub, Lypove, Novy Mir, Novomykhailivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Nove, and northeast of Lyman close to Kolodyazi, Torske, and Myrne on Might 5 and 6.[40]
Order of Battle: Artillery components of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz “Shram” Group are working within the Serebryanske forest space (southeast of Lyman).[41]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk route on Might 6 however didn’t make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally superior north of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[42]
A Russian milblogger claimed on Might 6 that Russian forces attacked southwest of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk) and that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Hryhorivka.[43]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar route on Might 6 however didn’t make any confirmed advances.
Russian forces attacked close to Chasiv Yar, south of Chasiv Yar close to Bila Hora, and southeast of Chasiv Yar close to Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka on Might 5 and 6.[44]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 78th “Sever-Akhmat” Motorized Rifle Regiment (forty second Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly working close to Chasiv Yar.[45] Drone operators of the Russian 2 hundredth Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions close to Mykolaivka (west of Chasiv Yar).[46]
Russian forces just lately superior within the Toretsk route.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on Might 4 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior alongside Berehova Road in jap Novospaske (previously Petrivka, west of Toretsk).[47] Geolocated footage revealed on Might 6 signifies that Russian forces marginally superior north of Toretsk.[48]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior close to Tarasivka (southwest of Toretsk) and Novoolenivka (west of Toretsk).[49]
Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk; north of Toretsk close to Dachne, Dyliivka, and Krymske; southwest of Toretsk close to Romanivka, Stara Mykolaivka, Nova Poltavka, Malynivka, Myrolyubivka, Sukha Balka, Stara Mykolaivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Kalynove; and west of Toretsk close to Novoolenivka on Might 5 and 6.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Tarasivka.[51]
A Russian milbloggers claimed on Might 5 that Russian forces have just lately intensified guided glide bomb strikes in opposition to Kostyantynivka.[52] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z teacher claimed that Russian forces have elevated the accuracy of guided glide bomb strikes within the space, with roughly 60 p.c of the glide bombs reaching their targets.[53]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Pokrovsk route on Might 6 however didn’t make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed on Might 6 that Russian forces, together with components of the 137th Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty first CAA, Central Army District [CMD]), seized Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior close to Malynivka (east of Pokrovsk) and in jap Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[55]
Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk close to Novotoretske; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka and Promin; south of Pokrovsk close to Shevchenko and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Kotlyne and Udachne on Might 5 and 6.[56]
The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned techniques battalion working within the Pokrovsk route said on Might 6 that Russian forces have began driving a lot quicker on bikes in off-road areas, indicating that the Russian navy has possible began coaching its troops to make use of bikes higher.[57]
Russian forces have possible just lately intensified long-range Shahed drone strikes in opposition to Ukrainian near-rear areas. The Russian MoD claimed on Might 6 that Russian forces performed a Shahed-136 strike on Ukrainian forces in Volodymyrivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[58] The Russian MoD equally claimed on Might 5 that Russian forces performed a Shahed-136 strike on a Ukrainian ammunition depot in Kramatorsk (northwest of Chasiv Yar).[59]
Russian forces just lately superior within the Novopavlivka route.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on Might 6 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior alongside the Solona River south of Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[60]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Kotlyarivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[61]
Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Novopavlivka close to Novoserhiivka, Uspenivka, and Novooleksandrivka and towards Muravka; east of Novopavlivka close to Kotlyarivka, Sribne, and Troitske; and southeast of Novopavlivka close to Bohdanivka on Might 5 and 6.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Novooleksandrivka.[63]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces just lately struck a bridge over the Solona River alongside the T-0428 Andriivka-Mezhova freeway in Novopavlivka.[64]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kurakhove route on Might 6 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces continued assaults west of Kurakhove close to Andriivka and Kostyantynopil and within the route of Bahatyr on Might 5 and 6.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Bahatyr.[66]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk Individuals’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly working close to Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove).[67]
Russian forces just lately superior within the Velyka Novosilka route.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on Might 4 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior in central Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and north of Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka) throughout a collection of huge motorbike assaults within the space on Might 3 and 4.[68] Ukrainian sources reported on Might 4 that Ukrainian forces destroyed 70 bikes in the course of the assaults.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that components of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, fifth CAA, Jap Army District [EMD]) participated within the advance close to Novosilka.[70]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior to the outskirts of Zelene Pole and Novopil (west of Velyka Novosilka).[71] One other Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior to the outskirts of Odradne (north of Velyka Novosilka) and are leveraging elevated cowl from new foliage to make extra speedy advances within the space.[72]
