Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 13, 2025

Angelica
Evans, Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, George Barros,
and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter and William Runkel

March 13, 2025, 9:00 pm ET

Observe:
The info cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on March 13. ISW will
cowl subsequent studies within the March 14 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign
Evaluation.

Russian President Vladimir
Putin rejected the ceasefire proposal that america and Ukraine
just lately agreed upon in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and provided another
proposal that undermines US President Donald Trump’s said purpose of
securing an enduring peace in Ukraine. Putin claimed on March 13
that he “agrees” with the short-term ceasefire proposal and that the
“thought itself is appropriate” however that the cessation of hostilities “ought to
be such that it could result in long-term peace and get rid of the preliminary
causes” of the struggle.[1] Putin thus rejected one of many primary ideas of
the US-Ukrainian proposal — that the short-term ceasefire precede formal
negotiations to finish the struggle.[2] Putin additionally claimed that there are
questions that “require painstaking analysis from either side.” Putin
questioned a number of points of the US-Ukrainian short-term ceasefire
proposal. Putin requested what would occur to the remaining Ukrainian
salient in Kursk Oblast and whether or not Ukraine could be allowed to proceed
to mobilize forces, prepare newly mobilized troopers, and obtain
army help from its companions and allies. Putin questioned the management
and verification measures of a short lived ceasefire and who would give
the orders to cease combating. Putin prompt that he might name President
Trump to debate the “points” concerned within the ceasefire proposal. Putin
postured army energy throughout his rejection of the ceasefire
proposal, highlighting latest Russian successes in pushing Ukrainian
forces out of Kursk Oblast and claiming that Russian forces are
advancing in “nearly all areas of fight.”

Putin’s
rejection of the ceasefire is in line with March 12 studies from
Russian insider sources in regards to the Kremlin’s possible response to the
proposal.[3] Bloomberg reported on March 12 that sources
accustomed to the Kremlin’s considering and the scenario said that Putin
will “stretch the timeline” for agreeing to the short-term ceasefire in
order to make sure that his stipulations “are taken under consideration.” A supply
near the Kremlin said that Russia might demand a halt to weapons
provides to Ukraine as a situation of the short-term ceasefire. Russian
opposition outlet Verstka reported on March 12 {that a} supply
near the Russian Presidential Administration said that the Kremlin
would “formally” give a “constructive response” to the short-term ceasefire
proposal however would additionally demand “unimaginable circumstances” to which Ukraine
can’t agree. The supply said that Putin needs to take away Ukraine from
talks in order that Russia can have interaction in negotiations with america
alone whereas additionally “correcting the scenario on the entrance” to strengthen
Russia’s negotiating place. ISW assessed on March 12 that these
Russian insider supply leaks might have been intentional and a part of a
Russian negotiating technique that goals to push america to
renegotiate its cope with Ukraine on the short-term ceasefire.[4] Putin’s
response to the ceasefire supply means that they could even have been
a minimum of partially correct.

Putin is providing an
different ceasefire settlement that’s opposite to the intentions and
targets of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal. The US-Ukrainian
ceasefire proposal requires a renewable 30-day cessation of fight
operations alongside the complete frontline, a moratorium on long-range
missile and drone strikes, and a cessation of operations within the Black
Sea.[5] The proposal permits for Russia and Ukraine to increase the
ceasefire and assumes the continuation of US intelligence sharing and US
and different army help to Ukraine. The US-Ukrainian ceasefire
proposal was explicitly geared toward permitting Russia and Ukraine to
show their willingness to make peace and separates the short-term
ceasefire from future negotiations to finish the struggle.

