Anna Harvey, Olivia Gibson, Nate Trotter, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan
Might 25, 2025, 8:00 pm ET
Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date every day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cell machine) is strongly beneficial for utilizing this data-heavy device.
Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces every day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.
Word: The information cut-off for this product was 12:00 pm ET on Might 25. ISW will cowl subsequent reviews within the Might 26 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is leveraging long-range strikes towards Ukrainian cities, aggressive rhetorical campaigns, and extreme pessimism within the West concerning the battlefield scenario in Ukraine in a multi-pronged effort to degrade Ukrainian morale and persuade the West {that a} Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and that supporting Ukraine is futile. Russian forces have intensified long-range strikes towards Ukraine during the last eight months and have carried out seven of the biggest drone and missile strikes in the course of the warfare thus far since January 2025.[1] Russian officers are presently inundating the data area with requires Ukraine to make concessions on its sovereignty and territorial integrity, though most of those statements are per long-standing Russian warfare calls for and in reality display that Russia’s calls for haven’t modified during the last three years of warfare.[2] These calls for ignore the truth that the battlefield scenario has shifted dramatically since early 2022, and that three years of manpower and materiel losses have considerably degraded the Russian army’s potential to beat Ukraine. Russian advances have considerably slowed as Russian forces proceed to undergo personnel losses and more and more depend on poorly skilled and geared up infantry to make positive factors. Putin stays deeply dedicated to distracting from the realities of the battlefield scenario, nevertheless, as bringing concerning the cessation of Western army help to Ukraine is Russia’s solely actual hope of profitable this warfare.
Russian forces carried out the biggest mixed drone and missile strike of the warfare towards Ukraine on the evening of Might 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Power reported on Might 25 that Russian forces launched 9 Iskander-M and Kn-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk Oblast, 55 Kh-101 and Kalibr cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast and the Black Sea, one Kh-22 cruise missile from the airspace over the Black Sea, and 4 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from an unspecified space of Russia and 298 Shahed and decoy drones from the route of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[3] The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 45 cruise missiles and that two Kh-59/69 missiles had been “misplaced in location.” The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Ukraine shot down 139 drones and that 127 drones had been “misplaced.” Ukrainian officers reported that the Russian strike primarily focused Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts and likewise focused Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, Sumy, Odesa, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, and Cherkasy oblasts.[4] Ukrainian officers reported that the strikes killed at the very least 12 folks and injured as much as 60 folks.[5]
Ukrainian sources famous on Might 25 that Russian forces are more and more launching missiles from occupied Crimea after utilizing missiles much less steadily during the last 5 months.[6] Ukrainian Important Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Chernyak reported that Russian forces have launched greater than 50 missiles from cell missile techniques in occupied Crimea since January 1, 2025. Chernyak acknowledged that Ukrainian Forces battle to strike the cell missile launch techniques since Russian forces can deploy the techniques in 20 minutes and shortly break down and transfer the techniques after a launch. Consultants aware of the subject reported that Russian forces have been launching Iskander ballistic missiles, Oniks supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, and Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles from Crimea. ISW assessed on Might 24 that Russian forces have used fewer cruise missiles in strike packages since January 2025, possible resulting from elevated reliance on cheaper long-range drones.[7] The Might 24 to 25 in a single day mixed strike signifies that Russia could also be stockpiling cruise missiles with the intention to conduct large-scale mixed strikes towards a number of areas of Ukraine at will. Russia may additionally be utilizing extremely assorted strike packages with the intention to confuse Ukrainian forces and forestall Ukrainian forces from conducting persistently efficient air protection.
