Avery Borens, Andie Parry, Ria Reddy, Carolyn Moorman, Nidal Morrison, Ben Schmida, Ben Rezaei, and Brian Carter
Data Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The Essential Threats Mission (CTP) on the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Research of Conflict (ISW) publish the Iran Replace, which gives insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored actions that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and pursuits. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Replace each weekday.
Click on here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed management of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli floor operations. The Syria map is up to date day by day alongside the static Syria maps on this report. CTP-ISW ended day by day maps of Israeli floor operations in February 2025.
We don’t report intimately on warfare crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t immediately have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We totally condemn violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity regardless that we don’t describe them in these studies.
Quite a lot of Syrian armed teams, together with these related to the brand new transitional authorities, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic teams, have dedicated a sequence of extrajudicial killings because the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW completely condemns these extrajudicial killings.
The Syrian transitional authorities has rapidly responded to a number of false studies of rebel exercise in coastal Syria during the last week. The federal government’s fast response demonstrates that the federal government stays involved about violence in coastal Syria regardless of low ranges of Alawite insurgency exercise there. A number of components, together with an absence of Alawite assist for rebel teams, authorities strain, and poorly executed rebel operations, have in all probability contributed to the lower in rebel exercise in coastal areas. The transitional authorities deployed a number of Basic Safety Companies (GSS) and Protection Ministry items to Daliyah, Latakia Province, on June 4 following false studies about an Assadist rebel assault within the city.[1] The “assault” was reportedly a private verbal dispute between two people who native officers overstated.[2] Alawite militia “Coastal Defend Brigade” denied that any rebel assault focused Daliyah on June 4.[3] The native transitional authorities officers probably responded to the rumored assault with power and urgency, on condition that neighboring areas participated within the March assaults towards the GSS.[4] Authorities forces imposed a curfew on Daliyah and arrested alleged “outlaws.“[5] A number of the protection ministry items that deployed to Daliyah dedicated atrocities focusing on Alawite communities on June 4 and 5.[6] fiftieth Division troopers reportedly killed three males and burned vehicles and houses within the neighboring villages of Daliyah.[7] The transitional authorities arrested the troopers on June 9, nevertheless.[8] This incident underscores the menace posed by the federal government’s continued self-discipline points inside sure MoD items. Poorly disciplined items which are deployed to areas in occasions of disaster may improve the chance of minor incidents devolving into widespread sectarian violence, like that seen in coastal Syria in March 2025.
The transitional authorities doesn’t seem like equally involved about small-scale rebel exercise in different areas of Syria.[9] Possible ISIS fighters detonated improvised explosive gadgets (IED) focusing on GSS positions in Deir ez Zor province, and unspecified militants detonated IEDs focusing on different GSS positions in Daraa from June 4 to June 10, however Damascus had a minimal response.[10] A part of the transitional authorities’s response to incidents in coastal Syria could also be linked to continued threats from organized teams and former militia leaders in coastal Syria.[11] Syrian businessman and the maternal cousin of Bashar al Assad, Rami Makhlouf, claimed in late Might 2025 that June 2025 will mark the “starting” of anti-government exercise and that this exercise will speed up in July 2025.[12]
Iran is making ready a counter-proposal for america that features phrases for an interim deal. Iran might calculate that reaching an interim cope with america will delay or forestall snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Deputy Overseas Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi advised Iranian state media on June 10 that Iran continues to be making ready its response to the latest US nuclear proposal however described the counter-proposal as providing a “framework for an settlement.”[13] Ravanchi acknowledged that Iran is just not presently keen on presenting a “very lengthy…complete” proposal. Ravanchi added that Iran and america can have interaction in “extra detailed negotiations” after they agree on a framework settlement. A senior US official advised Axios on June 10 that america has acquired indications that Iran will reject the latest US proposal whereas signaling curiosity in persevering with the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[14] Iran probably desires to proceed negotiations to be able to delay snapback sanctions or strikes on Iranian nuclear services. The Joint Complete Plan of Motion snapback mechanism expires in October 2025, which can give Iran an incentive to extend negotiations. Iran’s push for a framework settlement and continued negotiations additionally comes forward of US President Donald Trump’s 60-day deadline, which expires on June 12, for Iran to conform to a brand new nuclear deal.[15] The USA and Iran will reportedly maintain a sixth spherical of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations this week. Axios reported on June 10 that america and Iran will maintain the sixth spherical of nuclear talks in Oslo on June 13 or in Muscat on June 15.[16]
