Iran Replace, January 16, 2025
Siddhant Kishore, Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braveman, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Victoria Penza, and Brian Carter
Info Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The Essential Threats Challenge (CTP) on the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Research of Conflict (ISW) publish the Iran Replace, which gives insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored actions that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and pursuits.
Click on here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli floor operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the continued opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.
We don’t report intimately on conflict crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t straight have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We completely condemn violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes in opposition to humanity regardless that we don’t describe them in these studies.
The Israeli cupboard will vote on the ceasefire-hostage settlement on January 17 after it postponed its vote as a consequence of delays in Hamas approving an unresolved problem.[1] Either side resolved the difficulty. Hamas reportedly renegotiated the names of the Palestinian prisoners it expects Israel to launch as a part of the settlement.[2] An Israeli official confirmed that each side resolved the difficulty, and the Israeli cupboard will vote on the ceasefire-hostage settlement on January 17. The ceasefire will take impact on January 19, if accepted.[3]
A senior Israeli official confirmed that the Israel Protection Forces (IDF) will stay within the Philadelphi Hall through the first 42-day part of the ceasefire.[4] The withdrawal of the IDF from the Philadelphi Hall, an operationally and strategically important IDF-held space within the southern Gaza Strip, was a serious level of competition between Israel and Hamas through the ceasefire talks.[5] The official acknowledged that Israel will keep within the Philadelphi Hall past the primary part of the ceasefire till Israel achieves its conflict goals.[6] These goals embody the discharge of all hostages. The IDF will progressively withdraw from the remaining elements of the Gaza Strip to a 700-meter-deep buffer zone alongside the Gaza Strip’s japanese and northern boundaries, nonetheless.[7] Israel can even briefly halt air reconnaissance over the Gaza Strip through the first part.[8]
Hamas will probably use the primary part to reorganize its forces and transfer cells across the Gaza Strip with out Israeli aerial commentary. Hamas can solely obtain restricted reorganization and shall be unable to regenerate itself throughout this era, nonetheless. Reconstitution is a really time- and resource-intensive activity even underneath superb situations when the reconstituting drive is out of contact with the opposing drive. It contains restoring degraded items to fight effectiveness and enhance their survivability.[9] IDF operations have destroyed Hamas‘ navy group within the Gaza Strip by damaging the group so badly that it can’t be made usable with out being utterly rebuilt. Israel has additionally depleted Hamas’ weapons stockpile. Hamas can execute restricted reorganization duties, even perhaps together with efforts to arrange remoted cells underneath some semblance of a navy hierarchy. The regenerative duties that may create true, cohesive navy items inside a preventing group would take months freed from Israeli interference to finish. Regenerating the weapons stockpile is equally inconceivable within the 42-day window.[10]
Regeneration of Hamas’ navy drive is just not attainable on this 42-day window. Regeneration requires large-scale alternative of personnel, tools, and provides.[11] The alternative of personnel to a succesful degree requires coaching, which isn’t attainable with out sanctuary and a interval longer than 42 days. Hamas could possibly undertake some minimal coaching, however these newly skilled fighters shall be unable to noticeably impede Israeli forces if the IDF chooses to renew fight operations. Latest studies point out that Hamas has intensified recruitment efforts, however these recruits are inexperienced and untrained.[12]
The IDF will be capable to quickly re-seize areas it withdraws from if the ceasefire deal collapses after the primary part. The restricted and insufficient regeneration and reorganization Hamas could possibly undertake will nearly actually be wholly inadequate to noticeably impede the IDF from attaining any tactical mission it should full, equivalent to reoccupying the Netzarim Hall, if the ceasefire collapses.
