Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, and George Barros
Could 16, 2025, 8:00 pm ET
Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date every day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cellular system) is strongly advisable for utilizing this data-heavy device.
Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces every day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.
Be aware: The info cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on Could 16. ISW will cowl subsequent stories within the Could 17 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.
Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on Could 16 however made little progress in direction of agreeing to a full ceasefire or a peace settlement to Russia’s conflict towards Ukraine. The Russian delegation reportedly formally demanded that Ukraine cede territory to which Russia has informally been laying declare, whereas asserting that Russia is able to proceed the conflict for years. Russia could once more formalize beforehand casual territorial claims sooner or later as a part of Russia’s effort to safe full Ukrainian capitulation. Turkish, Ukrainian, and American delegations met on the morning of Could 16 in Istanbul, after which Turkish, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations met.[1] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, the top of the Russian delegation, seemingly met with US State Division Director of Coverage Planning Employees Michael Anton earlier than the Ukrainian-Russian assembly.[2] The Ukrainian delegation, together with Ukrainian Protection Minister Rustem Umerov, International Minister Andriy Sybiha, and Presidential Administration Chief of Employees Andriy Yermak, met with US Particular Envoy to Ukraine Common Keith Kellogg, UK Nationwide Safety Advisor Jonathan Powell, French Presidential International Coverage Advisor Emmanuel Bonn, and German Chancellor’s Advisor for International and Safety Coverage Gunter Sautter to coordinate positions earlier than the Ukrainian-Russian assembly.[3] Umerov and Medinsky introduced that Ukraine and Russia would trade 1,000 prisoners of conflict (POWs) every within the close to future.[4] Medinsky said that the Russian and Ukrainian delegations agreed to “write…down intimately” and current their visions for a attainable future ceasefire and that bilateral negotiations will proceed after this presentation.[5] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that an unspecified supply said that there was no particular date set for Russia and Ukraine to trade their ceasefire plans.[6]
Medinsky highlighted that Russia is ready to proceed its conflict in Ukraine for years to come back. Medinsky claimed that these “who have no idea historical past” say that there must be a ceasefire first, then negotiations to realize peace.[7] Medinsky claimed that conflict and negotiations must be performed concurrently, and Carroll reported that Medinsky said that Russia is “able to combat for a 12 months, two, three – nonetheless lengthy it takes.”[8] Medinsky reportedly referenced the Nice Northern Conflict (1700-1721) when asking “how lengthy [is Ukraine] able to combat?” and claimed that “Russia is ready to combat without end.”[9] Russia state media confirmed that Medinsky spoke in regards to the 18th-century conflict with Sweden through the assembly.[10]
Ukrainian diplomatic sources informed numerous Western and Ukrainian retailers that the Russian delegation made “unrealistic” and “unacceptable” calls for that went “far past” any calls for Russia has beforehand mentioned.[11] The delegation reportedly repeated the Kremlin’s demand that Ukrainian forces withdraw from everything of the illegally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts earlier than the beginning of a ceasefire. The Economist international correspondent Oliver Carroll reported {that a} supply said that the Russian delegation moreover threatened to grab Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, and Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Oleksiy Goncharenko equally reported that the Russian delegation threatened to annex Sumy Oblast in an effort to create a “safety zone.”[12]
The Kremlin has repeatedly publicly demanded that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – even the territory that Russian forces at the moment don’t occupy – however had not formally demanded that Ukraine cede all of Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts earlier than the Could 16 Istanbul assembly.[13] Russian officers have informally claimed all of Kharkiv Oblast as a part of Russia and launched offensive operations to create buffer zones in Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts in Could 2024 and March 2025, respectively, which might be seemingly a part of Russian territorial growth efforts, nonetheless. Kharkiv Oblast occupation governor Vitaly Ganchev claimed in early February 2025 that Kharkiv Oblast is “strategically” and politically vital for Russia and that he was “sure” that Russian forces would seize all of Kharkiv Oblast as a result of Russia wanted a “sanitary zone” to guard itself from Ukrainian shelling.[14] Ganchev additional claimed that Kharkiv Oblast would have held a “referendum” to turn into the “fifth oblast to hitch Russia” in September 2022 had it not been for the profitable Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast at the moment. Russian forces launched assaults throughout the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border in April 2025 to create a buffer zone and presumably press additional towards Sumy Metropolis in an effort to increase Russian territorial calls for in Ukraine.[15] Russian forces equally launched offensive operations in Could 2024 to create a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and Russian Safety Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev said at the moment that Russia’s envisioned “buffer zone” ought to embody all of Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin’s idea of the buffer zone is a thinly veiled justification for Russia’s intent to subsume bigger parts of Ukraine.[16]
Russian officers have lengthy been informally laying declare to extra territories in Ukraine past Sumy, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Russian officers, together with Russian President Vladimir Putin, have persistently claimed that “Novorossiya” – an invented area of Ukraine that Kremlin officers have claimed consists of all southern and japanese Ukraine – is an “integral” a part of Russia and that Odesa Metropolis is a “Russian” metropolis.”[17] Novorossiya geographically encompasses Kharkiv Oblast. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo said in April 2025 that the “return” of the west (proper) financial institution of the Dnipro River to Russia is “essentially essential” and an “absolute precedence.”[18] Saldo referred to as for Russia to fully management the areas of the Dnipro River that cross by means of Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts – a name for Russia to not solely achieve management over components of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces don’t at the moment occupy however to manage components of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, which Russia has not formally claimed or illegally annexed. The Kremlin could more and more undertake this sample of informally discussing extra Russian territorial claims after which formally introducing these claims as calls for in peace negotiations sooner or later.
