Iran Replace, March 6, 2025
Johanna Moore, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Victoria Penza, Avery Borens, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter
Data Cutoff: 2:00pm ET
The Vital Threats Challenge (CTP) on the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Examine of Struggle (ISW) publish the Iran Replace, which gives insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored actions that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and pursuits. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Replace each weekday.
Click on here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli floor operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the continued opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.
We don’t report intimately on conflict crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t immediately have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We completely condemn violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity although we don’t describe them in these stories.
Small-scale rebel cells have began to emerge and assault Syrian interim authorities forces in sure areas of Syria. Former Assad regime members performed coordinated assaults on Syrian navy checkpoints and patrols in Jableh, Beit Ana, and Daliyah in Latakia Province on March 6.[1] Interim authorities forces deployed to the world and cordoned off the world, presumably forward of a clearing effort.[2] Interim authorities forces suppressed fighters in Beit Ana and Daliyah however proceed to interact former Assad regime members within the Latakia countryside on the time of this writing.[3] CTP-ISW will proceed to watch this creating scenario. Former Assad regime members have killed not less than 13 Syrian troopers on March 6.[4] Former Assad regime loyalists have introduced their intent to revive Assad’s rule in Syria. It’s unlikely that all the people who participated within the assaults on interim authorities forces joined within the preventing to topple the federal government and restore Assad, nevertheless.[5]
Former Assad regime members will very probably kind the simplest rebel cells, given their pre-established networks. Former Assad regime members have already got preexisting networks that they’ll leverage to quickly set up rebel cells. These networks are navy, intelligence, and political networks and legal syndicates who have been regime supporters and misplaced important financial and political affect within the aftermath of Assad’s fall. These networks may allow former Assad regime members to coordinate assaults throughout wider areas. That is significantly true in former regime stronghold areas in coastal Syria.
These hardcore Assadists will probably exploit a wide range of grievances towards the Syrian interim authorities to recruit new members who might or might not be initially motivated by a want to revive Assad. Rebel teams usually entice supporters who maintain a variety of social, financial, and political grievances.[6] Interim authorities forces have performed near-constant raids in former regime strongholds concentrating on former Assad regime members since coming to energy in December 2024.[7] These raids, whereas ensuing within the arrest of many mid- to high-level Assad regime officers, have additionally fueled stories of revenge-based assaults and harassment, significantly towards the Alawite neighborhood.[8] Members of the Alawite neighborhood have expressed their perception that Alawites are being economically disenfranchised by Sunnis as a part of a broader effort to marginalize the Alawite neighborhood.[9] This isn’t true; all of Syria is economically devastated, however Alawites imagine they’re ”uniquely” experiencing financial points nonetheless.[10] Former Assad regime members have reportedly used Alawite fears of assaults on the neighborhood to mobilize younger males to take up arms.[11] Interim authorities forces have additionally launched a marketing campaign to interdict drug smuggling in western Syria, chopping off a once-steady income stream for some legal syndicates and their beneficiaries.[12] Rebel teams can leverage these grievances towards the interim authorities to extend their supporter base, and have already begun to take action.
Poorly executed counter-insurgency operations threat fueling a cycle of violence and elevated native assist for rebel teams if not performed rigorously. Rebel teams search to use insecurity and abuses to determine themselves as the first safety guarantor in a neighborhood.[13] Rebel teams conduct assaults on authorities safety forces to elicit a powerful response, which rebel teams can then body as authorities assaults on civilians.[14] Alawite activists have reportedly warned that the assaults on interim authorities forces in Latakia Province on March 6 aimed to elicit a harsh response from the Syrian authorities and thereby instigate an insurgency.[15] Former Assad regime members attacked an ambulance that was trying to evacuate Syrian troopers from Jableh with the expectation that the interim authorities would reply to the assault with a big operation.[16] A heavy-handed strategy that fails to obviously distinguish between insurgents and civilians undermines authorities efforts to reestablish management over an space by exacerbating fears throughout the neighborhood that authorities forces are concentrating on civilians. This worry can in flip drive well-liked assist for rebel teams.[17]
Former senior Syrian Arab Military (SAA) Fourth Division officer Brigadier Normal Gaith Dalah introduced the formation of a “navy council to liberate Syria” on March 6.[18] Dalah introduced that the group’s aims embrace the “liberation” of Syrian territory from the “terrorist, jihadist organizations” that management it, in reference to the Hayat Tahrir al Sham-led Syrian interim authorities.[19] The group additionally seeks to dismantle the Syrian interim authorities’s “deeply rooted sectarian constructions.” Dalah is a former Fourth Division normal.[20] The USA designated Dalah as a specifically designated nationwide (SDN) in 2020 for his efforts to stop a ceasefire in Syria.[21] It’s unclear if Dalah really established this navy council or if the group is claiming him as their chief as a consequence of his popularity within the Assad regime. It’s notable and sure not a coincidence that the group introduced its formation on the identical day that regime-affiliated clashes broke out in coastal Syria.
