Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 25, 2025

Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Christina Harward, Justin Younger, Olivia Gibson, and Kateryna Stepanenko

August 25, 2025, 8:15 pm ET

Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date each day alongside the static maps current on this report.

Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cell gadget) is strongly advisable for utilizing this data-heavy device.

Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces each day by displaying a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.

Observe: The information cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on August 25. ISW will cowl subsequent reviews within the August 26 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.

Ukrainian forces proceed to strain the Russian penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya. Ukrainian navy observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 25 that Ukrainian forces seized Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and Zapovidne (southeast of Dobropillya and the western sure of the bottom of the Russian penetration).[1] Mashovets acknowledged that Ukrainian forces pushed out Russian forces from positions close to the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk freeway and south of Vesele (northeast of Dobropillya). Mashovets added that Ukrainian forces have nearly utterly cleared Kucheriv Yar (east of Dobropillya). Mashovets’ August 25 report follows reviews from Ukrainian navy officers since August 15 that Ukrainian forces proceed to clear settlements at each the northern extent of the Russian penetration and alongside the bottom of the penetration.[2] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Common Oleksandr Syrskyi acknowledged on August 24 that Ukrainian forces had seized Volodymyrivka, (southeast of Dobropillya and the japanese sure of the bottom of the Russian penetration), and Ukrainian advances alongside the western and japanese bases of the penetration point out that Russian forces are failing to increase the width of the penetration to the extent essential to maintain the depth of the penetration.[3] Mashovets reported on August 25 that these Ukrainian counterattacks threatened to encircle components of the Russian 51st Mixed Arms Military ([CAA], previously 1st Donetsk Individuals’s Republic Military Corps [DNR AC], Southern Navy District [SMD]) working inside the penetration north of the Zapovidne-Mayak-Volodymyrivka line.[4] Mashovets reported that the command of the 51st CAA created an assault group that aimed to interrupt via Ukrainian forces and attain the Russian forces inside the penetration. Mashovets added that components of the first Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) had regrouped and tried to defend towards Ukrainian counterattacks on the western a part of the bottom close to Zapovidne. Mashovets had reported on August 18 that components of the Russian eighth CAA (SMD) had been making an attempt to outflank and threaten Ukrainian forces counterattacking on the japanese a part of the bottom close to Volodymyrivka.[5] These numerous latest reviews of Ukrainian advances within the space, coupled with the shortage of reporting about Russian advances or profitable reinforcement missions inside the penetration, point out that the efforts of each the 51st CAA and eighth CAA to defend the bottom of the penetration might have failed at the moment.

The Russian navy command has reportedly given up efforts to use the penetration towards Dobropillya, after Russia’s infiltration ways seem to have been unsuccessful in establishing enduring positions inside this penetration. Mashovets acknowledged on August 25 that the command of the 51st CAA is now getting ready for assaults straight towards Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), indicating that the 51st CAA has reverted again to its authentic plan following a quick shift in deal with exploiting the penetration northeast of Dobropillya.[6] Mashovets’ report and the latest Ukrainian advances inside the penetration point out that Russian forces probably haven’t established enduring positions inside the salient. Russian milbloggers’ reporting concerning the penetration close to Dobropillya has additionally considerably decreased in latest days and shifted again to specializing in exercise north, east, and southwest of Pokrovsk as an alternative — additional suggesting that Russian forces have been unsuccessful in consolidating and exploiting the penetration and are shifting their focus again on Pokrovsk straight. Russian milbloggers have warned previously week that the penetration close to Dobropillya was too slender relative to its depth, creating vulnerabilities to Ukrainian counterattacks and interdiction.[7] Russian milbloggers additionally beforehand warned that Russian forces needed to widen the penetration’s flanks to maintain the penetration, which Russian forces have failed to take action far.[8] ISW beforehand assessed that Russian infiltration ways and a low manpower density alongside the entrance within the Pokrovsk course appeared to have allowed Russian forces to briefly restore restricted, tactical maneuver east and southeast of Dobropillya, however Russia’s lack of ability to ascertain logistics to help and reinforce the ahead models working inside the penetration have degraded Russia’s potential to widen and exploit the penetration.[9]

