Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, March 25, 2025
Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Daria Novikov, George Barros with Nate Trotter
March 25, 2025, 6:50 pm ET
Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date every day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cellular system) is strongly advisable for utilizing this data-heavy device.
Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces every day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.
Word: The information cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on March 25. ISW will cowl subsequent stories within the March 25 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.
US, Ukrainian, and Russian officers reached some agreements for non permanent ceasefires on strikes towards vitality infrastructure and within the Black Sea. The small print of those ceasefires stay unclear and evaluating the ceasefires’ specifics within the absence of formally printed joint texts of the agreements signed by Russia and Ukraine stays tough. The White Home issued one readout concerning the outcomes of the US-Russian talks in Saudi Arabia from March 24 and one other concerning the US-Ukrainian talks from March 25.[1] The Kremlin and Ukrainian Protection Minister Rustem Umerov every issued separate statements for Russia and Ukraine.[2] The American, Russian, and Ukrainian statements share some commonalities however differ from one another considerably in different regards. The US readouts, the Kremlin readout, and Umerov generally acknowledged that the US, Ukraine, and Russia “agreed to develop measures for implementing” US President Donald Trump’s, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “settlement to ban strikes towards vitality amenities of Russia and Ukraine.”[3] Zelensky acknowledged that Ukraine additionally gave the US a listing of “strategic infrastructure objects” that Ukraine would really like protected beneath a strikes ceasefire.[4] This checklist will not be explicitly talked about within the US or Russian readouts. The Kremlin later issued a listing of Russian and Ukrainian amenities that Russian and American delegations agreed fall beneath the non permanent ceasefire on strikes on the vitality system.[5] The Kremlin acknowledged that the checklist consists of oil refineries; oil and fuel pipelines and storage amenities, together with pumping stations; electrical energy era and transmission infrastructure, together with energy vegetation, substations, transformers, and distributors; nuclear energy vegetation; and hydroelectric dams. It’s unclear if the Russian checklist of objects is similar checklist of “strategic infrastructure objects” that Zelensky talked about. The Kremlin acknowledged that the non permanent ceasefire is legitimate for 30 days ranging from March 18, 2025, which means that the ceasefire will by default expire on April 17, 2025, except Russia and Ukraine mutually conform to renew it. The Kremlin acknowledged that Russia and Ukraine have the suitable to think about themselves free from the obligations of the settlement if one of many events violates the settlement. The mechanisms to observe and tackle allegations of violations stay unclear. The Kremlin’s checklist notably solely consists of vitality infrastructure amenities, and it stays unclear whether or not discussions concerning Zelensky’s checklist of different non-energy amenities that he desires protected beneath the ceasefire are nonetheless ongoing or whether or not the Kremlin has rejected Zelensky’s proposal. Umerov additionally acknowledged that Ukraine is able to “prepared to arrange a separate assembly on the technical stage to start work on implementation mechanisms” for the strikes and Black Sea ceasefires and that “at this level, all events are going to temporary the related management, and we’ll announce the dates and occasions quickly.”[6] The Kremlin’s and Umerov’s statements recommend that Russia and Ukraine might not but have the same opinion about whether or not the ceasefire has gone into impact or not as of March 25.
The US readouts of its bilateral conferences in Saudi Arabia and Umerov famous that the US, Ukraine, and Russia “agreed to make sure secure navigation, remove the usage of pressure, and forestall the usage of industrial vessels for army functions within the Black Sea.”[7] The Kremlin readout of the US-Russian talks equally acknowledged that the US and Russia agreed to such measures as a part of a “Black Sea Initiative,” however added that there have to be “applicable management measures via inspection of such vessels.”[8] Umerov uniquely added that each one Russian army vessels motion “exterior of [the] jap a part of the Black Sea” will represent a violation of the spirit of this settlement and that Ukraine will regard such motion as a violation of the dedication to make sure the secure navigation of the Black Sea and a risk Ukraine’s nationwide safety.[9] Umerov acknowledged that Ukraine will have the ability to train its proper to self-defense within the occasion of such violations.