Putin’s
envisioned ceasefire settlement would grant Russia enormously
disproportionate benefits and set circumstances for the Kremlin to resume
hostilities on phrases extraordinarily favorable to Russia. Putin’s
envisioned ceasefire settlement would possible require america
and Ukraine’s different supporters to pause army help to Ukraine
and require Ukraine to cease recruiting and coaching personnel. Such a
ceasefire settlement would start to disarm Ukraine if renewed for a protracted
time frame by stopping its army from reconstituting, coaching,
and equipping itself and would trigger Ukraine and the West to give up
important leverage to Russia. Putin didn’t counsel that Russia would
additionally stop army recruitment efforts, the manufacturing of army
tools, and the receipt of army help from Russia’s allies.
Russia’s capacity to proceed these measures throughout a possible ceasefire
whereas stopping Ukraine from doing so would enable Russia to renew
offensive operations with higher manned and geared up models at a time of
its selecting. Russian forces are at present on the offensive throughout the
theater, as Putin noticed, so calls for that may forestall Ukrainian
forces from reconstituting can solely be meant to protect or improve
Russia’s capacity to renew the offensive at a later date.  Such calls for
would appear a transparent indication that Putin will not be, in reality, dedicated to
making peace.

Putin’s makes an attempt to introduce a brand new
ceasefire settlement on phrases that asymmetrically profit Russia ignore
Trump’s said intention that the ceasefire set circumstances for
negotiations towards a extra complete peace settlement sooner or later.
An settlement alongside the strains Putin seems to offer would
undermine the Trump administration’s said goal of bringing a couple of
sustainable peace in Ukraine, would reinforce Putin’s perception that
Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine, and would incentivize Putin to
resume army operations in opposition to Ukraine slightly than making any
concessions in formal negotiations to finish the struggle.

Putin
is holding the ceasefire proposal hostage and is trying to extract
preemptive concessions forward of formal negotiations to finish the struggle. Putin
refused to just accept the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal by itself phrases
and is as a substitute demanding extra circumstances that may contribute
on to the Kremlin’s struggle goals. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio
said on March 11 that the US will “know what the obstacle is to
peace” in Ukraine if Putin rejected the ceasefire proposal.[6] ISW
continues to evaluate that Putin is disinterested in good religion peace
negotiations to finish the struggle.[7] Putin stays dedicated to undertaking
his long-term targets of putting in a pro-Russian puppet regime in
Ukraine, undermining Ukraine’s capacity to defend itself in opposition to future
Russian aggression and stopping Ukraine’s accession to NATO. Putin’s
rejection of the ceasefire proposal underscores Putin’s dedication to
securing his aims in Ukraine, significantly Ukraine’s
demilitarization, and disinterest in any pause in combating that doesn’t
lead to Ukrainian capitulation or a minimum of set circumstances for a
profitable renewal of Russian offensive operations sooner or later.

Russian
forces proceed to clear Ukrainian forces from Sudzha and its environs
as Russian troops advance nearer to the border in Kursk Oblast slowed on
March 13 in comparison with latest days. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief
Common Oleksandr Syrskyi said on March 12 that he ordered Ukrainian
forces to withdraw from some unspecified positions inside the Kursk
salient and transfer to extra advantageous defensive positions in Kursk
Oblast with a view to save Ukrainian lives.[8] The Russian Ministry of
Protection’s (MoD) Foremost Navy-Political Directorate Deputy Head and
Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Main Common Apti Alaudinov, claimed that
Russian forces seized and cleared Sudzha and are attacking the remaining
settlements alongside the worldwide border.[9] Russian sources claimed
that Russian forces are clearing Sudzha and seized Podol (instantly
south of Sudzha), Goncharovka (simply west of Sudzha), Zaoleshenka (simply
northwest of Sudzha), Rubanshchina (west of Sudzha), and Molovoi (south
of Sudzha).[10] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are
advancing in the direction of Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha instantly on the
Russian-Ukrainian border) and that Ukrainian forces preserve positions
in Oleshnya, Gogolevka (northeast of Oleshnya), Guyevo (south of
Sudzha), and Gornal (southwest of Guyevo instantly on the
Russian-Ukrainian border).[11] A Russian milblogger continued to say
that renewed Ukrainian HIMARS strikes are slowing the speed of Russian
advances south of Sudzha.[12] Drone operators from the “Rubikon” Heart
for Superior Unmanned Applied sciences are reportedly working close to
Sudzha.[13]