ISW has persistently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin won’t compromise in peace negotiations until Ukraine and the West inflict vital battlefield and financial losses on Russia and pressure Putin to rethink his principle of victory. Putin articulated his principle of victory for his conflict in Ukraine in June 2024, which posits that Russia will have the ability to win a conflict of attrition towards Ukraine by persevering with gradual, creeping advances indefinitely and stopping Ukraine from conducting profitable, operationally vital counteroffensive operations, assuming Russia’s conflict effort outlasts Western help for Ukraine.[19]
ISW beforehand assessed that Russia faces numerous compounding materiel, protection industrial, manpower, and financial points that threaten Russia’s means to proceed the conflict in Ukraine in the long run.[20] Putin is probably going prioritizing dividing Ukraine’s Western allies and weakening Western help to Ukraine in an effort to safe his desired finish state in negotiations, fairly than successfully addressing Russia’s home issues. Putin’s choice to accentuate offensive operations all through Ukraine in March and April 2025 is just exacerbating these points and underscores his dedication to pressuring Ukraine in negotiations. ISW continues to evaluate that elevated Western – particularly US – army help and financial sanctions are essential to allow Ukraine to inflict vital battlefield losses on Russia and pressure Putin to both change his principle of victory or make an economically painful and unpopular choice to implement one other partial involuntary reserve call-up.
Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly authorised a sequence of command adjustments within the Russian army, together with a brand new Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Floor Forces. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on Could 15 to nominate former Commander-in-Chief of the Floor Forces Common Oleg Salyukov as Deputy Secretary of the Russian Safety Council.[21] Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia, citing an unspecified supply, reported on Could 15 that the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) appointed Colonel Common Andrei Mordvichev as Commander-in-Chief of the Floor Forces of the Armed Forces to switch Salyukov.[22] Mordvichev most just lately served because the commander of each the Russian Central Grouping of Forces and Central Navy District (CMD) and oversaw Russia’s seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian MoD additionally appointed Colonel Common Valery Solodchuk as the brand new CMD commander, and Russian outlet Ura reported {that a} high-ranking supply in Russian army circles confirmed these stories.[24] Solodchuk most just lately served as commander of the Kursk Grouping of Forces and led Russia’s efforts to eradicate the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.[25] Russian insider sources and milbloggers welcomed Mordvichev’s appointment and interpreted it as an indication that the Kremlin is initiating a modernization effort to boost Russia’s means to plan and execute operations in Ukraine and past.[26]
The Kremlin is probably going appointing Mordvichev to proliferate positional warfare ways and operational ideas for grinding marginal advances – the primary ways Russian forces used within the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk path – throughout Russia’s Floor Forces. Mordvichev’s appointment signifies that the Kremlin approves of the ways developed beneath Mordvichev’s command – particularly, using grinding, extremely attritional, infantry-led assaults – and goals to institutionalize these ways that the CMD used to advance within the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk path since late 2023.
