Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Johanna Moore,
Ben Schmida, and Brian Carter
Info Cutoff: 2:00pm ET
The
Vital Threats Challenge (CTP) on the American Enterprise Institute and
the Institute for the Examine of Warfare (ISW) publish the Iran Replace, which
supplies insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored actions that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and pursuits.
CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Replace each weekday.
Click on here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the continuing opposition offensive in Syria, and here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli floor operations. The
Syria map is up to date every day alongside the static Syria maps on this
report. CTP-ISW ended every day maps of Israeli floor operations in
February 2025.
We don’t report intimately on struggle crimes
as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t
immediately have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and
forecasting. We totally condemn violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle
and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity although we
don’t describe them in these studies.
A wide range of
Syrian armed teams, together with these related to the brand new
transitional authorities, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic teams,
have dedicated a sequence of extrajudicial killings because the fall of the
Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW completely condemns these
extrajudicial killings.
The Israeli prime minister
and overseas minister stated that Israel would “not permit the [Syrian]
Druze … to be harmed” and threatened extra airstrikes if the
violence doesn’t cease, suggesting that Israel goals to strain the
Syrian authorities into stopping the violence towards Druze.[1] An
effort to strain the federal government to reply as directed assumes that
the Syrian authorities has management over the Sunni fighters attacking
Druze communities exterior Damascus. Many of those fighters are ad-hoc
collections of locals who’re attacking the Druze.[2] Some authorities
forces have attacked the Druze.[3] The federal government deployed Normal
Safety Service (GSS) models to cordon off the Druze areas, nonetheless, and
a few of these forces fought alongside native Druze fighters to repulse
assaults by Sunni fighters.[4] The federal government’s deployments alongside
native fighters, whereas different government-linked fighters assault native
Druze, counsel that the federal government doesn’t exert good command and
management over its forces. The federal government’s restricted management over some
extremist parts of its ruling coalition, in addition to the localized
nature of a number of the attackers, signifies that will probably be unimaginable to
use airstrikes to strain the Syrian authorities into stopping the
assaults.
Damascus very probably already needs to cease the violence
as a result of the assaults on the Druze make it harder to safe the
exterior assist Damascus wants to keep up its maintain on energy. The
authorities faces a particularly dire financial state of affairs and wishes exterior
support and financial assist, significantly from the West. Many international locations,
together with the USA and the UK, have repeatedly
emphasised that Syria should forestall violence and maintain these accountable
accountable.[5] The federal government might want to persuade these international locations
that the federal government is deserving of their assist.
The airstrikes are unlikely to strain the Syrian authorities to cease extremists from conducting assaults. The
Israel Protection Forces (IDF) chief of employees ordered the IDF to strike
Syrian authorities targets “if the violence towards the Druze doesn’t
cease.”[6] The federal government’s restricted potential to demand that extremists
cease their assaults implies that even when the airstrikes did efficiently
strain the Syrian authorities to make calls for of Sunni fighters, it’s
unclear that authorities calls for would have any impact. The federal government
additionally has vital capability points, and airstrikes concentrating on the
Syrian authorities will solely make authorities efforts to cease the violence
harder.
It’s unclear how Israel can safe the Druze inhabitants in and round Damascus if the airstrikes fail. Airstrikes—if
they fail to strain the federal government—can’t forestall Druze from being
killed or injured by Sunni extremists. Solely floor forces ready to
bodily defend the Druze communities by pressure can defend the Druze.
It’s unclear if Israel is prepared or in a position to defend the Druze in
locations like Sahnaya and Jaramana, that are roughly 45km and 58km from
the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights, respectively. Such a floor
operation could be a particularly advanced navy enterprise. The dearth
of Druze assist for Israeli intervention and the destabilizing results
of a floor operation in Syria imply a floor operation would probably fail
and improve the risk to Israel by empowering extremists. Some Druze
have protested towards Israeli interference in Syria.[7]
Solely
the formation of a mixed Druze-Transitional Authorities pressure may
efficiently safe Druze locals from Sunni extremists whereas additionally
sidelining pro-Regime parts within the Druze group. The
ongoing violence shouldn’t be solely authorities towards Druze violence. The
present violence includes pro-government Druze factions, Druze militias
related to former Assad regime networks, native Sunni fighters, and
authorities forces which might be attentive to former Hayat Tahrir al Sham
(HTS) networks, and others.[8] The Syrian Druze are a politically
various group (see dialogue on completely different Druze positions beneath).
