Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan with William Runkel
Might 11, 2025, 4:45 pm ET
Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cell machine) is strongly really helpful for utilizing this data-heavy instrument.
Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.
Notice: The info cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on Might 11. ISW will cowl subsequent stories within the Might 12 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.
Russian President Vladimir Putin referred to as for Russia and Ukraine to renew bilateral negotiations primarily based on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that embody Russian calls for amounting to full Ukrainian give up. Any settlement primarily based on these protocols could be a capitulation doc. Putin spoke to media organizations on the night time of Might 10 to 11, following the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a common ceasefire no less than 30 days lengthy starting on Might 12.[1] Putin didn’t conform to the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal and as a substitute proposed that Russia and Ukraine “resume” the direct negotiations that he claimed “[Ukraine] interrupted” in 2022 on Might 15.[2] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov acknowledged that Russia will quickly announce its delegation to the resumed negotiations in Istanbul and that such negotiations ought to account for “developments of the 2022 talks.”[3]
Putin and Ushakov are referring to Russia’s April 2022 Istanbul protocols draft settlement, which included phrases that might have amounted to Ukraine’s give up and left Ukraine helpless to defend towards potential future Russian aggression.[4] The Wall Avenue Journal (WSJ) and the New York Occasions (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that each publications obtained a number of variations of the draft protocols from the April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul.[5] The draft protocols demanded that Ukraine forego its NATO membership aspirations and amend its structure so as to add a neutrality provision that might ban Ukraine from becoming a member of any navy alliances, concluding navy agreements, or internet hosting international navy personnel, trainers, or weapon methods in Ukraine. Russia additionally demanded that it, the US, the UK (UK), the Individuals’s Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus function safety guarantors of the settlement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate worldwide treaties and agreements incompatible with the everlasting neutrality [of Ukraine],” together with navy help agreements. Russia demanded to restrict the Ukrainian navy to 85,000 troopers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery methods as a part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia moreover demanded that Ukrainian missiles be restricted to a spread of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a spread that might permit Russian forces to deploy important methods and materiel near Ukraine with out concern of strikes.
Russia insisted on these phrases within the first and second months of the struggle when Russian troops have been advancing on Kyiv Metropolis and all through northeastern, japanese, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now making an attempt to reiterate these similar calls for after three years of struggle, even if Ukrainian forces have since efficiently pressured Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated important swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian price of advance throughout the theater. Putin is rejecting the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a common ceasefire and as a substitute continues to demand Ukrainian give up in an try and safe his strategic objectives by drawing out negotiations whereas persevering with to make battlefield positive aspects.
Putin additionally continues to demand that any negotiations deal with Russia’s perceived “root causes” of the struggle in Ukraine. Putin acknowledged throughout the press convention that the aim of renewed bilateral Russian-Ukrainian negotiations could be to “remove the basis causes” of the struggle in Ukraine.[6] Putin recommended that Russia and Ukraine might pursue a ceasefire as a part of these renewed negotiations, however claimed {that a} “actual truce” mustn’t allow the “rearmament” and “replenishment” of the Ukrainian navy. The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that Russia should remove the “root causes” of the struggle in Ukraine, which Russian officers have outlined as NATO’s alleged violation of commitments to not broaden into Japanese Europe and alongside Russia’s borders within the Nineteen Nineties, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian authorities’s alleged discrimination towards ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and tradition in Ukraine.[7] Kremlin officers just lately claimed that any ceasefire settlement ought to restrict Ukraine’s means to mobilize and practice new troops and obtain Western navy help, whereas failing to supply related concessions for Russia to restrict its personal drive technology and protection manufacturing efforts.[8] Requires the elimination of those alleged “root causes” and limitations on Ukraine’s drive technology capabilities are consistent with Putin’s calls for for Ukrainian neutrality, in addition to Putin’s pre-war demand that might have required NATO to roll again to its pre-1997 borders.[9]
Putin is making an attempt to govern ongoing discussions a few ceasefire and future peace in Ukraine, possible in an effort to undermine Ukrainian-US-European unity round a complete 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine. Kremlin officers have just lately intensified their engagement with Western media in an effort to message on to the Trump administration and American public and painting Russia’s phrases for Ukraine’s give up as cheap.[10] Putin’s Might 11 press convention and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov’s current interviews with Western media are a part of an try and inject Kremlin narratives into the Western data house aimed toward convincing the West that Russia is ready to conquer all of Ukraine militarily and scaring Ukraine and the West into conceding to Russia’s calls for.[11] Putin’s rhetorical posturing is an try to hide limitations within the Russian navy’s capabilities and distract from Russia’s failure to make any important progress on the battlefield over the past two years. Putin and different Kremlin officers firmly keep their struggle goals that quantity to Ukraine’s full capitulation and have to date refused to think about any peace deal that doesn’t concede to all of Russia’s calls for.[12] The Kremlin is falsely portraying itself as prepared to have interaction in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine whereas persevering with to assault frontline Ukrainian positions and setting situations for additional navy aggression towards Ukraine and NATO within the coming years.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal to carry bilateral negotiations in Turkey on Might 15. Zelensky acknowledged that he’ll personally await Putin in Turkey and that Ukraine is ready for Russia to conform to the US-Ukrainian-European common ceasefire proposal.[13] Putin mentioned renewing the 2022 Istanbul negotiations in a name with Erdogan on Might 11, and Erdogan expressed assist for resuming talks.[14] Erdogan famous throughout his name with Putin {that a} complete ceasefire would “create the required atmosphere” for peace talks.[15] European officers largely referred to as on Putin to conform to a complete ceasefire settlement earlier than starting bilateral peace negotiations with Ukraine.[16]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin referred to as for Russia and Ukraine to renew bilateral negotiations primarily based on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that embody Russian calls for amounting to full Ukrainian give up. Any settlement primarily based on these protocols could be a capitulation doc.