Mordvichev is without doubt one of the few Russian commanders to have achieved tactical penetrations of the Ukrainian line within the final two years and one in every of Russia’s most celebrated commanders in the meanwhile, however these restricted tactical penetrations have come at nice prices.[27] Russian forces suffered vital personnel and gear losses in trade for about 60 kilometers of penetration since parts of the CMD first redeployed to the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk path in October 2023.[28] Mordvichev’s appointment is probably going additionally an effort to distill classes discovered and ways from the CMD to the remainder of the Russian army, as ISW has beforehand noticed Russian models within the Kupyansk and Velyka Novosilka instructions implementing the attritional assaults that the CMD utilized to grab Avdiivka in February 2024.[29]
Russian forces are persevering with to increase their salient northeast of Pokrovsk and southwest of Toretsk, though it stays unclear whether or not the Russian army command will prioritize additional advances in direction of Kostyantynivka or Pokrovsk throughout Summer season 2025. Geolocated footage printed on Could 16 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior in northern Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk) and seized Myrolyubivka and Mykhailivka (simply west of Myrolyubivka).[30] Russian milbloggers claimed on Could 16 that Russian forces superior additional north and southwest of Myrolyubivka and northwest of Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk).[31] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) credited parts of the Russian fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Mixed Arms Military [CAA], previously 1st Donetsk Folks’s Republic Military Corps [DNR AC], Southern Navy District [SMD]) with seizing Myrolyubivka, and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger insinuated that the fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade is subordinated to the Central Grouping of Forces.[32] The brigade was seemingly beforehand subordinated beneath the Southern Grouping of Forces, because the Russian army command redeployed parts of the fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade from the Kurakhove path to bolster offensive operations close to Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk) in January 2025.[33] ISW has not noticed stories of the brigade engaged in fight since March 2025, nonetheless. Parts of the fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade and different parts of the 51st CAA appeared to culminate in Toretsk in February and March 2025, however the brigade could also be reentering fight after a interval of relaxation and reconstitution.
Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets said on Could 16 that Ukrainian forces keep some positions close to and inside Yelyzavetivka (east of Myrolyubivka) which might be complicating Russian advances in direction of Myrnohrad (west of Yelyzavetivka and simply east of Pokrovsk) and Pokrovsk.[34] Russian milbloggers additionally just lately acknowledged that Ukrainian forces keep positions north of Yalyzvetivka, and ISW is subsequently increasing Ukrainian advances within the space, though these advances are seemingly not current.[35] Mashovets said that parts of the Russian twentieth Motorized Rifle Division (eighth CAA, SMD) and 51st CAA are trying to advance from Malynivka towards Novoekonomichne and north of Nova Poltavka (all northeast of Pokrovsk) in an effort to pressure Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Yelyzavetivka and to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[36]
Russian forces have just lately intensified offensive operations northeast and east of Pokrovsk after largely abandoning this space in favor of advances additional northeast of Pokrovsk towards Kostyantynivka and southwest of Pokrovsk towards Novopavlivka in early 2024.[37] Ukrainian officers just lately reported that Russia is reinforcing its models within the Pokrovsk path, and ISW just lately noticed stories that parts of the Russian thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Military Corps [AC], Japanese Navy District [EMD]) just lately redeployed from the Kurakhove path to close Malynivka.[38] These current redeployments and the reported appointment of Valery Solodchuk as Central Navy District (CMD) commander after his current success in Kursk Oblast point out that the Russian army command could refocus on the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad within the coming weeks and months. ISW beforehand assessed that Russian forces could try and advance alongside the Vozdvyzhenka-Yelyzavetivka-Myrne-Razine line to envelop Pokrovsk as an alternative of preventing by means of the extra city and closely defended settlements of Novoekonomichne and Myrnohrad nearer to Pokrovsk.[39] The Russian army command could redeploy forces from Kursk Oblast or extra parts of the 51st CAA to the CMD’s space of accountability (AoR) round Pokrovsk and reintensify efforts to advance west of Pokrovsk ought to the Russian army command prioritize seizing Pokrovsk over pushing additional towards Kostyantynivka from the southwest throughout Summer season 2025.