The USA is contemplating a plan by which it may ask allies to cease and examine Iranian oil tankers, in accordance with unspecified sources chatting with Reuters on March 6.[22] Iran may reply to such a plan by attacking or seizing industrial vessels or tankers within the Persian Gulf. The plan is a part of the US “most stress” marketing campaign, which seeks to drive Iranian oil exports to zero and thereby coerce Iran to barter a brand new nuclear deal.[23] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent emphasised on March 6 that the US seeks to “shut down” Iran’s oil sector and drone manufacturing capabilities.[24] Iran has developed a number of methods to evade US sanctions on Iranian oil exports, akin to conducting ship-to-ship transfers in Malaysia to obfuscate the origin of Iranian oil shipments to China.[25] Beneath the plan that Reuters reported on March 6, the US would ask allies to examine Iranian tankers transiting chokepoints, such because the Malacca Strait off the coast of Malaysia, to stop illicit Iranian oil exports.[26] Iran has beforehand seized industrial tankers in response to Western seizures of Iranian tankers. Iran seized a tanker carrying Chevron oil within the Strait of Hormuz in April 2023 in response to the US confiscating Iranian oil shipments, for instance.[27] This incident resulted in a steep improve in crude oil costs.[28]
Syria has established a point of financial cooperation with Russia amid negotiations between the Syrian interim authorities and Russia over Russian basing rights in Syria. A US-sanctioned, Barbados-flagged tanker arrived on the coast of Baniyas, Tartous Province, Syria, on March 6.[29] The USA sanctioned the vessel in January 2025 for transporting Russian oil.[30] Reuters reported that the vessel departed from the Russian port of Primorsk for Syria on February 8 carrying 37,000 metric tons of ultra-low sulphur diesel.[31] It’s unclear whether or not the vessel has offloaded the diesel gasoline on the time of this writing. The Syrian interim authorities has sought to acquire oil since Iran halted oil exports to Syria after the autumn of the Assad regime. The Syrian authorities not too long ago reached a cope with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in February 2025 to move oil from SDF-controlled oil wells to authorities territory for refinement and use.[32] Russian oil exports to Syria would recommend that Russia seeks to reestablish its financial relationship with Syria, presumably to achieve favor with the interim authorities and attempt to safe navy basing rights in Syria.
Russian oil exports to Syria come as Syrian officers have expressed curiosity in creating financial ties with Russia in latest weeks. Russia delivered native Syrian forex to the Syrian central financial institution on February 12 following a name between Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara and Russian President Vladimir Putin.[33] Unspecified sources advised the Wall Road Journal on March 5 that Syrian officers have sought to renegotiate the phrases of a number of contracts that the Assad regime signed with Russia. These contracts cowl Russian investments in phosphate mines and oil fields within the central Syrian desert, a fertilizer plant in Homs, and the port of Tartous.[34] A safety pressure can be wanted to guard Russian belongings at mines and oil fields within the central Syrian desert provided that ISIS repeatedly assaults services on this space. It’s unclear whether or not the Syrian interim authorities would decide to defending Russian belongings or enable some Russian safety presence at these websites. Russo-Syrian financial cooperation can happen with out an settlement between the interim authorities and Russia about Russian basing rights in Syria. Russia may attempt to use its financial assist for Syria as leverage to safe a “lowered” navy presence in Syria, nevertheless.