All readouts of the March 23 to 25 bilateral conferences famous that the events “welcome the great places of work of third nations with a view towards supporting the implementation of the vitality and maritime agreements” and that each one events “will proceed working towards attaining a sturdy and lasting peace.”[10] (Turkey notably helped facilitate the July 2022 grain deal by inspecting industrial vessels transporting foodstuffs within the Black Sea.)[11] The White Home and Umerov acknowledged that the US and Ukraine “agreed that the US stays dedicated to serving to obtain prisoners of struggle (POWs) exchanges, the discharge of civilian detainees, and the return of forcibly transferred Ukrainian youngsters.”[12]
Putin continues to reject Trump’s and Zelensky’s proposed non permanent frontline ceasefire, regardless of agreeing to some type of ceasefire for strikes on vitality infrastructure and within the Black Sea. Putin’s persistent stalling and intransigence are inhibiting Trump’s efforts to safe a long-lasting and steady peace settlement. The US readouts for each its conferences with Russian and Ukrainian delegations famous that Trump’s “crucial that the killing on either side” of the struggle should cease, “as the required step towards attaining an everlasting peace settlement” — probably in reference to the unconditional 30-day normal ceasefire on the frontline that Trump and Zelensky have already agreed upon, however that Putin rejected on March 18.[13]
The Kremlin acknowledged that it’ll not implement the agreed ceasefire within the Black Sea till the US lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned agricultural financial institution Rosselkhozbank and different unspecified monetary organizations concerned in worldwide meals and fertilizer commerce.[14] The Kremlin acknowledged that unspecified actors — presumably the US — should additionally reconnect Rosselkhozbank and different unspecified monetary organizations to SWIFT and elevate restrictions on commerce finance transactions. Moreover, they have to elevate sanctions limiting firms producing and exporting meals and fertilizers and their insurance coverage firms, elevate restrictions on servicing ships in ports and sanctions towards ships working beneath the Russian flag concerned in buying and selling meals and fertilizer merchandise, and elevate restrictions on supplying agricultural equipment and different instruments utilized in meals and fertilizer manufacturing to Russia. The US didn’t present Russia such demanded sanctions aid when Ukraine and Russia agreed to the grain deal in July 2022.[15] The White Home and Kremlin readouts of the US-Russian conferences famous that the “United States will assist restore Russia’s entry to the world marketplace for agricultural and fertilizer exports, decrease maritime insurance coverage prices, and improve entry to ports and cost techniques for such transactions,” however the US readout notably didn’t embody express language suggesting that Russia‘s acceptance and adherence to the Black Sea ceasefire can be conditional on preliminary US sanctions aid.[16] The US will probably require European Union (EU) cooperation in an effort to elevate some sanctions and restrictions on Russian agricultural, monetary, and commerce entities to reconnect Russia to worldwide agricultural and fertilizer markets.[17] US President Donald Trump responded to a query about the US lifting some sanctions on Russia earlier than Russia implements measures within the Black Sea and acknowledged that the US is contemplating lifting some sanctions towards Russia.[18] Establishing the preliminary grain deal in July 2022 didn’t require any sanctions aid, and reinstating the grain deal probably equally doesn’t require preliminary sanctions aid.[19] Establishing a brief ceasefire within the Black Sea doesn’t require preliminary sanctions aid.
The Kremlin’s official statements are imprecise, stipulate necessities for the ceasefire that neither the US nor Ukrainian official statements point out, and depart room for disagreement among the many events that may be concerned in deciphering the agreements, lifting sanctions, and monitoring potential violations. The official Kremlin assertion is imprecise on the particular sanctions and restrictions the Kremlin is demanding that the West preliminarily elevate and the particular monetary organizations and corporations concerned. The Kremlin assertion additionally doesn’t specify the actors that can interpret the parameters of those restrictions, monitor lifting these restrictions, and confirm all events’ compliance. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged that Ukraine, Russia, and the US issued separate statements as a result of the US-Ukrainian conferences didn’t focus on US-Russian efforts to help restoring Russian entry to agricultural and commerce markets.[20]
Key Takeaways:
- US, Ukrainian, and Russian officers reached some agreements for non permanent ceasefires on strikes towards vitality infrastructure and within the Black Sea. The small print of those ceasefires stay unclear and evaluating the ceasefires’ specifics within the absence of formally printed joint texts of the agreements signed by Russia and Ukraine stays tough.
- The Kremlin’s and Umerov’s statements recommend that Russia and Ukraine might not but have the same opinion about whether or not the ceasefire has gone into impact or not as of March 25.
- Putin continues to reject Trump’s and Zelensky’s proposed non permanent frontline ceasefire, regardless of agreeing to some type of ceasefire for strikes on vitality infrastructure and within the Black Sea. Putin’s persistent stalling and intransigence are inhibiting Trump’s efforts to safe a long-lasting and steady peace settlement.
