Annika Ganzeveld, Ben Schmida, Avery Borens, Nidal Morrison, and Andie Parry
Info Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET
The Crucial Threats Mission (CTP) on the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Research of Struggle (ISW) publish the Iran Replace, which gives insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored actions that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and pursuits. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Replace day by day.
Click on here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed management of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli floor operations. The Syria map is up to date day by day alongside the static Syria maps on this report. CTP-ISW ended day by day maps of Israeli floor operations in February 2025.
Click on here to see ISW-CTP’s interactive map displaying the whole strikes in Iran since June 12, in addition to an interactive timelapse displaying the strikes day-by-day.
The Iranian International Affairs Ministry introduced on July 21 that senior Iranian officers will meet with E3 (the UK, France, and Germany) officers in Istanbul, Turkey, on July 25 to debate the Iranian nuclear difficulty.[1] Iranian Deputy International Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy International Affairs Minister for Authorized and Worldwide Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi will attend the talks. The talks come because the E3 has threatened to set off the Joint Complete Plan of Motion (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reimpose UN Safety Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran. The E3 has warned that it could set off the snapback mechanism if Iran doesn’t resume nuclear negotiations with the USA and make “concrete outcomes” within the negotiations by the top of August.[2] The E3 must provoke the snapback mechanism by September 3 to finish the snapback course of earlier than the mechanism expires in October 2025.[3] Iranian International Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei emphasised on July 21 that the Iran-E3 talks are separate from nuclear negotiations with the USA and acknowledged that Iran has “no plans” to barter with the USA.[4]
Baghaei additionally introduced that Iranian officers will meet with Chinese language and Russian officers on July 22 to debate the potential for the E3 triggering the JCPOA snapback mechanism.[5] CTP-ISW beforehand assessed that Russia and China would possible not have the ability to stop the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran if the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism.[6] Any JCPOA signatory can provoke the snapback course of by referring Iran’s non-compliance to the UNSC. The JCPOA provides the UNSC 30 days to move a decision to increase sanctions reduction for Iran, however UNSC everlasting members (the USA, the UK, France, China, and Russia) can veto such a decision.[7] China and Russia may subsequently attempt to stop the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran by proposing a decision to increase sanctions reduction for Iran, however the USA, the UK, or France may veto such a decision.
Iranian Protection Minister Brigadier Normal Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Russian Protection Minister Andrei Belousov in Moscow on July 21, probably to attempt to safe Russian army help following the Israel-Iran Struggle. Iranian media reported that Nasir Zadeh and Belousov mentioned “increasing army cooperation.”[8] Iranian media additionally reported that Nasir Zadeh attended Iranian Supreme Chief Adviser Ali Larijani’s assembly with Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 20.[9] Nasir Zadeh heads the Iranian Protection and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry, which oversees the Iranian defense-industrial complicated and manages Iranian arms gross sales and purchases.[10] Iran has lengthy sought to amass Russian Su-35 fighter jets and has pressured Russia to supply it with S-400 air protection programs after Israeli airstrikes in April and October 2024 rendered Iran’s 4 S-300 air protection programs inoperable.[11] Russia has not offered Iran with this tools and is unlikely to take action within the close to future, which underscores the bounds of the Russo-Iranian strategic relationship.[12] CTP-ISW beforehand assessed that Iran could increase strategic relations with different companions, similar to China, attributable to Russia’s restricted assist for Iran throughout and after the warfare.[13]
Professional-government Bedouin teams and Druze militias continued to stick to the US-brokered ceasefire in Suwayda Province on July 21 as Syrian transitional authorities forces evacuated over 1,500 Bedouin civilians who have been focused in intercommunal violence since July 13.[14] Druze militias have obstructed the implementation of some ceasefire phrases, however combating has not resumed on a big scale.[15] Suwayda Inner Safety Commander Brigadier Normal Ahmed al Dalati introduced on July 21 that Druze militias agreed to permit Suwaydawi civilians to evacuate the province with help from the Syrian Ministry of Inside (MoI) till “their protected return to their houses is secured.”[16] Dalati additionally introduced that the transitional authorities established a safety cordon round Suwayda Province to cease combating between Druze and Bedouin militias and preserve the ceasefire settlement.[17] The evacuation of civilians from Suwayda is a part of the second section of the July 18 ceasefire settlement, which additionally mandates the supply of humanitarian support and the supply of fundamental providers to civilians in Suwayda Province.[18] Druze militias prevented the supply of humanitarian support by the transitional authorities into Suwayda Province on July 20, nevertheless.[19] The Syrian Communications Ministry additionally stated that Druze militias prevented it from getting into Suwayda Metropolis to evaluate the town’s gasoline wants and handle electrical energy and communications outages.[20] The Syrian International Ministry condemned Druze militias on July 20 for stopping Syrian Purple Crescent support convoys led by three Syrian ministers from getting into Suwayda.[21] The Syrian International Ministry stated that Druze militias solely permitted a small variety of Purple Crescent autos to enter the province.[22] Druze militias reportedly didn’t take part in a prisoner alternate on July 20 within the city of Umm al Zaytoun, which was stipulated within the second section of the ceasefire settlement.[23]
The transitional authorities faces main obstacles in restoring the rule of legislation, regaining belief, and therapeutic inter- and intra-communal divisions in Suwayda Province even because the ceasefire holds. The third section of the ceasefire mandates that inner safety personnel will deploy to Suwayda Province and that state establishments within the province will reopen.[24] This section will probably be tough for the federal government to successfully implement as a result of displacement of 93,000 folks from Suwayda Province since combating started, the continuing documentation of atrocities by all actors, and Bedouin-Druze and intra-Druze battle.[25] Mistrust between the Bedouin and Druze communities stays excessive as extra accounts of reciprocal atrocities floor.