The US and Israeli air forces performed a joint train on March 4 to strengthen interoperability and put together for “a variety of eventualities.”[35] The drill concerned Israeli F-15Is, F-35Is, and a US B-52 bomber.[36] The train comes after senior Iranian navy commanders have resurfaced threats to conduct a direct assault on Israel. These threats probably goal to form Israeli resolution making and deter a possible Israeli strike on Iran.[37]
Outstanding Druze militias and the Syrian authorities agreed to determine Suwaydawi-led safety forces beneath interim Syrian authorities management in Suwayda Province. The Males of Dignity Motion introduced on March 6 that it and different distinguished Druze teams, together with Mudafa al Karama and Ahrar Jabal al Arab Gathering, reached an settlement with the interim Syrian Inside Ministry.[38] The Males of Dignity stated that Suwaydawi-led safety forces will oversee safety and struggle legal exercise and drug trafficking in Suwayda with logistical assist from the Inside Ministry.[39] The Inside Ministry despatched eight police autos to Suwayda for the brand new safety pressure to make use of and pledged to offer additional assist within the coming days.[40]
The Druze militias and interim authorities agreed that native leaders and residents from Suwayda would comprise the province’s safety models, though it’s unclear if Suwaydawis may have a majority presence within the models or if the models will solely be comprised of Suwaydawis.[41] The Syrian authorities has not reached the same safety association with every other minority group in Syria. The Males of Dignity have referred to as for a decentralized system of presidency from Damascus for the reason that fall of the Assad regime.[42] Shara has, for probably the most half, rejected minority teams’ requires any kind of federalist system. His acquiescence to the presumably Druze demand that safety forces in Suwayda Province be comprised of Suwaydawis—probably Druze militia members—means that Shara is prepared to loosen up his place beneath sure circumstances. Shara may search to make the same settlement with the Kurds in northeastern Syria, who’ve equally referred to as for a decentralized governance system.
The Males of Dignity Motion’s settlement with the Syrian authorities is a departure from its earlier place, by which the group prevented the entry of presidency forces into Suwayda Province. The HTS-led Division of Army Operations briefly deployed to western Suwayda Province for the primary time on February 12 to comprise tensions surrounding the homicide of a neighborhood man, however it’s unclear if authorities forces remained within the space or in the event that they coordinated their operations with Druze militias.[43] The Syrian authorities has not forcibly deployed safety forces to areas in Suwayda Province and has prioritized negotiations with native Druze authorities, prone to domesticate goodwill amongst Suwayda residents and the Druze neighborhood. A delegation of Druze officers, together with Ahrar al Arab Gathering chief Sheikh Suleiman Abdul Baqi and former Males of Dignity member Laith al Balous, met with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on February 24 to debate safety cooperation in southern Syria.[44] Rising tensions in Suwayda over Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s demand to ”demilitarize” southern Syria might have contributed to the Males of Dignity’s willingness to cooperate with the Syrian authorities.[45]
Key Takeaways:
- Rising Syrian Insurgency: Small-scale rebel cells have began to emerge and assault Syrian interim authorities forces in sure areas of Syria. Former Assad regime members will very probably kind the simplest rebel cells, given their pre-established networks. These hardcore Assadists will probably exploit a wide range of grievances towards the Syrian interim authorities to recruit new members who might or might not be initially motivated by a want to revive Assad.
- Iranian Sanctions Evasion: The USA is contemplating a plan by which it may ask allies to cease and examine Iranian oil tankers, in accordance with unspecified sources chatting with Reuters on March 6. Iran may reply to such a plan by attacking or seizing industrial vessels or tankers within the Persian Gulf.
- Russia in Syria: Syria has established a point of financial cooperation with Russia amid negotiations between the Syrian interim authorities and Russia over Russian basing rights in Syria. Russian oil exports to Syria come as Syrian officers have expressed curiosity in creating financial ties with Russia in latest weeks.
- US-Israeli Workouts: The US and Israeli air forces performed a joint train on March 4 to strengthen interoperability and put together for “a variety of eventualities.”