- The Kremlin acknowledged that it’ll not implement the agreed ceasefire within the Black Sea till the US lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned agricultural financial institution Rosselkhozbank and different unspecified monetary organizations concerned in worldwide meals and fertilizer commerce.
- Russian forces just lately superior within the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border space, close to Toretsk, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- The Russian army continues to disclaim rotations to troopers who’ve been combating within the struggle in Ukraine for years.
We don’t report intimately on Russian struggle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t instantly have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We’ll proceed to judge and report on the results of those felony actions on the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity although we don’t describe them in these stories.
- Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
- Russian Most important Effort – Japanese Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate foremost efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis
- Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #3 – Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Pressure Technology Efforts
- Russian Technological Variations
- Actions in Russian-occupied areas
- Important Exercise in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian forces just lately superior within the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border space amid continued assaults on restricted Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast on March 25.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on March 24 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior inside and east of Zhuravka (northeast of Sumy Metropolis alongside the worldwide border).[21]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 25 that components of the Russian twenty second Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, forty fourth Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Navy District [LMD]) superior close to Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[22]
Russian forces attacked close to Gogolevka (west of Sudzha); close to the Sudzha checkpoint alongside the worldwide border southwest of Sudzha; and north to northeast of Sumy Metropolis alongside the worldwide border close to Volodymyrivka, Veselivka, Zhuravka, and Basivka on March 24 and 25.[23]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and drone operators of the Rubicon Heart for Superior Unmanned Applied sciences are reportedly working in Kursk Oblast.[24]
Ukrainian forces just lately superior alongside the worldwide border in northwestern Belgorod Oblast.
Assessed advances: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on March 24 that Ukrainian forces just lately superior west of Demidovka and northwest of Popovka (each northwest of Belgorod Metropolis).[25]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Demidovka and Popivka and superior southeast of Demidovka and west of Prilesye (northwest of Belgorod Metropolis).[26] Different Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked Demidovka and that the southern a part of the settlement is a contested “grey zone.”[27]
A number of Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, together with reserve Russian Federal Safety Service (FSB) border guards from Primorsky Krai and components of the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty fourth AC, LMD) repelled Ukrainian assaults towards Popovka on the night time of March 24 to 25.[28]
Russian Most important Effort – Japanese Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kharkiv course on March 25 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces carried out floor assaults northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk on March 24 and 25.[29]
Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk course on March 25 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces superior close to Topoli, Kamyanka (each northeast of Kupyansk), Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk), and Stepova Novosilka (southeast of Kupyansk).[30]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk close to Kamyanka; east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk close to Stepova Novoselivka on March 24 and 25.[31]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova course on March 25 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova close to Zahryzove; east of Borova close to Kopanky; and southeast of Borova towards Novomykhailivka and Katerynivka and close to Cherneshchyna on March 24 and 25.[32]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Lyman course on March 25 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed on March 25 that Russian forces seized Myrne (northeast of Lyman).[33]
Russian forces carried out offensive operations northeast of Lyman close to Kolodyzai and Yampolivka and towards Nove and Zarichne; and east of Lyman close to Torske on March 24 and 25.[34]
Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk course on March 25 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces carried out offensive operations northeast of Siversk close to Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka, east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk close to Ivano-Daryivka on March 24 and 25.[35]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar course on March 25 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces carried out offensive operations close to Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar towards Predtechyne and Dyliivka on March 24 and 25.[36]
Russian forces just lately superior within the Toretsk course.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on March 25 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior in northwestern Toretsk and central Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk).[37] Extra geolocated footage printed on March 21 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior on the southeastern outskirts of Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[38]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that components of the Russian a hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division (eighth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Navy District [SMD]), together with components of its 68th Tank Regiment, seized Oleksandropil and Panteleymonivka (north of Oleksandropil).[39] A Russian supply claimed that stories that Russian forces seized Oleksandropil and Panteleymonivka are inaccurate.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior in southwestern Toretsk, north and northwest of Toretsk, west of Leonidivika (west of Toretsk), and northwest of Oleksandropil.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Shcherbynivka and Leonidivka.[42]