- Putin additionally continues to demand that any negotiations deal with Russia’s perceived “root causes” of the struggle in Ukraine.
- Putin is making an attempt to govern ongoing discussions a few ceasefire and future peace in Ukraine, possible in an effort to undermine Ukrainian-US-European unity round a complete 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal to carry bilateral negotiations in Turkey on Might 15.
- Ukrainian forces just lately superior close to Toretsk. Russian forces just lately superior within the northern Kharkiv and Novopavlivka instructions.
We don’t report intimately on Russian struggle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t straight have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those felony actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity although we don’t describe them in these stories.
- Alleged Ceasefire Violations
- Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Major Effort – Japanese Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate foremost efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis
- Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and presumably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
- Vital Exercise in Belarus
Alleged Ceasefire Violations
There are not any energetic ceasefires in Ukraine.
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued floor assaults in Kursk Oblast on Might 11.
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked southwest of Glushkovo alongside the worldwide border close to Tetkino, Volfinskiy, and Novyi Placed on Might 10 and 11.[17]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly putting Ukrainian forces close to Tetkino.[18]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported floor exercise in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on Might 11.
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Sumy Metropolis)
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported floor exercise in northern Sumy Oblast on Might 11.
Russian Major Effort – Japanese Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)
Russian forces just lately superior northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on Might 10 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior in northern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis).[19]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk on Might 10 and 11.[20]
Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Main Viktor Trehubov reported on Might 11 that Russian forces just lately elevated the variety of day by day assaults within the Vovchansk route from between one to 2 assaults to as much as 5.[21]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian “Anvar” Spetsnaz detachment (presumably referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly working close to Vovchansk.[22]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk route on Might 11 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk close to Kindrashivka and Mala Shapkivka, northeast of Kupyansk close to Synkivka and Kamyanka, and southeast of Kupyansk close to Hlushkivka on Might 10 and 11.[23]
Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Main Viktor Trehubov reported on Might 11 that Russian forces working within the Kupyansk route are receiving older reinforcements who’re much less able to conducting assaults and experiencing logistics issues which might be hindering offensive operations.[24]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova route on Might 11 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milbogger claimed on Might 11 that Russian forces superior southeast of Borova close to Makiivka.[25]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova close to Zahryzove, east of Borova close to Kopanky, and southeast of Borova close to Cherneshchyna on Might 10 and 11.[26]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the “Black Raven” detachment (purportedly a volunteer unit) are reportedly working close to Nadiya (east of Borova).[27]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Lyman route on Might 11 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on Might 11 that Russian forces just lately superior northeast of Lyman close to Hrekivka and east of Lyman in Torske.[28]
Russian forces attacked north of Lyman close to Zelena Dolyna, Nove, Olhivka, Ridkodub, and Lypove and northeast of Lyman close to Yampolivka, Kolodyazi, and Hrekivka on Might 10 and 11.[29]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and presumably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk route on Might 11 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk close to Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka on Might 10 and Might 11.[30]
The commander of a Ukrainian drone platoon working within the Siversk route acknowledged that Russian forces have accrued giant portions of bikes for assaults close to Bilohorivka.[31] The commander additionally acknowledged that Russian forces proceed to make use of fiber-optic drones virtually day by day within the Siversk route.