This inter-communal distrust is compounded by the Druze neighborhood’s mistrust of the transitional authorities after authorities forces dedicated abuses towards Druze civilians upon deploying to Suwayda Province on July 16.[26] This mistrust challenges the federal government’s potential to keep up order and restore the rule of legislation in Suwayda. The Syrian authorities stays answerable for holding all perpetrators of atrocities accountable, together with authorities forces. The Syrian Nationwide Inquiry Fee, which investigated the massacres of Alawites on the Syrian coast in March, offered its findings to President Ahmed al Shara on July 13.[27] Whereas the main points of the Inquiry Fee’s conclusions have but to be printed, whether or not or how the transitional authorities holds its forces accountable for abuses dedicated in the course of the March coastal violence will possible inform future peace processes in Suwayda Province. The Syrian authorities’s response to the coastal atrocity report may additional construct or degrade minority belief in Suwayda, relying on how the federal government responds to the report’s findings. Holding perpetrators of atrocities accountable requires the federal government to not solely examine the atrocities, however to behave on its findings and cost, sentence, and punish perpetrators.
Key Takeaways:
- Iran-E3 Talks: The Iranian International Affairs Ministry introduced on July 21 that senior Iranian officers will meet with E3 (the UK, France, and Germany) officers in Istanbul, Turkey, on July 25 to debate the Iranian nuclear difficulty. Iranian officers will meet with Chinese language and Russian officers on July 22 to debate the potential for the E3 triggering the JCPOA snapback mechanism.
- Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Iranian Protection Minister Brigadier Normal Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Russian Protection Minister Andrei Belousov in Moscow on July 21, probably to attempt to safe Russian army help following the Israel-Iran Struggle. Nasir Zadeh heads the Iranian Protection and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry, which oversees the Iranian defense-industrial complicated and manages Iranian arms gross sales and purchases.
- Syria Ceasefire: The Syrian transitional authorities faces main obstacles in restoring rule of legislation, regaining belief, and therapeutic inter- and intra-communal divisions in Suwayda Province even because the ceasefire holds. Mistrust between the Bedouin and Druze communities stays excessive as extra accounts of reciprocal atrocities floor. This inter-communal distrust is compounded by the Druze neighborhood’s mistrust of the transitional authorities after authorities forces dedicated abuses towards Druze civilians upon deploying to Suwayda Province on July 16. This mistrust challenges the federal government’s potential to keep up order and restore the rule of legislation in Suwayda.