- Druze in Syria: Outstanding Druze militias and the Syrian authorities agreed to determine Suwaydawi-led safety forces beneath interim Syrian authorities management in Suwayda Province. The Druze militias and interim authorities agreed that native leaders and residents from Suwayda would comprise the province’s safety models, though it’s unclear if Suwaydawis may have a majority presence within the models or if the models will solely be comprised of Suwaydawis.
Syria
Interim authorities forces concluded operations in al Sanamayn, north of Daraa, on March 6 after they engaged a militia within the space that collaborated with the Syrian regime.[46] Interim authorities forces deployed to al Sanamayn on March 5 after a militia led by Mohsen al Haymed killed two interim authorities safety personnel.[47] Haymed’s faction has operated in al Sanamayn since not less than 2018, when the group reconciled with the Assad regime and commenced collaborating with the regime Army Intelligence, in accordance with Syrian opposition media.[48] Syrian media reported that clashes between interim authorities forces and Haymed’s faction killed eight interim authorities safety personnel.[49] The Syrian Interim Protection Ministry reported on March 6 that it has arrested greater than 60 members of Haymed’s faction and killed 9 others.[50] It’s unclear if Haymed stays at-large.[51]
Jordanian Border Guard forces thwarted a drug and weapons smuggling try alongside the Jordan-Syria border on March 6.[52] Jordanian border forces engaged the smugglers, killing 4 of them, whereas the remaining smugglers fled again into Syrian territory. Jordanian authorities recovered a big drug cargo and a Kalashnikov-style rifle from the smugglers.[53]
Israeli forces continued to function in southern Quneitra Province on March 5 and 6. Israeli armored autos reportedly entered the village of Kudna and operated close to a hill south of Kudna.[54]
The co-chairman of the Turkish pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy (DEM) Occasion, Keskin Bayindir, referred to as for the discharge of PKK chief Abdullah Ocalan on March 6.[55] Bayindir stated that Ocalan’s launch is “vital” to advance negotiations between the PKK and the Turkish authorities. Bayindir’s name comes after Ocalan urged the PKK to disarm and dissolve on February 27.[56] A number of PKK leaders have expressed assist for Ocalan’s name.[57]
Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian Nationwide Military (SNA) have continued to assault US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) positions in Aleppo and Raqqa provinces since CTP-ISW’s final information cutoff on March 5. Turkey and the SNA struck SDF positions close to the Qara Qozak Bridge in japanese Aleppo Province.[58] The SDF reported that Turkish plane additionally struck an SDF place south of Kobani.[59] The SDF stated that it shelled Turkish or Turkish-backed fighters close to the Qara Qozak Bridge in response, killing one fighter.[60] Turkish drones struck SDF positions alongside the M4 freeway on March 6.[61] The SNA shelled SDF positions close to the Tishreen Dam on March 6.[62]
The Turkish Protection Ministry introduced that Turkey has killed 26 Kurdistan Staff’ Occasion (PKK) fighters in northern Iraq and Syria previously week.[63] Turkey usually conflates the SDF and the PKK-linked Kurdish Individuals’s Safety Models (YPG) with the PKK and makes use of “PKK” to check with the complete SDF.
The UK (UK) suspended sanctions and asset freezes on 24 Syrian entities within the Syrian vitality, banking, and transportation sectors on March 6.[64] The UK introduced a plan to ease sanctions on Syria’s vitality, transport, and monetary sectors in February 2025.[65] The UK will preserve sanctions on members of the Assad regime and people concerned in drug smuggling.[66] The UK acknowledged on March 6 that it’ll proceed to evaluate the interim authorities “by their actions, not their phrases.”[67] Shara and his allies have prioritized securing sanctions reduction from the West because it shaped the interim authorities in December 2024.[68]
Syrian Interim International Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani attended an Group for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) assembly in The Hague on March 5.[69] Shaibani acknowledged that his participation within the assembly mirrored Syria’s dedication to worldwide safety and reaching justice for victims of the Assad regime’s chemical weapons assaults. Shaibani held conferences with Worldwide Legal Courtroom Prosecutor Karim Khan and Director Normal of the Worldwide Fee on Lacking Individuals Kathryne Bomberger.[70] Shaibani and Khan mentioned efforts to strengthen transitional justice in Syria. Shaibani and Bomberger mentioned growing cooperation to seek for people who disappeared beneath the Assad regime. Shaibani’s participation within the OPCW assembly is the most recent in a collection of worldwide engagements which might be designed to distance the Syrian interim authorities from the Assad regime’s crimes and painting the interim authorities as a reasonable governing establishment.