Russian forces carried out offensive operations close to Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk close to Dyliivka and Dachne; and east of Toretsk close to Krymske on March 24 and 25.[43]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment and 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (each of the a hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly working close to Shcherbynivka and Leonidivka.[44]Components of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (a hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly working close to Toretsk.[45]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Pokrovsk course on March 25 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior northwest of Shevchenko, northeast of Pishchane, west of Uspenivka, west of Nadiivka, and inside Solone (all southwest of Pokrovsk).[46] A Russian supply claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Uspenivka.[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces occupied half of Solone, roughly half of Tarasivka, and residential areas close to Kotlyne.[48]
Russian forces attacked close to Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk close to Zelene Pole and Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk close to Shevchenko and Vidrodzhennya (previously Novyi Trud); southwest of Pokrovsk close to Kotlyne, Udachne, Preobrazhenka, Bohdanivka, Uspenivka, and Solone and towards Novoserhiivka and Kotlyarivka on March 24 and 25.[49] Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Pokrovsk close to Tarasivka, south of Pokrovsk close to Shevchenko, and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Udachne and Kotlyne.[50]
Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Main Viktor Trehubov acknowledged on March 24 that Russian assaults within the Pokrovsk course just lately intensified after a latest temporary pause however that the depth of Russian assaults will not be as excessive as in February 2025, probably as a consequence of giant Russian personnel and tools losses.[51] The pinnacle of the digital and cyber warfare service of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Pokrovsk course acknowledged that Russian forces are utilizing a mean of 100 to 150 first-person view (FPV) drones per day within the Pokrovsk course however that Russian drone utilization relies on climate situations.[52]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian ninetieth Tank Division (forty first CAA, Central Navy District [CMD]) are reportedly working close to Sribne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[53] Components of the 506th and 589th motorized rifle regiments (each of the twenty seventh Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly working close to Uspenivka.[54] Components of the 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (twenty seventh Motorized Rifle Division), thirtieth Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD), and 1453rd Regiment (1st Slavic Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly working close to Solone.[55] Components of the thirty third Motorized Rifle Regiment (twentieth Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly working close to Tarasivka.[56] Drone operators of the “Vizantiya” detachment and Vanya Ivanov group are reportedly working within the Pokrovsk course.[57]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kurakhove course on March 25 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior towards Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove) and a minimum of 500 meters deep and a couple of.05 kilometers huge close to Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[58]
Russian forces attacked southwest of Kurakhove close to Rozlyv and west of Kurakhove close to Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, Ulakly, and Oleksiivka on March 24 and 25.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Rozlyv and Kostyantynopil.[60]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Military Corps [AC], Japanese Navy District [EMD]) and the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Common Workers’s Most important Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly working close to Kostyantynopil.[61]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velyka Novosilka course on March 25 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka close to Dniproenerhiya, Vesele, Skudne, and Novoocheretuvate; and northwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Vilne Pole; and west of Velyka Novosilka close to Novopil on March 24 and 25.[62] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked close to Vesele and Vilne Pole.[63]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly working within the Shakhtarske (east of Velyka Novosilka) course.[64]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Keep frontline positions and safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces just lately superior within the western Zaporizhia course.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on March 24 and 25 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior in central Stepove (northwest of Robotyne) and in southern Lobkove (northwest of Robotyne).[65]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne close to Lobkove, Maly Shcherbaky, Stepove, and Kamyanske on March 24 and 25.[66]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 247th VDV (Airborne) Regiment and the 108th VDV Regiment (each seventh VDV Division) are reportedly working close to Lobkove.[67] Components of the Russian nineteenth Motorized Rifle Division (58th Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Navy District [SMD]) are reportedly working alongside the Stepove-Kamyanske line.[68] Drone operators of the Russian BARS-37 Sarmat Detachment (Russian Fight Military Reserve) are reportedly working within the Zaporizhia course.[69]
Russian forces carried out restricted offensive operations within the Kherson course on March 25 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked within the Dnipro course on March 24 and 25.[70]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces carried out a collection of missile and drone strikes towards Ukraine on the night time of March 24 and 25. The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea and 139 Shahed and decoy drones from the instructions of Kursk Metropolis; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[71] The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Ukrainian forces downed 78 drones and that 34 drones have been ”misplaced,” probably as a consequence of Ukrainian digital warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officers reported that Russian forces struck infrastructure in Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Cherkasy, and Odesa oblasts and {that a} Russian missile broken civilian infrastructure, together with a faculty in Sumy Metropolis, injuring 23 youngsters.[72]
Russian Mobilization and Pressure Technology Efforts (Russian goal: Develop fight energy with out conducting normal mobilization)
The Russian army continues to disclaim rotations to troopers who’ve been combating within the struggle in Ukraine for years. Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged throughout a gathering of the Council for Tradition and Arts on March 25 that the Russian MoD is contemplating points surrounding rotations for servicemembers who went to the entrance earlier within the full-scale invasion.[73] Putin acknowledged that the “challenge is acute” and vaguely claimed that Russian authorities “will proceed from the realities which might be creating on the frontline.” Putin claimed that many mobilized servicemembers who haven’t had rotations have gained a lot fight expertise through the years that “a lot of them have grow to be skilled troopers” and work alongside personnel from skilled army items, like naval infantry and airborne (VDV) components.