Some key Druze powerbrokers are negotiating with the federal government to finish
the continuing violence, as GSS and Druze forces have cooperated on the
floor.[9] A call by Damascus to depend on joint Druze-government
models may efficiently de-escalate the state of affairs whereas extending
authorities management over well-known bastions of pro-regime sentiment in
Jaramana.[10] The federal government has already taken steps to type joint
models.[11] The federal government’s determination to right away have interaction native leaders
and cooperate with some Druze militias means that Syrian
Transitional President Ahmed al Shara and his allies have discovered from
the experiences with Alawite militias in western Syria, the place the
failure to have interaction native leaders and Alawites contributed to continued
pressure.
Damascus has made severe efforts to curb
confessional-motivated violence between Sunni extremists, Druze
fighters, civilians, and safety providers. GSS models
reportedly cordoned off Sahnaya and prevented extra exterior Sunni
teams from collaborating within the clashes concentrating on Druze militants and
civilians.[12] Authorities officers instantly ordered former Ahrar al
Sham commander and fortieth Division Commander Colonel Binyan al Hariri (Abu
Fares Daraa) to deploy the fortieth Division to Soura Kabira to safe the
space after preventing between tribal fighters and Druze militiamen alongside
the Damascus-Suwayda freeway.[13] Authorities forces additionally started to deploy
alongside the border between Suwayda and Daraa provinces on April 1.[14]
These deployments comply with a number of assaults that tribal teams launched on
Druze cities alongside the western Suwayda border.[15] Safety forces are
anticipated to quickly deploy throughout Suwayda Province.[16] These are tangible
steps that counsel that the transitional authorities seems to be
studying find out how to higher include violence concentrating on minorities and rebuild
native belief since sectarian-motivated violence swept coastal Syria in
March 2025.
CTP-ISW defines violence between the
Muslim and Druze communities as “confessional” moderately than “sectarian”
as a result of “sectarian violence” refers to violence between completely different
spiritual denominations. “Confessional violence” refers to violence
between completely different religions. Most Druze contemplate themselves a definite
spiritual group from Islam.[17]
High Druze
leaders continued to have interaction with the Syrian transitional authorities,
although Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri publicly denounced the
authorities. Males of Dignity chief Laith al Balous and two
outstanding Druze sheikhs met with the governors of Suwayda, Daraa, and
Quneitra provinces on April 30 and agreed to a ceasefire in Jaramana and
Ashrafiyeh Sahnaya. Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri launched a fiery
assertion after the assembly that in contrast the latest assaults on the
Druze group to the massacres that focused Alawites on the coast in
early March.[18] The variety of civilians killed and harmed within the latest
assaults on Druze-majority areas in and round Damascus is a number of
orders of magnitude decrease than the variety of civilians killed and harmed
in Alawite areas alongside the coast.[19] Syrian and Turkish media reported
that fewer than 5 civilians had been killed in southern Syria.[20] Armed
teams affiliated with the transitional authorities killed 420 unarmed
individuals in western Syria in early March, together with 39 youngsters.[21]
Hijri, who has persistently criticized the federal government, introduced that he
“not trusts a authorities that kills its personal individuals” and referred to as
upon “worldwide forces to intervene instantly.”[22] The clear
fractures between Druze leaders on participating the federal government didn’t
forestall Balous and different Druze leaders from presumably negotiating the
deployment of GSS forces throughout Suwayda Province.
Iraqi
media reported on Could 1 that former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad
al Halbousi and his Sunni rival Khamis al Khanjar fashioned an
election-related settlement that “resembles reconciliation.”[23] Halbousi’s
Progress Get together and Khanjar’s Sovereignty Get together will reportedly compete
within the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections collectively or type a
post-election alliance, in response to a latest Iraqi media report.
CTP-ISW assessed on April 28 that Halbousi could also be cooperating with the
Shia Coordination Framework to unseat his rival and present Parliament
Speaker, Mahmoud al Mashhadani.[24] The latest report a couple of
Khanjar-Halbousi reconciliation is inconsistent with the April 28
evaluation and will counsel that Halbousi will not be cooperating with
the Shia Coordination Framework. The Shia Coordination Framework is a
free coalition of Shia political events, a few of which Iran backs.