Russian Safety Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev steered that Russia will occupy most of Ukraine if the West continues to help Ukraine. Medvedev known as for Russian management over a buffer zone encompassing almost all of Ukraine, aside from a comparatively small space of Volyn and Lviv oblasts alongside Poland’s border, on his English-language social media accounts on Might 25 and threatened that Russia will seize nearly all of Ukraine as a buffer zone if the West continues to produce Ukraine with army assist.[8] Medvedev and different Russian officers have repeatedly known as for Russia to ascertain buffer zones in northern Ukraine, and Medvedev himself beforehand known as for Russia to occupy most of Ukraine as a “buffer zone” with the intention to place Russian cities out of the vary of Ukraine’s Western-provided long-range strike techniques. Russian officers routinely problem calls for for Ukraine to concede important swaths of occupied and unoccupied territory to Russia and have used Russia’s unlawful annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea and the Kremlin-generated idea of “Novorossiya” — an invented area of Ukraine that Kremlin officers have claimed contains all southern and jap Ukraine — to justify these claims.[9] Medvedev’s statements are a part of a long-term Kremlin technique to make use of outstanding voices within the data area and weaponized variations of historical past to justify Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine and the long-term occupation of Ukrainian territory.[10]
The Kremlin is trying to leverage giant strike packages and more and more aggressive rhetorical efforts to distract from the Russian army’s poor efficiency throughout this present stage of the warfare. Putin might assess that important strikes towards Ukrainian cities and aggressive Russian rhetoric towards NATO and Jap European states will draw enough consideration away from Russia’s sluggish, grinding advances in jap Ukraine. ISW has beforehand famous that Russia has intensified its narrative efforts towards Ukraine throughout important moments when the West is discussing supplying Ukraine with extra army assist, and Putin possible views the present dialogue of a doable ceasefire or peace settlement to finish the warfare as one other important second amongst Ukraine’s supporters.[11] Putin possible intends long-range strikes and aggressive rhetoric to generate emotions of hopelessness in Ukraine and the West and dissuade European capitals and the US from additional aiding Ukraine by falsely portraying Russian victory as inevitable. Russia can also be platforming its partnerships with adversarial nations such because the Individuals’s Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and North Korea to push again on the looks of diplomatic isolation and posture itself as a rustic with highly effective allies who’re prepared to face towards the West.
Russian officers try to obfuscate the truth of Russia’s compounding financial and materiel constraints, that are more and more hindering Russia’s potential to attain important battlefield positive factors. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Basic Oleksandr Syrskyi not too long ago reported that Russian forces have suffered 177,000 casualties in Ukraine for the reason that begin of 2025, and ISW continues to evaluate that Russia has prioritized quickly deploying low high quality troops with minimal coaching and battlefield expertise for marginal positive factors, which additional complicates Russian forces’ potential to conduct advanced operations.[12] Russia’s protection industrial base (DIB) can not produce armored automobiles and artillery techniques at charges that will offset Russia’s present tempo of losses within the medium- to long-term.[13] Russia can also be going through important challenges in balancing useful resource allocation between protection industrial manufacturing and civilian sectors, and is more and more counting on migrant employees to alleviate important labor shortages exacerbated by the warfare effort.[14] The Kremlin could also be reassessing its potential to maintain a long-term warfare effort and seems to be reprioritizing its efforts to persuade the West to preemptively concede to Russian calls for in gentle of Russia’s financial and army constraints.
Russian forces have eradicated the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk after a four-month-long offensive operation to stage the frontline south and southwest of Kostyantynivka with the intention to set circumstances to advance in the direction of the settlement. Geolocated footage revealed on Might 25 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago superior in central Zorya and northern Romanivka (west of Toretsk) and certain seized Stara Mykolaivka and Hnativka and the fields south of Romanivka.[15] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Romanivka, and Russian milbloggers claimed that parts of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (a hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division, sixth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Leningrad Navy District [LMD]) participated within the advance north of Romanivka.[16] One other Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked within the northern outskirts of Romanivka.[17] ISW assesses that Russian forces seized roughly 65 sq. kilometers of territory as a part of their advance into Romanivka and Zorya, though Ukrainian forces possible beforehand withdrew from positions within the southern a part of this pocket a number of days or even weeks in the past.
