Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, April 25, 2025
Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter and William Runkel
April 25, 2025, 9:30pm ET
Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cell system) is strongly beneficial for utilizing this data-heavy device.
Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.
Observe: The information cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on April 25. ISW will cowl subsequent experiences within the April 26 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.
Ukrainian and European representatives reportedly introduced the USA with a proposal to finish the conflict in Ukraine throughout multilateral talks in London on April 23. The Telegraph reported on April 25 that the Ukrainian-European proposal contained 5 factors about territory, safety ensures, negotiations, refusing Russian sovereignty over occupied Crimea, and the Ukrainian navy and protection industrial base (DIB).[1] Reuters revealed the complete textual content of the phrases that Ukrainian and European officers reportedly developed in response to the US seven-point peace plan on April 25.[2] The proposal as introduced by Reuters requires a full, unconditional air, sea, and land ceasefire concurrently with fast technical negotiations to implement the ceasefire, involving the USA and European international locations; United States-led ceasefire monitoring with assist from third international locations; strong Ukrainian safety ensures absent Ukraine’s NATO accession; and for Russia to unconditionally return illegally deported Ukrainian kids and detained Ukrainian civilians in addition to have interaction in an “all-for-all” prisoner of conflict (POW) alternate. The proposal reportedly rejects restrictions on the Ukrainian navy, requires an advert hoc group of European states and prepared non-European international locations to ensure Ukraine’s safety, and rejects restrictions on the deployment of any pleasant forces to Ukraine.[3]
The Ukrainian-European proposal states that Russia and Ukraine will negotiate territorial points solely after the implementation of a full and unconditional ceasefire and that these negotiations will use the present frontline as a beginning framework.[4] The Ukrainian-European proposal would reportedly present Ukraine with “unhindered entry” to the Dnipro River and management of the Kinburn Spit and Kakhovka Dam.[5] The proposal reportedly requires Ukraine to regain management over the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant (ZNPP) “with US involvement.” The Ukrainian-European proposal additionally reportedly states that Ukraine’s companions will work towards a consensus on NATO membership, and that Ukraine will pursue becoming a member of the European Union (EU).
The Ukrainian-European proposal reportedly requires the USA and Ukraine to implement the US-Ukraine minerals deal and financial cooperation settlement. The proposal states that US sanctions on Russia could also be topic to “gradual easing” if a sustainable peace is achieved and will resume if Russia violates a peace settlement. The proposal reportedly requires Ukraine’s full reconstruction and monetary compensation, together with utilizing frozen Russian property.
Reuters additionally revealed the complete textual content of the seven-point peace proposal that US Particular Envoy for the Center East Steve Witkoff reportedly introduced to Ukrainian and European officers in Paris on April 17, supporting earlier reporting concerning the US peace proposal.[6] Reuters reported that the US plan calls for a direct ceasefire and direct technical negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.[7] The US plan reportedly supplies Ukraine with sturdy safety ensures from a coalition of European and prepared non-European states but in addition requires Ukraine to desert efforts to hitch NATO whereas sustaining the choice to pursue European Union (EU) membership. The US plan reportedly contains “de jure” US recognition of Russian management over occupied Crimea and de facto recognition of Russian management of Luhansk Oblast and elements of occupied Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Kherson Oblasts. The popularity of de jure Russian sovereignty over Crimea or every other areas of Ukraine below occupation since 2014 would represent a big concession to Russia that needs to be balanced by a big Russian concession in return.
The US plan reportedly stipulates that Ukraine will regain territory in Kharkiv Oblast and the Zaporizhia Nuclear Energy Plant (ZNPP), which the USA would function and which might provide electrical energy to each Russia and Ukraine. The proposed US plan would return the Kakhovka Dam and Kinburn Spit to Ukraine and assure Ukrainian passage on the Dnipro River. The US plan reportedly states that Ukraine and the USA will implement a mineral deal and financial partnership settlement, requires Ukraine’s full reconstruction, and gives monetary compensation to Ukraine, however doesn’t specify the funding supply. The US proposal reportedly requires lifting sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 and resuming US-Russian financial cooperation within the vitality and industrial sectors.