Russian forces additionally marginally superior in
northern Sumy Oblast. Geolocated footage printed on March 12 signifies
that Russian forces superior northwest of Basivka (northeast of Sumy
Metropolis).[14] Syrskyi said that Russian airborne (VDV) and Spetsnaz
forces are attacking alongside the worldwide border and trying to
advance additional into Sumy Oblast.[15] Ukraine’s State Border Service
Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko said on March 12 that Russian forces are
trying to interdict Ukrainian floor strains of communication (GLOCs)
alongside the worldwide border close to Novenke (northeast of Sumy
Metropolis).[16] A Ukrainian supply affiliated with Ukrainian army
intelligence said on March 13 that Russian forces are utilizing
all-terrain autos (ATVs) in northern Sumy Oblast and try
to leverage their manpower benefit to advance within the space.[17] Russian
milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking close to
Zhuravka, Basivka, and Novenke (all northeast of Sumy Metropolis).[18]

Russian
milbloggers theorized on March 13 that Russian forces might launch an
organized offensive operation into northern Sumy Oblast within the coming
weeks and months and may additionally assault into Chernihiv Oblast — in line
with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s March 12 statements.[19] One
Russian milblogger claimed that an offensive into Sumy Oblast would
considerably strengthen Russia’s place in future peace
negotiations.[20] Putin requested Russian Chief of the Common Workers Common
Valery Gerasimov throughout a go to to a Russian command publish in Kursk
Oblast on March 12 to “suppose sooner or later about making a safety
zone” alongside the Ukrainian-Russian worldwide border.[21] Putin and
different Kremlin officers beforehand justified Russia’s offensive
operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast as an try to ascertain a
“buffer zone” to guard Belgorod Metropolis from Ukrainian shelling.[22]
Putin might assess that Russian forces could make important advances into
northern Ukraine following their comparatively faster advances in Kursk
Oblast over the earlier week, although Russian forces have
didn’t make important advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast over the
final ten months.

Kremlin officers proceed to
use narratives comparable to those who the Kremlin has used to justify its
invasions of Ukraine to set informational circumstances to justify future
aggression in opposition to NATO member states. Russian Presidential
Aide and former Safety Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed in
an interview with Russian nationwide security-focused journal Nationwide Protection printed
on March 13 that NATO “historically” makes use of threats as its primary
instrument in interstate relations and that NATO’s “European wing” is
persevering with its coverage on “blocking” Russia within the Baltic area.
Patrushev claimed that the UK (UK) is “orchestrating” NATO’s
“aggravation of the scenario” as a part of efforts to disrupt
negotiations on Ukraine and Russian and American makes an attempt to normalize
their bilateral relations. Patrushev additionally claimed that the Finnish
inhabitants, in contrast to Finnish authorities, is pleasant to Russia and that
the UK has accepted Finnish authorities to “do every little thing to deprive
their nation [Finland] of its sovereignty.” Patrushev threateningly
claimed that the Gulf of Finland has a historic “geographic
affiliation with Russia” and that “it shouldn’t be forgotten that
Finland was a part of the Russian Empire.” Patrushev claimed that the
Russian Empire “revered” and “preserved” the Finnish folks and
language within the Grand Duchy of Finland. Patrushev appeared to attempt to
examine Russia’s present struggle in opposition to Ukraine to the Soviet-Finnish
Winter Battle in 1939–1940. Patrushev claimed that Finnish makes an attempt to
seize Soviet lands and “actively militarize” created a risk to the
USSR and that Finland was “indiscriminately exterminating” the Slavic
inhabitants in Karelia. Patrushev claimed that the West is “once more turning
[Finland] right into a springboard” for aggression in opposition to Russia. The
Kremlin has used comparable false narratives in regards to the Ukrainian
authorities’s discrimination of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine
and the army threats that Ukraine supposedly poses to Russia in
order to justify Moscow’s invasions of Ukraine. Patrushev’s claims that
the UK is “orchestrating” Finland’s and the Baltic states’ allegedly
threatening conduct are possible a part of the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to
drive wedges between america and Europe and to weaken
NATO[23] The Kremlin seems to be utilizing the identical normal narrative
playbook that it has used in opposition to Ukraine and different former Soviet states
however is adjusting its narratives to take advantage of any tensions amongst Western
states.