Russian forces continued assaults north of Velyka Novosilka close to Vesele and within the route of Odradne and Komar; northwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Burlatske, Vilne Pole, Pryvilne, and Shevchenko; west of Velyka Novosilka close to Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Rivnopil and Novopil on Might 5 and 6.[73]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (fifth CAA, EMD) reportedly struck Ukrainian forces close to Vilne Pole.[74]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Keep frontline positions, safe rear areas in opposition to Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)
Russian forces performed offensive operations east of Hulyaipole close to Vysoke (previously Chervone) on Might 5 and 6 however didn’t advance.[75]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on Might 6 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior west of Mali Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv).[76]
Russian forces performed floor assaults south of Orikhiv in direction of Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv close to Stepove; and west of Orikhiv close to Mali Shcherbaky and Kamyanske and in direction of Novoandriivka on Might 5 and 6.[77]
Ukrainian sources reported on Might 6 that Russian forces are conducting motorbike assaults extra regularly as a result of terrain within the Zaporizhia route and that Russian forces are utilizing a ”wave” tactic of sending 4 to 5 bikes to search out gaps in Ukrainian defenses after which following up with dismounted infantry to consolidate positions.[78]
Ukrainian State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate Head Oleh Korikov reported that Russian forces are blocking the work of the Worldwide Atomic Vitality Company’s (IAEA) monitoring mission on the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant (ZNPP).[79] Korikov famous that the ZNPP lacks a dependable water provide, an exterior energy provide, certified personnel, correct upkeep of security techniques, and any warning, radiation monitoring, or emergency preparedness techniques.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1251st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the forty second Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly working within the Orikhiv route, and drone operators of the “Nemets” drone group (291st Motorized Rifle Regiment, forty second Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly working within the Zaporizhia route.[80]
Russian forces performed restricted offensive operations within the Kherson route on Might 6 however didn’t advance.[81]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces performed a collection of drone strikes in opposition to Ukraine on the evening of Might 5 to six. The Ukrainian Air Drive reported on Might 6 that Russian forces launched 136 Shahed and different drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Prymorsk, Zaporizhia Oblast.[82] The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Ukrainian forces downed 54 drones over Ukraine and that 70 drones have been ”misplaced,” possible on account of Ukrainian digital warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian sources reported that the strikes broken civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa oblasts and killed one civilian in Odesa Oblast.[83]
Vital exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing important to report.
Notice: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorised materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly accessible data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially accessible satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the premise for these reviews. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.
[1] https://t.me/wargonzo/26343 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26357 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22786 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22783 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70616 ; https://t.me/control_sigma/41532 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70647 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23211 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/21177 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91226 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91229 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23217
[2] https://t.me/notes_veterans/23217 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35466
[3] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35416 ; https://t.me/divannyevoini/14950 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91182 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91170 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91229 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91226
[4] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27965 ; https://t.me/soniah_hub/10365
[5] https://t.me/yurasumy/22783 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/21170 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2025
[6] https://t.me/wargonzo/26357
[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2025 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70607
[8] https://rg dot ru/2025/05/06/eto-nasha-pobeda.html
[9] http://en.kremlin dot ru/acts/information/69810 ; http://kremlin dot ru/acts/information/69810
[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2025 ; https://isw.pub/RussianForceGen042325 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-30-2025
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024
[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0
[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025
[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2024
[15] https://rg dot ru/2025/05/06/eto-nasha-pobeda.html
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2024
[17] https://rg dot ru/2025/05/06/eto-nasha-pobeda.html ; https://t.me/tass_agency/313484
[18] https://chechnyatoday dot com/information/385072
[19] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5700
[20] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5700
[21] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/06/05/2025/6819ff4d9a7947b627111f9e; https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/2025/05/06/20993624.shtml; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2022/09/04/939111-ramzan-kadirov-zayavil-o-vozmozhnosti; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/information/2025/05/06/1108636-kadirov-poprosil
[22] https://istories dot media/information/2025/03/27/kadirov-vstupil-v-konflikt-s-kremlem-govoryat-istochniki-vazhnikh-istorii/?tztc=1
[23] https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2025/05/05/vozvrashchenie-molodogo-ramzana