The newly revealed Reuters doc helps and clarifies earlier reporting by Axios and The Telegraph of the US seven-point proposal to Ukraine, however some particulars stay unclear.[8] The Reuters doc affirms core particulars, comparable to territorial preparations, Ukraine’s non-accession to NATO, and the US-run operation of the ZNPP. The report additionally clarifies that Ukraine would regain management of the Kinburn Spit, the small a part of Mykolaiv Oblast that Russia at present occupies, and the Kakhovka Dam, which spans between occupied and unoccupied Kherson Oblast. The Reuters doc doesn’t deal with Sumy Oblast, the place Russian forces just lately started conducting offensive operations, or how the USA and Ukraine would achieve entry to the ZNPP, provided that the Kakhovka Reservoir and Dnipro River are pure limitations between present Ukrainian positions and the ZNPP. Russian forces must partially withdraw from both east (left) financial institution Kherson Oblast or allow a land bridge throughout the Kakhovka Reservoir below the US plan, however neither possibility inherently supplies the strategic depth Ukraine would wish to defend the ZNPP towards additional Russian aggression, as ISW has just lately reported.[9]
US Particular Envoy to the Center East Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on April 25, reportedly to safe a significant Russian concession in a future peace deal. Witkoff met with Putin, CEO of the Russian Direct Funding Fund (RDIF) and Presidential Particular Consultant for Funding and Financial Cooperation with Overseas International locations Kirill Dmitriev, and Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov.[10] Ushakov said that the assembly lasted three hours, included discussions about probably resuming direct Ukrainian-Russian negotiations, and claimed that the assembly introduced US and Russian positions about Ukraine and different unspecified points “nearer collectively.”[11] US officers haven’t reported on the small print of Witkoff’s assembly with Putin as of the time of this publication.
Bloomberg reported on April 24, citing individuals conversant in the matter, that Witkoff deliberate to current a requirement that Russia settle for Ukraine’s proper to develop an adequately outfitted military and protection business as a part of a peace settlement with Russia.[12] This reported US demand is opposite to the Kremlin’s demand for Ukrainian demilitarization – a requirement that the Kremlin first fabricated from Ukraine and the West in December 2021.[13] Russia then sought to pressure Ukraine into demilitarization by launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the Kremlin reiterated demilitarization as a requirement within the March 2022 Istanbul negotiations, whose protocols primarily demanded Ukraine’s full capitulation to Russia and which the Kremlin has recognized as its most well-liked foundation for a peace deal in Ukraine.[14] Kremlin officers have repeatedly outlined Ukrainian demilitarization and its different pre-war calls for as stipulations for a peace settlement, as these calls for would enable Russia to launch renewed aggression from an advantageous place sooner or later.[15] Russia’s acceptance of Ukraine’s proper to a developed navy and protection industrial base would due to this fact be a big Russian concession ought to the USA reach gaining Putin’s settlement.
That the Kremlin is just not formally demanding that Ukraine cede most or all of its territory to Russia at the moment is just not a big Russian concession, nevertheless. The preliminary full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine aimed to grab Kyiv in February and March 2022 so as to pressure Ukraine to capitulate absolutely, depose the present Ukrainian authorities, and disarm the Ukrainian navy, amounting to the entire defeat of Ukraine. Russia failed to realize this goal as a result of the Ukrainian navy, with restricted Western assist, defeated the Russian assault on Kyiv and stalled Russian offensives within the east and south. Ukrainian forces pressured Russian forces to withdraw from Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts in early April 2022 and from most of Kharkiv Oblast and all of west-bank Kherson Oblast later in 2022.[16] Russian forces stay unable to launch an offensive operation that would seize Kyiv or recross the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine at the moment, and spent 2024 combating desperately to grab an space nine-tenths the scale of Rhode Island. Russia doesn’t have the navy energy to grab the remainder of Ukraine absent a full-scale mobilization of Russian society, and probably not then, so long as Western assist to Ukraine continues.
The Kremlin has not deserted its maximalist goals, furthermore. Kremlin mouthpieces, together with Russian Safety Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev, have laid the rhetorical groundwork for Russia to finally lay declare to most or all of Ukraine.[17] Russian officers have additionally doubled down on their calls for for regime change in Ukraine and rhetoric supposed to undermine the legitimacy of the present Ukrainian authorities as just lately as April 24.[18] Each of those efforts in live performance point out that Putin retains his goal of controlling all of Ukraine, however is proscribed by Russia’s incapability to realize this goal militarily.