Russian Prosecutor Common Igor Krasnov is more likely to develop into the Chairperson of the Russian Supreme Courtroom, reportedly after Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Chairperson Alexander Bastrykin refused the Kremlin’s supply to imagine this place. The Russian Greater Qualification Collegium of Judges (which oversees the collection of candidates for judicial positions) introduced on August 25 that it accomplished accepting functions for the vacant place of Chairperson of the Supreme Courtroom and that Krasnov was the only real candidate who submitted an utility.[10] Moscow-based enterprise newspaper Vedomosti reported on August 21 that the Greater Qualification Collegium of Judges cancelled the required qualification examination for the place resulting from a scarcity of candidates and reported on August 22 that Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded Krasnov the title Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation, exempting Krasnov from the qualification examination.[11] A Russian insider supply claimed on August 25 that Bastrykin, whom Vedomosti beforehand reported was a candidate for the Supreme Courtroom emptiness, lately refused the place for unknown causes throughout a closed-door assembly with Putin.[12] Bastrykin reportedly requested to stay in his place on the Russian Investigative Committee for an additional yr earlier than shifting to develop into the Plenipotentiary Consultant of the Russian President within the Northwestern Federal Okrug. Putin beforehand allowed Bastrykin to stay in workplace previous the age of 70 in September 2024, and ISW assessed on August 20 that the Kremlin might have tried to nominate Bastrykin to function Chairperson of the Supreme Courtroom to open the Sledkom chairperson place to a youthful official with out firing or retiring Bastrykin.[13] The Russian insider supply claimed that the present plenipotentiary consultant, Alexander Gutsan, will succeed Krasnov as Prosecutor Common and that present Minister of Justice Konstantin Chuychenko will exchange Bastrykin as Investigative Committee chairperson.[14] Krasnov has held his place as Prosecutor Common since 2020 and is notably 49 years previous; and Chuychenko is 60 years previous — considerably youthful than the nearly-72-year-old Bastrykin, reflecting the Kremlin’s introduction of youthful officers to senior positions.[15]

Russian authorities lately detained Appearing Kursk Oblast Vice Governor Vladimir Bazarov, probably as a part of the Kremlin’s continued efforts to scapegoat native officers for Russian border safety failures. Appearing Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein advised Kremlin newswire TASS on August 25 that Russian regulation enforcement detained Bazarov as half of a bigger felony case investigating the embezzlement of funds that Russian authorities beforehand allotted for the development of defensive fortifications within the Belgorod Oblast border areas throughout Bazarov’s tenure within the Belgorod Oblast administration.[16] Khinshtein claimed that Bazarov embezzled one billion rubles (roughly $12.4 million) of those funds.[17] Russian authorities beforehand detained former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, former Bryansk Oblast Vice Governor Nikolai Simonenko, and former Belgorod Oblast Vice Governor Rustem Zainullin on comparable embezzlement costs.[18] Russian President Vladimir Putin additionally notably dismissed Russian Minister of Transport and former Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit on July 7, simply previous to Starovoit’s reported suicide on July 7.[19] ISW continues to evaluate that these arrests and personnel modifications are a part of a concerted Kremlin effort to make use of border oblast officers as scapegoats for Russia’s failure to repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[20] The Kremlin is probably going additionally making an attempt to scapegoat native officers for Russia’s failure to repel Ukrainian cross-border raids into Belgorod Oblast in 2023 and 2024.[21]