Hezbollah is reportedly prioritizing home drone manufacturing to be able to scale back its reliance on procuring Iranian weapons.[17] Israeli media reported on June 9 that Hezbollah has shifted its rehabilitation funds to deal with home manufacturing of explosive-laden and assault drones over missiles and rocket procurement.[18] These drones are reportedly easier, sooner, and cheaper to supply as a result of they use available civilian components.[19] The Houthis equally produce some drones domestically and depend on available civilian components.[20] These Houthi drones had been used to maintain a year-long marketing campaign towards Saudi Arabia that focused southern Saudi provinces simply over the Yemeni border.[21] Israeli media reported that these drones are tougher for Israeli air protection methods to right away detect and classify.[22] A few of Hezbollah’s most deadly assaults towards Israel have used these drones, together with the October 2024 drone assault focusing on an Israel Protection Forces (IDF) coaching camp in Binyamina that injured at the very least 67 Israelis.[23]
Hezbollah probably seeks to prioritize home drone manufacturing after latest setbacks which have sophisticated its capability to obtain and smuggle Iranian weapons into Lebanon.[24] The Israeli Air Drive officer answerable for overseeing efforts towards Hezbollah’s covert aerial unit acknowledged that Hezbollah desires to realize “higher self-sufficiency and fewer reliance on Iran.”[25] Hezbollah has traditionally relied on land, air, and maritime smuggling routes to obtain weapons from Iran into Lebanon.[26] The brand new Syrian authorities has affirmed that it’s going to not enable Iran to re-establish its actions and affect in Syria, which it beforehand used to supply monetary assist and navy tools to Hezbollah.[27] The Syrian transitional authorities has additionally continued to dismantle smuggling networks between Iraq and Syria that beforehand served as a key node within the floor line of communication between Iran and Hezbollah through the Assad regime.[28] Lebanese authorities additionally tightened safety and management at Beirut’s Worldwide Airport in Might 2025 to curb Hezbollah-linked smuggling.[29] Iran has used civilian flights touring to Beirut airport to visitors weapons to Hezbollah since at the very least 2018.[30] The IDF has additionally continued to focus on Hezbollah weapons manufacturing and storage services in latest months.[31] The IDF Air Drive struck Hezbollah drone manufacturing and storage services in Beirut’s southern suburbs on June 5.[32]
Hezbollah might be able to smuggle some small shipments of arms by way of Syria into Lebanon, however Hezbollah will discover it far more difficult to smuggle in missile or missile manufacturing parts. Hezbollah beforehand used Syria as a rear space the place it may produce very subtle solid-fuel ballistic missile methods, for instance.[33] It won’t be doable for Hezbollah to rebuild related manufacturing capabilities. Many missile parts, comparable to engines, are additionally a lot bigger and tough to move in comparison with small arms or dual-use drone parts.
Key Takeaways:
- Syrian Insurgencies: The Syrian transitional authorities has rapidly responded to a number of false studies of rebel exercise in coastal Syria during the last week. The federal government’s fast response demonstrates that the federal government stays involved about violence in coastal Syria regardless of low ranges of Alawite insurgency exercise there. The transitional authorities doesn’t seem like equally involved about small-scale rebel exercise in different areas of Syria.
- Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iran is making ready a counter-proposal for america that features phrases for an interim deal. Iran might calculate that reaching an interim cope with america will delay or forestall snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.
- Hezbollah Reconstitution: Hezbollah is reportedly prioritizing home drone manufacturing to be able to scale back its reliance on procuring Iranian weapons. Hezbollah probably seeks to prioritize home drone manufacturing after latest setbacks which have sophisticated its capability to obtain and smuggle Iranian weapons into Lebanon. Hezbollah might be able to smuggle some small shipments of arms by way of Syria into Lebanon, however Hezbollah will discover it far more difficult to smuggle in missile or missile manufacturing parts.
