Avery Borens, Katherine Wells, Nidal Morrison, Ria Reddy, Ben Schmida, Carolyn Moorman, and Brian Carter
Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET
The Vital Threats Undertaking (CTP) on the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Examine of Conflict (ISW) publish the Iran Replace, which offers insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored actions that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and pursuits. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Replace every day.
Click on here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed management of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli floor operations. The Syria map is up to date every day alongside the static Syria maps on this report. CTP-ISW ended every day maps of Israeli floor operations in February 2025.
Click on here to see ISW-CTP’s interactive map displaying the overall strikes in Iran since June 12, in addition to an interactive timelapse displaying the strikes day-by-day.
Some senior Lebanese officers are trying to suggest a Hezbollah disarmament plan that might search to “purchase time” for Lebanon, thereby rising the chance that Hezbollah may reconstitute itself within the interim and make it harder to disarm Hezbollah. Lebanese ministers and high-level officers have reportedly proposed numerous plans to disarm Hezbollah however stay cut up on a call. Two unspecified Lebanese sources informed Reuters on August 5 that Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, President Joseph Aoun, and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have been working to agree on a cupboard resolution that might appease the US and “purchase Lebanon extra time.”[1] It’s unclear what size of time this resolution seeks. Berri’s proposed wording would commit Lebanon to forming a nationwide protection technique and sustaining a ceasefire with Israel, however would keep away from an specific pledge to disarm Hezbollah throughout Lebanon.[2]
Hezbollah would doubtless comply with Berri’s proposal as a result of Hezbollah Secretary Basic Naim Qassem has repeatedly referred to as for the Lebanese authorities and Hezbollah to coordinate on a nationwide protection technique.[3] Berri’s proposal comes amid Lebanese media reporting that Aoun and Berri each intention to “forestall any home political conflict that might torpedo” future cupboard classes.[4] Lebanese officers have additionally raised considerations {that a} resolution explicitly calling for Hezbollah to disarm may spark communal tensions in Lebanon.[5]
Some Lebanese ministers seem to have rejected Berri’s proposal, nonetheless. Anti-Hezbollah Lebanese Forces Get together-affiliated Minister Kamal Shehadi informed Reuters that different Lebanese ministers plan to suggest a formulation that commits Lebanon to a deadline to disarm Hezbollah.[6]
Hezbollah would profit considerably from Berri’s proposal as it might give the group time to reconstitute and reestablish itself domestically. Hezbollah Secretary Basic Naim Qassem emphasised on August 5 that Hezbollah wouldn’t comply with any timetable handy over its weapons, which is probably going an try and delay talks additional and safe extra time for reconstitution.[7] The shortage of a disarmament deadline would hinder the Lebanese authorities’s skill to disarm Hezbollah as a result of it might give the group time to entrench itself domestically and enhance the chance of a army confrontation that the federal government is unlikely to simply accept. Israeli operations stay targeted on efforts to take care of Hezbollah’s degradation, nonetheless.
Hezbollah Secretary Basic Naim Qassem threatened Israel immediately for the primary time in months throughout his televised speech on August 5.[8] Qassem threatened to launch missiles concentrating on Israel if Israel engages in a “large-scale aggression“ in opposition to Lebanon.”[9] It’s unlikely that Hezbollah possesses the capabilities to launch any large-scale assaults in opposition to Israel, on condition that it was severely degraded through the Israel-Lebanon battle in late 2024.[10]
Qassem acknowledged that Hezbollah suffered a forty five% casualty price through the Israeli marketing campaign in Lebanon, which nearly definitely rendered Hezbollah fight ineffective. Hezbollah suffered 12.5% killed in motion from its whole drive through the struggle. Qassem famous that Israel killed 5,000 Hezbollah fighters and wounded 13,000 others, which marks the primary time that Hezbollah has offered an official loss of life toll.[11] Hezbollah had 40,000 whole fighters earlier than the struggle, in accordance with US intelligence, which signifies that 32.5% of its whole drive was wounded and 12.5% of its whole drive was killed.[12] Qassem mentioned that Hezbollah nonetheless has fighters who’re able to make ”the harshest sacrifices” if wanted.[13] The Israel Protection Forces (IDF) has killed practically all the prime Hezbollah commanders, degraded the Radwan Pressure, destroyed kilometers of offensive tunnels, and demonstrated the Israeli skill to quickly inflict huge casualties upon Hezbollah at comparatively little price.[14]