The Russian army command could alternatively select to proceed prioritizing advances towards Kostyantynivka in Summer season 2025. Russian forces intensified offensive operations geared toward eliminating the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk in February and March 2025, and up to date Russian advances into Novoolenivka and close to Zorya (each southwest of Toretsk) will seemingly pressure Ukrainian forces to withdraw from their restricted positions remaining within the pocket within the close to future.[40] Mashovets said that Russian forces are at the moment trying to assault alongside the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka freeway towards Stepanivka (northwest of Toretsk) and Yablunivka (west of Toretsk).[41] Mashovets said that parts of the twentieth Motorized Rifle Division are the primary pressure attacking between Stara Mykolaivka (southwest of Toretsk) and Nova Poltavka and that parts of the one hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division (eighth CAA) are attacking in different areas southwest of Toretsk, together with towards Romanivka.[42] ISW beforehand assessed that Russian forces seemingly intend to leverage advances southwest of Toretsk to push alongside the H-20 Donetsk Metropolis-Kostyantynivka freeway and facilitate deeper advances northeast of Pokrovsk alongside the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka freeway towards Kostyantynivka.[43] ISW just lately noticed stories that parts of the Russian forty second Motorized Rifle Division (58th Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Navy District [SMD]) redeployed from western Zaporizhia Oblast to the Stara Mykolaivka space and that unspecified drone operators just lately redeployed from the Kursk path to close Kalynove (south of Stara Mykolaivka).[44] The Russian army command could proceed to bolster the Russian pressure grouping southwest of Toretsk and try and advance additional alongside the H-20 Donetsk Metropolis-Kostyantynivka freeway towards Oleksandro-Kalynove (west of Toretsk) within the coming weeks in the event that they intend to prioritize offensive operations towards Kostyantynivka in Summer season 2025.
Russia is unlikely to have adequate manpower, materiel, and operational planning capabilities to conduct each an envelopment of Pokrovsk and a big offensive operation towards Kostyantynivka within the coming months. Russian advances southwest of Toretsk at the moment help each of those efforts, however the Russian army command will seemingly have to decide on to prioritize one path within the coming weeks as a consequence of near-term constraints in Russia’s manpower and materiel reserves.[45] Latest Ukrainian estimates recommend that Russia is recruiting sufficient forces to slowly develop their pressure grouping in Ukraine, however ISW has not noticed indications that the Kremlin has generated a adequate operational reserve to help a number of intensified operations as of this report.[46]
Russian forces have so far struggled to interrupt out of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, which has seemingly difficult Russia’s plans for an offensive towards Kostyantynivka and the broader Ukrainian fortress belt. Russian forces could conduct an operational pause after they degree the frontline southwest of Toretsk in an effort to give Russian models in Chasiv Yar and Toretsk time to make extra vital advances earlier than starting a concerted offensive towards Kostyantynivka. The current intensification in Russian exercise northeast, east, and south of Pokrovsk means that Russian forces could assess that Ukrainian positions in Pokrovsk have gotten more and more weak and that Russian forces ought to renew their efforts to envelop the city. The Russian army command could try and pursue the envelopment of Pokrovsk and vital advances towards Kostyantynivka concurrently, however pursuing each operations will expedite the timeline for a probable Russian fruits and can undermine Russian forces’ means to perform both objective. Russian forces additionally should proceed to stability offensive operations close to Toretsk and Pokrovsk with the manpower and materiel calls for of ongoing efforts to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, seize Kupyansk, and push towards Borova, Lyman, Sumy Metropolis and Kharkiv Metropolis.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on Could 16 however made little progress in direction of agreeing to a full ceasefire or a peace settlement to Russia’s conflict towards Ukraine.
- Medinsky highlighted that Russia is ready to proceed its conflict in Ukraine for years to come back.
- The Kremlin has repeatedly publicly demanded that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – even the territory that Russian forces at the moment don’t occupy – however had not formally demanded that Ukraine cede all of Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts earlier than the Could 16 Istanbul assembly.
- ISW has persistently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin won’t compromise in peace negotiations until Ukraine and the West inflict vital battlefield and financial losses on Russia and pressure Putin to rethink his principle of victory.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly authorised a sequence of command adjustments within the Russian army, together with a brand new Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Floor Forces.
- Russian forces are persevering with to increase their salient northeast of Pokrovsk and southwest of Toretsk, though it stays unclear whether or not the Russian army command will prioritize additional advances in direction of Kostyantynivka or Pokrovsk throughout Summer season 2025.
- Russia is unlikely to have adequate manpower, materiel, and operational planning capabilities to conduct each an envelopment of Pokrovsk and a big offensive operation towards Kostyantynivka within the coming months.
- Russian forces just lately superior close to Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka and within the Zaporizhia path.
We don’t report intimately on Russian conflict crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t straight have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We’ll proceed to judge and report on the results of those legal actions on the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants, and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity though we don’t describe them in these stories.