The Kurdistan Democratic Get together (KDP) seems to be making an attempt to stress the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to keep away from a full-scale battle with Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian Nationwide Military (SNA). A consultant of KDP chief Masoud Barzani met with SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi in Hasakah, northeastern Syria, on January 13.[13] Unspecified sources instructed Iraqi media that Barzani probably seeks to stress the SDF to conclude an settlement with Turkey and the SNA to “stop the destruction” of Kurdish areas in Syria. Turkey and the SNA proceed to threaten the SDF positions in northeastern Syria.[14] The KDP has steadily improved its relationship with Turkey in recent times, primarily as a result of KDP’s hostility to the Kurdistan Employees’ Get together (PKK).[15] Turkey usually conflates the SDF and the PKK-linked Kurdish Folks’s Safety Items (YPG) with the PKK and makes use of ”PKK” as a euphemism for your complete SDF.[16]
The KDP can be pressuring the SDF to cooperate with minority Syrian Kurdish political events in negotiations with the HTS-led interim authorities. Masoud Barzani met with Abdi in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, on January 16.[17] A senior KDP member instructed Western media that Barzani and Abdi targeted on unifying Kurdish political efforts in Syria.[18] The KDP has traditionally aligned itself with the Kurdish Nationwide Council, a coalition of Syrian Kurdish political events.[19] The SDF’s political physique is led by the Kurdish Nationwide Council’s political rival.[20] Barzani’s consultant additionally met with Kurdish Nationwide Council officers on January 13 to try to dissolve tensions between the Syrian Kurdish political events.[21]
Barzani and Abdi additionally reportedly mentioned methods to distance the SDF from the PKK of their assembly on January 16.[22] A PKK official individually instructed Reuters that PKK forces would withdraw from Syria if the SDF had joint or solo management of northeastern Syria.[23] Abdi equally stated that the PKK would withdraw from Syria if Turkey agreed to a ceasefire.[24] The distinction in how the SDF and Turkey outline the PKK and its function within the SDF makes a ceasefire troublesome to acquire. Turkey might outline SDF chief Mazloum Abdi, a Syrian and former PKK member, as an energetic member of the PKK, for instance, as a consequence of his function throughout the YPG and SDF. Abdi and the SDF are unlikely to carry the identical view. Turkey has additionally explicitly known as for the destruction of the YPG/PKK and views the SDF and YPG and PKK as undistinguishable.[25]
Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) chief and interim head of state Ahmed al Shara addressed Israeli navy exercise in southern Syria on January 16 throughout a gathering with the Qatari international minister.[26] Shara stated that Israel’s advance into Syria was “as a result of presence of Iranian militias and Hezbollah” however that such a “pretext” now not exists with HTS in energy.[27] He emphasised that Israeli forces should return to the 1974 disengagement line within the Golan Heights and that UN forces ought to deploy to the buffer zone.[28] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated on December 8 that he considers the 1974 disengagement settlement on the Golan Heights to have ”collapsed” with the autumn of the Syrian regime.[29] Interim Syrian Overseas Minister Asaad al Shaibani reportedly went additional than Shara and stated that Syria should ”defend our nation and our individuals.”[30]
Shara and Shaibani’s statements have been very probably spurred by an IDF Air Drive strike on an HTS-affiliated convoy close to the Syria-Golan Heights border on January 15 that killed two Public Safety Division members as they collected surrendered weapons.[31] The Israeli strike additionally killed the mayor of Ghadir al Bustan.[32] The January 15 strike seems to be the primary IDF strike that has straight focused HTS-led authorities forces.[33] It stays unclear right now how a lot effort Shara will commit to the restoration of the 1974 disengagement line with Israel and whether or not this assertion is predominantly as a consequence of public stress after the January 15 assault.
Key Takeaways:
- Gaza Strip Ceasefire Deal: The Israeli cupboard will vote on the ceasefire-hostage settlement on January 17 after it postponed its vote as a consequence of delays in Hamas approving an unresolved problem. Either side resolved the difficulty.