Ukraine’s Western companions proceed to supply navy help to Ukraine, together with via the acquisition of US weapons and joint manufacturing ventures. German Vice Chancellor and Minister of Finance Lars Klingbeil introduced on August 25 that Germany will allocate 9 billion euros (roughly $10 billion) to Ukraine yearly for the following two years.[22] NATO introduced on August 24 that Canada will finance a $500 million help package deal to buy US navy gear for Ukraine via the Prioritized Ukrainian Necessities Record (PURL) initiative.[23] Ukrainian Minister of Protection Denys Shmyhal introduced on August 24 that Ukraine and Canada signed a joint protection manufacturing settlement that can simplify the institution of Ukrainian protection industrial firms in Canada, facilitate expertise exchanges, and assist present Ukrainian forces with fashionable weapons and navy gear in the long run.[24] Shmyhal and Lithuanian Protection Minister Laurynas Kasciunas equally signed a letter of intent on August 25 on the joint manufacturing of protection merchandise in each international locations, with an emphasis on the joint manufacturing of long-range drones.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces proceed to strain the Russian penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya.
• The Russian navy command has reportedly given up efforts to use the penetration towards Dobropillya, after Russia’s infiltration ways seem to have been unsuccessful in establishing enduring positions inside this penetration.
• Russian Prosecutor Common Igor Krasnov is more likely to develop into the Chairperson of the Russian Supreme Courtroom, reportedly after Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Chairperson Alexander Bastrykin refused the Kremlin’s supply to imagine this place.
• Russian authorities lately detained Appearing Kursk Oblast Vice Governor Vladimir Bazarov, probably as a part of the Kremlin’s continued efforts to scapegoat native officers for Russian border safety failures.
• Ukraine’s Western companions proceed to supply navy help to Ukraine, together with via the acquisition of US weapons and joint manufacturing ventures.
• Ukrainian forces lately superior in northern Sumy Oblast and close to Lyman and Pokrovsk. Russian forces lately superior close to Kupyansk, Lyman, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velykomykhailivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We don’t report intimately on Russian conflict crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t straight have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those felony actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity despite the fact that we don’t describe them in these reviews.  

• Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Foremost Effort – Jap Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate predominant efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Foremost Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis
• Russian Subordinate Foremost Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Foremost Effort #3 – Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and presumably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
• Important Exercise in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Group of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces performed a HIMARS strike on the Russian 186th Motorized Rifle Regiment’s (Jap Navy District [EMD]) command and drone operations management publish in Dubrava, Kursk Oblast (northwest of Kursk Metropolis).[26]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border)

Ukrainian forces lately superior in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 25 signifies that Ukrainian forces lately superior close to Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy Metropolis).[27]

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian navy observer Kostyantyn Mashovets acknowledged on August 25 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Andriivka (north of Sumy Metropolis) and superior towards the Zolotarivskyy Reserve (northwest of Andriivka).[28] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Group of Forces claimed that components of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) superior towards Stepne (northwest of Sumy Metropolis close to the worldwide border).[29]

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast and in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 24 and 25.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Bezsalivka and within the Andriivka-Oleksiivka course (north of Sumy Metropolis).[31]

Mashovets acknowledged on August 25 that the Russian navy command lately rotated and regrouped a number of models and detachments to the Sumy course.[32] Mashovets acknowledged that Russian command rotated in components of the twentieth Motorized Rifle Regiment (presumably a reformed Soviet unit) and 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade to exchange components of the thirtieth Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, forty fourth Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Navy District [LMD]) and a hundred and fifty fifth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) that suffered vital losses within the western components of the Russian penetration. ISW beforehand noticed components of the twentieth Motorized Rifle Regiment function within the Toretsk course in April 2025.[33] Mashovets acknowledged that Russian navy command deployed components of the 106th VDV Division to exchange most or all the 76th VDV Division, which had been making an attempt to advance within the japanese a part of the penetration, particularly close to Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy Metropolis).[34]

Order of Battle: Mashovets acknowledged that components of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are working close to Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy Metropolis), and components of the eleventh and 83rd VDV brigades are working in Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy Metropolis).[35] Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions in Andriivka.[36] Drone operators of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[37]

Russian Foremost Effort – Jap Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Foremost Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 25 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 24 that Russian forces superior west of Synelnykove and close to Tykhe (each northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis).[38]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk and Synelnykove on August 24 and 25.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 24 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked on the southern (left) financial institution of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk.[40]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velykyi Burluk course on August 25 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 24 that Russian forces superior towards Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[41]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk close to Ambarne and Khatnie on August 24 and 25.[42]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kanada Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly putting Ukrainian forces close to Ambarne.[43]