Iran
Senior Iranian officers reiterated their opposition to the deliberate Zangezor Hall to senior Armenian officers on July 19. The Zangezor Hall is a Turkish-Azerbaijani proposed transit route that may join Azerbaijan correct to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Iran opposes the proposed Zangezor Hall as a result of the route would minimize off Iranian land entry to Russia and Europe through Armenia. Iranian Supreme Nationwide Safety Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian emphasised that Iran opposes any “change within the area’s geopolitics” in a telephone name with Armenian Safety Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan.[28] Grigoryan assured Ahmadian that Armenia has not modified its place “concerning regional transit routes.” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian individually emphasised Iran’s assist for “preserving the territorial integrity of all international locations” in a telephone name with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.[29] The July 19 telephone calls come after the USA provided on July 11 to handle the Zangezor Hall.[30] Iranian media described the Zangezor Hall on July 16 as a Turkish try to increase Turkish affect into Eurasia.[31] Iranian media additionally argued that the Zangezor Hall would stop Iran from with the ability to militarily assist Armenia towards Azerbaijan. Iran has develop into more and more involved concerning the development of Turkish affect within the South Caucasus in recent times, notably because the begin of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Iranian officers have expressed concern that Russia’s deal with the warfare in Ukraine has left an influence vacuum within the South Caucasus for different regional actors, similar to Turkey and Israel, to take advantage of.[32]
The Iranian Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) navies began an annual naval train with the Russian Navy within the Caspian Sea on July 21.[33] The train is happening within the 4th Artesh Naval District, which relies in Bandar Anzali, Gilan Province, and can proceed till July 23.[34] A Russian naval commander instructed Iranian media on July 21 that the train demonstrates Iran and Russia’s dedication to “strengthening army interactions” with one another.[35] Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan participated within the earlier iteration of this train in July 2024.[36]
Iran is constant to develop its house program, which may assist Iran’s growth of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). Iran performed a suborbital check of the Qased house launch automobile (SLV) on July 21 to guage unspecified “new applied sciences.”[37] The Qased SLV beforehand launched the Nour-1 satellite tv for pc in April 2020, the Nour-2 satellite tv for pc in March 2022, and the Nour-3 satellite tv for pc in September 2023.[38] All three launches came about on the Shahroud Area Heart in Semnan Province, which is operated by the IRGC Aerospace Power.[39] Advancing Iran’s house program may contribute to Iran’s growth of ICBMs, on condition that SLVs use related applied sciences.[40] The Protection Intelligence Company beforehand assessed in 2019 that Iran was growing SLVs with “rising carry capability” and “boosters that could possibly be able to ICBM ranges and doubtlessly attain the continental United States, if configured for that objective.”[41]
Khatam ol Anbia Air Protection Headquarters Commander Brigadier Normal Ali Reza Sabahifard met with newly appointed IRGC Aerospace Power Commander Brigadier Normal Majid Mousavi on July 21.[42] Sabahifard claimed that Iranian air protection capabilities compelled Israel to “retreat” in the course of the Israel-Iran Struggle. Israeli strikes on Iranian air protection programs in the course of the warfare enabled Israel to determine air superiority over giant elements of Iran, nevertheless. Sabahifard’s assembly with Mousavi follows a collection of comparable conferences between senior Iranian army commanders in latest days. Many of those commanders have been not too long ago appointed to their posts by Supreme Chief Ali Khamenei following the Israeli decapitation marketing campaign concentrating on senior Iranian army commanders in the course of the Israel-Iran Struggle. The latest conferences embody a gathering between newly appointed Armed Forces Normal Employees Chief Main Normal Abdol Rahim Mousavi and Majid Mousavi on July 14 and a gathering between newly appointed IRGC Commander Main Normal Mohammad Pak Pour and newly appointed Artesh Commander Main Normal Amir Hatami on July 17.[43]
The Guardian Council reappointed Ahmad Jannati and Siamak Rahpeyk as its secretary and deputy secretary, respectively, on July 18.[44] The Guardian Council is a 12-member regime physique that’s answerable for supervising elections, vetting candidates, and approving laws. Jannati has served because the Guardian Council secretary since 1988.[45] Iranian Supreme Chief Ali Khamenei reappointed senior clerics Ahmad Khatami, Alireza Arafi, and Ahmad Hosseini Khorasani as Guardian Council clerical members on July 15.[46] The Iranian Parliament permitted Hadi Tahan Nazif, Gholam Reza Mola Beygi, and Behzad Pour Seyyed as Guardian Council authorized consultants on July 16.[47]
Iraq
An Iranian Parliamentary Nationwide Safety and International Coverage Committee delegation met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and Nationwide Knowledge Motion chief Ammar al Hakim in Baghdad on July 20.[48] Iraqi media reported on July 20 that Hakim has been mediating efforts between the Shia Coordination Framework and Shia nationalist cleric Moqtada al Sadr to persuade Sadr to re-enter Iraqi politics.[49] The Shia Coordination Framework is a unfastened coalition of Shia political events, a few of which Iran backs. Sadr introduced in March 2025 that his political celebration wouldn’t take part within the upcoming November 2025 parliamentary elections, though some Iraqi politicians speculate that Sadr may sway voters by endorsing sure insurance policies or candidates.[50]
Syria
US Particular Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi met on July 19 to debate steps to revive Syrian stability and unify Syria.[51] Barrack acknowledged after the assembly that there could possibly be a breakthrough in negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian transitional authorities “within the coming weeks.“[52] A Turkish journalist that beforehand wrote for a pro-Erdogan newspaper claimed on July 21 that the USA and Turkey gave the SDF a 30-day deadline to complete integrating into the Syrian authorities.[53] The Turkish journalist claimed that Turkish and US officers instructed the SDF that some SDF models wouldn’t combine into the Syrian military and would wish to disarm.[54] The SDF denied this report.[55] CTP-ISW can not confirm this report.