Russian officers proceed to accentuate narratives used to justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine so as to set circumstances to justify future Russian aggression towards European states and management European protection coverage within the Kremlin’s reflexive management marketing campaign. The Russian Ministry of Overseas Affairs (MFA) revealed a report on April 25 entitled “80 Years After the Nice Victory: The Shadow of Nazism Has Once more Coated Europe,” which accuses European states and officers of reviving Nazi ideology and creating insurance policies that discriminate towards Russian-speaking populations, particularly in Lithuania, Lativa, and Estonia.[19] Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova amplified this report and claimed that European states are stopping Russia from reaching its long-held goals of demilitarization and “denazification” of Ukraine on account of this alleged assist of Naziism.[20] Russian officers commonly invoke “denazification” to name for regime change in Ukraine and the set up of a pro-Russian puppet authorities.[21] Zakharova particularly accused the Baltic States and Poland of justifying and reviving Nazism.
Russian officers have notably leveraged accusations of neo-Nazi ideology to justify Russia’s invasions of Ukraine, and Russian officers leveraging these narratives towards European states – particularly the Baltics and Poland – helps ISW’s evaluation that Russia could also be setting informational circumstances to justify future aggression towards these states as effectively.[22] Russian officers are possible trying to discredit European states extra broadly so as to deter them from offering additional help to Ukraine and revitalizing their protection industries so as to set circumstances for future Russian aggression towards a weakened Europe.[23] ISW continues to evaluate that Russia stays dedicated to discrediting Europe in response to European leaders’ reinvigorated dedication to rearming Europe in alignment with US President Donald Trump’s coverage objectives.
Russian Ambassador to the USA Alexander Darchiev said in the course of the opening ceremony of an annual movie pageant commemorating Russia’s Victory Day on the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., on April 24 that the Soviet-US navy alliance shaped throughout World Battle II ought to serve for instance of US-Russian relations at present.[24] Darchiev’s remarks point out that the Kremlin goals to painting to its home and international audiences that US-Russian relations are on the mend and concurrently exacerbate divisions between the USA and Europe.
Unknown actors assassinated the deputy head of the Russian Normal Employees’s Major Operational Directorate, Lieutenant Normal Yaroslav Moskalik, in Balashikha, Moscow Oblast, on April 25. Unknown actors detonated an improvised explosive system (IED) full of shrapnel, rigged to a car as Moskalik handed the automobile.[25] Russian Ministry of Overseas Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused Ukraine of involvement in Moskalik’s assassination.[26] Ukrainian officers haven’t commented on the assault as of this publication. The Ukrainian Safety Companies (SBU) claimed duty for assassinating the Russian Nuclear, Organic, Chemical Protection Forces Head Lieutenant Normal Igor Kirillov and his assistant, Main Ilya Polikarpov, in Moscow on December 17, 2024, making this the second assassination of a Russian common in Moscow within the final 5 months.[27]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian and European representatives reportedly introduced the USA with a proposal to finish the conflict in Ukraine in the course of the multilateral talks in London on April 23.
- Reuters additionally revealed the complete textual content of the seven-point peace proposal that US Particular Envoy for the Center East Steve Witkoff reportedly introduced to Ukrainian and European officers in Paris on April 17, supporting earlier reporting concerning the US peace proposal.
- US Particular Envoy to the Center East Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on April 25, reportedly to safe a significant Russian concession in a future peace deal.
- That the Kremlin is just not formally demanding that Ukraine cede most or all of its territory to Russia at the moment is just not a big Russian concession, nevertheless.
- Russian officers proceed to accentuate narratives used to justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine so as to set circumstances to justify future Russian aggression towards European states and management European protection coverage within the Kremlin’s reflexive management marketing campaign.
- Unknown actors assassinated the deputy head of the Russian Normal Employees’s Major Operational Directorate, Lieutenant Normal Yaroslav Moskalik, in Balashikha, Moscow Oblast, on April 25.
- Ukrainian forces just lately superior in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces just lately superior in Sumy and Kursk oblasts and close to Pokrovsk.
We don’t report intimately on Russian conflict crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t immediately have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We’ll proceed to judge and report on the results of those legal actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity despite the fact that we don’t describe them in these experiences.
- Alleged Ceasefire Violations
- Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Major Effort – Jap Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate primary efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis
- Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
- Vital Exercise in Belarus
Alleged Ceasefire Violations
There aren’t any lively ceasefires in Ukraine.