Russian Subordinate Foremost Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces lately superior within the Kupyansk course.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 24 signifies that Russian forces lately superior inside northern Kupyansk.[44]

Russian forces attacked close to Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk close to Zapadne and Holubivka and towards Kutkivka and Kolodyazne; and northeast of Kupyansk close to Synkivka and Kamyanka and towards Dvorichanske on August 24 and 25.[45]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (eleventh Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Navy District [LMD]) are reportedly working close to Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova course on August 25 however didn’t advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova close to Kolisnykivka; northeast of Borova close to Borivska Andriivka, Vyshneve, and Zahryzove; east of Borova close to Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova close to Hrekivka.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Hrekivka.[48]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian navy observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that components of the Russian third Motorized Rifle Division (twentieth Mixed Arms Military (CAA), Moscow Navy District [MMD]) are working close to Hrekivka.[49]

Each Ukrainian and Russian forces lately superior within the Lyman course.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 25 exhibits Ukrainian troopers elevating a flag in japanese Novomykhailivka (north of Lyman), indicating that Ukrainian forces probably liberated the settlement.[50] Footage printed on August 24 and geolocated on August 25 signifies that Ukrainian forces probably liberated Novyi Myr (northwest of Novomykhailivka).[51]

Assessed Russian advances: Mashovets reported on August 25 that Russian forces lately seized Torske (east of Lyman).[52]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior west of Torske and within the Serebryanske forest space (southeast of Lyman).[53]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman close to Shandryholove and Serednie and towards Novoselivka; north of Lyman close to Ridkodub, Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, Novyi Myr, and Novomykhailivka; northeast of Lyman close to Ivanivka and Kolodyazi; east of Lyman close to Torske; and southeast of Lyman towards Yampil and within the Serebryanske forest space.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Novomykhalivka.[55]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that components of the Russian 164th and 169th motorized rifle brigades (each of the twenty fifth CAA, CMD) are working within the Serebryanske forest space; components of the thirty seventh and thirty first Motorized Rifle Regiments (each of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division, twenty fifth CAA, CMD) are working in central Zarichne (east of Lyman); components of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (twentieth CAA, Moscow Navy District [MMD]) are working close to Zarichne; and different components of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division and hooked up components of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Military [GTA], MMD) are working close to Kolodyazi and south of Karpivka.[56] Drone operators of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly working within the Lyman course.[57]

Russian Subordinate Foremost Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and presumably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk course on August 25 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior roughly 2.3 kilometers south of Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk).[58]

Russian forces attacked towards Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk towards Dronivka; northeast of Siversk close to Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk close to Vyimka; and southwest of Siversk close to Fedorivka and Pereizne on August 24 and 25.[59]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces within the Siversk course are utilizing small infantry teams to infiltrate into the Ukrainian close to rear.[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar course on August 25 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 24 that Russian forces superior east of Virolyubivka (northwest of Chasiv Yar).[61]

Russian forces attacked close to Chasiv Yar itself; northwest of Chasiv Yar close to Maiske; and south of Chasiv Yar close to Stupochky on August 24 and 25.[62]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly proceed to function in Chasiv Yar.[63]

Russian forces lately superior within the Toretsk course.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 25 signifies that Russian forces lately superior northeast of Bila Hora (northeast of Toretsk) and in southern Oleksandro-Shultyne (simply west of Bila Hora).[64]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior north of Bila Hora.[65]

Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk close to Oleksandro-Shultyne; north of Toretsk close to Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk close to Rusyn Yar; and west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka on August 24 and 25.[66]

Ukrainian navy observer Kostyantyn Mashovets acknowledged that dozens of Russian assault components, presumably from 102nd or 103rd motorized rifle regiments (one hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Navy District [SMD]), are working in northern Shcherbynivka.[67] Mashovets added that Ukrainian forces haven’t been in a position to repel Russian infiltration into northern Schcherbynivka for round every week. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are preventing on the outskirts of Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk) and entered the city.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that there are not any confirmed reviews that Russian forces have entered the city, nevertheless.[69]