Mashhadani, Khanjar, and Halbousi’s different historic rivals are members
of the United Sunni Management Coalition that fashioned in early January
2025 and has explicitly supported long-held Sunni political calls for.[25]
Halbousi has additionally lately referred to as for political motion to attain Sunni
political calls for, similar to after the Federal Supreme Courtroom suspended
the implementation of a legislation that favored Sunnis in February 2025.[26] A
Halbousi-Khanjar alliance would vastly improve Sunni electoral
power, as Halbousi’s get together and Khanjar’s former get together had been the 2
highest-performing Sunni events within the 2021 elections.[27]
The
Houthis might try to strain the UN into ending the UN Verifications
and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) by holding oil tankers and cargo ships
in Houthi-controlled ports till the UN ends the mechanism.
The United Nations carried out UNIVIM in 2016 to cease prohibited cargo,
similar to weapons, from being exported to Yemen, whereas making certain that Yemen
retained entry to meals and different needed provides.[28] The United
Kingdom Maritime Commerce Operations (UKMTO) reported on Could 1 that the
Houthis are prohibiting oil tankers and cargo ships, together with UNVIM
cleared vessels, from leaving Ras Issa Port on the Hudaydah
shoreline.[29] The Houthis reportedly fired warning pictures after one
vessel tried to exit, and armed Houthi fighters boarded different
vessels.[30] There have been not less than 14 vessels anchored close to Ras Issa Port
on Could 1, in response to Maritime Site visitors information. Many of those vessels
travelled from Djibouti, the place UNVIM officers examine vessels
transporting cargo to Yemeni ports. Houthi International Minister Gamal Amer
additionally lately referred to as for the termination of UNIVIM in a letter to the UN
Secretary-Normal, Antonio Guterres, and the UN Safety Council
President, suggesting the Houthis could also be utilizing the vessels as hostages
to renegotiate UNVIM or strain the UN to alter how the UNVIM
operates.[31]
The fourth spherical of US-Iran nuclear talks in Rome on Could 3 was postponed.[32] The
Iranian International Ministry reported on Could 1 that US-Iran talks had been
rescheduled on the suggestion of the Omani overseas minister.[33] Omani
International Minister Badr bin Hamad al Busaidi stated the talks had been
rescheduled for “logistical causes.”[34] Iranian officers have
repeatedly emphasised in latest months that Iran is not going to negotiate
beneath navy risk or financial strain.[35] US Protection Secretary
Pete Hegseth threatened navy motion towards Iran in response to
Iran’s assist for the Houthis in an April 30 tweet.[36] US Particular
Envoy to the Center East Steve Witkoff, who has led the US delegation in
the primary three rounds of US-Iran talks, retweeted Hegseth’s feedback.
The USA individually sanctioned a number of entities and vessels on
April 29 and 30 that had been concerned in Iran’s ballistic missile program
and Iranian petroleum and petrochemical merchandise commerce,
respectively.[37] An unspecified senior Iranian official informed Reuters on
Could 1 that US sanctions usually are not serving to the US and Iran resolve nuclear
disputes, and the subsequent spherical of talks might be scheduled “relying on
the US method.”[38] An Iranian knowledgeable near the regime said on
Could 1 that talks had been postponed as a consequence of what unspecified Iranian sources
referred to as “contradictory US positions.“[39] The sources additionally stated that the
United States was attempting to alter the final framework of the talks.
The Wall Avenue Journal reported on April 26 that one of many
key disputes between Iran and the USA is whether or not a closing
settlement ought to deal with the Iranian missile program, which Iran has
repeatedly indicated it’s unwilling to make concessions on.[40] Iran
and the E3 (the UK, France, and Germany) had been additionally scheduled
to carry talks in Rome on Could 2 forward of US-Iran talks.[41] It’s
unclear if Iran-E3 talks may even be postponed.