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed Supreme Chief Adviser Ali Larijani as Supreme Nationwide Safety Council (SNSC) secretary.[15] Larijani’s appointment comes as average and pragmatic hardline components within the Iranian regime have sought to play a extra influential position in Iran’s safety coverage following the Israel-Iran Conflict. Larijani is changing Ali Akbar Ahmadian, who had served as SNSC secretary since Could 2023.[16] Ahmadian will reportedly assume a brand new, unspecified deputy place inside the authorities.[17] Some Iranian media retailers and social media customers have speculated in latest weeks that the regime would quickly appoint Larijani as SNSC secretary and have praised Larijani as an efficient, trusted, and average chief.[18] These characterizations of Larijani as a “average” official are according to stories that Larijani tried to contact Supreme Chief Ali Khamenei through the Israel-Iran Conflict to advocate for a ceasefire.[19] Larijani beforehand served as SNSC secretary from 2005 to 2007 earlier than he resigned as a result of disagreements with hardliner former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.[20] Larijani was the speaker of the parliament from 2008 and 2020 and oversaw the passage of the 2015 nuclear deal, also called the Joint Complete Plan of Motion (JCPOA).[21] Larijani repeatedly expressed his assist for the deal and defended it in opposition to hardliners in parliament.[22] Media affiliated with former SNSC Secretary Ali Shamkhani acknowledged on August 5 that Larijani’s appointment will affect Iran’s engagement with the West.[23]
Larijani has performed an essential position in creating Iran’s relations with Russia, China, and the Axis of Resistance along with partaking in diplomacy with the West. Western media reported in January 2025 that Larijani had made secret journeys to Russia to realize Russian help on Iran’s nuclear program.[24] Larijani additionally mentioned the Iranian nuclear program with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on July 20.[25] Larijani has additionally held a long-standing position overseeing the Iranian strategic partnership with China, together with the 25-year cooperation settlement signed in 2021.[26] Larijani met with senior Lebanese officers in Beirut following the Israel-Hezbollah battle to strengthen Iran’s regional stance.[27] Some Iranian media have characterised Larijani as an efficient communicator and diplomat.[28]
Larijani’s appointment comes amid a broader effort to restructure and reshape Iran’s decision-making equipment, doubtless as a way to put together for potential future conflicts. This restructuring effort seems to be led by average and pragmatic hardline components inside the regime. The SNSC established a “Protection Council” on August 3 to streamline decision-making throughout wartime.[29] An outlet affiliated with pragmatic hardliner Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf urged that average Iranian President Pezeshkian will appoint Ghalibaf because the Protection Council secretary.[30] A political analyst near the regime equally urged that Ghalibaf had a big position in establishing the Protection Council.[31] CTP-ISW beforehand assessed that the institution of this physique, which can function below the SNSC, doubtless displays Iranian leaders’ recognition of systemic organizational and operational failures through the Israel-Iran Conflict.[32] Different Iranian media retailers have not too long ago referred to as on the Iranian regime to change its inner and exterior technique following the struggle.[33] Media affiliated with former SNSC Secretary Ali Shamkhani revealed an op-ed on July 29 that urged Iran to “rearrange the nation’s decision-making system” to adapt to evolving threats.[34]
Iran has sought Russian assist for its nuclear weapons program.[35] The Monetary Instances reported on August 4 that 4 Iranian nuclear scientists and an Iranian counterintelligence officer traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to go to Russian analysis institutes specializing in dual-use applied sciences that can be utilized in nuclear weapons growth.[36] These nuclear scientists have been affiliated with the Iranian Protection and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry (MODAFL)’s Group of Defensive Innovation and Analysis (SPND), which performed a number one position within the Iranian nuclear weapons analysis program earlier than 2003.[37] MODAFL reportedly requested one of many scientists to make use of his know-how consulting agency, doubtless as a guise, to steer an Iranian delegation to Moscow.[38] One of many different scientists runs a US-sanctioned firm that procures dual-use know-how for nuclear weapons growth for SPND.[39] The opposite two scientists focus on radiation testing and neutron turbines that set off nuclear explosions.[40]