- Alleged Ceasefire Violations
- Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Predominant Effort – Japanese Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate primary efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis
- Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #3 – Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and presumably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
- Important Exercise in Belarus
Alleged Ceasefire Violations
There are not any energetic ceasefires in Ukraine.
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Combating continued in Kursk Oblast on Could 15 and 16.[47]
Russian milbloggers claimed on Could 15 and 16 that preventing continues in Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and close to Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Atynske (southeast of Tetkino in Sumy Oblast) and Ryzhivka (simply south of Tetkino throughout the worldwide border).[49]
Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (eleventh Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Navy District [LMD]) are reportedly working close to the worldwide border close to Sudzha.[50]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported floor exercise in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on Could 16.
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Sumy Metropolis)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on Could 16 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that parts of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (eleventh Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Navy District [LMD]) superior from Veselivka (northeast of Sumy Metropolis).[51]
Combating continued north and northeast of Sumy Metropolis alongside the Vodolahy–Loknya line.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed on Could 16 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy Metropolis close to Bezsalivka.[53]
Russian Predominant Effort – Japanese Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kharkiv path on Could 16 however didn’t make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior as much as 300 meters towards Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis).[54]
Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Lyptsi, Kurdiivka and Hlyboke and in direction of Vysoka Yaruha and northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory.[55] Geolocated footage printed on Could 15 signifies that Russian forces just lately performed an unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force mission south of Zhuravlevka (north of Kharkiv Metropolis in Belgorod Oblast) towards the worldwide border, presumably to arrange for future offensive operations within the space west of Striplecha (simply east of Zhuravelvka in Kharkiv Oblast).[56] Official Ukrainian sources reported on Could 15 that Russian forces attacked within the instructions of Kurdiivka and Vysoka Yaruga and used an unspecified variety of armored automobiles and a big variety of all-terrain automobiles (ATVs) and bikes.[57] Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Russian forces additionally attacked close to Hlyboke with one automotive and 6 bikes.[58]
Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk path on Could 16 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk close to Putnykove and southeast of Kupyansk towards Pischane and Novoosynove on Could 15 and 16.[59]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova path on Could 16 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on Could 15 that Russian forces superior on the japanese financial institution of the Tekuch River close to Hrekivka (southwest of Borova).[60]
Russian forces attacked north of Borova close to Bohuslavka and towards Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova close to Zahryzove, Kruhlyakivka, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Kolisnykivka; and southeast of Borova towards Olhivka on Could 15 and 16.[61]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Lyman path on Could 16 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on Could 15 that Russian forces superior northeast of Novomykhailivka (northeast of Lyman).[62]
Russian forces attacked north of Lyman close to Novyi Mir and Ridkodub and towards Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman close to Kolodyazi; and southeast of Lyman within the Serebryanske forest space on Could 15 and 16.[63]
Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 67th Motorized Rifle Division (twenty fifth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Central Navy District [CMD]) are reportedly working in Torske (east of Lyman).[64]
Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and presumably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk path on Could 16 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces performed offensive operations northeast of Siversk close to Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka and east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske on Could 15 and 16.[65]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar path on Could 16 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior inside Chasiv Yar, northwest of Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar), and into Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[66]
Russian forces performed offensive operations close to Chasiv Yar itself; southeast of Chasiv Yar close to Kurdyumivka and Klishchiivka; and south of Chasiv Yar close to Bila Hora on Could 15 and 16.[67]
Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (sixth Motorized Rifle Division, third Military Corps [AC]) are reportedly working in Stupochky.[68]
Russian forces just lately superior within the Toretsk path.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on Could 12, 15, and 16 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior in northern Toretsk, north of Dachne (north of Toretsk), west of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk) and within the northern outskirts of Druzhba (northeast of Toretsk).[69]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior north of Toretsk and northwest of Oleksandropil (west of Toretsk).[70]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk close to Dyliivka and Krymske; west of Toretsk close to Katerynivka; and southwest of Toretsk close to Novospaske (previously Petrivka), Zorya, Stara Mykolaivka, and Nova Poltavka and towards Popiv Yar on Could 15 and 16.[71]
See topline textual content for added particulars on Russian exercise southwest of Toretsk.
Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets said on Could 16 that parts of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Mixed Arms Military [CAA], previously 1st Donetsk Folks’s Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Navy District [SMD]) are using unit commanders in infantry assaults within the Toretsk path.[72]
Ukrainian and Russian forces just lately superior within the Pokrovsk path.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: See topline textual content for stories of Ukrainian advances east of Pokrovsk.
Assessed Russian advances: See topline textual content for stories of Russian advances east of Pokrovsk.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior northwest of Zvirove (south of Pokrovsk).[73]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk close to Myrolyubivka and Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk close to Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk close to Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Udachne and Kotlyne on Could 15 and 16.[74]
Russian forces just lately superior within the Novopavlivka path.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on Could 15 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior southwest of Novooleksandrivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[75]
Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Novopavlivka close to Novooleksandrivka and Novoserhiivka and towards Muravka; east of Novopavlivka close to Kotlyarivka, Zaporizhzhia, and Troitske; and southeast of Novopavlivka close to Bohdanivka on Could 15 and 16.[76] Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant Common Serhiy Nayev reported on Could 16 that Ukrainian forces just lately repelled a multi-directional strengthened company-sized Russian mechanized assault with 12 armored automobiles, 5 tanks, and 25 bikes in an unspecified space between the Novopavlivka by means of Velyka Novosilka instructions.[77] A Ukrainian outlet steered that the mechanized assault could have occurred close to Novooleksandrivka.[78]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kurakhove path on Could 16 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior close to Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove) and Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove).[79] A Russian supply claimed that Russian forces occupy central Bahatyr.[80]
Russian forces performed offensive operations west of Kurakhove close to Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, and Bahatyr on Could 15 and 16.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked close to Bahatyr.[82]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velyka Novosilka path on Could 16 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior north of Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), south and northwest of Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), northwest of Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka), and east of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[83]
Russian forces performed offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Shevchenko, Pryvilne, and Vilne Pole; west of Velyka Novosilka close to Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Zelene Pole on Could 15 and 16.[84]
The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed on Could 16 that the weather of the Russian fifth CAA (EMD) seized Vilne Pole, however ISW assessed Russian forces seized the settlement as of Could 15.[85]
Order of Battle: Artillery parts of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade and drone operators of the 57th and sixtieth motorized rifle brigades (all the fifth CAA, EMD) are reportedly working within the Velyka Novosilka path.[86]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions, safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)
Russian forces just lately superior within the Zaporizhia path.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on Could 15 signifies that Russian forces marginally superior northwest of Lobkove (southwest of Orikhiv).[87]
Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv close to Shcherbaky, Mali Shcherbaky, Novoandriivka, and Stepove on Could 15 and 16.[88]
Russian forces performed restricted offensive operations within the Kherson path on Could 15 and 16 however didn’t advance.[89]
A Russian milblogger claimed on Could 16 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance teams periodically cross from the Russian-occupied east (left) financial institution of the Dnipro River to the west (proper) financial institution.[90]
Ukrainian forces seemingly performed a drone strike towards a Russian army base in occupied Crimea on Could 16. The “Atesh” Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported that there have been explosions on the base of the Russian 126th Coastal Protection Brigade and the eighth Separate Artillery Regiment (each of the twenty second Military Corps [AC], Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) close to occupied Perevalne (southeast of Simferopol).[91] Geolocated footage printed on Could 16 exhibits an explosion and fireplace at an ammunition warehouse in Perevalne.[92] Ukrainian Heart for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who typically stories on profitable Ukrainian drone strikes, said that “unknown drones” struck Russian warehouses in occupied Crimea in a single day.[93]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces performed a sequence of drone strikes towards Ukraine in a single day on Could 15 and 16. The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Russian forces launched 112 Shahed and decoy drones from the instructions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Aktarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[94] The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Ukrainian forces downed 73 Shahed drones over northern, japanese, southern, and central Ukraine and that 36 drones have been “misplaced.” Ukrainian official sources reported that Russian drones struck Odesa, Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, Mykolaiv, and Kyiv oblasts.[95]
Important exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Belarusian Protection Minister Lieutenant Common Viktor Khrenin met with Russian Protection Minister Andrei Belousov in Minsk on Could 16 to debate strengthening protection cooperation.[96] Lukashenko and Belousov emphasised that Belarus and Russia are planning the upcoming “Zapad-2025” joint army train in each Russia and Belarus. Lukashenko thanked Russia for offering Belarus with army {hardware}, together with airplanes and helicopters, and introduced that Belarus is actively working to implement Russian President Vladimir Putin’s plan to deploy superior weaponry, together with Oreshnik medium-range missiles, in Belarus.[97] Belousov highlighted that Russia is coaching over 300 Belarusian servicemembers at Russian army academic establishments in trendy fight operations and unmanned techniques.[98] Belarusian Worldwide Navy Cooperation Division Head Valery Revenko said on February 20 that the “Zapad-2025” train will happen in mid-September 2025, nevertheless it stays unclear what number of servicemembers will take part.[99] Russia could use the train to completely ahead deploy Russian forces in Belarus. Russia and Belarus ratified a treaty in March 2025 permitting Russia to construct army bases in Belarus.[100]
Be aware: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorised materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly obtainable info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially obtainable satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the idea for these stories. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.