Iran continued to broaden financial cooperation with China to undermine the US most strain marketing campaign. The
U.S. Division of the Treasury’s Workplace of International Property Management
(OFAC) reported on Could 1 that Iran exported 1.6 million barrels per day
of crude oil in April 2025.[42] United In opposition to Nuclear Iran (UANI)
estimated that Iranian oil exports to China made up 97 % of Iran’s
whole oil exports in April.[43] Supreme Nationwide Safety Council
Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian individually met with Chinese language International
Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the BRICS safety summit in Brazil
on Could 1.[44] Each officers emphasised the significance of increasing
bilateral financial ties to “problem unilateralism within the worldwide
enviornment.” Iran’s participation in BRICS is a part of its broader efforts to
set up a parallel worldwide order that challenges Western
“dominance.”[45] UANI additionally reported that Iran more and more used tankers
beforehand concerned in Russian oil trades, additional illustrating
cooperation between main US adversaries.[46]
Key Takeaways:
- Israel in Syria: The
Israeli prime minister and overseas minister stated that Israel would “not
permit the [Syrian] Druze…to be harmed” and threatened extra
airstrikes if the violence doesn’t cease, suggesting that Israel goals to
strain the Syrian authorities into stopping the violence towards
Druze. The airstrikes are unlikely to strain the Syrian authorities to
cease extremists from conducting assaults, as a result of the federal government can’t
order the extremists to cease. It’s unclear how Israel can safe the
Druze inhabitants in and round Damascus if the airstrikes fail.
Airstrikes—in the event that they fail to strain the federal government—can’t forestall Druze
from being killed or injured by Sunni extremists. Solely the
formation of a mixed Druze-Transitional Authorities pressure may
efficiently safe Druze locals from Sunni extremists whereas additionally
sidelining pro-Regime parts within the Druze group. - Violence in Southern Syria: Damascus
has made severe efforts to curb confessional-motivated violence
between Sunni extremists, Druze fighters, civilians, and safety
providers. GSS models reportedly cordoned off Sahnaya and prevented
extra exterior Sunni teams from collaborating within the clashes
concentrating on Druze militants and civilians. - Druze-Damascus Relations: High
Druze leaders proceed to have interaction with the Syrian transitional
authorities, although Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri publicly denounced
the federal government. This demonstrates the political variety amongst Syria’s
Druze group. - Iraqi Politics: Iraqi media
reported on Could 1 that former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al
Halbousi and his Sunni rival Khamis al Khanjar fashioned an
election-related settlement that “resembles reconciliation. The latest
report a couple of Khanjar-Halbousi reconciliation is inconsistent with
CTP-ISW’s April 28 evaluation and will counsel that Halbousi will not be
cooperating with the Shia Coordination Framework. - Houthis and the UN: The
Houthis might try to strain the UN into ending the UN Verifications
and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) by holding oil tankers and cargo ships
in Houthi-controlled ports till the UN ends the mechanism. - Iran-US Talks: The fourth spherical of US-Iran nuclear talks in Rome on Could 3 was postponed.
- Iran-China Cooperation: Iran continued to broaden financial cooperation with China to undermine the US most strain marketing campaign.
Iranian Determination-Making, Inner Dynamics, and International Coverage
The Iranian rial depreciated from 815,000 rials to 1 US greenback on April 30 to 820,000 rials to 1 US greenback on Could 1.[47]
Senior
Iranian navy officers look like getting ready for potential US or
Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear services and vitality infrastructure.
Khatam ol Anbia Air Protection Headquarters Commander Brigadier Normal
Alireza Sabahi Fard visited the Southwestern Air Protection Zone on Could 1
to examine the positioning’s operational readiness and capabilities.[48] Sabahi
Fard inspected radar and missile programs and confused the zone’s
important function in defending Iranian airspace. The positioning is positioned in
Khuzestan Province, the place there are lots of key Iranian ports and oil and
gasoline infrastructure. Iranian Artesh Commander Main Normal Abdol Rahim
Mousavi individually inspected the 4th Tactical Airbase in Dezful,
Khuzestan Province, on Could 1.[49] Artesh Air Power Commander Brigadier
Normal Hamid Vahedi and different senior officers accompanied Mousavi
through the go to. Israel beforehand weighed potential strikes on Iranian
oil infrastructure in October 2024, a transfer former US President Joe
Biden opposed.[50]
Iran
continues to strengthen financial ties with African international locations, prone to
bolster commerce and mitigate the influence of Western sanctions. Iran
hosted the third Iran-Africa Financial Cooperation Summit from April 27
to Could 1 in Tehran.[51] This summit centered on alternatives to bolster
commerce within the areas of oil, gasoline, petrochemicals, mining, and vitality.
Representatives from 38 African international locations and senior Iranian political
officers, together with President Masoud Pezeshkian, attended the summit.
Syria
Turkey seems to be resuming its marketing campaign to strain the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to combine into the Syrian state.