Barrack additionally acknowledged that he believes that the violence in Suwayda Province won’t derail integration negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian transitional authorities.[56] Syrian media have accused Syrian Protection Ministry forces of raiding houses, conducting abstract executions, looting, and threatening civilians at gunpoint.[57] These actions threat eroding Syrian minority communities’ belief of the Syrian authorities, no matter whether or not or how the federal government holds perpetrators accountable. Minority communities that worry the federal government won’t shield them, such because the Kurds, could view the violence in Suwayda as affirmation of their fears and resist integration and disarmament. Kurdish political events have persistently cited authorities safety of Kurdish residents and their rights as considered one of their most necessary calls for of the federal government.[58]
Arabian Peninsula
The Israeli Air Power (IAF) performed drone strikes on Houthi-controlled Hudaydah Port on July 21.[59] The IAF stated that it destroyed Houthi infrastructure, together with gasoline tanks, vessels, and engineering instruments used to revive the port.[60] Commercially out there satellite tv for pc imagery captured on July 21, minutes after the strikes, exhibits smoke plumes close to berths two and 5. The IAF not too long ago struck and prompted important injury to berth two on July 6.[61] Satellite tv for pc imagery signifies that the Houthis minimally repaired injury that the port’s berths sustained throughout the newest Israeli strikes on July 6. Israeli airstrikes concentrating on Hudaydah Port since Might 2025 have rendered a number of berths on the port inoperable.[62] The latest Israeli strikes may additional hinder the Houthis’ potential to restore these amenities.
The IAF intercepted a Houthi drone earlier than it crossed into Israeli territory on July 21 after Israel struck Hudaydah Port.[63]
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
Nothing important to report.
[1] https://x.com/IranNuances/standing/1947110751929237571
[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-hold-nuclear-talks-with-european-powers-friday-2025-07-20/
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-15-2025
[4] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/information/1404/04/30/3358890
[5] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/information/1404/04/30/3358890
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-3-2025
[7] https://2009-2017.state.gov/paperwork/group/245317.pdf ;
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/snapback-sanctions-iran-more-bark-bite
[8] https://en.mehrnews dot com/information/234585/Iran-Russia-defense-ministers-meet-in-Moscow
[9] https://x.com/IranNuances/standing/1947209086866530591
[10] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran-Is-Adapting-for-Fashionable-Battle-and-Warfare.pdf?x85095
[11] https://x.com/ali_motahari_ir/standing/1939591211867582569 ; https://www.newsweek.com/iran-pivots-russia-china-quest-new-weapons-after-israel-war-2100933 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran
[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-9-2025
[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-15-2025
[14] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1947200677068865898
[15] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/1159 ;https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1947011605784318184
[16] https://t.me/sana_gov/134075
[17] https://t.me/syriafree25/1512
[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-19-2025 ; https://t.me/sana_gov/133962 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1946614190103286064
[19] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/1159 ;https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1947011605784318184
[20] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1947011605784318184
[21] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/1159
[22] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/1159?single
[23] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/standing/1946969578031947831
[24] https://t.me/sana_gov/133963
[25] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1947200677068865898 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1947261700366868659 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/standing/1947351857644335587 ; https://x.com/andynovy/standing/1945930804728561723 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1946313538462433418
[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-16-2025
[27] https://t.me/SyPresidency/1270
[28] https://defapress dot ir/fa/information/763609/
[29] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/information/875879/
[30] https://www.state.gov/briefings-foreign-press-centers/strengthening-us-turkiye-relations-and-advancing-relations-with-syria ; https://www.reuters.com/world/us-has-told-armenia-it-is-ready-manage-transport-corridor-with-azerbaijan-2025-07-16/
[31] https://defapress dot ir/fa/information/762702
[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-14-2023
[33] https://defapress dot ir/fa/information/764227
[34] https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/photos/information/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf
[35] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/information/1404/04/30/3359205
[36] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/information/501292/Iran-hosts-joint-Caspian-Sea-search-and-rescue-exercise