Russian forces intensified assaults on this space in early February 2025 and started a concerted effort to remove Ukrainian positions within the pocket south of Romanivka in late April 2025.[18] The Russian army command redeployed parts of two divisions of the eighth Mixed Arms Military (CAA) (Southern Navy District [SMD]) from the Kurakhove route to the Toretsk route in mid-February and parts of the 58th CAA (SMD) and 68th Military Corps (AC) (Jap Navy District [EMD]) from the western Zaporizhia and Kurakhove instructions respectively to this space in early Might.[19] Russian forces have struggled to advance on this space, nevertheless, regardless of showing to prioritize this sector of the frontline and reinforcing this space in early 2025.
Russian forces would want roughly a century to grab Medvedev’s proposed “buffer zone” at their present charge of advance at the price of almost 50 million casualties at present loss charges. Russian forces superior a mean of roughly 14.3 sq. kilometers per day in Ukraine and Russia between January 1, 2025, and Might 24, 2025. At this charge of advance, it could take Russian forces roughly 3.9 years to grab the rest of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and roughly 91 years to grab Medvedev’s proposed “buffer zone,” which incorporates 587,459 sq. kilometers of Ukrainian territory. ISW assessed on February 21 that Russia would want 83 years to seize the remaining 80 p.c of Ukraine at their then charge of advance, indicating that the Russian charge of advance has slowed between February and Might 2025.[20] Present and former Western officers advised the Washington Submit in an article revealed on Might 24 that Russian forces have sustained a mean of 1,500 casualties per day during the last 12 months (since mid-2024), suggesting that Russian forces might undergo almost 50 million casualties (roughly a 3rd of the present Russian inhabitants) had been Russian forces to maintain their present casualty charge for the 91 years that it could take to create Medvedev’s “buffer zone.”[21]
These estimates assume that Russian forces will be capable to keep their present assessed charge of advance and don’t have in mind plenty of geographic and defensive obstacles that Russian forces must overcome to grab the remaining 80 p.c of Ukraine. Russian forces would want to grab Ukraine’s fortress belt (a bunch of main cities that kind a major defensive belt in Donetsk Oblast); cross the Dnipro River and retake Kherson Metropolis in Kherson Oblast; conduct a touchdown operation within the Black Sea to realize positions in Odesa Oblast; and retake Sumy and Kharkiv cities and seize Kyiv and different main cities in central and western Ukraine earlier than seizing Medvedev’s “buffer zone.” The Dnipro River acts as a pure barrier between present Ukrainian positions and Russian positions in Kherson Oblast and has served as a pure frontline since Ukraine retook Kherson Oblast in 2022. Russian forces failed to perform many of those targets in the course of the first a number of months of the warfare, and Russian forces haven’t seized a significant city space since they seized Bakhmut in Might 2023.[22] Russian forces haven’t demonstrated the flexibility to conduct the sort of fast, multi-directional offensive operations vital to perform these targets since early 2022 and are unlikely to considerably enhance their talents within the close to future provided that advancing roughly 65 sq. kilometers constitutes a major success in a precedence frontline space at this stage of the warfare.
The Kremlin can also be utilizing its bilateral engagements with Ukraine and america to take care of the looks of being interested by peace and delay Western dialogue of extra assist to Ukraine. Ukraine and Russia concluded the 1,000-for-1,000 prisoner of warfare (POWs) change on Might 25, every exchanging 303 servicemembers.[23] Russian Deputy Protection Minister Alexander Fomin acknowledged that Russia expects the POW change to ascertain “a good environment for discussing a settlement” to Russia’s warfare in Ukraine.[24] Russian officers are framing Russia’s participation within the POW change and bilateral negotiations with Ukraine in Istanbul as indicators that Russia is interested by peace.[25] The Kremlin is clearly trying to painting Russia as amenable to negotiations regardless of Russian officers’ constant public statements about Russia’s unwillingness to have interaction in ceasefire discussions or compromise on any settlement in need of Ukraine’s capitulation.