An unspecified Turkish International Ministry supply claimed that Turkey
seeks to “implement” the March 10 settlement between the Syrian
transitional authorities and the SDF.[52] The settlement referred to as for the
illustration of all Syrian communities and their participation within the
political course of, in addition to the combination of all civil and navy
establishments in northeastern Syria into the Syrian state.[53] The March
10 settlement established a seven-point framework to information future
negotiations over the small print of the settlement‘s implementation. These
negotiations haven’t occurred but.[54] The official didn’t outline what
mechanisms Turkey would use to ”implement” the settlement. Turkey
threatened to conduct a full-scale assault on SDF-held territories
between December 2024 and March 2025 to compel the SDF to combine into
the Syrian state.[55] Turkish officers have persistently demanded that
the SDF absolutely disarm and combine into the Syrian Protection
Ministry.[56] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Kurdish political
events stay at odds over Syria’s type of authorities, nonetheless. Neither
facet has made any main changes to their positions on Syrian
centralization or navy integration regardless of the March 10 Settlement
between the 2 events.
Iraq
Iran
is reportedly making an attempt to keep away from a serious rift between Iraqi Prime
Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and State of Regulation Coalition head Nouri
al Maliki forward of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November
2025.[57] An Iraqi Dawa get together member informed Saudi media on Could 1
that Iran would select between Maliki and Sudani if Iraqi Shia
nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr runs within the elections. Sudani and
Maliki are each members of the Shia Coordination Framework. The Shia
Coordination Framework is a free coalition of Shia political events,
a few of which Iran backs. CTP-ISW assessed on April 30 that Iran is
probably urging the Shia Coordination Framework unity forward of the
elections to enhance the chance that Iranian-backed events will
keep management of the Iraqi authorities.[58] Maliki and Sudani
reportedly plan to run on opposing lists.[59] Sadr gained the most important share
of parliament seats within the 2021 election as a result of his Shia Nationwide
Motion ran on a single listing, which might necessitate unity between
Sudani and Maliki if Sadr participates within the elections.[60]
Arabian Peninsula
Axis of Resistance goals:
- Harden the Houthi regime towards inside dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
- Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in an effort to management all of Yemen
- Erode Israeli will to proceed the struggle within the Gaza Strip
US
Central Command (CENTCOM) carried out not less than 10 airstrikes concentrating on
Houthi infrastructure and management in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen
since 1:00 pm ET on April 30.[61] CENTCOM carried out an
airstrike concentrating on Houthi fortifications in al Hawak District, south of
Hudaydah.[62] The Houthis issued an evacuation order to residents in
areas of the al Hawak District in November 2024, probably to make use of the land
to assemble these fortifications.[63] CENTCOM additionally carried out not less than
three airstrikes concentrating on Houthi underground services in Kitaf
District, Saada Governorate, on April 30.[64] CENTCOM additionally struck Houthi
infrastructure in al Khab al Shaaf District, al Jawf Governorate, on
Could 1 not less than six occasions, which is roughly 50 kilometers (km)
behind the frontlines in Marib Governorate.[65] A Yemeni analyst
reported on April 13 that the Houthis had a coaching camp in Khab al
Shaaf District.[66]
The
Houthis claimed on April 30 that they launched an unspecified variety of
drones on the USS Carl Vinson plane provider within the Arabian Sea.[67] Native sources reported on April 30 that the Houthis launched drones from the al Jawba space, south of Marib Governorate.[68]
The
Houthis claimed on April 30 that they’d launched two drones concentrating on
an unspecified “very important” goal within the Tel Aviv-Jaffa space and Ashkelon,
southern Israel.[69] The Israeli Protection Forces (IDF)
intercepted a drone from Yemen on April 29.[70] Native sources reported
on April 30 that the Houthis launched drones from websites within the Haradh
space, Hajjah Governorate.[71]
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
Nothing Important to Report.
CTP-ISW
is not going to be masking the brand new Israeli operation within the Gaza Strip. We
have reprioritized our Center East protection to concentrate on Iran’s nuclear
program, Iranian home safety, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its
networks within the Levant, together with the Palestinian Territories. Given
that Israel and its companions have destroyed Hamas’ navy group
and severed the group’s potential to resupply itself, we are actually centered
on how Iran seeks to rebuild its strains of communication with Hezbollah
and Hamas by means of Syria.
The Iran Replace supplies
insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored actions overseas that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and pursuits. It
additionally covers occasions and tendencies that have an effect on the steadiness and
decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Vital Threats Challenge
(CTP) on the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the
Examine of Warfare (ISW) supplies these updates recurrently primarily based on regional
occasions.