Russian forces proceed to execute Ukrainian prisoners of struggle (POW) in violation of worldwide regulation. Ukrainian
Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on March 13 that there’s footage of
Russian forces allegedly executing 5 unarmed Ukrainian POWs in an
unspecified space.[24] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported
on March 13 that there’s footage reportedly filmed close to Kazachya Loknya
(north of Sudzha in Kursk Oblast) displaying 5 deceased Ukrainian
POWs.[25] ISW has noticed and reported on quite a few cases of Russian
servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs alongside the frontline in Ukraine
and Kursk Oblast and continues to evaluate that this can be a systemic development
within the Russian army and that Russian commanders are both complicit
in or straight enabling their subordinates to conduct such
atrocities.[26]

Russia will possible increase its
everlasting army basing in Belarus to reinforce Russia’s pressure posture
in opposition to NATO’s jap flank. Russian President Vladimir Putin
and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met in Moscow on March 13
and ratified the Russian-Belarus Union State treaty on safety
ensures.[27] The treaty permits Russia to ascertain army bases
and infrastructure in Belarus.[28] Putin famous that the treaty on
safety ensures defines Russia’s and Belarus’ mutual allied
obligations to make sure their protection and safety utilizing “the complete
out there arsenal of forces and means.” Putin famous that Russia has
deployed a joint Regional Group of Forces, fashionable Russian protection
techniques, and tactical nuclear weapons to Belarusian territory — all of
which Putin claimed “reliably covers” the western borders of Belarus and
Russia. ISW forecasted in 2021 that Russia might deploy a everlasting
Russian pressure presence in Belarus with a view to improve Russia’s capability
to threaten NATO’s jap flank and continues to evaluate that the
Kremlin is utilizing the Union State framework to advance its strategic
effort to de facto annex Belarus.[29]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian
  President Vladimir Putin rejected the ceasefire proposal that the
  United States and Ukraine just lately agreed upon in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
  and provided another proposal that undermines US President Donald
  Trump’s said purpose of securing an enduring peace in Ukraine.
• Putin
  is providing another ceasefire settlement that’s opposite to the
  intentions and targets of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal.
• Putin’s
  envisioned ceasefire settlement would grant Russia enormously
  disproportionate benefits and set circumstances for the Kremlin to resume
  hostilities on phrases extraordinarily favorable to Russia.
• Putin
  is holding the ceasefire proposal hostage and is trying to extract
  preemptive concessions forward of formal negotiations to finish the struggle.
• Russian
  forces proceed to clear Ukrainian forces from Sudzha and its environs
  as Russian troops advance nearer to the border in Kursk Oblast slowed on
  March 13 in comparison with latest days.
• Russian
  milbloggers theorized on March 13 that Russian forces might launch an
  organized offensive operation into northern Sumy Oblast within the coming
  weeks and months and may additionally assault into Chernihiv Oblast — in line
  with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s March 12 statements.
• Kremlin
  officers proceed to make use of narratives comparable to those who the Kremlin
  has used to justify its invasions of Ukraine to set informational
  circumstances to justify future aggression in opposition to NATO member states.
• Russian forces proceed to execute Ukrainian prisoners of struggle (POW) in violation of worldwide regulation
• Russia
  will possible increase its everlasting army basing in Belarus to reinforce
  Russia’s pressure posture in opposition to NATO’s jap flank.