[37] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/information/1404/04/30/3359195
[38] https://nextspaceflight dot com/rockets/231 ; https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-05/news-briefs/iran-launches-military-satellite ; https://www.fdd.org/evaluation/2023/09/29/iran-launches-satellite-using-ballistic-missile-technology/
[39] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/29/world/middleeast/israel-strikes-iran-shahroud-space-center.html ; https://mepei dot com/iran-launches-its-first-military-satellite-into-orbit/
[40] https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/photos/information/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-21-2023
[41] https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/photos/information/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf
[42] https://defapress dot ir/fa/information/764209
[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-17-2025
[44] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/information/515797/Key-figures-retain-positions-in-Iran-s-Guardian-Council-presidium
[45] https://iranwire.com/en/politics/118680-97-year-old-cleric-jannati-re-elected-as-guardian-council-chief/
[46] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/message-content?id=60686
[47] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/information/1404/04/25/3355606
[48] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/وفد-يراني-في-بغداد-لمراجعة-العلاقات-الثنا-ية-مع-العراق ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/information/1404/04/30/3359007/%D8percentAFpercentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentAFpercentD8percentA7percentD8percentB1-%D9percent87percentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentA6percentD8percentAA-%D8percentA7percentD8percentB9percentD8percentB2percentD8percentA7percentD9percent85percentDBpercent8C-%D9percent85percentD8percentACpercentD9percent84percentD8percentB3-%D8percentA8percentD8percentA7-%D8percentA7percentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7percentD9percent86percentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentA7percentD9percent86-%D9percent85percentD9percent82percentDBpercent8CpercentD9percent85-%D8percentB9percentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7percentD9percent82-%D8percentAApercentD9percent85percentD8percentACpercentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentAF-%D8percentADpercentDApercentA9percentDBpercent8CpercentD9percent85-%D8percentA7percentD8percentB2-%D8percentAFpercentD9percent82percentD8percentAA-%D9percent85percentD9percent88percentD8percentB4percentDApercentA9-%D9percent87percentD8percentA7percentDBpercent8C-%D8percentA7percentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7percentD9percent86 ; https://www.mehrnews dot com/information/6537564/%D8percentB3percentD9percent88percentD8percentAFpercentD8percentA7percentD9percent86percentDBpercent8C-%D8percentA7percentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7percentD9percent86-%D9percent88-%D8percentB9percentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7percentD9percent82-%D8percentAFpercentD8percentB1-%DBpercent8CpercentDApercentA9-%D8percentB3percentD9percent86percentDApercentAFpercentD8percentB1-%D9percent87percentD8percentB3percentD8percentAApercentD9percent86percentD8percentAF
[49] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/ال-طار-يبحث-عن-مفتاح-الحنانة-ويستعين-بشخصية-دينية-ل-قناع-الصدر
[50] https://x.com/salih_m_iraqi/standing/1905319183518150830 ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8percentB3percentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentA7percentD8percentB3percentD8percentA9/%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB5percentD8percentAFpercentD8percentB1-%D9percent84percentD9percent86-%D8percentB4percentD8percentA7percentD8percentB1percentD9percent83-%D9percent81percentD9percent8A-%D8percentA7percentD9percent86percentD8percentAApercentD8percentAEpercentD8percentA7percentD8percentA8percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA-%D8percentB9percentD8percentB1percentD8percentACpercentD8percentA7-%D9percent85percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAFpercentD8percentA7percentD9percent85-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD9percent81percentD8percentB3percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAF-%D9percent85percentD9percent88percentD8percentACpercentD9percent88percentD8percentAFpercentD8percentA7 ; https://www.rudaw.web/english/middleeast/iraq/270320252
[51] https://x.com/USEmbassySyria/standing/1946655485773692960
[52] https://apnews.com/article/syria-us-barrack-israel-druze-ede9f5299c4e59a477736842adcd7de9
[53] https://www.middleeasteye.web/information/syrian-kurds-face-30-day-ultimatum-us-turkey
[54] https://www.middleeasteye.web/information/syrian-kurds-face-30-day-ultimatum-us-turkey
[55] https://x.com/SDF_Syria/standing/1947356843308614063
[56] https://apnews.com/article/syria-us-barrack-israel-druze-ede9f5299c4e59a477736842adcd7de9
[57] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-16-2025
[58] www.npasyria dot com/211587
[59] https://x.com/idfonline/standing/1947208668241375573
[60] https://x.com/idfonline/standing/1947208668241375573
[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-10-2025
[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-10-2025
[63] https://x.com/manniefabian/standing/1947268927374938582