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” because the
unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated within the Center East
because the Islamic Republic got here to energy in 1979. This transnational
coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that
cooperate to safe their collective pursuits. Tehran considers itself
to be each a part of the alliance and its chief. Iran furnishes these
teams with various ranges of monetary, navy, and political assist
in trade for a point of affect or management over their actions.
Some are conventional proxies which might be extremely attentive to Iranian
route, whereas others are companions over which Iran exerts extra restricted
affect. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand
strategic goals, which embrace eroding and ultimately expelling
American affect from the Center East, destroying the Israeli state,
or each. Pursuing these goals and supporting the Axis of Resistance
to these ends have change into cornerstones of Iranian regional technique.
[1] https://allisrael.com/amidst-clashes-in-syria-netanyahu-threatens-israeli-strikes-to-defend-druze-in-syria
[2]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-29-2025;
https://x.com/Charles_Lister/standing/1917955888352051332;
[3]
https://www.fb.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0SdFRSPeN9sYq4MgmqLY44H1NpFR9ExRLrS1dZUfrLMBhjyg2xWR87vFgGrMqRPi9l?__cft__[0]=AZXuWQ3OdcLnmR5SXeyvNF5fYPHeBF2bbjAxLPZxwbu1rrSEyd6iEZe5epVZ3tgRgqfDGhdyf8HTveI-tk98B1VvDxPsHGFIwqgU8TXp1_UN_Hyu7gljtWVACyUUqtfvLXPw3tBM5vB3UA3qq5HKZnwFZ3Ix0aIii9V-1t-coDCnCQ&__tn__=%2COpercent2CP-R;
[4]
https://x.com/Charles_Lister/standing/1917946008106836318 ;
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1917516256892141682 ;
https://x.com/suwayda24/standing/1917404525280776500 ;
https://www.fb.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0AZ94tv4czygGaDS7zvfHU9HvkuNpGscrdhVhwD8wuXgDhhJYH1Nf3jjDUT1brfjnl
[5]
https://x.com/SecRubio/standing/1898833468441981178;
https://www.reuters.com/world/uk-lifts-sanctions-against-syrias-defence-ministry-intelligence-agencies-2025-04-24/
[6] https://x.com/idfonline/standing/1917566064788992133
[7] https://www.newarab.com/information/syrians-protest-against-israeli-attempts-divide-south
[8]
https://x.com/sameersaboungi/standing/1917435513415348358;
https://x.com/Charles_Lister/standing/1917955888352051332;
https://x.com/Charles_Lister/standing/1917946008106836318
[9] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1917516256892141682; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1917602765250965546
[10] https://x.com/sameersaboungi/standing/1917435513415348358;
[11]
https://www.fb.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0SdFRSPeN9sYq4MgmqLY44H1NpFR9ExRLrS1dZUfrLMBhjyg2xWR87vFgGrMqRPi9l?__cft__[0]=AZUETTAmKqqsN1qeXt7N6XQzMtFKE-N3RfNkYAv3ORN8LA3x43rIh0sAv1wi38rnXjPqW6gAuysogSkJoHIEkpLCfdfbVBb_3AskQ_0MwkADI8MFmiI6cAs4rNgPjJypGTGTYqEgF1Zfh3ucfu0_Ss-ygztWLIMkB_M6lfbHzAAirOnJqmepUrjikKZyOxsR27MuW4Nw9drS938ADbbunoV_&__tn__=%2COpercent2CP-R;
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1917602765250965546;
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1917649465143427525/picture/1
[12] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/standing/1917603572507722204
[13]
https://www.fb.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0SdFRSPeN9sYq4MgmqLY44H1NpFR9ExRLrS1dZUfrLMBhjyg2xWR87vFgGrMqRPi9l
; https://t.me/AjaNews/375808; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/128797
[14] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/128816
[15]
https://x.com/suwayda24/standing/1917639052536275128;
https://x.com/suwayda24/standing/1917662312330125701;
https://x.com/omar_alharir/standing/1917675308385288581
[16] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/standing/1918001746846101646; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1917988217489362964
[17]
https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2016/03/21/5-facts-about-israeli-druze-a-unique-religious-and-ethnic-group/;
https://www.ifcj.org/be taught/resource-library/who-are-the-druze
[18] https://www.fb.com/picture/?fbid=1115236280646181&set=a.607854068051074
[19]
https://www.aa dot
com.tr/en/middle-east/16-killed-in-attacks-by-outlaw-groups-in-southern-syria-authorities-say/3553530
; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/standing/1917925886193442946 ;
https://www.npr.org/2025/03/09/nx-s1-5322458/syria-revenge-killings-alawites-latakia
[20]
https://www.aa dot
com.tr/en/middle-east/16-killed-in-attacks-by-outlaw-groups-in-southern-syria-authorities-say/3553530
; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/standing/1917925886193442946 ;
https://apnews.com/article/syria-israel-druze-clashes-sahnaya-jaramana-40f8aeec865c1d81f128b05ef21dfa59
[21] https://snhr.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/R250305E-1.pdf
[22] https://www.fb.com/picture/?fbid=1115236280646181&set=a.607854068051074