Iraq
Axis of Resistance aims:
- Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance affect over the Iraqi state and society
- Harden the Iraqi authorities towards inner dissent
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continued to debate their technique for the October 2025 parliamentary elections. Iraqi media reported on March 6 that a number of militias, together with Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, might kind a political alliance referred to as the “Iraqi Resistance.”[71] The militias might be a part of smaller alliances or ally with the Shia Coordination Framework within the upcoming elections. The Shia Coordination Framework is a free coalition of Shia political events, a few of that are backed by Iran. This report is in line with latest stories that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ political wings might “be a part of alliances” and kind a political bloc “impressed by the Iraqi resistance,” presumably in reference to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.[72] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, together with Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, that regularly focused Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria through the October 7 Struggle.[73] A well-organized political alliance may improve the militias’ illustration in parliament and subsequently improve Iranian affect within the Iraqi political sphere.
Arabian Peninsula
Axis of Resistance aims:
- Harden the Houthi regime towards inner dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
- Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in an effort to management all of Yemen
- Erode Israeli will to proceed the conflict within the Gaza Strip
Nothing important to report.
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
Axis of Resistance aims:
- Erode the need of the Israeli political institution and public to maintain clearing operations within the Gaza Strip
- Reestablish Hamas because the governing authority within the Gaza Strip
- Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
- Set up the West Financial institution as a viable entrance towards Israel
Nothing important to report.
Iranian Resolution-Making, Inside Dynamics, and International Coverage
The Iranian rial depreciated from 887,900 rials to 1 US greenback on March 5 to 891,700 rials to 1 US greenback on March 6.[74]
The USA and the E3 (the UK, France, and Germany) issued an announcement condemning Iranian noncompliance with the Worldwide Atomic Power Company (IAEA) on the IAEA Board of Governors assembly on March 5.[75] UK Ambassador to the IAEA Corinne Kitsell stated that the US and the E3 should not have “limitless persistence” and warned that the “complete report” on Iranian nuclear actions may present that Iran is “in non-compliance with its safeguards agreements.” The IAEA handed a censure decision proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to supply a “complete report” on Iranian nuclear actions by spring 2025.[76] CTP-ISW beforehand assessed that the report would virtually definitely verify Iranian noncompliance with the 2015 Joint Complete Plan of Motion (JCPOA) and lay the muse for the E3 to reimpose snapback sanctions in early March 2025.[77] The JCPOA snapback mechanism permits JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Safety Council sanctions on Iran within the occasion of “important non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[78] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025.
The Iranian overseas affairs minister appointed former Deputy International Affairs Minister for Authorized and Worldwide Affairs Reza Najafi because the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations (UN) in Vienna and the IAEA.[79] Najafi changed Mohsen Naziri Asl who served within the function since 2022. Najafi beforehand served because the Iranian ambassador to the UN in Vienna and the IAEA between 2013 and 2018.[80] Iran and the P5+1 (the US, the UK, China, France, Russia and Germany) signed the JCPOA in 2015.
The Iran Replace gives insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored actions overseas that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and pursuits. It additionally covers occasions and traits that have an effect on the steadiness and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Vital Threats Challenge (CTP) on the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Examine of Struggle (ISW) gives these updates repeatedly based mostly on regional occasions.
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” because the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated within the Center East for the reason that Islamic Republic got here to energy in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to safe their collective pursuits. Tehran considers itself to be each a part of the alliance and its chief. Iran furnishes these teams with various ranges of monetary, navy, and political assist in change for a point of affect or management over their actions. Some are conventional proxies which might be extremely aware of Iranian course, whereas others are companions over which Iran exerts extra restricted affect. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic aims, which embrace eroding and finally expelling American affect from the Center East, destroying the Israeli state, or each. Pursuing these aims and supporting the Axis of Resistance to these ends have grow to be cornerstones of Iranian regional technique.