[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2024; https://kyivindependent dot com/30-years-since-start-of-first-chechen-war-kadyrovs-chechnya-remains-one-of-most-brutal-places-on-earth/; https://neweasterneurope dot eu/2024/12/15/chechnyas-instability-implications-for-russia-and-the-eu/; https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2010/11/north-caucasus-of-the-bizarre?lang=en
[25] https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2025/05/05/vozvrashchenie-molodogo-ramzana
[26] https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2025/05/05/vozvrashchenie-molodogo-ramzana
[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2024
[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2023
[29] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/standing/1919732905833599419 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/standing/1919732742004105216 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14109
[30] https://t.me/mod_russia/52193 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52189
[31] https://t.me/rybar/70153; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28107
[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28107
[33] https://t.me/dva_majors/70607
[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28106; https://t.me/rusich_army/23189
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449
[36] https://x.com/giK1893/standing/1919660584229888015; https://t.me/rubak112/245
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899
[38] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163702
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901
[41] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5698
[42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163685
[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35465
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26343 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163628
[45] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5699
[46] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163676
[47] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27935 ; https://t.me/azov_media/6790
[48] https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1919639459231908009
[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/70607 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163685 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28154 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22782 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163628
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28154 ; https://t.me/rybar/70153
[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28154
[52] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163628 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2352
[53] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2352
[54] https://t.me/mod_russia/52179 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52180 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52184
[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28101 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163685 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28154
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449
[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/06/ye-motoczykly-z-yakyh-shhe-ne-vstygly-plivku-zderty-poblyzu-pokrovska-dronari-aktyvno-zakryvayut-vorozhyj-motosezon/
[58] https://t.me/mod_russia/52177
[59] https://t.me/mod_russia/52135
[60] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27953; https://t.me/gostrikartuzy/944
[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35440 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22779 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28157
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91161 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35414
[63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35414
[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91193 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163709
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64022 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26343
[66] https://t.me/dva_majors/70607 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26343
[67] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13769
[68] https://t.me/AFUStratCom/29285 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27934
[69] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/04/minus-70-motoczykliv-za-dobu-zsu-kosyat-vidchajdushni-moto-shturmy-rf-na-shlyahu-do-dnipropetrovshhyny/ ; https://www.fb.com/watch/?v=2747959232260454&rdid=iuAqmdX8AhTjdkr8 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/05/motoczykletnyj-bliczkryg-zahlynuvsya-syly-oborony-spalyly-blyzko-70-vorozhyh-bajkiv-pid-chas-odnogo-shturmu/
[70] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35415 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35468
[71] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64019
[72] https://t.me/yurasumy/22778
[73] https://t.me/readovkanews/95967; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449
[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/14757
[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899
[76] https://t.me/dva_majors/70607
[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899
[78] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/06/taktyka-hvyl-i-avos-na-pivdni-prodovzhuyetsya-masova-utylizacziya-vorozhogo-motozaliza/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/06/bajk-shou-v-zaporizkyh-stepah-vorog-jde-vpered-motoczykletnymy-nakatamy/
[79] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1011425-vidsutni-nadijne-vodozabezpecenna-ta-stabilne-zovnisne-elektropostacanna-oleg-korikov-pro-situaciu-na-zaes/; https://snriu.gov dot ua/information/holova-derzhatomrehuliuvannia-u-onlain-formati-vziav-uchast-v-cherhovomu-zasidanni-mizhnarodnoi-asotsiatsii-iadernykh-rehuliatoriv-inra
[80] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35439 ; https://t.me/ZS42MSD/2963; https://t.me/dva_majors/70602
[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951
[82] https://t.me/kpszsu/33942
[83] https://t.me/kpszsu/33942; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2494 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14152; https://x.com/SESU_UA/standing/1919653735417946230; https://t.me/synegubov/14154; https://t.me/synegubov/14160 ; https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/05/06/u-harkovi-vnaslidok-udaru-po- dot ynku-barabashovo-poshkodzheno-blyzko-90-torgivelnyh-obpercentcapercentbcyektiv/; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/19626; https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02KnP5U5sp4hCMX6w5eeEiySdC56qR6dhoRjsbtaYGgR9hQbLBArD24pe8398vMSCSl; https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/29905; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/06/na-odeshhyni-cherez-rosijski-obstrily-zagynula-lyudyna/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/9554