Iranian Resolution-Making, Inside Dynamics, and Overseas Coverage
Iran continued to reiterate its dedication to the Axis of Resistance and its strategic goal to destroy the Israeli state. Senior Iranian officers met with In style Entrance for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Deputy Secretary Basic Jamil Mazhar in Tehran to debate regional developments.[34] Overseas Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Mazhar on June 9 and reaffirmed Iran’s assist for Palestinian militia teams of their efforts to ”resist” Israel.[35] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Main Basic Hossein Salami and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf individually met with Mazhar on June 9.[36]
Iran continues to emphasise air protection modernization amid potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Iranian Artesh Northwest Air Protection Area Deputy Commander Brigadier Basic Jafar Saleh inspected the Shahid Tohidi radar station in Bileh Savar, Ardabil Province, on June 10, to guage protection capabilities on the website.[37] Advisor to the Artesh Air Protection Drive Commander Brigadier Basic Abazar Jokar individually highlighted the home growth of the Iranian-made Bavar-373 system. Jokar confirmed that Iran developed Bavar-373 after Russia didn’t ship S-300s.[38] Israeli airstrikes on Iran in April and October 2024 rendered Iran’s 4 S-300 air protection methods inoperable. CTP-ISW beforehand assessed that it’s unlikely that Russia can provide Iran with new S-300 parts, given Russia’s want for S-300s for its warfare with Ukraine.[39]
The Iranian rial appreciated from 825,000 rials to 1 US greenback on June 9 to 820,500 rials to 1 US greenback on June 10.[40]
Syria
There have been a number of engagements between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian military’s 66th Division that clashed in a number of areas east of Raqqa on June 9.[41] Syrian media reported that the SDF and 66th Division engaged one another close to Madan, Abu Hamad, and al Maghla Bridge within the japanese Raqqa countryside on June 9.[42] The brand new Syrian military despatched navy reinforcements to its positions in Madan, Raqqa province, following the preventing.[43] The SDF and Syrian transitional authorities beforehand agreed on March 10 that the SDF would combine into the Syrian Ministry of Protection (MoD).[44] The SDF and Syrian transitional authorities haven’t but reached an settlement on excellent points that the March 10 settlement didn’t resolve, nevertheless.[45]
The USA performed two separate drone strikes that killed three individuals in Idlib Province on June 10.[46] The primary drone strike killed two unidentified males on a bike within the city of Dana, Idlib Province.[47] The second strike killed the driving force of a automotive and wounded 4 close by civilians within the city of Atmeh, Idlib Province.[48] That is the primary US strike in territory managed by the Syrian transitional authorities because the February 23, 2025, strike, which focused a former chief of Hurras al Din, a Salafi-jihadi militant group allied to al Qaeda.[49] The US has beforehand shared secret intelligence with the Syrian transitional authorities, and it’s doable these strikes concerned related intelligence cooperation.[50]
The massive variety of Assad regime members in authorities custody is creating challenges for the Syrian transitional authorities because it makes an attempt to steadiness the pursuit of transitional justice with the reintegration of low-level regime members. The Syrian Ministry of Inside’s (MoI) spokesperson, Noureddine Baba, held a joint press convention with Supreme Committee for Civil Peace spokesperson Hassan Soufan on June 10 that centered on transitional justice and sustaining order in Syria.[51] The convention was held following the transitional authorities’s launch of distinguished Assad regime members, together with the pinnacle of the Nationwide Protection Forces (NDF), Fadi al Saqr, who’s implicated in human rights violations perpetrated by the pro-Assad militia all through the Syrian battle.[52] Baba mentioned that roughly 123,000 MoI personnel through the Assad regime are implicated in warfare crimes and that the MoI is coordinating with Interpol to pursue violators exterior of Syria.[53]
The Syrian transitional authorities should steadiness the prosecution of former Assad regime members who dedicated crimes with disarming and reintegrating low-level former Assad regime members. Soufan acknowledged that Saqr and different former Assad regime members had been launched as a part of a political choice to protect civil peace.[54] The shortage of an efficient transitional justice system has pushed revenge-based assaults focusing on people with ties or suspected ties to the previous Assad regime. These assaults, in flip, discourage cooperation between Alawite communities who may successfully reintegrate into society and the transitional authorities. The Syrian transitional authorities should prosecute, cost, and imprison perpetrators of crimes dedicated beneath the previous Assad regime by way of truthful trials to successfully acquire the belief of the Syrian inhabitants. The Supreme Committee for Civil Peace’s choice to launch Saqr may additional undermine confidence in these transitional justice establishments.[55]
Iraq
The In style Mobilization Forces (PMF) Basic Directorate of Safety and Self-discipline introduced on June 9 that it had arrested an unspecified variety of PMF members for utilizing their authority beneath the PMF for electoral fraud.[56] The PMF Directorate introduced that the arrests are a part of an ongoing investigation into PMF members illegally acquiring voter playing cards or intimidating voters, following directives from Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and In style Mobilization Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh.[57] The 2016 PMF Fee Legislation, which formalized the PMF as an unbiased safety power, prohibits PMF members from being affiliated with or collaborating in political actions.[58] The PMF Basic Directorate of Safety and Self-discipline goals to stop PMF members from participating in legal actions.[59] These arrests observe studies of the PMF being exploited for electoral functions forward of the November 2025 elections.[60] Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political actors have used the PMF for unlawful voter intimidation and election interference in previous election cycles.[61] The PMF is an Iraqi state safety service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias who nominally report back to the prime minister however truly report back to their respective commanders, a lot of whom have political wings.[62] The top of the PMF Basic Directorate of Safety and Self-discipline, Abu Zainab al Lami, is a member of Iranian-backed militia Kata’ib Hezbollah.[63] Lami may both conduct a phony investigation or abuse his investigative powers to assist the electoral pursuits of the Hoquq Motion, which is KH’s political wing, or its allies.