- Navy Implications for Ceasefire: Hamas will probably use the primary part to reorganize its forces and transfer cells across the Gaza Strip with out Israeli aerial commentary. Hamas can solely obtain restricted reorganization and shall be unable to regenerate itself throughout this era, nonetheless. The restricted and insufficient regeneration and reorganization Hamas could possibly undertake will nearly actually be wholly inadequate to noticeably impede the IDF from attaining any tactical mission it should full, equivalent to reoccupying the Netzarim Hall, if the ceasefire collapses.
- Kurdish Coordination: The Kurdistan Democratic Get together (KDP) seems to be making an attempt to stress the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to keep away from a full-scale battle with Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian Nationwide Military (SNA). Barzani and Abdi additionally reportedly mentioned methods to distance the SDF from the PKK of their assembly on January 16.
- Kurdistan Employees’ Get together and the SDF: A PKK official instructed Reuters that PKK forces would withdraw from Syria if the SDF had joint or solo management of northeastern Syria. The distinction in how the SDF and Turkey outline the PKK and its function within the SDF makes a ceasefire in northern Syria troublesome to acquire. Turkey might outline SDF chief Mazloum Abdi, a Syrian and former PKK member, as an energetic member of the PKK, for instance, as a consequence of his function throughout the YPG and SDF. Abdi and the SDF are unlikely to carry the identical view.
- Hayat Tahrir al Sham and Israel: Shara stated that Israel’s advance into Syria was “as a result of presence of Iranian militias and Hezbollah” however that such a “pretext” now not exists with HTS in energy. Interim Syrian Overseas Minister Asaad al Shaibani reportedly went additional than Shara and stated that Syria should ”defend our nation and our individuals.” Shara and Shaibani’s statements have been very probably spurred by an IDF Air Drive strike on an HTS-affiliated convoy close to the Syria-Golan Heights border on January 15 that killed two Public Safety Division members as they collected surrendered weapons.
Syria
Axis of Resistance targets:
- Reestablish floor strains of communication from Syria to Lebanon
- Reestablish Iranian affect in Syria
Turkish air property struck an Autonomous Administration of North East Syria (AANES)-organized demonstration close to Tishreen Dam, east of Aleppo, on January 16.[34] Turkish or Turkish-backed SNA air property additionally struck civilian gatherings close to the dam on January 15 and eight.[35] AANES, which is the governing authority in northeast Syria affiliated with the SDF, known as on January 7 for civilians to journey to the Tishreen Dam and protest Turkish-backed navy operations there.[36] An SDF spokesperson condemned the strike concentrating on “peaceable sit-ins” and stated that over 20 civilians have been killed or wounded by the strikes on the dam space.[37] Anti-SDF media claimed that the SDF has compelled authorities staff to take part within the demonstrations to assist SDF forces.[38] The SDF and SNA have fought close to the Tishreen Dam since mid-December 2024. The prior strikes focused civilian convoys that traveled on an SDF provide line to the SDF bridgehead at Tishreen Dam.[39] Turkey and the SNA are trying to isolate SDF forces by putting provide strains and key nodes behind the entrance whereas pressuring the SDF bridgeheads with floor assaults.