[23]
https://shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8percentB3percentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentA7percentD8percentB3percentD8percentA9/%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD9percent82percentD9percent88percentD9percent89-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB3-%D9percent86percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentA9-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB9percentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7percentD9percent82percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentA9-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD9percent83percentD8percentA8percentD8percentB1percentD9percent89-%D8percentAApercentD8percentAEpercentD9percent88percentD8percentB6-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentA7percentD9percent86percentD8percentAApercentD8percentAEpercentD8percentA7percentD8percentA8percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA-%D9percent85percentD8percentAApercentD8percentB3percentD9percent84percentD8percentADpercentD8percentA9-%D8percentA8percentD8percentABpercentD9percent82percentD9percent84percentD9percent87percentD8percentA7-%D9percent88percentD9percent82percentD9percent88percentD8percentA7-%D9percent85-%D8percentB5percentD8percentBApercentD9percent8ApercentD8percentB1percentD8percentA9-%D8percentAApercentD9percent86percentD8percentA7percentD9percent81percentD8percentB3percentD9percent87percentD8percentA7-%D8percentB5percentD9percent88percentD8percentB1percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentA7
[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-28-2025
[25]
https://shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8percentB3percentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentA7percentD8percentB3percentD8percentA9/%D9percent83percentD8percentAApercentD9percent84-%D9percent88percentD8percentB4percentD8percentAEpercentD8percentB5percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA-%D8percentAApercentD8percentB9percentD9percent84percentD9percent86-%D8percentB9percentD9percent86-%D8percentAApercentD8percentB4percentD9percent83percentD9percent8ApercentD9percent84-%D8percentAApercentD8percentADpercentD8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD9percent81-%D8percentB3percentD9percent86-%D9percent8A-%D8percentACpercentD8percentAFpercentD9percent8ApercentD8percentAF-%D9percent85percentD9percent86-%D8percentA8percentD8percentBApercentD8percentAFpercentD8percentA7percentD8percentAF
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-18-2025
[26]
https://x.com/AlHaLboosii/standing/1886773790987763821 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-5-2025
[27] https://www.kurdistan24 dot web/en/story/386432
[28] https://vimye.org/about
[29] https://x.com/UK_MTO/standing/1917904883648270600
[30] https://x.com/UK_MTO/standing/1917904883648270600
[31] https://x.com/BashaReport/standing/1917866771086016569
[32]
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-iran-talks-postponed-new-date-depends-us-approach-iranian-official-says-2025-05-01/
[33] https://t.me/MFAIran/27078
[34] https://x.com/badralbusaidi/standing/1917941337736827292
[35]
https://www.chief dot ir/fa/content material/28066 ;
https://x.com/araghchi/standing/1898858793934467171 ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/irans-president-trump-i-will-not-negotiate-do-whatever-hell-you-want-2025-03-11/
[36] https://x.com/SecDef/standing/1917741093392707886
[37]
https://dwelling.treasury.gov/information/press-releases/sb0116 ;
https://www.state.gov/maximum-pressure-sanctions-on-illicit-traders-of-iranian-petroleum-and-petrochemical-products/
[38]
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-iran-talks-postponed-new-date-depends-us-approach-iranian-official-says-2025-05-01/
[39] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/standing/1917961234391224733
[40]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-and-iran-divided-by-key-question-in-nuclear-talks-59b26210
;
https://www.criticalthreats.org/evaluation/iran-update-march-24-2025-67e1e57f7311a
; https://www.criticalthreats.org/evaluation/iran-update-april-28-2025
[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-uk-france-germany-hold-nuclear-talks-friday-2025-04-30/
[42] https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934236/obtain?inline
[43] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/weblog/april-2025-iran-tanker-tracker
[44] https://www.mehrnews dot com/information/6453139/
[45]
https://www.criticalthreats.org/evaluation/iran-update-august-24-2023#_edn468e988744e943807520b659438a957122
; https://www.irna dot ir/information/84859472
[46] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/weblog/april-2025-iran-tanker-tracker
[47] https://www.bon-bast.com/
[48] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/information/1404/02/11/3303226