Shia Coordination Framework-affiliated politicians proceed to attempt to discredit Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani forward of the upcoming elections. The Shia Coordination Framework is a unfastened coalition of Shia political events, a few of which Iran backs.[64] Sudani’s Particular Envoy to Syria, Izzat Shabandar, met with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on June 9.[65] Shabandar posted on X (Twitter) that the go to was in Iraq’s curiosity.[66] A Shia Coordination Framework-affiliated parliamentarian claimed on June 9 that unspecified Syrian officers gave Shabandar Assad regime Iraq-related paperwork. The parliamentarian claimed that Sudani will use these paperwork in his election marketing campaign.[67] The parliamentarian didn’t point out the content material of the alleged paperwork. Iranian-backed Iraqi figures might search to forged Sudani’s assembly with Shara in a unfavourable gentle as a part of a broader effort to oppose Iraq-Syria normalization. They beforehand criticized Sudani’s invitation to Shara to attend the Might 2025 Arab Summit in Baghdad.[68] Shia Coordination Framework members against Sudani additionally not too long ago accused Sudani and his coalition of corruption, prone to harm his electoral prospects within the upcoming elections.[69]
Arabian Peninsula
The Houthis have launched two separate ballistic missile assaults on Israel since June 9.[70] The Houthis launched one ballistic missile on June 9 that landed exterior Israeli territory.[71] The Houthis performed a second ballistic missile assault on June 10, focusing on Ben Gurion Airport.[72] The IDF intercepted the missile.[73]
The IDF Air Drive performed an airstrike on the Hudaydah port on June 10 in retaliation for Houthi drone and missile assaults.[74] The IDF acknowledged that the airstrike was supposed to impede navy use of the port.[75] UKMTO acknowledged on June 9 that industrial ships ought to rethink docking at Hudaydah port.[76]
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
See topline part.
CTP-ISW won’t be protecting the brand new Israeli operation within the Gaza Strip. We’ve got reprioritized our Center East protection to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, Iranian home safety, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, together with the Palestinian Territories. Provided that Israel and its companions have destroyed Hamas’ navy group and severed the group’s capability to resupply itself, we are actually centered on how Iran seeks to rebuild its traces of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas by way of Syria.
The Iran Replace gives insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored actions overseas that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and pursuits. It additionally covers occasions and developments that have an effect on the soundness and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Essential Threats Mission (CTP) on the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Research of Conflict (ISW) gives these updates often primarily based on regional occasions.
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” because the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated within the Center East because the Islamic Republic got here to energy in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to safe their collective pursuits. Tehran considers itself to be each a part of the alliance and its chief. Iran furnishes these teams with various ranges of economic, navy, and political assist in change for a point of affect or management over their actions. Some are conventional proxies which are extremely aware of Iranian route, whereas others are companions over which Iran exerts extra restricted affect. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic aims, which embrace eroding and finally expelling American affect from the Center East, destroying the Israeli state, or each. Pursuing these aims and supporting the Axis of Resistance to these ends have grow to be cornerstones of Iranian regional technique.