The SNA and Turkey continued to stress the SDF bridgehead west of Tishreen Dam. Anti-SDF media reported that the SNA and the SDF exchanged artillery fireplace west of the dam.[40] An SDF spokesperson stated that Kurdish forces destroyed an SNA weapons and ammunition warehouse north of the Tishreen Dam close to Abu Qalal village.[41]
The Turkish-backed Syrian Nationwide Military (SNA) continued to assault US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) positions alongside the road of management close to Tal Tamr on January 16. Anti-SDF media reported that the SNA shelled SDF positions close to the road of management close to Tal Tamr.[42] The SNA has reportedly deployed forces to the road of management close to Tal Tamr since January 8.[43] A Turkish airstrike individually focused an SDF place south of Tal Abyad on the other aspect of the SNA-controlled Peace Spring space.[44]
HTS-led safety forces performed safety operations in three areas on January 15 and 16. HTS-led forces confiscated weapons together with MANPADS, rockets, artillery shells, and mines present in warehouses and underground caches in Sanamayn, northern Daraa Province.[45] HTS-led forces confiscated weapons and arrested quite a lot of fighters in operations concentrating on former Assad regime members in Hafir Fawqa, north of Damascus.[46]
HTS-led forces individually reportedly arrested a pacesetter in an unspecified SNA group, Bilal Awda, throughout a patrol close to Homs Metropolis.[47] Syrian media reported the forces arrested Awda as a consequence of his ”formation of a navy faction exterior the administration of the interim authorities.”[48] Awda reportedly has beforehand been concerned in organized crime in Talat Rakan, Homs Province.[49] A Syria-focused analyst reported that locals in Homs Province blame native crime on Sultan Murad Division commanders who at the moment are serving in native safety positions, suggesting that Awda could also be a part of the Sultan Murad Division.[50] The Sultan Murad Division is a Turkmen militia that’s a part of the SNA.[51] The Syria analyst famous that two former Farouq Battalion members, Nasser Nahar, and Ahmed Faisal Khalouf, assumed safety management for Baba Amr, Homs Metropolis.[52] The Farouq Battalion is an Islamist Homs Province-based insurgent group that joined the Syrian Islamic Liberation Entrance in 2012.[53] The Farouq Battalion fought in opposition to the regime within the Baba Amr neighborhood, Homs Metropolis, in 2011 through the regime’s siege there.[54] Nasser al Nahar reportedly led the ”Free Males of Baba Amr brigade” within the Free Syrian Military, a unfastened coalition of armed teams against the Assad regime through the early levels of the Syrian Civil Conflict.[55] The analyst additionally famous that former Talkalakh Martyrs Battalion member Hamoudi al Layli additionally assumed management of Baba Amr.[56] Layli reportedly fled to Lebanon following the autumn of the Assad regime.[57]
US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Basic Michael Kurilla additionally mentioned regional safety and US-Jordan protection coordination with the Chairman of the Jordanian Joint Chiefs of Workers Main Basic Yousef al Hnaity and different Jordanian navy commanders in Jordan on January 15.[58] Kurilla highlighted Jordanian border safety and Jordanian assist to the US-led anti-ISIS mission within the conferences.
Iraq
Axis of Resistance targets:
- Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance affect over the Iraqi state and society
- Harden the Iraqi authorities in opposition to inner dissent
Iraqi Overseas Minister Faud Hussein instructed Reuters on January 16 that the Iraqi authorities is trying to persuade Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to both give up their weapons or be a part of the official Iraqi safety equipment.[59] Many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias integrated parts of their militias into the Common Mobilization Forces (PMF), an Iraqi state safety service, within the mid-2010s. An Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework member of Parliament equally instructed Iraqi media on January 16 that the Iraqi authorities is at present trying to comprise the militias and place weapons “in Baghdad’s palms,” moderately than making an attempt to grab militia headquarters or weapons.[60] A militia supply individually instructed Iraqi media on January 16 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba (HHN) Secretary-Basic Akram al Kaabi rejected Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s suggestion to combine members of HHN, Kataib Hezbollah, and Kataib Sayyad al Shuhada into the PMF.[61] Many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias embody brigades which can be a part of the PMF and extra forces that aren’t a part of the PMF.[62] Neither the official brigades throughout the PMF nor the non-official forces exterior of the PMF reply to the Iraqi prime minister in observe, nonetheless.[63]
US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Basic Michael Kurilla mentioned the US-led anti-ISIS mission and up to date developments in Syria with senior US and Iraqi navy leaders in Baghdad on January 15.[64] Kurilla held conferences with Iraqi Military Chief of Workers Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah, Iraqi Joint Operations Deputy Commander Basic Qais al Muhammadawi, and Mixed Joint Process Drive-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) Commander Main Basic Kevin Leahy.