[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/315323
[2] https://newsukraine dot rbc.ua/information/director-of-policy-planning-michael-anton-1747383878.html; https://www.bbc.com/information/dwell/c74nxrr7mwkt?submit=assetpercent3Aeda5239c-2c2b-4305-bfaa-225e8ff23930#submit ; https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-remarks-to-the-press-4/; https://t.me/tass_agency/315368
[3] https://t.me/ermaka2022/6231
[4] https://suspilne dot media/1019593-potencijno-gotuemo-zustric-na-rivni-lideriv-krain-umerov-pro-peregovori-z-rf/; https://t.me/tass_agency/315414
[5] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/16/05/2025/682741909a7947e29e06acf2
[6] https://tass dot ru/politika/23966381
[7] https://ria dot ru/20250516/medinskiy-2017467577.html
[8] https://x.com/olliecarroll/standing/1923357966880604303
[9] https://x.com/olliecarroll/standing/1923357966880604303; https://x.com/olliecarroll/standing/1923379942579908862; https://x.com/RobynDixon__/standing/1923395655151550606
[10] https://smotrim dot ru/video/2973430?utm_source=inner&utm_medium=serp&utm_campaign=serp
[11] https://information.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-latest-peace-talks-zelenskyy-putin-istanbul-crimea-baltic-nato-jet-clarke-frontline-turkey-erdogan-12541713?postid=9592110#liveblog-body; https://www.theguardian.com/world/dwell/2025/could/16/ukraine-russia-zelenskyy-putin-war-us-turkey-talks-istanbul-live-updates?CMP=share_btn_url&web page=withpercent3Ablock-68272b758f088b79656ba3cf#block-68272b758f088b79656ba3cf; https://x.com/BarakRavid/standing/1923354285472952826; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/05/16/russia-ukraine-turkey-peace-talks/1ecf08ea-322d-11f0-8498-1f8214bba2d2_story.html’ https://x.com/olliecarroll/standing/1923371616227979459; https://www.axios.com/2025/05/16/russia-ukraine-ceasefire-talks-turkey
[12] https://x.com/olliecarroll/standing/1923371616227979459; https://t.me/oleksiihoncharenko/47144
[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121924
[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020425
[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040925
[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051424; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325
[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525
[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125
[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024; http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/74234
[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
[21] https://t.me/tass_agency/315247 ; https://iz dot ru/1887012/2025-05-15/general-polkovnik-mordvichev-naznachen-glavnokomanduiushchim-sukhoputnymi-voiskami-vs-rf ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23956439
[22] https://iz dot ru/1887012/2025-05-15/general-polkovnik-mordvichev-naznachen-glavnokomanduiushchim-sukhoputnymi-voiskami-vs-rf
[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2024
[24] https://www dot kyivpost.com/submit/52806 ; https://ura dot information/information/1052934042 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71269 ; https://t.me/sashakots/53699 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23002 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164893 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/148462
[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2025
[26] https://t.me/yurasumy/23000 ; https://t.me/arbat/2079 ; https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/17654
[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine
[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2023
[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2025
[30] https://x.com/creamy_caprice/standing/1923264945107370191; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9157; https://t.me/tass_agency/315280
[31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31592 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/315280; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31592
[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/52718
[33] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011325 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2025
[34] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2742
[35] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31592 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31570 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31560 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35809
[36] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2742
[37] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2025
[38] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2025
[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010525
[40] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2025
[41] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2742
[42] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2741 ; https://www.fb.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02hZcw2QDERyD3XgFsTLSk9KerJet2LZKjTFmdM9JiWByEjQmbNHCAhW612MjTr7UZl ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2025
[43] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425
[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042625
[45] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032925
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24291 ; https://t.me/osirskiy/1160 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314
[48] https://t.me/rybar/70432 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26563 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91764
[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/71285; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91764
[50] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164880
[51] https://t.me/milinfolive/148466
[52] https://t.me/rybar/70432
[53] https://t.me/milinfolive/148466
[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28665
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095 ; https://t.me/alehingennadiy/5462 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28665