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian forces just lately superior close to the worldwide border in Kursk Oblast as a part of efforts to push Ukrainian forces from their restricted remaining positions within the space.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on April 24 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior north of Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[28] Extra geolocated footage revealed on April 25 reveals that Russian forces reached the northeastern outskirts of Oleshnya (northwest of Gornal) throughout a decreased platoon-sized mechanized assault.[29]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 25 that Russian forces superior into Gornal, to the Psel River northeast of Gornal, and northeast of Oleshnya.[30]
Preventing continued towards Oleshnya and close to Gornal on April 24 and 25.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 24 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked towards Goptarovka (southeast of Sudzha alongside the Kursk-Belgorod Oblast border).[32]
Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) reportedly proceed to function in Kursk Oblast.[33] Assault components of the twenty second Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, forty fourth Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Navy District [LMD]), and drone components of the “Anvar Spetsnaz” detachment (probably referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly working and putting Ukrainian positions close to Gornal, respectively.[34]
Preventing continued in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on April 25.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 24 that Russian forces superior in Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod Metropolis).[35]
Preventing continued northwest of Belgorod Metropolis close to Popovka and Demidovka on April 25.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 24 and 25 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Popovka and close to the Kursk-Belgorod Oblast administrative boundary close to the worldwide border.[37]
Order of Battle: Assault components of the Russian “fifteenth Tank Regiment” (reportedly 69th Motorized Rifle Division, sixth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Leningrad Navy District [LMD]) and of the “Aida” group of the 204th Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz Regiment are reportedly working close to Demidovka.[38]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border and method to inside tube artillery vary of Sumy Metropolis)
Russian forces just lately superior in Sumy Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on April 25 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior alongside Pratsi Avenue in southern Zhuravka (northeast of Sumy Metropolis).[39]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior throughout the worldwide border northeast of Sadky and entered northern Bilovody (each northeast of Sumy Metropolis).[40]
Russian forces carried out floor assaults north of Sumy Metropolis close to Novomykolaivka and northeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Bilovody and Sadky on April 25.[41]
Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly working within the Sumy path.[42] Parts of the 1434th “Akhmat-Chechnya” Regiment (forty second Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Navy District [SMD]) are reportedly working close to Novomykolaivka.[43] Drone components of the “Anvar Spetsnaz” detachment (probably referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions close to Myropillya (northeast of Sumy Metropolis).[44]
Russian Major Effort – Jap Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported floor exercise in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 25.
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported floor exercise within the Kupyansk path on April 25.
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova path on April 25 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Borova towards Bohuslavka, northeast of Borova close to Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka, east of Borova close to Nadiya and Novoyehorivka, and southeast of Borova close to Olhivka on April 24 and 25.[45]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Lyman path on April 25 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman close to Ridkodub, Nove, Novyi Mir, Yampolivka, and Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman close to Torske on April 24 and 25.[46]
Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (eighth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Navy District [SMD]) are reportedly working close to Ridkodub.[47] Parts of components of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (twentieth CAA, Moscow Navy District [MMD]) are reportedly attacking in Nove.[48]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk path on April 25 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Siversk close to Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk close to Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka, and east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske on April 24 and 25.[49]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar path on April 25 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked close to Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar close to Markove, southeast of Chasiv Yar close to Andriivka, and south of Chasiv Yar towards Predtechyne and close to Bila Hora on April 24 and 25.[50] Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 25 that Russian forces within the Chasiv Yar path just lately carried out a company-sized mechanized assault utilizing six armored autos and 5 civilian passenger automobiles.[51]
Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly working close to Chasiv Yar.[52] Parts of the “Smuglyanka” detachment are reportedly working within the Chasiv Yar path.[53]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Toretsk path on April 25 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior close to a reservoir north of Toretsk and east of Toretsk close to Krymske.[54]
Russian forces carried out floor assaults close to Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk close to Dachne and Dyliivka; southwest of Toretsk close to Petrivka, Romanivka, Stara Mykolaivka, Kalynove, Leonidivka, Tarasivka, Vodyane Druhe, Berezivka, and Yelyzavetivka; and west of Toretsk close to Petrivka, Romanivka, and towards Shcherbynivka on April 24 and 25.[55] Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to the Fomikha Mine waste heap in northern Toretsk and close to Tarasivka.[56]
Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian twentieth Motorized Rifle Division (eighth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Navy District [SMD]) are reportedly working close to Stara Mykolaivka.[57] Parts of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division (twenty fifth CAA, Central Navy District [CMD]) are reportedly working close to Toretsk.[58] Parts of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (twentieth Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly working close to Tarasivka.[59]
Russian forces just lately superior within the Pokrovsk path.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on April 25 signifies that Russian forces superior to southern Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[60]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior in northern Pishchane (southwest of Pokrovsk).[61]
Russian forces attacked close to Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk close to Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk close to Novotoretske and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk close to Chunyshyne and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and towards Molodetske on April 24 and 25.[62]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drone operations proceed to threaten Russian floor traces of communication (GLOCs) close to Lysivka.[63]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Novopavlivka path on April 25 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that components of the Russian twenty seventh Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, CMD) superior south of Uspenivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and towards Novooleksandrivka (southwest of Uspenivka).[64] The milblogger claimed that components of the Russian ninetieth Tank Division (forty first CAA, CMD) superior in northwestern Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka).
Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka close to Novooleksandrivka, Novoserhiivka, and Uspenivka; east of Novopavlivka close to Nadiivka, Preobrazhenka, and Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka close to Troitske and Bohdanivka on April 24 and 25.[65]
Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (twenty seventh Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly working in Uspenivka.[66]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kurakhove path on April 25 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior close to Oleksiivka (west of Kuakhove) and close to Bahatyr, Rozlyv, and Odradne (all southwest of Kurakhove).[67]
Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove close to Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, and Andriivka; and southwest of Kurakhove close to Bahatyr, Rozlyv, and Odradne on April 24 and 25.[68] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Bahatyr and Odradne.[69]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian thirty seventh Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, Jap Navy District [EMD]) and of the 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Normal Employees’s Major Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly putting Ukrainian targets close to Odradne.[70]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velyka Novosilka path on April 25 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior 1.5 kilometers north of Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and 500 meters south of Malynivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[71]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Vesele, Vilne Pole, and Pryvilne, and west of Velyka Novosilka close to Novosilka on April 24 and 25.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Vilne Pole.[73]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 336th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, Leningrad Navy District [LMD]) are reportedly putting Ukrainian targets close to Malynivka.[74] Drone operators of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 305th Artillery Brigade (each fifth CAA, EMD) are reportedly putting Ukrainian targets close to Shevchenko (west of Velyka Novosilka).[75]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions, safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)
Ukrainian forces just lately superior in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on April 23 signifies that Ukrainian forces just lately superior within the southeastern outskirts of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[76]
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv towards Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv close to Novodanylivka, and southwest of Orikhiv close to Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Mali Shcherbaky on April 24 and 25.[77]
Russian forces carried out restricted floor assaults within the Kherson path on April 25.[78]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces participated in assembly engagements close to the Antonivka Street Bridge (east of Kherson Metropolis).[79]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly working within the Kherson path.[80]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces carried out a collection of drone strikes towards Ukraine in a single day on April 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Russian forces launched 103 Shahed and different drones from the instructions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities.[81] The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Ukrainian forces downed 41 drones in northern and central Ukraine and that 40 Russian decoy drones had been “misplaced,” possible on account of digital warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officers reported that Russian strikes hit Kharkiv, Sumy, Cherkasy, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[82]
The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) revealed footage on April 25 purportedly exhibiting a Russian Geran-2 (Russian analogue of the Shahed-136) drone putting a Ukrainian place in an unspecified location within the Zaporizhia path, doubtlessly in an space nearer to the frontline than the standard Russia Shahed targets in Ukraine’s deep rear areas.[83]
Vital exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing vital to report.
Observe: ISW doesn’t obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly accessible info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially accessible satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the idea for these experiences. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.