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[3] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/standing/1897716682300268686 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1897777644520829401 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1897682953574261037
[4] https://t.me/nahermedia/45465
[5] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1897706473612099639
[6] https://2009-2017.state.gov/paperwork/group/119629.pdf ; https://www.mei.edu/publications/mullah-omar-wants-you-taliban-mobilization-strategies-or-motivations-joining ; https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/artwork/psychology-of-participation-in-insurgency
[7] https://t.me/ALBADIA_24/3878 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1883109082300883054 ; https://x.com/SanaAjel/standing/1879091411045474646
[8] https://x.com/SanaAjel/standing/1892243574315520505 ; https://www.mei.edu/publications/security-alawite-regions-post-assad-syria
[9] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/standing/1892119268881277373
[10] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/standing/1892119268881277373
[11] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/standing/1897710423195156853 ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/16/constant-fear-alawites-syria-homs-terrified-reprisals ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/standing/1897712035192094841
[12] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135799 ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/might/07/drug-captagon-turning-syria-into-narco-state
[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/jaysh-al-mahdi ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-27-2023
[14] https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/61/Docs/Al-AnbarAwakeningVolIIpercent5B1percent5D.pdf ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/standing/1897723421955703278
[15] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1897706473612099639
[16] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/standing/1897723421955703278
[17] https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/61/Docs/Al-AnbarAwakeningVolIIpercent5B1percent5D.pdf
[18] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/standing/1897710698550972678; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1897764296358088933
[19] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/standing/1897710698550972678
[20] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1897764296358088933
[21] https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20200820 ; https://2017-2021.state.gov/syria-sanctions-designations-2/
[22] https://www.reuters.com/enterprise/vitality/us-mulls-plan-disrupt-irans-oil-by-halting-vessels-sea-2025-03-06/
[23] https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/national-security-presidential-memorandum-nspm-2/
[24] https://www.cnbc.com/2025/03/06/us-will-collapse-irans-economy-by-shutting-down-its-oil-industry-treasury-secretary-says.html
[25] https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-iran-south-china-sea-oil-trade/ ; https://www.reuters.com/enterprise/vitality/russian-iranian-oil-supply-china-rebounds-new-vessels-cash-trade-2025-02-28/
[26] https://www.reuters.com/enterprise/vitality/us-mulls-plan-disrupt-irans-oil-by-halting-vessels-sea-2025-03-06/
[27] https://x.com/US5thFleet/standing/1651560354265145344 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/tanker-involved-us-seizure-iran-oil-cargo-changes-name-2023-09-20/
[28] https://www.reuters.com/enterprise/vitality/us-mulls-plan-disrupt-irans-oil-by-halting-vessels-sea-2025-03-06/
[29] https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/particulars/ships/shipid:753736/mmsi:314982000/imo:9322956/vessel:PROSPERITY
[30] https://house.treasury.gov/information/press-releases/jy2777; https://www.reuters.com/enterprise/vitality/russia-ships-diesel-syria-tanker-under-us-sanctions-data-shows-2025-03-06/
[31] https://www.reuters.com/enterprise/vitality/russia-ships-diesel-syria-tanker-under-us-sanctions-data-shows-2025-03-06/
[32] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-northeast-begins-supplying-oil-damascus-oil-ministry-says-2025-02-22/
[33] https://x.com/SanaAjel/standing/1890343048099303916 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-14-2025
[34] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/russia-is-chasing-a-deal-to-keep-its-military-bases-in-syria-f9f6ca6e?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1 ; https://www.ft.com/content material/30ddfdd0-b83e-11e9-96bd-8e884d3ea203
[35] https://x.com/IDF/standing/1897590213855068601; https://x.com/CENTCOM/standing/1897605258685071534
[36] https://x.com/IDF/standing/1897590213855068601
[37] https://www.criticalthreats.org/evaluation/iran-update-february-20-2025