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[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-3-2025
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[26] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/dont-assume-irans-supply-lines-hezbollah-are-cut
[27] https://www.npr.org/2025/02/04/g-s1-46361/syrias-new-leader-denounces-iran-calling-its-proxies-a-regional-threat ; https://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-strategy-syria
[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-25-2023 ; https://carnegieendowment.org/analysis/2020/03/the-transformation-of-the-iraqi-syrian-border-from-a-national-to-a-regional-frontier?lang=en&heart=middle-east ; https://newlinesmag.com/highlight/life-returns-to-al-bukamal-after-iranian-militias-flee/
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[32] https://x.com/idfonline/standing/1930753541846487369
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https://x.com/KhosroIsfahani/standing/1932135274852892740 ;
https://x.com/ghalibaffans/standing/1932056320548516197
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https://x.com/ghalibaffans/standing/1932056320548516197
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[40] www.bon-bast.com
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[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/websites/default/recordsdata/Iraqpercent20-%20ISFpercent20PMFpercent20Orderspercent20ofpercent20Battle_0_0.pdf
[60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-4-2025
[61] https://alarab.co dot uk/%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB9percentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7percentD9percent82-%D8percentACpercentD9percent85percentD8percentA7percentD8percentB9percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA-%D9percent85percentD8percentB3percentD9percent84percentD8percentADpercentD8percentA9-%D8percentAApercentD8percentB3percentD8percentAApercentD8percentAEpercentD8percentAFpercentD9percent85-%D8percentB4percentD8percentB1percentD8percentB9percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentAApercentD9percent87percentD8percentA7-%D9percent84percentD8percentA7percentD8percentA8percentD8percentAApercentD8percentB2percentD8percentA7percentD8percentB2-%D8percentA3percentD8percentB5percentD9percent88percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD9percent86percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAEpercentD8percentA8percentD9percent8ApercentD9percent86 ; https://www.aa.com dot tr/ar/%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB3percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentA7percentD8percentB3percentD8percentA9/%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentA3percentD9percent85percentD9percent85-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD9percent85percentD8percentAApercentD8percentADpercentD8percentAFpercentD8percentA9-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentA7percentD9percent86percentD8percentAApercentD8percentAEpercentD8percentA7percentD8percentA8percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB9percentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7percentD9percent82percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentA9-%D8percentB4percentD9percent87percentD8percentAFpercentD8percentAA-%D8percentB9percentD9percent85percentD9percent84percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA-%D8percentAApercentD8percentB2percentD9percent88percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentB1-%D9percent88percentD8percentAApercentD8percentB1percentD9percent87percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentA8/1161063
[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraqpercentE2percent80percent99s-popular-mobilization-forces
[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/websites/default/recordsdata/Iraqpercent20-%20ISFpercent20PMFpercent20Orderspercent20ofpercent20Battle_0_0.pdf , pg. 34 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8percentB3percentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentA7percentD8percentB3percentD8percentA9/%D8percentAApercentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7percentD8percentACpercentD8percentB9-%D8percentB9percentD9percent86-%D8percentB9percentD9percent81percentD8percentA7-%D8percentA7percentD8percentA8percentD9percent88-%D8percentB2percentD9percent8ApercentD9percent86percentD8percentA8-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD9percent84percentD8percentA7percentD9percent85percentD9percent8A-%D9percent88percentD8percentA7percentD8percentB9percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAFpercentD8percentAApercentD9percent87-%D9percent85percentD8percentAFpercentD9percent8ApercentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7-%D9percent84-%D9percent85percentD9percent86-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentADpercentD8percentB4percentD8percentAF
[64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-4-2025
[65] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/144100
[66] https://x.com/IAlshabandar/standing/1932419030654079075
[67] https://x.com/Y_B_Alkilaby/standing/1932492115352932451 ; https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/standing/1932165229187944498 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/khlaf-byn-sayb-ahl-alhq-w-mnzmt-bdr-hwl-alsytrt-ly-alryys-aljdyd-lmjls-alnwab ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/aljnah-alarhaby-dakhl-alhkwmt-alraqyt-yard-zyart-alshr
[68] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate051625 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate022725
[69] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-4-2025
[70] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rja11ie1bll ; https://t.me/army21ye/3089?single
[71] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rja11ie1bll
[72] https://t.me/army21ye/3089?single
[73] https://x.com/idfonline/standing/1932484340555919473
[74] https://x.com/idfonline/standing/1932313149534826697
[75] https://x.com/idfonline/standing/1932313149534826697
[76] https://x.com/UK_MTO/standing/1931770861650092279