Arabian Peninsula
Axis of Resistance targets:
- Harden the Houthi regime in opposition to inner dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
- Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition to be able to management all of Yemen
- Erode Israeli will to proceed the conflict within the Gaza Strip
Nothing important to report.
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
Axis of Resistance targets:
- Erode the need of the Israeli political institution and the general public to maintain clearing operations within the Gaza Strip
- Reestablish Hamas because the governing authority within the Gaza Strip
- Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
- Set up the West Financial institution as a viable entrance in opposition to Israel
The Gaza Strip
The IDF Air Drive struck “dozens” of Palestinian militia positions throughout the Gaza Strip on January 15 and 16.[65] Hamas claimed that an IDF airstrike focused a location the place Hamas held a feminine Israeli hostage.[66] Hamas stated the ceasefire deal stipulated that the hostage could be launched through the first part.[67] Hamas didn’t present any details about the hostage’s standing, nonetheless. This assertion is probably going a part of a Hamas data effort geared toward pressuring the Israeli cupboard and swaying Israeli public opinion to assist the ceasefire-hostage settlement.
IDF Chief of Workers Herzi Halevi mentioned operations in Beit Hanoun with IDF 933rd Infantry Brigade (162nd Division) officers on January 16.[68] Halevi briefed the Israeli troopers on IDF operations within the Gaza Strip forward of the ceasefire.
Geolocated footage posted on January 15 confirmed Israeli forces demolishing infrastructure within the northeastern Jabalia refugee camp within the northern Gaza Strip.[69] PIJ mortared Israeli forces in Jabalia refugee camp on January 16.[70]
The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired rockets and mortared Israeli forces alongside the Netzarim Hall on January 16.[71]
Lebanon
Hezbollah-affiliated and Lebanese media reported on January 16 that Israeli forces moved towards two cities in southeastern Lebanon the place the IDF had beforehand operated in or close to. Hezbollah-affiliated media reported on January 16 that the IDF superior in direction of the outskirts of Deir Siryan, roughly 5 kilometers northwest of Israel.[72] Lebanese media reported that Israeli tanks entered the northern neighborhood of Maroun al Ras.[73] The IDF has operated in and round Maroun al Ras since early November 2024.[74]
Hezbollah-affiliated and Lebanese media reported on January 16 that Israeli forces superior into Taybeh and Houla, southeastern Lebanon.[75]
Lebanese media reported on January 16 that the IDF detonated unspecified infrastructure in 5 cities on or close to the Israel-Lebanon border. The cities included Qouzah and Aita al Shaab, southwestern Lebanon, and Yaroun, Mays al Jabal, and Taybeh.[76]
The IDF eleventh Territorial Brigade (146th Division) destroyed “dozens” of above and below-ground Hezbollah infrastructure in southwestern Lebanon on January 16.[77] This included weapons depots that contained rocket launchers, small arms, and different navy tools.[78] The IDF individually destroyed a weapons cache in a civilian constructing close to a UN base with out inflicting injury to the bottom. Israeli forces additionally destroyed an armed launcher in southwestern Lebanon geared toward Israeli territory.