Russian Technological Variations (Russian goal: Introduce technological improvements to optimize techniques to be used in Ukraine)
Nothing important to report.
Actions in Russian-occupied areas (Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian residents into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance techniques)
ISW will not be publishing protection of actions in Russian-occupied areas at this time.
Important exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Belarus could also be creating army infrastructure to deal with Russian nuclear warheads. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Belarusian service Radio Svaboda reported on March 24 that satellite tv for pc imagery confirmed that Belarus expanded the development of hangars for Iskander ballistic missiles in Asipovichy, Belarus, from October 2022 to February 2025, and that development work is in its ultimate stage.[74] The New York Occasions reported in Could 2024 that satellite tv for pc imagery indicated that Belarus had been establishing amenities that would home nuclear warheads on the Belarusian 1405th Artillery Ammunition Base, which is positioned 12 kilometers away from the Iskander storage website in Asipovichy.[75] Radio Svaboda famous that Belarus is establishing a separate railway to attach the Belarusian 1405th Artillery Ammunition Base with the Iskander ballistic missile storage website in Asipovichy and a “radiation prevention” website in Malaya Garozha (6km northeast of Asipovichy).[76] ISW continues to evaluate that neither Russia nor Belarus seeks nuclear escalation and that their use of nuclear weapons stays unlikely.
Word: ISW doesn’t obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly accessible info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially accessible satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the premise for these stories. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.
[1] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-russia-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-ukraine-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/
[2] https://x.com/rustem_umerov/standing/1904549709349339531; http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76526
[3] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-russia-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-ukraine-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/; http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76526; https://x.com/rustem_umerov/standing/1904549709349339531
[4] https://suspilne dot media/979369-zelenskij-ukraina-peredala-ssa-spisok-obektiv-po-akih-rf-ne-mae-zavdavati-udariv/ ; https://x.com/Mylovanov/standing/1904600910866850196
[5] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76534
[6] https://suspilne dot media/979449-umerov-gotovi-organizuvati-tehnicnu-zustric-sodo-implementacii-domovlenostej-v-er-riadi/
[7] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-ukraine-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-russia-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/; https://x.com/rustem_umerov/standing/1904549709349339531
[8] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76526
[9] https://x.com/rustem_umerov/standing/1904549709349339531
[10] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-russia-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/; http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76526; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-ukraine-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/; https://x.com/rustem_umerov/standing/1904549709349339531
[11] https://peacemaker.un.org/websites/default/recordsdata/doc/recordsdata/2024/05/blackseagraininitiativefulltext.pdf ; https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative
[12] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-ukraine-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/; https://x.com/rustem_umerov/standing/1904549709349339531
[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025
[14] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76526
[15] https://peacemaker.un.org/websites/default/recordsdata/doc/recordsdata/2024/05/blackseagraininitiativefulltext.pdf
[16] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76526; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-russia-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/
[17] https://www.bbc.com/information/stay/c4g7w7521w0t?submit=assetpercent3Ae2e56d86-788f-473f-8baa-4cb4a1d19061; https://suspilne dot media/979433-ssa-rozgladaut-znatta-castini-sankcij-z-rf-v-obmin-na-peremira-u-cornomu-mori-tramp/
[18] https://www.bbc.com/information/stay/c4g7w7521w0t?submit=assetpercent3Ae2e56d86-788f-473f-8baa-4cb4a1d19061
[19] https://peacemaker.un.org/websites/default/recordsdata/doc/recordsdata/2024/05/blackseagraininitiativefulltext.pdf
[20] https://x.com/Mylovanov/standing/1904600919368446324
[21] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/standing/1904447071035257015; https://t.me/OMBr67/2499; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8727 ; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/standing/1904307640689123609; https://t.me/OMBr67/2499; https://x.com/klinger66/standing/1904317580573045092
[22] https://t.me/sashakots/52698
[23] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25903 ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/979125-na-sumsini-zbilsilas-sira-zona-dani-karti-deep-state/ ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22031 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25502; https://t.me/dva_majors/67589
[24] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2238 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50540
[25] https://t.me/rybar/69119
[26] https://t.me/notes_veterans/22639 ; https://t.me/romanov_92/46430 ; https://t.me/rybar/69119 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25502
[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/25495 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25502 ; https://t.me/rybar/69119 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22043 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20926 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/19250