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar route on Might 11 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked close to Chasiv Yar itself, northwest of Chasiv Yar towards Mayske, north of Chasiv Yar close to Novomarkove, northeast of Chasiv Yar close to Orikhovo-Vasylivka, southeast of Chasiv Yar towards Ozaryanivka, and south of Chasiv Yar towards Bila Hora and Predtechyne.[32]
Ukrainian forces just lately superior within the Toretsk route.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage printed on Might 10 signifies that Ukrainian forces just lately superior north of Druzhba (northeast of Toretsk).[33]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior north of Oleksandropil towards Zorya and close to Romanivka (each southwest of Toretsk).[34]
Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk; north of Toretsk close to Dyliivka; northeast of Toretsk close to Druzhba; west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka, Romanivka, and Nova Poltavka; and southwest of Toretsk towards Zorya and close to Stara Mykolaivka, Malynivka, Oleksandropil, and Vodyane Druhe on Might 10 and 11.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Toretsk and close to Romanivka.[36]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Mixed Arms Military [CAA], previously 1st Donetsk Individuals’s Republic Military Corps [DNR AC], Southern Navy District [SMD]) and the “Tserber” group of the Russian 109th Separate Rifle Regiment (1st “Slovyansk” Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA)) are reportedly working in central Toretsk.[37] Components of the 238th Artillery Brigade (eighth CAA, SMD) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions close to Yablunivka (southwest of Toretsk).[38]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Pokrovsk route on Might 11 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk close to Myrne and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on Might 10 and 11.[39]
Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on Might 11 that combating stays intense within the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka instructions.[40] A Ukrainian servicemember working within the Pokrovsk route acknowledged on Might 11 that Russian forces are at present concentrating on destroying infrastructure within the rear Ukrainian areas of this route with a view to facilitate future Russian advances.[41] The servicemember acknowledged that Russian forces try to destroy Ukrainian reconnaissance and communications tools within the space. A Russian milblogger claimed on Might 11 that Russian forces are concentrating offensive operations close to Hrodivka and making an attempt to advance from Myrolyubivka towards Moskovke (all east of Pokrovsk).[42]
Order of Battle: Components of the “Vega” Spetsnaz Detachment (twenty fourth Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian Basic Employees’s Major Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly working within the Pokrovsk route.[43]
Russian forces just lately superior within the Novopavlivka route.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on Might 11 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior south and west of Novooleksandrivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and certain seized the settlement throughout a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault.[44]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on Might 11 that Russian forces superior close to Novomykolaivka, west of Uspenivka, and in Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka); northwest of Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka); and in Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka).[45]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka close to Novooleksandrivka and Novoserhiivka; east of Novopavlivka close to Kotlyarivka and Preobrazhenka; and southeast of Novopavlivka close to Troitske.[46]
Ukrainian Southern Protection Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn acknowledged that Russian forces are attacking as much as 30 instances per day within the Novopavlivka route and have assembled as much as three mechanized regiments’ price of troops on this route.[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kurakhove route on Might 11 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove close to Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, Bahatyr, and Oleksiivka on Might 10 and 11.[48]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velyka Novosilka route on Might 11 however didn’t advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior close to Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[49]
Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Vesele, Vilne Pole, Pryvilne, and Shevchenko; and west of Velyka Novosilka close to Novosilka and Novopil on Might 10 and 11.[50] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked towards Velyka Novosilka.[51]
A Ukrainian battalion working within the Velyka Novosilka route reported on Might 10 that Ukrainian forces repelled a multi-directional company-sized Russian mechanized assault with three tanks, eight infantry combating autos (IFVs), and a lot of bikes within the space on Might 9.[52]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions, safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on Might 11 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces carried out floor assaults southeast of Orikhiv close to Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv in direction of Novodanylivka; and southwest of Orikhiv close to Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske on Might 10 and 11.[53]
Russian forces carried out restricted offensive operations within the Kherson route on Might 11 however didn’t advance.[54]
Ukrainian Southern Protection Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn acknowledged on Might 11 that Russian forces try to land small infantry teams on the islands within the Dnipro River Delta to conduct reconnaissance on Ukrainian positions.[55]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces carried out a sequence of drone strikes towards Ukraine on the night time of Might 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Russian forces launched 108 Shahed and decoy drones from the instructions of Bryansk Metropolis; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Prymorsk, Zaporizhia Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[56] The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Ukrainian forces downed 60 Shahed and different drones over the japanese, northern, southern, and central Ukraine; that 41 decoy drones have been “misplaced in location,” which means that Ukrainian forces overlooked the drone and have no idea what occurred to it; and that Russian drone strikes affected Sumy Oblast.