Russia’s solely actual hope of profitable this warfare is to persuade the West to desert Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin stays dedicated to his concept of victory, which assumes that the Russian army will be capable to maintain important personnel losses in change for incremental positive factors in Ukraine indefinitely and that Russia will be capable to outlast Western help for Ukraine.[26] Putin is subsequently desperately in search of to stop the long run provide of Western army assist to Ukraine, as well-resourced Ukrainian forces have persistently demonstrated their potential to inflict unsustainable losses on Russian forces and defend towards important Russian advances.[27] ISW assesses that Western assist stays very important to Ukraine’s potential to defend itself towards Russian aggression and is essential for guaranteeing a simply and enduring peace in Ukraine and long-term safety in Europe.[28]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin is leveraging long-range strikes towards Ukrainian cities, aggressive rhetorical campaigns, and extreme pessimism within the West concerning the battlefield scenario in Ukraine in a multi-pronged effort to degrade Ukrainian morale and persuade the West {that a} Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and that supporting Ukraine is futile.
- Russian forces carried out the biggest mixed drone and missile strike of the warfare towards Ukraine on the evening of Might 24 to 25.
- Russian Safety Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev steered that Russia will occupy most of Ukraine if the West continues to help Ukraine.
- The Kremlin is trying to leverage giant strike packages and more and more aggressive rhetorical efforts to distract from the Russian army’s poor efficiency throughout this present stage of the warfare.
- Russian forces have eradicated the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk after a four-month-long offensive operation to stage the frontline south and southwest of Kostyantynivka with the intention to set circumstances to advance in the direction of the settlement.
- Russian forces would want roughly a century to grab Medvedev’s proposed “buffer zone” at their present charge of advance at the price of almost 50 million casualties at present loss charges.
- The Kremlin can also be utilizing its bilateral engagements with Ukraine and america to take care of the looks of being interested by peace and delay Western dialogue of extra assist to Ukraine.
- Russia’s solely actual hope of profitable this warfare is to persuade the West to desert Ukraine.
- Russian forces not too long ago superior in Kursk Oblast and close to Kharkiv, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk.
We don’t report intimately on Russian warfare crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t instantly have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We’ll proceed to judge and report on the results of those felony actions on the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity though we don’t describe them in these reviews.
- Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Important Effort – Jap Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate most important efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Important Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis
- Russian Subordinate Important Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Important Effort #3 – Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and presumably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
- Important Exercise in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian forces not too long ago superior in Kursk Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on Might 25 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago marginally superior in western Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[29]
Restricted preventing continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on Might 24 and 25.[30]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (seventh VDV Division) reportedly proceed to function close to Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[31]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported floor exercise in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on Might 25.
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Sumy Metropolis)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on Might 25 however didn’t make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Bilovody and superior into Yunakivka (each northeast of Sumy Metropolis).[32]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Yunakivka and Bilovody on Might 25.[33]
Russian Northern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Yaroslav Yakimkin claimed on Might 25 that Russian forces are working to ascertain a “safety zone” alongside the worldwide border in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[34]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (seventh VDV Division), and 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly working within the Sumy Oblast border space.[35] Components of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly attacking within the route of Myropillia (northeast of Sumy Metropolis).[36]
Russian Important Effort – Jap Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Important Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)
Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Kharkiv route.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on Might 24 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Vovchansk Combination Plant in northern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis).[37]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on Might 24 and 25.[38]
Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Main Viktor Trehubov acknowledged on Might 25 that Russia has had a big pressure grouping alongside the worldwide border with northern Kharkiv Oblast for the reason that starting of the full-scale invasion, however that Russian forces try to cross the border in new areas.[39] ISW beforehand assessed that the Russian army command might intend to make use of a number of the Russian pressure grouping in Kursk Oblast to accentuate offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[40]