[28] https://t.me/wargonzo/25495 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33790 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33791 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25512 ; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/10776 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20926 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159055 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159099
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6834
[30] https://t.me/tass_agency/307440; https://t.me/dva_majors/67589
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6834
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22347; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6834
[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/50548
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22347; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6834
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22347; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6834; https://t.me/dva_majors/67589
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22347; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318
[37] https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1904548988717572326; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1904549129478426924; https://t.me/tytanybpla/89;
[38] https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1904555048694087706; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1882911634450268476; https://t.me/azov_media/6662
[39] https://t.me/dva_majors/67589; https://t.me/yurasumy/22042; https://t.me/dva_majors/67560; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33824; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159109
[40] https://t.me/rybar/69129
[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33794; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159109; https://t.me/rybar/69129; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88706; https://t.me/yurasumy/22042
[42] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33794
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22347; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6834
[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33794; https://t.me/dva_majors/67560
[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33796
[46] https://t.me/yurasumy/22044; https://t.me/wargonzo/25502; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33840; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33807; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33807; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33849
[47] https://t.me/yurasumy/22044
[48] https://t.me/yurasumy/22044; https://t.me/rybar/69129; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33807; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33840
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22347; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318
[50] https://t.me/wargonzo/25502; https://t.me/rybar/69129
[51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/24/i-yih-menshe-i-tehniky-v-nyh-menshe-u-rosiyan-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-problemy-z-pihotoyu/
[52] https://youtu.be/_fTI1PEp2DQ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/25/vid-100-do-150-fpv-droniv-na-den-vorog-namagayetsya-zahopyty-povitrya-pid-pokrovskom/
[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/50546
[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33797
[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33840
[56] https://t.me/rybar/69129; https://t.me/dva_majors/67589; https://t.me/yurasumy/22042
[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25944; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159045
[58] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159130; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88720; https://t.me/voin_dv/14076
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22347; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6834; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88720
[60] https://t.me/wargonzo/25502; https://t.me/voin_dv/14076; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159130
[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33826
[62] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6834; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318; https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02CbB8DdkSK7NwPiRXYQRZ9HQ1dX72FCH8nh3qnwLr7fgien4a3fZtrWQEyrKCzTK1l; https://t.me/dva_majors/67589
[63] https://t.me/voin_dv/14076; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159130
[64] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159096;
[65] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8733; https://t.me/armagedrontime/128; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8728; https://t.me/brigade128/1797
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22347; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318; https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02CbB8DdkSK7NwPiRXYQRZ9HQ1dX72FCH8nh3qnwLr7fgien4a3fZtrWQEyrKCzTK1l; https://t.me/dva_majors/67589; https://t.me/wargonzo/25502; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20933; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/979159-selo-mali-serbaki-zaporizkoi-oblasti-perebuvae-pid-kontrolem-zsu-sili-oboroni-sprostuvali-zaavi-sodo-okupacii/; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88742
[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88742; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159128
[68] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20933
[69] https://t.me/tass_agency/307434
[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22347
[71] https://t.me/kpszsu/31391
[72] https://t.me/kpszsu/31391; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/978685-armia-rf-atakuvala-poltavsinu-e-travmovani/; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9019; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/34534 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/78197; https://meduza dot io/function/2025/03/25/v-den-peregovorov-s-ssha-rossiya-nanesla-udar-po-tsentru-sum; https://t.me/synegubov/13541
[73] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76525
[74] https://www.svaboda dot org/a/33357342.html
[75] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/10/world/europe/russia-nuclear-weapons-belarus.html
[76] https://www.svaboda dot org/a/33357342.html