Vital exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing important to report.
Notice: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorized materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly accessible data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially accessible satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the idea for these stories. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76899 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2025
[2] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76899
[3] https://t.me/tass_agency/314561 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23911063
[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-april-15-2022
[5] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-ukraine-peace-deal-2022-document-6e12e093 ; https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html ; https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/a456d6dd8e27e830/e279a252-full.pdf
[6] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76899
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025
[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025
[9] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=ru
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051025 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/314505 ; https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/10/world/video/russia-ceasefire-resistant-dmitry-peskov-digvid
[11] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76899
[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025;
[13] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/standing/1921611690891940116 ; ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14175https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/standing/1921469464358346850 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14175
[14] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76900 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/58843 ; https://x.com/trpresidency/standing/1921524395874390050
[15] https://x.com/trpresidency/standing/1921524395874390050
[16] https://x.com/JanLipavsky/standing/1921479272163672557 ; https://x.com/edgarsrinkevics/standing/1921516658973163870 ; https://x.com/donaldtusk/standing/1921515458412392937
; https://x.com/bundeskanzler/standing/1921524319286362491; https://x.com/bundeskanzler/standing/1921524321945588090; https://x.com/bundeskanzler/standing/1921524324487307666 ; https://suspilne dot media/1015273-evropa-hoce-buti-ucasniceu-potencijnih-peregovoriv-miz-ukrainou-ta-rosieu-mzs-francii/; https://www.radiofrance dot fr/franceinter/podcasts/questions-politiques/questions-politiques-du-dimanche-11-mai-2025-6758757 ; https://www.barrons.com/information/putin-s-proposed-ukraine-talks-a-first-step-but-not-enough-macron-a90f041c
[17] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91488; https://t.me/dva_majors/70971; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91525; https://t.me/wargonzo/26453; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28427
[18] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91509
[19] https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1921240824332894710 ; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21806 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164373
[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/2413 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/2413 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/2413
[21] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/11/masshtabnyh-proryviv-nemaye-ale-ataky-posylyly-viktor-tregubov-pro-sytuacziyu-bilya-vovchanska/
[22] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91506
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106
[24] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/11/masshtabnyh-proryviv-nemaye-ale-ataky-posylyly-viktor-tregubov-pro-sytuacziyu-bilya-vovchanska/
[25] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64169
[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108
[27] https://t.me/notes_veterans/23294
[28] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64169 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164373
[29]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64169
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106
[31] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1015195-vijska-rf-gotuut-masovanij-sturm-na-motociklah-na-siverskomu-napramku-dani-81-oaebr/
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106
[33] https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1921577442608587184; https://t.me/prizrak_lpr/40
[34] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164367; https://t.me/yurasumy/22907
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106; https://t.me/yurasumy/22907; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91514
[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164367; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91514; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91532
[37] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91514
[38] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13795
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106
[40] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/11/vorog-namagayetsya-perekydaty-syly-cherez-oskil-i-zherebecz-u-zsu-prokomentuvaly-sytuacziyu-na-fronti/
[41] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/11/vijskovi-rozpovily-pro-zminu-taktyky-protyvnyka-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/
[42] https://t.me/yurasumy/22906
[43] https://t.me/sashakots/53619
[44] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9118; https://t.me/fpvredrone/62; https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1921474063609811318; https://t.me/skarlatop/4820
[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35679; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164399; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35692; https://t.me/yurasumy/22905; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164373; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35696
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106
[47] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/11/my-zamanyuyemo-voroga-u-vognevi-mishky-ta-znyshhuyemo-sotnyamy-syly-oborony-pivdnya/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/11/vijskovi-rozpovily-pro-zminu-taktyky-protyvnyka-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106; https://t.me/yurasumy/22904
[49] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164367
[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/52567 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106 ;
[51] https://t.me/voin_dv/14875
[52] https://www.fb.com/share/v/12JaCoAq1KX/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/11/dijshly-do-liniyi-zitknennya-i-zlamalysya-nashi-dronari-vidbyly-potuzhnu-ataku-okupantiv-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku/
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/11/desantni-diyi-na-hersonshhyni-ta-shturmy-na-zaporizhzhi-u-zsu-rozpovily-pro-ataky-okupantiv-na-pivdni/
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136
[55] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/11/desantni-diyi-na-hersonshhyni-ta-shturmy-na-zaporizhzhi-u-zsu-rozpovily-pro-ataky-okupantiv-na-pivdni/
[56] https://t.me/kpszsu/34173