Russian Subordinate Important Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk route on Might 25 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk close to Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk close to the worldwide border close to Stroivka and Krasne Pershe; and east of Kupyansk in the direction of Petropavlivka on Might 24 and 25.[41]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Kontora” Detachment of the 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (forty seventh Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Military [GTA], Moscow Navy District [MMD]) are reportedly working close to Stepova Novoselivka (east of Kupyansk).[42]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova route on Might 25 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova close to Kruhlyakivka, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Zahryzove and southeast of Borova close to Hrekivka and Olhivka on Might 24 and 25.[43]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Lyman route on Might 25 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Lyman close to Ridkodub, Novomykhailivka, Lypove, Zelena Dolyna, and Karpivka and in the direction of Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman close to Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman close to Torske and Kopanky on Might 24 and 25.[44]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian thirty first Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, twenty fifth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Central Navy District [CMD]) are reportedly working in Torske.[45]
Russian Subordinate Important Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and presumably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued assaults within the Siversk route on Might 25 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Siversk close to Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka, southeast of Siversk close to Vyimka, and south of Siversk close to Pereizne on Might 24 and 25.[46]
Russian forces not too long ago marginally superior within the Chasiv Yar route.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on Might 25 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago marginally superior south of Chasiv Yar.[47]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that parts of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (sixth Motorized Rifle Division, third Military Corps [AC]) are advancing in and north of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[48]
Russian forces continued offensive operations close to Chasiv Yar itself; south of Chasiv Yar close to Predtechyne, Bila Hora, and Stupochky; and southeast of Chasiv Yar from Andriivka on Might 24 and 25.[49]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian “Burevestnik” detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly working close to Chasiv Yar.[50]
Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Toretsk route on Might 25.
Assessed Russian advances: See topline textual content for assessed Russian advances southwest of Toretsk.
Unconfirmed claims: See topline textual content for unconfirmed claims of Russian advances southwest of Toretsk.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk close to Dyliivka, Dachne, and Druzhba; north of Toretsk close to Krymske; northwest of Toretsk within the route of Pleshchiivka; west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka and Petrivka; and southwest of Toretsk close to Zorya, Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, and Nova Poltavka on Might 24 and 25.[51]
Order of Battle: Components of the “Volka” group of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (eighth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Navy District [SMD]) are reportedly working close to Dyliivka.[52] Components of the thirty third Motorized Rifle Brigade (twentieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA) are reportedly working close to Yablunivka.[53]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Pokrovsk route on Might 25 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior into southern Leontovychi (southwest of Pokrovsk, previously Pershe Travnya).[54]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk close to Malynivka, Yelyzavetivka, Novotoretske, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk close to Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Kotlyne and Udachne on Might 24 and 25.[55]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty first CAA, Central Navy District [CMD]) reportedly proceed to function within the Pokrovsk route.[56]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Novopavlivka route on Might 25 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers continued to make contradictory claims about Russian advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces quickly superior throughout the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border, though a number of different Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are nonetheless advancing towards the border close to Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka).[57]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka close to Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka and towards Muravka; east of Novopavlivka close to Troitske, Kotlyarivka, and Horikhove on Might 24 and 25. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking close to Horikhove.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces additionally counterattacked south of Novomykolaivka and seized restricted positions within the close by forest.[59]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian fifteenth Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly working in Novomykolaivka.[60]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kurakhove route on Might 25 however didn’t advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on Might 24 that parts of the Russian thirty sixth Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, Jap Navy District [EMD]) superior alongside the H-15 Kostyantynivka-Zaporizhzhia Metropolis freeway northwest of Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[61]
Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove close to Andriivka, Oleksiivka, Kostyantynopil, and Bahatyr, and within the route of Novoukrainka and southwest of Kurakhove close to Odradne on Might 24 and 25.[62] Russian milbloggers claimed on Might 25 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Odradne and Dachne and within the route of Oleksiivka (each west of Kurakhove).[63]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velyka Novosilka route on Might 25 however didn’t make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that parts of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division’s (fifth CAA, EMD) 114th and 394th motorized rifle regiments superior southwest of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and that extra parts of the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment superior northwest and southwest of Zelene Pole (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[64]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Komar and Vesele; west of Velyka Novosilka close to Vilne Pole and Shevchenko; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Novosilka, Novopil, and Zelene Pole on Might 24 and 25.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed on Might 25 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked alongside the Bahatyr-Odradne-Komar line and close to Zelene Pole.[66]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Basic Employees’s Important Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly working within the Velyka Novosilka route.[67]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions, safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported floor exercise within the Hulyaipole route on Might 25.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian sixty fourth Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty fifth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Jap Navy District [EMD]) reportedly proceed working within the Polohy route.[68]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Zaporizhia route on Might 25 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv close to Novoandriivka, Stepove, and Mali Shcherbaky on Might 24 and 25.[69]