• Ukrainian
  forces just lately superior close to Pokrovsk, and Russian forces just lately
  superior in Sumy Oblast and close to Lyman, Siversk, and Toretsk.
• Russia
  continues its crypto-mobilization efforts in opposition to the backdrop of US
  efforts to start out the negotiation course of to finish the struggle.

Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation

See topline textual content for studies on Russian exercise in Kursk Oblast and northern Sumy Oblast.

Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported
on March 13, citing sources in Ukrainian intelligence, that drone
operators of Ukraine’s Foremost Navy Intelligence Directorate (GUR)
struck the Kaluga Aerated Concrete Plant in Kaluga Metropolis.[30] The sources
said that Russia arrange a short lived drone manufacturing line on the
facility. Kaluga Oblast Governor Vladislav Shapsha said that particles
from downed drones struck an industrial enterprise in Dzerzhinsky Raoin,
inflicting a fireplace.[31]

Russian Foremost Effort – Jap Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Foremost Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border
with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of
Kharkiv Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kharkiv course on March 13 however didn’t advance.

Russian forces carried out offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk on March 12 and 13.[32]

Russian Subordinate Foremost Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk course on March 13 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 13 that Russian forces
superior 700 meters from bridgeheads within the Fyholivka-Novomlynsk space
in the direction of Krasne Pershe and 600 meters within the Topoli course in the direction of
Kamyanka (all northeast of Kupyansk).[33] Ukrainian army observer
Kostyantyn Mashovets said on March 13 that Ukrainian forces preserve
defensive positions in western Zapadne (north of Kupyansk) and in
northwestern Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk) regardless of Russian makes an attempt
to thoroughly seize these settlements.[34] Mashovets additionally said that
Ukrainian forces counterattacked within the space west of Synkivka and the
Oskil River’s east (left) financial institution and north of Kupyansk close to jap
Zapadne and efficiently pushed Russian forces again east of the
Kupyansk-Dvorichna P-79 highway between Zapadne and Doroshivka (west of
Zapadne).[35]

Russian forces continued conducting floor
assaults north of Kupyansk close to Doroshivka; northeast of Kupyansk close to
Topoli and Krasne Pershe alongside the Oskil River as a part of Russian
efforts to ascertain a brand new bridgehead on the river’s west (proper) financial institution;
east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk close to
Stepova Novoselivka on March 12 and 13.[36] Russian forces are
reportedly growing their operational tempo within the Kupyansk course.
Ukrainian army officers working within the Kupyansk and Lyman
instructions reported that Russian forces just lately elevated their
exercise within the space and that Russian forces are attacking with
mechanized tools and huge numbers of personnel.[37]  Khortytsia
Group of Forces Spokesperson Main Viktor Trehubov said that Russian
forces used earlier icy climate to switch tools and infantry
throughout the frozen Oskil River to the west (proper) financial institution.[38]

Order
of Battle: Mashovets said that components of the Russian twenty fifth Motorized
Rifle Brigade (sixth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Leningrad Navy
District [LMD]) are working close to Synkvika.[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova course on March 13, however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 13 that Russian forces
superior west of Kolisnykivka and southwest of Kruhlyakivka (each
northeast of Borova) within the course of Bohuslavka (south of
Kruhlyakivka).[40]

Russian forces carried out floor assaults
northeast of Borova close to Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova close to
Hrekivka on March 12 and 13.[41] Ukrainian forces reportedly carried out
counterattacked east of Borova close to Nadiya.[42]

Order of
Battle: Parts of Russia’s 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd
Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Military [GTA], MMD) are
reportedly working within the neighborhood of Bohuslavka and southern
Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[43] Parts of the 752nd Motorized
Rifle Regiment (third Motorized Rifle Division, twentieth CAA, MMD) are
reportedly working close to Nadiya.[44]

Russian forces just lately superior within the Lyman course.

Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on March 13 signifies
that Russian forces just lately superior in southern Novolyubivka
(northeast of Lyman).[45]

Russian
forces continued floor assaults north of Lyman towards Nove, Zelena
Dolyna, and Novomykhailivka and northeast of Lyman close to Yampolivka,
Myrne, and Kolodyazi on March 12 and 13.[46] Russian forces are
reportedly attacking within the course of Nove and south of Yampolivka
in opposition to organized Ukrainian defenses.[47]

Russian Subordinate Foremost Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces just lately superior within the Siversk course.

Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on March 12 signifies
that Russian forces just lately superior to the T-0513 Siversk-Bakhmut
freeway northwest of Sakko i Vantsetti (southeast of Siversk).[48]
Extra geolocated footage printed on March 13 signifies that
Russian forces just lately superior to jap Vasyukivka (west of Sakko i
Vantsetti).[49]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger
claimed that Russian forces superior two kilometers within the forested space
south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[50]

Russian
forces carried out offensive operations northeast of Siversk close to
Bilohorivka, east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of
Siversk close to Ivano-Darivka on March 12 and 13.[51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar course on March 13 however didn’t advance.

Russian
forces carried out offensive operations close to Chasiv Yar itself and
southeast of Chasiv Yar close to Ozaryanivka on March 13.[52]

Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that unspecified Russian airborne
(VDV) components superior inside Chasiv Yar.[53]

A Russian
milblogger claimed that troublesome terrain and Ukrainian first-person
view (FPV) drone exercise are complicating Russian advances close to
Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[54] The milblogger claimed that Russian
forces are utilizing FPV drones with fiber-optic cables with a view to
overcome Ukrainian digital warfare (EW) techniques within the Chasiv Yar
course.

Russian forces just lately superior within the Toretsk course.

Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on March 13 signifies
that Russian forces just lately superior alongside Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Avenue
in northern Toretsk.[55]

ISW recessed assessed Russian
advances from its map in northwestern Toretsk and Shcherbynkivka (west
of Toretsk), as ISW has not noticed proof of an everlasting Russian
presence in these areas, and since ISW has noticed restricted Ukrainian
counterattacks in central Toretsk. These modifications didn’t happen within the
previous 24 hours. Russian milbloggers have just lately claimed that Ukrainian
forces have counterattacked and seized positions within the space.[56]

Russian
forces carried out offensive operations close to Toretsk itself; east of
Toretsk close to Druzhba; and southwest of Toretsk close to Leonidivka on March
12 and 13.[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are
counterattacking inside and close to Toretsk.[58]

Ukrainian
Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro
Zaporozhets said that Russian forces have just lately considerably
elevated the variety of artillery strikes and assaults within the Toretsk
course and have elevated the dimensions of their infantry assault teams
from two-to-five personnel to as much as 10 personnel.[59]

Order
of Battle: Zaporozhets said that components of the Russian one hundred and fiftieth
Motorized Rifle Division (eighth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern
Navy District [SMD]) are working within the Toretsk course.[60]

Ukrainian forces just lately superior within the Pokrovsk course.  

Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage printed on March 11 and 13
signifies that Ukrainian forces just lately superior to the southern
outskirts of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk) and have seized many of the
settlement.[61] ISW can’t verify that Ukrainian forces have completely
liberated Shevchenko at the moment, nonetheless.

Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior west of
Nadiivka towards Kotlyarivka and south and southeast of Sribne (all
southwest of Pokrovsk).[62]  A Russian supply claimed that Ukrainian
forces marginally superior in southern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk)
and that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces to the northern
outskirts of Shevchenko.[63]

Russian forces attacked
northeast of Pokrovsk close to Vodyane Druhe; east of Pokrovsk close to
Yelyzavetivka and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka,
Novotroitske, and Dachenske; south of Pokrovsk close to Shevchenko and
Zelene; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Pishchane, Kotlyne, Uspenivka,
Sribne, Novooleksandrivka, Novoserhiivka, Kotlyarivka, Zvirove,
Novoukrainka, Yasenove, and Nadiivka on March 12 and 13.[64] Russian
milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking close to
Shevchenko and Udachne.[65]