West Financial institution
Israeli forces killed ten Palestinian militia fighters and arrested fifty extra fighters throughout operations within the West Financial institution since January 12.[79] Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s (PIJ) Jenin Battalion mourned the loss of life of certainly one of its commanders and three fighters on January 16, each of whom the IDF killed in Jenin refugee camp.[80] The IDF additionally seized weapons and “terrorist funds” throughout their operation.[81]
Iranian Resolution-Making, Inside Dynamics, and Overseas Coverage
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated that Iran could be keen to have interaction in direct nuclear talks with the USA if Iran obtained “assurances” that the US would keep its commitments throughout an interview with NBC on January 15.[82] Pezeshkian’s assertion probably goals to sign to the West that Iran maintains open to nuclear negotiations and forestall the West from triggering additional sanctions—together with snapback sanctions—in opposition to Iran. Iranian Supreme Chief Ali Khamenei in the end will resolve Iran’s official coverage on negotiations, nonetheless. Khamenei has beforehand delivered deliberately imprecise statements on Iran’s official place about negotiations with the West. He has expressed openness to negotiations to alleviate sanctions stress on Iran however he maintains that Iranian officers shouldn’t “belief” Iranian adversaries and deal with Iranian pursuits.[83] Iranian hardliners proceed to precise unwillingness to barter with the West and have inspired Khamenei to revoke his 2003 fatwa banning the manufacturing and use of nuclear weapons.[84]
Pezeshkian met with senior Tajik officers in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, on January 16 to debate alternatives to increase bilateral commerce and funding ties. Pezeshkian and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon signed 23 cooperation agreements throughout varied sectors together with border cooperation, customs companies, and data know-how.[85] Pezeshkian additionally met with Tajik Prime Minister Kokhir Rasulzoda, Speaker of the Tajik Home of Representatives Mohammad Tahir Zakirzadeh, and Speaker of the Nationwide Meeting of Tajikistan Rustam Emomali.[86] These conferences look like a continuation of Iran’s “neighborhood coverage” centered on constructing relations with regional and different states to undermine and mitigate the affect of worldwide sanctions.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Operational Base Forces and the Intelligence Ministry arrested 15 probably Jaish al Adl—a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group—fighters in Sistan and Baluchistan Province, close to the Pakistani border, on January 16.[87] The IRGC Quds Operational Base Forces seized weapons and ammunition.[88]
The Iranian Artesh Navy established the 2nd Naval Zone in Jask, Hormozgan Province, on January 16.[89] Iranian Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani acknowledged that the zone has obtained floor, subsurface, and aerial techniques, together with cruise missiles, air protection weapons, and digital and cyber warfare techniques.[90] The 2nd Naval Zone reportedly contains restore amenities and helps operational and defensive items, together with commando brigades, digital warfare groups, and cyber items.
The Iran Replace gives insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored actions overseas that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and pursuits. It additionally covers occasions and tendencies that have an effect on the steadiness and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Essential Threats Challenge (CTP) on the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Research of Conflict (ISW) gives these updates often based mostly on regional occasions.
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” because the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated within the Center East for the reason that Islamic Republic got here to energy in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to safe their collective pursuits. Tehran considers itself to be each a part of the alliance and its chief. Iran furnishes these teams with various ranges of economic, navy, and political assist in change for some extent of affect or management over their actions. Some are conventional proxies which can be extremely attentive to Iranian path, whereas others are companions over which Iran exerts extra restricted affect. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic targets, which embody eroding and finally expelling American affect from the Center East, destroying the Israeli state, or each. Pursuing these targets and supporting the Axis of Resistance to these ends have turn into cornerstones of Iranian regional technique.