Order of Battle: Mashovets acknowledged that components of the Russian twentieth Motorized Rifle Division (eighth CAA) are attacking close to Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk) and that components of the one hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division are attacking close to Shcherbynivka and Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[70] Parts of the thirty third Motorized Rifle Regiment (twentieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA) reportedly proceed to function within the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) course.[71]

Ukrainian forces lately superior within the Pokrovsk course.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 24 signifies that Ukrainian forces lately superior in southern Pokrovsk, on the northern outskirts of Leontovychi (southwest of Pokrovsk), and northeast of Leontovychi.[72] ISW assesses that Russian forces usually are not at present working inside Pokrovsk, given the shortage of Russian milblogger claims of Russian forces working within the city. Mashovets acknowledged that small infantry and sabotage and reconnaissance teams of the Russian 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment (comprised of Russian mobilization reserve) and unspecified components of the 2nd CAA (CMD) infiltrated Pokrovsk via Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk).[73] Mashovets acknowledged that these Russian forces haven’t been in a position to accumulate forces and means for additional advances, nevertheless.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[74] Mashovets acknowledged that Russian forces haven’t seized Udachne, nevertheless.[75]

Russian forces attacked close to Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk close to Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk close to Zapovidne, Mayak, Zatyshok, Nove Shakhove, Shakhove, Sukhetske, and Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk close to Myrolyubivka, Novoekonomichne, Hrodivka, and Mykolaivka; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk close to Chunyshyne, Troyanda, Shevchenko, and Leontovychi; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on August 24 and 25.[76]

Mashovets reported that Russian forces haven’t seized Novoekonomichne or Myrolyubivka (southeast of Novoekonomichne) regardless of reviews from Russian troops to their commanders about seizing each settlements.[77] A Russian milblogger equally claimed that Russian forces submitted false reviews concerning the seizure of Novoekonomichne to their superiors, permitting Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance teams to enter the settlement and advance to Malynivka (simply east of Novoekonomichne).[78] Mashovets acknowledged that Russian forces gained a foothold on the dam south of Myrolyubivka and that Russian assault teams typically enter the settlement however have failed to realize a foothold. Mashovets reported that small Russian teams are working in Rodynske and Krasnyi Lyman however can not consolidate their positions.[79] Mashovets denied Ukrainian reviews that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of the realm north of Rodynske alongside the railway. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Pokrovsk course acknowledged that Russian forces proceed to make use of small infantry group assault ways however are altering their provide ways by utilizing unmanned floor automobiles (UGVs).[80]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that components of the Russian 1st and a hundred and tenth motorized rifle brigades (each of the 51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk Individuals’s Republic Military Corps [DNR AC], SMD) and of the thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Jap Navy District [EMD]) are attacking Rodynske and Krasnyi Lyman.[81] Mashovets acknowledged that components of the fifth and ninth motorized rifle brigades (each of the 51st CAA) are attacking close to Novoekonomichne and Myrolyubivka.[82] Mashovets acknowledged that components of the fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade, with help from components of the 137th Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty first CAA, CMD) and of the 72nd Spetsnaz Battalion (reportedly of the third AC), attacked alongside the Hrodivka-Promin (east of Pokrovsk)[83] Mashovets acknowledged that components of the fifteenth Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Navy District [CMD] are preventing close to Udachne. Drone operators of the fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade are additionally reportedly working close to Novoekonomichne[84][85]

Russian forces lately superior within the Novopavlivka course.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 24 signifies that Russian forces lately seized Yalta and superior to central Filiya (each south of Novopavlivka).[86]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 24 that Russian forces haven’t seized Filiya, refuting the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) declare that Russian forces seized the settlement.[87]

Russian forces attacked towards Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka close to Novomykolaivka; southeast of Novopavlivka close to Horikhove, Novoukrainka, and Dachne; south of Novopavlivka close to Yalta and Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka close to Novokhatske and Zelenyi Hai on August 24 and 25.[88]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian eightieth Tank Regiment (ninetieth Tank Division, forty first CAA, CMD) are reportedly working inside Filiya.[89]