The spokesperson for a
Ukrainian brigade working within the Pokrovsk course said on March 13
that Russian exercise within the space has decreased in comparison with the beginning
of March 2025, that Russian forces proceed to assault in small infantry
teams, and that Russian forces are utilizing fewer gentle armored autos
within the space.[66] The spokesperson famous that Russian forces conduct extra
assaults when the climate is cloudy – possible as a result of decreased threat
of Ukrainian drone strikes and reconnaissance – and don’t use autos
throughout clear climate. The spokesperson said that Russian forces assault
alongside the identical route and on the identical time and that the primary group of
Russian forces typically assault with out weapons. Ukrainian army observer
Kostyantyn Mashovets said on March 13 that Ukrainian forces occupy
Preobrazhenka (southwest of Pokrovsk), which is hampering Russian
advances in Nadiivka (north of Preobrazhenka) and alongside the
Sribne-Troitske line (southwest of Pokrovsk and south of
Preobrazhenka).[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces
occupy roughly 50 p.c of Shevchenko.[68] A Russian supply claimed
that Russian forces try to regain misplaced positions in Udachne,
Pishchane, Shevchenko, and Zelene.[69]

Order of Battle:
Drone operators of the Russian thirty third Motorized Rifle Regiment (twentieth
Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA, SMD) are reportedly working close to
Tarasivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), and components of the four-hundredth Artillery
Regiment, 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (each reportedly of the ninetieth
Tank Division, forty first CAA, Central Navy District [CMD]) and 589th
Motorized Rifle Regiment (twenty seventh Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD)
are reportedly working within the Pokrovsk course.[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kurakhove course on March 13 however didn’t advance.

Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 13 that Russian forces
superior west of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[71]

Russian
forces attacked west of Kurakhove close to Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, and
Oleksiivka and southwest of Kurakhove close to Rozlyv on March 12 and
13.[72]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian eleventh Air
Drive and Air Protection Military (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Jap
Navy District [EMD]) are reportedly working close to Bahatyr (west of
Kurakhove).[73] Mashovets said that components of the Russian a hundred and tenth and
114th motorized rifle brigades (each 51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk
Folks’s Republic Military Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are working close to Andriivka
and that components of the thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, EMD),
thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, EMD), and 57th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (fifth CAA, EMD) are working within the Kurakhove course.[74]

Russian
Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko and DNR
Head Denis Pushilin visited Russian-occupied Kurakhove on March 13, and
Kiriyenko spoke with troopers of the fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st
CAA).[75]

Russian forces continued offensive
operations within the Velyka Novosilka course on March 13 however didn’t
make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims:
A Russian milblogger claimed on March 13 that Russian forces superior
east of Dniproenerhiya (north of Velyka Novosilka) and north and west of
Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[76]

Russian
forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Burlatske; west of
Velyka Novosilka close to Pryvilne and Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka
Novosilka close to Novopil and Novodarivka on March 12 and 13.[77]

Mashovets
said on March 13 that Ukrainian counterattacks pressured Russian forces
to withdraw eastward from Novosilka and from the realm between Burlatske
and Pryvilne.[78]

Order of Battle: Mashovets said that
components of the Russian fortieth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet);
336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet); sixtieth Motorized Rifle
Brigade (fifth CAA); thirty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, EMD); fifth
Tank Brigade (thirty sixth CAA); and thirty fourth Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty ninth CAA,
SMD) are reportedly working within the Velyka Novosilka course.[79]
Mashovets said that components of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle
Division are working on the Shevchenko-Burlatske-Pryvilne-Vilne Pole
line (northwest of Velyka Novosilka). Parts of the Russian 394th
Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, fifth CAA) are
reportedly working close to Burlatske.[80]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions and safe rear areas in opposition to Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued floor assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 13 however didn’t make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized
Pyatykhatky (northwest of Robotyne) and superior north of Pyatykhatky,
southeast and southwest of Mali Shcherbaky (northwest of Robotyne), and
in southern Mali Shcherbaky.[81]