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[2] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18401 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-hamas-quarrel-over-final-details-of-gaza-cease-fire-2fbb837b?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1
[3] https://www.ft.com/content material/5dc922d6-5a5d-4d5e-a536-f6ece5164290 ; https://www.aljazeera dot com/program/newsfeed/2025/1/15/israel-hamas-reach-ceasefire-deal-qatari-pm
[4] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18411
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-15-2025
[6] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18411
[7] https://www.palestinechronicle dot com/the-gaza-ceasefire-agreement-key-points-and-steps-toward-reconstruction/ ; https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/article-837724
[8] https://www.palestinechronicle dot com/the-gaza-ceasefire-agreement-key-points-and-steps-toward-reconstruction/
[9] https://www.military.mil/article/219390/the_fallacy_and_myth_of_reconstitution
[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-13-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/israel-defeating-hamas-destroying-hamas-will-require-post-war-vision
[11] https://www.military.mil/article/219390/the_fallacy_and_myth_of_reconstitution
[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-14-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-13-2025 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-has-another-sinwar-and-hes-rebuilding-0a16031d
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[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-15-2025
[15] https://www.rudaw dot internet/english/evaluation/29062021
[16] https://www.aa dot com.tr/tr/politika/disisleri-bakani-fidan-turkiye-bekasina-yonelik-tum-tehditleri-kaynaginda-yok-etme-gucune-ve-kararliligina-sahiptir/3446537
[17] https://apnews.com/article/kurds-syria-iraq-pkk-sdf-kdp-meeting-0089a12183d690b6afffef0280e9a79c
[18] https://apnews.com/article/kurds-syria-iraq-pkk-sdf-kdp-meeting-0089a12183d690b6afffef0280e9a79c
[19] https://newlinesmag.com/argument/syrias-kurdish-northeast-ratifies-a-new-constitution/
[20] https://www.brussels-school.be/websites/default/recordsdata/Thepercent20PYD:YPGpercent20inpercent20thepercent20Syrianpercent20Conflict-%20Aspirationspercent20forpercent20Autonomypercent20inpercent20North-easternpercent20Syria.pdf
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[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/pkk-would-leave-syria-if-kurdish-forces-keep-leadership-role-official-says-2025-01-16/
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[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-8-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-13-2025
[44] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/standing/1879661042369958362 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/133224
[45] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1879863222406443021
[46] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1879858631174467875
[47] https://x.com/Al7khalidi/standing/1879670259520811296
[48] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/standing/1879651466543235093
[49] https://x.com/homstodaytv/standing/494940228491427840
[50] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/standing/1879749910016545030
[51] https://www.counterextremism.com/armed-opposition-groups-nw-syria/sultan-murad-division
[52] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/standing/1879749910016545030
[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/websites/default/recordsdata/The-Free-Syrian-Military-24MAR.pdf ; https://www.bbc.com/information/world-middle-east-24403003
[54] https://x.com/GinnySacksMole/standing/1866051025062490573
[55] https://www.thetimes.com/world/middle-east/article/homs-cradle-syria-revolution-assad-d8x7zw9xj ; https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-free-syrian-army-a-decentralized-insurgent-brand/
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[57] https://x.com/HussamHamoud/standing/1872219572738343012
[58] https://x.com/CENTCOM/standing/1879871161862873131
[59] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraq-wants-iran-backed-factions-lay-down-weapons-foreign-minister-says-2025-01-16/
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[62] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/02/networks-power/03-pmf-set-networks
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[64] https://x.com/CENTCOM/standing/1879804904450965792
[65] https://x.com/idfonline/standing/1879907214179381513
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[69] https://x.com/NemoAnno/standing/1879825302991585665
[70] https://t.me/sarayaps/19052
[71] https://t.me/nedalps/4634 ; https://t.me/nedalps/4635
[72] https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/standing/1879868198092259464
[73] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/127481
[74] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-16-2024
[75] https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/standing/1879829651834507535 ; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/13042
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; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/127497 ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/127492 ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/127484 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/111480 ; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/standing/1879824611358970116
[77] https://www.idf dot il/264690
[78] https://www.idf dot il/264690
[79] https://www.idf dot il/264656
[80] https://t.me/sarayaps/19056
[81] https://www.idf dot il/264656
[82] https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/video/exclusive-one-on-one-with-iran-s-president-extended-interview-229424197852
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[84] kayhan dot ir/fa/information/303945/ ;
https://x.com/Ahmadnaderi_ir/standing/1865703381123084489 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/evaluation/iran-update-october-9-2024 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/evaluation/iran-update-august-21-2024
[85] https://president dot ir/fa/156789
[86] https://president dot ir/fa/156808 ; https://president dot ir/fa/156812 ; https://president dot ir/fa/156806 ; https://president dot ir/fa/156801
[87] https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/information/4432247
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[89] https://defapress dot ir/fa/information/719969
[90] https://defapress dot ir/fa/information/719709