The delegation visited two analysis services run by a Russian scientist with nuclear weapons testing experience, particularly in vacuum know-how for implosion mechanisms.[41] Such visits would reportedly require Russian intelligence approval.[42] The USA sanctioned an SPND-affiliated firm, Ideally suited Vacuum, in Could for attempting to ”procure from overseas suppliers and indigenously fabricate gear that might be relevant in nuclear weapons analysis and growth.”[43] One of many nuclear scientists tried to buy three nuclear isotopes, together with tritium, which will increase the yield of nuclear warheads, from a Russian nuclear isotope provider in Could 2024.[44] The Monetary Instances was unable to substantiate if the scientist accomplished the sale of those isotopes. Iran has traditionally pursued nuclear cooperation with Russia by means of numerous diplomatic channels, doubtless together with the Russo-Iranian Strategic Complete Settlement signed in January.[45] Newly-appointed SNSC Secretary and Supreme Chief Ali Khamenei’s senior advisor Ali Larijani tried to muster up assist for the Iranian nuclear program in a number of covert conferences with Russian officers in 2025.[46]
Current Islamic State (IS) propaganda has tried to use latest combating between Druze and Sunni Bedouin fighters to recruit new fighters from hardline components of Shara’s coalition. The hassle may search to recruit native Sunni Bedouin in Suwayda Province. IS launched an editorial on July 31 that criticized the Syrian authorities and Shara’s actions through the intercommunal violence in Suwayda Province in mid to late July.[47] IS accused Shara of dragging Sunni Bedouin fighters into “his political recreation after which leaving them alone” to face “siege, betrayal, and displacement” through the Suwayda violence.[48] IS mentioned that Shara “abruptly performed the position of the deliverer of the Druze.”[49] IS’s hardline ideology maintains that the Druze are apostates who ought to be killed.[50] IS equally criticized Syrian authorities forces for aiding the US in a raid concentrating on an ISIS cell in al Bab, Aleppo Province, on July 25.[51] IS referred to as on “confused jihadists” who don’t consider that Shara’s cooperation with the US is “clear apostasy and assist for the ‘Zio-Crusader’.”[52] These arguments very doubtless search to generate recruits among the many hardline Salafi-jihadists in Shara’s orbit who equally consider that the Druze are apostates.
IS doubtless goals to use hardliners’ anger over these latest occasions and stoke additional disillusionment amongst IS sympathizers. A BBC Salafi-jihadi analyst reported on August 4 that Islamist hardliners are dissatisfied with Shara’s failure to take a powerful stand in opposition to the Druze and assist Sunni Bedouin tribes in Suwayda.[53] IS has steadily referenced ISIS’s 2018 violence in opposition to the Druze in Suwayda to enchantment to hardliners and painting itself as the one drive prepared to behave decisively in opposition to the Druze.[54] A number of ISIS-linked social media accounts additionally claimed that ISIS supporters have been lively in Suwayda Province and took part within the battle “discreetly and independently” alongside Sunni Bedouin tribes.[55] There was no definitive proof that ISIS took half in assaults on the Druze in any organized method, which means that these posts are doubtless an try and create the phantasm that ISIS fighters assist the Bedouin tribes and that Shara doesn’t. The BBC analyst additionally reported that IS is exploiting Islamist and jihadist anger over the Syrian authorities forces cooperating with the US on the al Bab raid.[56] Outstanding hardline clerics started partaking in theological debates relating to whether or not Shara and his forces had dedicated an act of disbelief or apostasy by ”cooperating” with the ”enemies of Islam.”[57] IS has reportedly not too long ago proven renewed optimism concerning the group’s enchantment and recruitment potential in Syria.[58]
The IS propaganda effort will even doubtless contribute to elevated mistrust in southwestern Syria, particularly if ISIS conducts any assaults concentrating on the Druze. The ISIS claims that it participated within the latest combating will give extra credence to Druze militia claims that the Sunni Bedouin sought to exterminate Druze communities, no matter whether or not that was the precise intent.[59] ISIS has lengthy sought to wipe out teams it deems apostates, and the IS propaganda will allow some Druze leaders to mobilize their communities with larger ease.[60] Elevated Druze mobilization may result in additional combating and additional Sunni Bedouin communal mobilization, particularly if ISIS does change into extra concerned. A plan of action that ends in extra Sunni Bedouin and Druze mobilization and combating would create vital recruitment alternatives for ISIS. IS and its associates, together with ISIS, have lengthy sought to create intercommunal strife in goal areas as a way to exploit the following chaos.[61]
Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah supplied on August 4 to cede management of unspecified areas inside the Baghdad Belts to the Iranian-backed In style Mobilization Forces (PMF).[62] The Baghdad Belts are residential, industrial, and agricultural areas that encircle Baghdad.[63] Kataib Hezbollah Spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari didn’t explicitly establish the areas that Kataib Hezbollah was prepared to cede however referred to al Latifiya, al Buaitha, al Madain, and al Tajiat as areas with a Kataib Hezbollah presence.[64] It’s equally unclear which PMF unit Askari is providing management of those areas to. The particular PMF items that the Iraqi authorities gave management of the areas to would matter as a result of Kataib Hezbollah instructions the forty fifth and forty sixth PMF brigades. A hypothetical resolution that gave management of those areas to those PMF brigades would signify no change, for instance.[65]
Askari mentioned that Kataib Hezbollah spreads ”safety, justice, and peaceable coexistence amongst sects” in areas below its management, which is fake.[66] Kataib Hezbollah and different militias dedicated acts of sectarian cleaning in Jurf al Sakhr, south of Baghdad, through the anti-ISIS combat. Kataib Hezbollah has used areas below its management for assassinations, rocket assaults, weapons storage, and extortion of native companies.[67] Askari’s assertion comes after a number of Kataib Hezbollah members engaged Iraqi Federal Cops in Dora, Baghdad, on July 27 and killed one civilian and a Federal Police officer.[68] Kataib Hezbollah and different Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have tried to distance themselves from this incident, which occurred amid coverage discussions over proscribing arms to the Iraqi state and dissolving the PMF. Askari’s assertion most likely goals to current Kataib Hezbollah as a accountable actor that could be a web constructive as a way to undermine efforts to disarm the militias.
Askari additionally referred to as Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani an ineffective chief on August 4.[69] He described Sudani as a ”supervisor” as a substitute of a frontrunner. He referred to as on the Shia Coordination Framework to imagine their “historic tasks,” doubtless in reference to the elimination of US forces from Iraq and different coverage considerations that Askari raised in his assertion.[70] The Shia Coordination Framework is a free coalition of Shia political events, a few of which Iran backs. Kataib Hezbollah’s Haquq Motion is a member of the Shia Coordination Framework. Askari’s feedback relating to Sudani may replicate rising disillusionment amongst components of the Shia Coordination Framework with Sudani forward of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.
Key Takeaways
- Lebanese Hezbollah Disarmament: Some senior Lebanese officers are trying to suggest a Hezbollah disarmament plan that might search to “purchase time” for Lebanon, which might enhance the chance that Hezbollah may reconstitute itself within the interim and make it harder to disarm Hezbollah.
- Israel-Hezbollah: Hezbollah Secretary Basic Naim Qassem threatened Israel immediately for the primary time in months throughout his televised speech on August 5. Qassem acknowledged that Hezbollah suffered a forty five% casualty price through the Israeli marketing campaign in Lebanon, which nearly definitely rendered Hezbollah fight ineffective. Hezbollah suffered 12.5% killed in motion from its whole drive through the struggle.
- Iranian Protection Equipment: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed Supreme Chief Adviser Ali Larijani to Supreme Nationwide Safety Council (SNSC) secretary. Larijani’s appointment comes as average and pragmatic hardline components within the Iranian regime have sought to play a extra influential position in Iran’s safety coverage following the Israel-Iran Conflict.
- Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran has sought Russian assist for its nuclear weapons program. The Monetary Instances reported on August 4 that 4 Iranian nuclear scientists and an Iranian counterintelligence officer traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to go to Russian analysis institutes specializing in dual-use applied sciences that can be utilized in nuclear weapons growth.
- Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah supplied on August 4 to cede management of unspecified areas inside the Baghdad Belts to the Iranian-backed In style Mobilization Forces (PMF). It’s unclear which PMF unit Kataib Hezbollah is providing management of those areas to. Kataib Hezbollah instructions the forty fifth and forty sixth PMF brigades. Kataib Hezbollah additionally referred to as Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani an ineffective chief, which may replicate rising disillusionment amongst components of the Shia Coordination Framework with Sudani forward of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.
- ISIS in Syria: Current Islamic State (IS) propaganda has tried to use latest combating between Druze and Sunni Bedouin fighters to recruit new fighters from hardline components of Shara’s coalition. IS launched an editorial on July 31 that criticized the Syrian authorities and Shara’s actions through the intercommunal violence in Suwayda Province in mid to late July. IS doubtless goals to use hardliners’ anger over these latest occasions and stoke additional disillusionment amongst sympathizers.