[56] https://x.com/giK1893/standing/1923083295652446274 ; https://t.me/FENRIRFPVMAVICJOB/62 ; https://t.me/FENRIRFPVMAVICJOB/63; https://t.me/FENRIRFPVMAVICJOB/64 ; https://x.com/moklasen/standing/192310070756713304 1; https://t.me/brigada92_war/3248 ; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/standing/1923298875953086764 ; https://t.me/br58ua/1592
[57] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095 ; https://t.me/brigada92_war/3248 ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9261 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24330
[58] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095
[60] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64304
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095
[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64304
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64304 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64296
[64] https://t.me/rybar/70432
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095
[66] https://t.me/wargonzo/26563; https://t.me/dva_majors/71285; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164877; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31589
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095; https://t.me/wargonzo/26563
[68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35898; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35873
[69] https://t.me/prizrak_lpr/44; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1923351183852220418; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1923349427219022241; https://t.me/tytanybpla/94; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1923349973870989356; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1923349791272042902; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1102; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1923101167657116039; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1923101881355669935; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1923396578053673019; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/663; https://t.me/ombr_28/2105
[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28675; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31570; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164894
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095
[72] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1019387-cerez-vtrati-u-torecku-armia-rf-zalucae-upravlinna-brigad-do-sturmiv-otu-lugansk/
[73] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35909
[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095
[75] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9156; https://t.me/stepovi_hyzhaky_59/6038
[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095
[77] https://www.fb.com/story.php?story_fbid=642716195415806&id=100090322922535&rdid=dHKwy4Kp4gcUZirY
[78] https://militarnyi dot com/en/information/ukrainian-armed-forces-defeat-russian-mechanized-convoys-near-novooleksandrivka-village/
[79] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31579; https://t.me/voin_dv/14978
[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/14978
[81] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329; https://t.me/dva_majors/71285;
[82] https://t.me/voin_dv/14978
[83] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28696; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64297; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64322; https://t.me/voin_dv/14978
[84] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329
[85] https://t.me/mod_russia/52735 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52738 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52740 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2025
[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/14964
[87] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9159 ; https://t.me/rubak_vyriy/61
[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314 ; https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0angbARaHb2B7gNhZk9BK1oyKjE6t18HMGo4xNnyWTDe6RDvqngbPnQpyS1tZg74el
[89] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314; https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0angbARaHb2B7gNhZk9BK1oyKjE6t18HMGo4xNnyWTDe6RDvqngbPnQpyS1tZg74el
[90] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164940
[91] https://t.me/atesh_ua/6985 ; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1019009-v-krimu-prolunali-vibuhi-na-vijskovih-obektah-armii-rf-ates/
[92] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/79614 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/standing/1923275872049516767 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71293 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/79594 ; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1226
[93] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9263
[94] https://t.me/kpszsu/34464
[95] https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/1018183-na-cerkasini-16-travna-znisili-32-udarnih-droni-podrobici/ ; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/11808 ; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/11809 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/16/u-kmva-povidomyly-pro-naslidky-ataky-rosijskyh-bpla/ ; https://www.fb.com/100064704725226/posts/1124281876405293/?mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=YQLo0apZbgjtm9tB# ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1019025-rf-atakuvala-odesku-oblast-dronami-e-travmovani/ ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/42786 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/16/dronova-ataka-na-odeshhynu-ye-postrazhdali-zrujnovani-zhytlovi-budynky/ ; https://t.me/kpszsu/34464
[96] https://belta dot by/president/view/my-znachitelno-prodvinulis-lukashenko-o-voenno-tehnicheskom-sotrudnichestve-s-rossiej-715283-2025/ ; https://t.me/modmilby/47603 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52730 ; https://t.me/modmilby/47596
[97] https://belta dot by/president/view/my-znachitelno-prodvinulis-lukashenko-o-voenno-tehnicheskom-sotrudnichestve-s-rossiej-715283-2025/
[98] https://t.me/mod_russia/52741
[99] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2025
[100] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325