Russian forces carried out
floor assaults northwest of Robotyne close to Pyatykhatky, Stepove,
Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske and towards Novoandriivka on March 12 and
13.[82]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 247th Airborne
(VDV) Regiment (seventh VDV Division) are reportedly working within the
Zaporizhia course, and components of the Chechen “Vostok-Akhmat”
Battalion are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions close to Novodanylivka
(north of Robotyne).[83]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported floor assaults within the Kherson course on March 13.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)

Russian
forces carried out a sequence of missile and drone strikes in opposition to Ukraine
on the night time of March 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that
Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile from Kursk
Oblast and 117 Shahed and decoy drones from the instructions of Kursk and
Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk,
Krasnodar Krai.[84] The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Ukrainian
forces shot down 74 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kyiv,
Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Odesa, and
Mykolaiv oblasts and that 38 decoy drones had been “misplaced,” possible as a result of
Ukrainian digital warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officers
said that Russian forces struck crucial and civilian infrastructure
in Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia
oblasts.[85]

Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported
on March 13 that the Ukrainian public group Unbiased
Anti-Corruption Fee (NAKO) said that Russia is growing its
manufacturing of guided glide bombs with a minimum of 26 factories in Russia
concerned within the manufacturing of glide bomb parts.[86] NAKO famous that
not all of those factories are linked to the Russian authorities. NAKO
famous that Russia just lately improved the bombs’ “Comet” navigation
system, which Russia additionally installs on drones and missiles. NAKO senior
researcher Viktoria Vyshnivska said that Russia elevated the quantity
of antennas within the “Comet” navigation system from eight to 12 to
lower the possibilities of Ukrainian forces interfering with the
projectiles. Vyshnivska famous that it’s unimaginable to fully
isolate Russia with sanctions as NAKO reported that Russia makes use of lots of
of shell and offshore corporations to buy important quantities of
microelectronics for glide bombs. Ukrainian Air Drive Spokesperson
Colonel Yuriy Ihnat said that destroying Russian plane able to
launching glide bombs is without doubt one of the finest methods to counter Russian glide
bomb strikes and an advisor on digital intelligence and
countermeasures of the Ukrainian Ministry of Strategic Trade, Ilya
Kukharenko, famous that Ukrainian digital countermeasures in opposition to
glide bombs embrace spoofing Russian onboard plane radars and utilizing
digital warfare (EW) techniques to affect the navigation of every
particular person aerial bomb.

Russian Mobilization and Drive Technology Efforts (Russian goal: Broaden fight energy with out conducting normal mobilization)

Russia
continues its crypto-mobilization efforts in opposition to the backdrop of US
efforts to start out the negotiation course of to finish the struggle. Russian
opposition outlet Verstka reported on March 13 {that a} supply in
Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin’s workplace said that Moscow Metropolis is
persevering with to recruit volunteer servicemembers (dobrovoltsi) to
struggle in Ukraine and that Russian authorities have issued no steerage
to sluggish army recruitment efforts.[87] One other supply primarily based in Moscow
Metropolis said that Russian authorities are persevering with to distribute
commercials for army recruitment “as regular.” A supply from an
unspecified regional authorities informed Verstka that there are “no
indicators” that Russia is “even shut” to winding down its army
recruitment efforts, and one other supply in a army registration and
enlistment workplace in Siberia cited the specter of a future struggle with NATO
as one justification to proceed recruitment efforts. One other authorities
supply primarily based in Russia’s Far East informed Verstka that Russian
authorities will proceed recruitment efforts quietly within the background
till they obtain additional instruction from the Kremlin.

Russian Technological Variations (Russian goal: Introduce technological improvements to optimize techniques to be used in Ukraine) 

Nothing important to report.

Actions in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed
areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian residents into Russian sociocultural,
financial, army, and governance techniques)

ISW will not be publishing protection of actions in Russian-occupied areas in the present day.