[1] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2025/04/24/starmer-challenges-donald-trump-over-ukraine-peace-plan/; https://archive.ph/t0mUv
[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukrainian-european-peace-deal-counterproposals-us-talks-london-2025-04-25/
[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukrainian-european-peace-deal-counterproposals-us-talks-london-2025-04-25/
[4] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2025/04/24/starmer-challenges-donald-trump-over-ukraine-peace-plan/; https://www.reuters.com/world/ukrainian-european-peace-deal-counterproposals-us-talks-london-2025-04-25/
[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukrainian-european-peace-deal-counterproposals-us-talks-london-2025-04-25/
[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042325; https://www.axios.com/2025/04/22/trump-russia-ukraine-peace-plan-crimea-donbas; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/04/22/trumps-plan-to-let-putin-keep-land-seized-from-ukraine/
[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-peace-deal-proposals-set-out-by-us-talks-paris-2025-04-25/
[8] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/22/trump-russia-ukraine-peace-plan-crimea-donbas; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/04/22/trumps-plan-to-let-putin-keep-land-seized-from-ukraine/
[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025
[10] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76797; https://t.me/tass_agency/312142; https://t.me/tass_agency/312143 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312145 ; https://t.me/rian_ru/291038; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025
[11] https://t.me/tass_agency/312142; https://t.me/tass_agency/312143 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312145 ; https://t.me/rian_ru/291038; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025
[12] https://www.bloomberg.com/information/articles/2025-04-24/us-to-demand-putin-accept-ukraine-s-right-to-military-force; https://archive.ph/hYi3I
[13] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/17/russia-issues-list-demands-tensions-europe-ukraine-nato
[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-says-russia-us-see-2022-istanbul-draft-possible-basis-ukraine-deal-2025-03-07/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-april-15-2022
[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030125
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/websites/default/information/Russianpercent20Operationspercent20Assessmentspercent20Aprilpercent203.pdf
[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-22-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2024;
[18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624
[19] https://mid dot ru/ru/exercise/ko-dny-pobedy/2011501/?lang=ru ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/56232
[20] https://t.me/MID_Russia/56233
[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525
[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325
[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525
[24] https://t.me/MID_Russia/56186
[25] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1022841; https://t.me/sledcom_press/20694; https://t.me/sledcom_press/20695; https://t.me/sledcom_press/20696; https://t.me/sledcom_press/20698 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312088; https://t.me/tass_agency/312066; https://t.me/tass_agency/312068 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312069 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312075 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312079 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312081 ; https://t.me/astrapress/79843 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/standing/1915749654370668991; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63761; https://t.me/sashakots/53305; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/697; https://t.me/mash/63421; https://t.me/dva_majors/69864; https://t.me/dva_majors/69863; https://t.me/rusich_army/22909
[26] https://t.me/tass_agency/312140 ; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1022841
[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121824; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/17/world/europe/russian-general-bombing-moscow.html
[28] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8982; https://t.me/rt_russian/238361; https://t,.me/boris_rozhin/162489
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23489; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8992
[30] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34765; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162482; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162489
[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/26121; https://t.me/rusich_army/22893; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34761; https://t.me/milinfolive/146828; https://t.me/dva_majors/69834
[32] https://t.me/rybar/69891
[33] https://t.me/wargonzo/26131
[34] https://t.me/milinfolive/146828; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162507
[35] https://t.me/rybar/69891
[36] https://t.me/rybar/69891; https://t.me/dva_majors/69834; https://t.me/wargonzo/26121; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162509
[37] https://t.me/wargonzo/26121; https://t.me/rybar/69896
[38] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162509; https://t.me/mmcpodolsk/8734
[39] https://t.me/alkor_aero/135; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8984
[40] https://t.me/wargonzo/26121; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27489
[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/69837; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27489; https://t.me/wargonzo/26121;
[42] https://t.me/dva_majors/69868
[43] https://t.me/dva_majors/69837
[44] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162507
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23490; https://t.me/tass_agency/312036; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8695; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23490; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8695; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27543
[47] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34776
[48] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34776
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8695
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23490; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8695
[51] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8695
[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27507
[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/69838
[54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162482; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162489
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23490; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8695; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63750; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63755; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27534; https://t.me/dva_majors/69834
[56] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162489; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63743
[57] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63750
[58] https://t.me/operationall_space/3572
[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63743
[60] https://x.com/InBigall/standing/1915786483077619986 ; https://t.me/Airborne1126/25669
[61] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27487
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23490 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8695
[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27487
[64] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34751
[65] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63766 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162442 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27541 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8695 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23490
[66] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63766 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34751
[67] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63756 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27491 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26121 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/69834 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162442 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162493
[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23490 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8695 https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27491 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26121 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/69834 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14610
[69] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27491 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63756 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26121 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/69834 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14610
[70] https://t.me/voin_dv/14603
[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162493 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14610
[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23490 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14610
[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/14610
[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/14595
[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/14605
[76] https://t.me/ZS42MSD/2780; https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1915678482446856409
[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23490; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469 ; https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0mjjBzMSvYtK6u1nAyE7jQVzaMzm53USyEeTZqzzYP2RWwSsUqt9zc1BoxMHLDgf9l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466; https://t.me/rybar/69893; https://t.me/dva_majors/69844
[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469 ; https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0mjjBzMSvYtK6u1nAyE7jQVzaMzm53USyEeTZqzzYP2RWwSsUqt9zc1BoxMHLDgf9l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466
[79] https://t.me/dva_majors/69834
[80] https://t.me/dva_majors/69821 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/69831
[81] https://t.me/kpszsu/33237
[82] https://t.me/kpszsu/33237; https://t.me/synegubov/14026;
[83] https://t.me/mod_russia/51735