The spokesperson for the Ukrainian Volunteer Military reported on Might 25 that parts of the Russian seventh Airborne (VDV) Division working within the Zaporizhia route are anticipating that one other regiment of the seventh VDV Division will redeploy to the world from Kursk Oblast.[70]
Geolocated footage revealed on Might 25 reveals a Ukrainian drone placing a Russian gasoline prepare close to occupied Novobohdanivka, Zaporizhia Oblast, on Might 24.[71] Ukraine’s Important Navy Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Ukrainian drone operators destroyed at the very least three gasoline tanks on a Russian army provide prepare in Zaporizhia Oblast.[72]
Russian forces continued restricted assaults within the Kherson route on Might 25.[73]
The spokesperson for the Ukrainian Volunteer Military reported on Might 25 that parts of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) working within the Kherson route are considerably degraded and that Russian forces are unable to resupply Russian items working on the islands within the Dnipro River.[74]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)
See topline textual content.
Important exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing important to report.
Word: ISW doesn’t obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly out there data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially out there satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the premise for these reviews. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.
[1] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022325
[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060424; http://en.kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/67843
[3] https://t.me/kpszsu/35037
[4] https://t.me/kpszsu/35037; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9312; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9315; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14344; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24737; https://suspilne dot media/1026055-rosia-zdijsnila-masovanu-na-ukrainu-golovne-na-ranok-25-travna/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/43167 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/25/vid-golosiyeva-do-fastova-vogon-ta-rujnuvannya-kyyiv-ta-oblast-perezhyly-strashnu-nich/; https://www.fb.com/iklymenko.fb/posts/1299985352129767?ref=embed_post ; https://suspilne dot media/1026025-ukraina-ta-rosia-proveli-vze-dva-etapi-obminu-1000-na-1000-rf-atakue-bezpilotnikami-1186-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1748169307&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/bryzynskyi/3126; https://t.me/bryzynskyi/3128; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/43161; https://t.me/synegubov/14475 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14476 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2526; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2527; https://t.me/dva_majors/71934; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/43175; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1191 ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1190 ; https://suspilne dot media/1026031-nicna-ataka-rf-na-kiiv-so-vidomo/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4680; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/11959; https://www.fb.com/vanegoda/posts/pfbid0umxpawzqLpj6waPWJE5VqG5zi6kAfxktC9yNhCyxyFSM1JBQeQgtdmFP5UUo7Hh5l
[5] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9312; https://www.fb.com/iklymenko.fb/posts/1299985352129767?ref=embed_post ; https://suspilne dot media/1026025-ukraina-ta-rosia-proveli-vze-dva-etapi-obminu-1000-na-1000-rf-atakue-bezpilotnikami-1186-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1748169307&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/43167 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/25/vid-golosiyeva-do-fastova-vogon-ta-rujnuvannya-kyyiv-ta-oblast-perezhyly-strashnu-nich/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24737
[6] https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1025129-oniks-iskander-cirkon-ak-rf-zapuskae-raketi-po-ukraini-z-krimu/
[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2025
[8] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/standing/1926647867101290617 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/73 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/316760
[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-22-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2024
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033125
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv
[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325 ;
[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051825
[15] https://t.me/bbc44ombr/75; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9222; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1926603915828559892; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1926604683608498325
[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/53096 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/316731 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53097 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64575 ; https://t.me/sashakots/53893; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36333; https://t.me/sashakots/53899; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92278;
[17] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64573
[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025;
[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/websites/default/recordsdata/Russianpercent20Offensivepercent20Campaignpercent20Assessmentpercent2Cpercent20Aprilpercent2014percent2Cpercent202025percent20PDF.pdf
[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-fact-sheet-february-21-2025
[21] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/05/24/trump-putin-battlefield-ceasefire-ukraine/; https://www.statista.com/statistics/263767/total-population-of-russia/
[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlinpercentE2percent80percent99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut
[23] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14364 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/316727 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/316732 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/316733 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53094 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24736; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24712
[24] https://t.me/tass_agency/316738
[25] https://tass dot ru/politika/24037995
[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030225 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024
[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-1-2025
[28] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainepercentE2percent80percent99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment
[29] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9223 ; https://t.me/legitdron/43
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24689 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24686
[31] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92242
[32] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31648 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26751
[33] https://t.me/wargonzo/26751
[34] https://t.me/tass_agency/316721 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/316722 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53093
[35] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92242 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53091 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/23560 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92264
[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/71886
[37] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28415; https://t.me/vovkodavy34/28
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24737; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10736; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24689; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24686;
[39] https://suspilne dot media/1026025-ukraina-ta-rosia-proveli-vze-dva-etapi-obminu-1000-na-1000-rf-atakue-bezpilotnikami-1186-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1748164014&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1026175-ci-e-nakopicenna-sil-rosii-bila-kordonu-z-harkivskou-oblastu-vidpovid-osuv-hortica/
[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2025
[41] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10736; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24689; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24686; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24689; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24686
[42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165939
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24689; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24686; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10736
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24689; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24686; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10736
[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36309
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24689 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24686 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10736
[47] https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1926652068481081417; https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1926653774208102408
[48] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165901 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36317 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26751
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24689 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24686
[50] https://t.me/wargonzo/26748
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24689 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24686 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10736
[52] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13844
[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/71885
[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29099
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24689 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24686 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10736
[56] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165893
[57] https://t.me/dva_majors/71895 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64561 l https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92246
[58] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64561
[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29099 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36329 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36350
[60] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36329
[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36311
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24689 ; https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02nuZeePpqDbxGzBx6r3F7Qn112kLwfeV4LHc9ycV1dvQ2VchGmoAZnfTNyAjpHAj1l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24686; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10736;
[63] https://t.me/voin_dv/15154; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165963
[64] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36319; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36357;
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24689 ; https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02nuZeePpqDbxGzBx6r3F7Qn112kLwfeV4LHc9ycV1dvQ2VchGmoAZnfTNyAjpHAj1l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24686; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10736; https://t.me/voin_dv/15154
[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/15154
[67] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165925 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15144
[68] https://t.me/voin_dv/15148 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15155
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24689 ; https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02nuZeePpqDbxGzBx6r3F7Qn112kLwfeV4LHc9ycV1dvQ2VchGmoAZnfTNyAjpHAj1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24686 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29095
[70] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/25/nemaye-bk-nemaye-pidkriplennya-nemaye-evakuacziyi-tak-czaryuyut-rosijski-morpihy-na-ostrovah-hersonshhyny/
[71] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/11450; https://t.me/DIUkraine/5987; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28435
[72] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5987 ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1026145-bijci-gur-znisili-rosijskij-vijskovij-poizd-na-timcasovo-okupovanij-teritorii-zaporizkoi-oblasti/
[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24737
[74] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/25/nemaye-bk-nemaye-pidkriplennya-nemaye-evakuacziyi-tak-czaryuyut-rosijski-morpihy-na-ostrovah-hersonshhyny/