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[42] https://www.wsj.com/opinion/syria-has-a-new-governmentor-does-it-al-sharaa-hts-islamist-0f938cc5?mod=opinion_lead_pos12
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[44] https://x.com/suwayda24/standing/1894139731728109813
[45] https://www.yahoo.com/information/israel-wants-demilitarization-parts-southern-204817731.html; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-3-2025
[46] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/120539 ; https://t.me/Free_Daraa_city/1358 ;
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[51] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1897393573915713627
[52] https://www.hala dot jo/2025/03/06/%D9percent82percentD9percent88percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA-%D8percentADpercentD8percentB1percentD8percentB3-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentADpercentD8percentAFpercentD9percent88percentD8percentAF-%D8percentAApercentD8percentB4percentD8percentAApercentD8percentA8percentD9percent83-%D9percent85percentD8percentB9-%D9percent85percentD8percentACpercentD9percent85percentD9percent88percentD8percentB9percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA-%D9percent85percentD8percentB3percentD9percent84percentD8percentADpercentD8percentA9/
[53] https://www.hala dot jo/2025/03/06/%D9percent82percentD9percent88percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA-%D8percentADpercentD8percentB1percentD8percentB3-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentADpercentD8percentAFpercentD9percent88percentD8percentAF-%D8percentAApercentD8percentB4percentD8percentAApercentD8percentA8percentD9percent83-%D9percent85percentD8percentB9-%D9percent85percentD8percentACpercentD9percent85percentD9percent88percentD8percentB9percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA-%D9percent85percentD8percentB3percentD9percent84percentD8percentADpercentD8percentA9/
[54] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/standing/1897719477586084097 ; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/standing/1897361665601183861
[55] https://www.rudawarabia dot internet/arabic/middleeast/turkey/060320251
[56] https://x.com/ragipsoylu/standing/1895120510109000176
[57] https://www.rudaw dot internet/sorani/kurdistan/050320252 ; https://www.turkishminute dot com/2025/03/03/senior-pkk-figure-says-turkish-officials-engaged-in-talks-with-ocalan-for-a-year-before-his-historic-call/
[58] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/137231 ; https://npasyria dot com/206983/
[59] https://npasyria dot com/206983/
[60] https://npasyria dot com/206983/
[61] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/137246
[62] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/137259
[63] hhttps://x.com/tcsavunma/standing/1897576112487612769
[64] https://www.gov.uk/authorities/information/update-on-syria-lifting-asset-freezes-on-24-entities
[65] https://www.gov.uk/authorities/speeches/update-on-uk-syria-sanctions-regime-minister-doughty-statement; https://www.barrons.com/articles/uk-plans-to-ease-syria-sanctionsafter-assad-fall-govt-8b5e25f5
[66] https://www.gov.uk/authorities/information/update-on-syria-lifting-asset-freezes-on-24-entities
[67] https://www.gov.uk/authorities/information/update-on-syria-lifting-asset-freezes-on-24-entities
[68] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/after-assad-navigating-syria-policy-part-1; https://english dot alarabiya.internet/Information/middle-east/2024/12/29/syria-s-new-elections-and-draft-constitution-al-sharaa-outlines-timeline ; https://www.voanews.com/a/syrian-ministers-urge-lifting-of-us-sanctions-in-first-visit-to-doha/7924928.html ; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/16/world/middleeast/syria-al-shara-al-assad.html
[69] https://x.com/SanaAjel/standing/1897171591223726453
[70] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/120550; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/standing/1897356929003085848
[71] https://almadapaper dot internet/398044/
[72] https://almadapaper dot internet/397373/
[73] https://www.fdd.org/evaluation/op_eds/2024/06/04/the-islamic-resistance-in-iraq-increases-its-drone-attacks-on-israel/
[74] https://www.tgju dot org/forex; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-5-2025
[75] https://ir.usembassy.gov/quad-statement-iaea-board-of-governors-meeting/
[76] https://ir.usembassy.gov/quad-statement-iaea-board-of-governors-meeting/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-nuclear-watchdogs-35-nation-board-passes-resolution-against-iran-2024-11-21/
[77] https://www.criticalthreats.org/evaluation/iran-update-november-14-2024
[78] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf
[79] https://en.mehrnews dot com/information/229297/Najafi-appointed-Iran-s-envoy-to-Vienna-based-intl-bodies
[80] https://english.alarabiya dot internet/Information/middle-east/2025/03/06/iran-appoints-new-envoy-to-un-nuclear-watchdog-