[49] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/information/1404/02/11/3303222
[50] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/09/biden-netanyahu-call-israel-attack-iran
https://www.axios.com/2024/10/02/iran-israel-missile-attacks-response
[51]
https://en.isna dot
ir/picture/1404020704425/The-Third-Iran-Africa-Financial-Cooperation-Convention
; https://www.mehrnews dot com/information/6453407/
[52]
https://www.cnnturk dot
com/turkiye/disisleri-kaynaklari-turkiyenin-beklentisi-suriye-yonetimi-ile-sdg-arasinda-varilan-mutabakatin-uygulanmasidir-2278259
[53]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025
;
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/facilitating-new-sdf-agreement-key-stabilizing-syria
[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025
[55]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-19-2024 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-3-2025
[56]
https://www.aljazeera dot
com/information/2024/12/19/turkiye-refutes-us-claims-of-ceasefire-with-syrian-kurdish-fighters
; https://www dot
kurdistan24.web/en/story/828282/turkish-fm-sdf-must-dissolve-before-we-launch-a-military-operation
; https://damascusv dot com/archives/66220
[57] https://aawsat
dot
com/%D9percent81percentD9percent8A-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB9percentD9percent85percentD9percent82/%D8percentAApercentD8percentADpercentD9percent82percentD9percent8ApercentD9percent82percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA-%D9percent88percentD9percent82percentD8percentB6percentD8percentA7percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentA7/5138335-%D8percentA5percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7percentD9percent86-%D8percentAEpercentD8percentA7percentD8percentB1percentD8percentAC-%D9percent85percentD8percentB7percentD8percentA8percentD8percentAE-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentA7percentD9percent86percentD8percentAApercentD8percentAEpercentD8percentA7percentD8percentA8percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB9percentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7percentD9percent82percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentA9-%D9percent84percentD9percent83percentD9percent86percentD9percent87percentD8percentA7-%D9percent81percentD9percent8A-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD9percent85percentD9percent86percentD8percentB2percentD9percent84
[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-30-2025
[59]
https://shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8percentB3percentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentA7percentD8percentB3percentD8percentA9/%D8percentAApercentD9percent88percentD8percentADpercentD8percentAFpercentD9percent88percentD8percentA7-%D9percent88percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAApercentD8percentACpercentD9percent87percentD9percent88percentD8percentA7-%D9percent84percentD9percent84percentD8percentB5percentD8percentAFpercentD8percentB1-%D9percent82percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAFpercentD8percentA9-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84-%D8percentB7percentD8percentA7percentD8percentB1-%D9percent8ApercentD8percentB3percentD8percentAApercentD9percent84percentD9percent85percentD9percent88percentD9percent86-%D8percentB1percentD8percentB3percentD8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentA9-%D9percent85percentD9percent86-%D8percentB7percentD9percent87percentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7percentD9percent86-%D8percentA8percentD8percentB4-%D9percent86-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentA7percentD9percent86percentD8percentAApercentD8percentAEpercentD8percentA7percentD8percentA8percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA
[60] https://www.mei.edu/publications/iraq-crisis-elite-consensus-based-politics-turns-deadly
[61] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/standing/1917669019672248537 ;
https://x.com/defenseliney/standing/1917705935494975509 ;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/standing/1917902106599580118 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/standing/1917860097830899749
[62] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/standing/1917669019672248537; https://x.com/defenseliney/standing/1917705213315788814
[63] https://yemenfuture dot web/information/27279
[64] https://x.com/defenseliney/standing/1917705935494975509
[65] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/standing/1917902106599580118; https://x.com/BashaReport/standing/1917860097830899749
[66] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/standing/1911509908660314565
[67] https://t.me/army21ye/2899?single
[68] https://x.com/defenseliney/standing/1917718160347717811
[69] https://t.me/army21ye/2899?single
[70] https://x.com/idfonline/standing/1917308196181393507
[71] https://x.com/defenseliney/standing/1917718160347717811