Russian forces lately superior within the Velykomykhailivka course.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 25 signifies that Russian forces lately superior inside central Vorone and seized Zaporizke (each southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[90]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka close to Andriivka-Klevtsove and Oleksandrohrad; east of Velykomykhailivka close to Voskresenka; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka close to Shevchenko, Komyshuvakha, Vilne Pole, Maliivka, Novoheorhiivka, and towards Novomykolaivka on August 24 and 25.[91]

Order of Battle: The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers credited components of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (fifth CAA, EMD) with seizing Zaporizke.[92] Drone operators of the thirtieth Spetsnaz Firm (reportedly of the thirty sixth CAA, EMD) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions close to Pidhavrylivka (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[93] Drone operators of the thirtieth Spetsnaz Firm and of the thirty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, EMD) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions close to Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka).[94] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Common Workers’s Foremost Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions within the Dnipropetrovsk (Velykomykhailivka) course.[95]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Keep frontline positions, safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in japanese Zaporizhia Oblast on August 25 however didn’t advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole close to Zelene Pole, Temyrivka, and Olhivske and west of Hulyaipole towards Zaliznychne on August 24 and 25.[96]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian navy observer Konstantyn Mashovets reported that the Russian navy command probably redeployed the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division in Hulyaipole course someday round August 11.[97] Drone operators of the Russian thirty eighth Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty fifth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Jap Navy District [EMD]) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions in japanese Zaporizhia Oblast with Molniya-2 drones.[98]

Russian forces lately superior in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 24 signifies that Russian forces lately superior alongside the Prydniprovska Railroad south of Prymorske (northwest of Orikhiv).[99]

Russian forces attacked towards Orikhiv itself; south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka; west of Orikhiv close to Stepnohirsk, Plavni, and Kamyanske; and northwest of Orikhiv towards Prymorske on August 24 and 25.[100]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone group working in western Zaporizhia Oblast reported that Russian forces proceed to assault in small fireplace groups of two to 10 troopers and have amassed numerous numerous weapons and are actively utilizing them within the Zaporizhia course.[101] The commander reported that Ukrainian and Russian forces have drone parity, which permits Ukrainian forces to neutralize Russian forces’ benefits in different weapons. The commander has not noticed proof of Russian forces advancing towards Zaporizhzhia Metropolis (northwest of Orikhiv).

Ukrainian and Russian milbloggers claimed on August 24 that Russian forces performed a drone strike towards Zaporizhzhia Metropolis for the primary time with a mothership drone carrying first-person view (FPV) drones.[102]

Order of Battle: Parts, together with drone operators, of the Russian third Assault Firm of the Nemets group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (forty second Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Navy District [SMD]) are reportedly working within the Orikhiv course.[103]

Russian forces continued restricted assaults within the Kherson course on August 25 however didn’t advance.[104]

Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed on August 25 that Russian forces established fireplace management over Karantynnyi Island (west of Kherson Metropolis).[105]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions in Burhunka (northeast of Kherson Metropolis).[106]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces performed a sequence of drone strikes towards Ukraine on the evening of August 24 and 25. The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Russian forces launched 104 Shahed-type and decoy drones from Kursk Metropolis; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[107] The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Ukrainian forces downed 76 drones north and east of Ukraine and that 28 drones struck 15 unspecified places and drone particles struck 4 unspecified places. Kharkiv Oblast Navy Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on August 25 that Russian forces launched one unspecified missile, one KAB guided glide bomb, 32 Shahed (Geran-2) drones, six Lancet loitering munitions, 5 Molniya drones, and 5 unidentified drones towards 42 settlements in Kharkiv Oblast since August 18, inflicting vital injury to civilian infrastructure.[108] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne reported on August 24, citing native sources, that Russian forces launched two Shahed drones towards Billopillya, Sumy Oblast, inflicting energy outages, and Sumy Oblast Navy Administration Head Oleh Hryhorov reported that Russian forces struck Kovpakivskyi Raion in Sumy Metropolis 10 instances.[109]

Important exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing vital to report.

Observe: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorised materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly accessible info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially accessible satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the premise for these reviews. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.