Iran
Chinese language imports of Iranian crude oil decreased by 0.4 million barrels per day (bpd) from June to July, in accordance with oil market intelligence agency Kpler.[71] Iranian crude oil exports to Chinese language teapot refineries decreased from 1.7 million bpd to 1.3 million bpd in July.[72] CTP-ISW beforehand reported that Iran elevated crude oil exports to China from 1.7 million bpd in June to 1.8 million bpd within the first half of July.[73] This enhance most likely occurred as a result of Iran loaded a larger-than-normal quantity of oil into floating storage vessels previous to the Israel-Iran Conflict in early June to keep away from the destruction of oil in onshore services, in accordance with Vortexa.[74] A Kpler analyst assessed that the Iranian crude oil export price to China doubtless fell within the second half of July as a result of demand from Chinese language teapot refineries fell as they reached their oil quota in June with the excess from the July provide.[75]
Iraq
See topline part.
Syria
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi informed Kurdish media on August 5 that the SDF seeks to conduct mixed counter-ISIS operations with the US and the Syrian transitional authorities.[76] Abdi acknowledged that the US-led Worldwide Coalition’s withdrawal from some positions in northeast Syria has not impacted the SDF’s counter-ISIS operations or mission.[77] Abdi emphasised that the Syrian transitional authorities is obligated to hitch the counter-ISIS mission, given the Syrian authorities’s relationship with the US.[78] Syrian transitional authorities forces not too long ago assisted a US floor raid concentrating on an ISIS cell in al Bab, Aleppo Province, on July 25.[79] The USA has beforehand shared intelligence with the Syrian transitional government–and earlier than the autumn of Assad, shared intelligence with Ahmed al Shara’s Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) organization–to goal ISIS and Hurras al Din, a Salafi-jihadi militant group allied to al Qaeda that threatened HTS.[80] Abdi acknowledged that the SDF has additionally begun sharing counter-ISIS ways and expertise with the transitional authorities as a part of this effort.[81] The SDF, Syrian transitional authorities, France, and the US are scheduled to satisfy in Paris quickly to barter the combination of the SDF into the Syrian Ministry of Protection (MoD).[82]
Russian forces patrolled close to their base on the Qamishli Airport in Hasakah Province with 4 autos and two helicopters on August 4 for the primary time for the reason that fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[83] The SDF at present controls the city of Qamishli.[84] Russian forces reportedly prevented the SDF from collaborating within the patrol.[85] Russian forces reestablished their presence on the Qamishli Airport in March after they relocated troops and gear from Hmeimim Airbase through cargo flights.[86] Russian transfers of troops and gear to Qamishli intensified between April and June.[87] Russia upgraded the bottom’s infrastructure, safety, and protection capabilities in June.[88] Russian exercise in Qamishli follows latest conferences between senior Syrian and Russian officers in Moscow on July 31 to barter Russian basing in Syria.[89]
Arabian Peninsula
The Houthis launched a ballistic missile concentrating on Ben Gurion Airport on August 4.[90] The Israeli Air Pressure intercepted a Houthi missile earlier than it crossed into Israeli territory on August 4.[91] The Houthis have launched a whole lot of drones and ballistic missiles concentrating on Israel for the reason that Houthis started their marketing campaign to implement an financial blockade on Israel in October 2023.[92]
Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
See topline part.
[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-cabinet-meets-discuss-hezbollahs-arms-after-us-pressure-2025-08-05/
[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-cabinet-meets-discuss-hezbollahs-arms-after-us-pressure-2025-08-05/
[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-tasks-army-with-limiting-arms-state-forces-challenge-hezbollah-2025-08-05/
[4] https://www.naharnet dot com/tales/en/314541-tuesday-s-cabinet-session-latest-developments
[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-cabinet-meets-discuss-hezbollahs-arms-after-us-pressure-2025-08-05/
[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-cabinet-meets-discuss-hezbollahs-arms-after-us-pressure-2025-08-05/
[7] https://www.arabnews dot pk/node/2610787/middle-east ;
[8] https://www.reuters.com/enterprise/aerospace-defense/hezbollah-chief-says-missiles-will-fall-israel-if-it-resumes-war-lebanon-2025-08-05/
[9] https://www.reuters.com/enterprise/aerospace-defense/hezbollah-chief-says-missiles-will-fall-israel-if-it-resumes-war-lebanon-2025-08-05/
[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/israels-victory-lebanon
[11] https://www.reuters.com/enterprise/aerospace-defense/hezbollah-chief-says-missiles-will-fall-israel-if-it-resumes-war-lebanon-2025-08-05/
[12] https://www.voanews.com/a/hezbollah-hamas-are-down-but-not-out-us-says/7862018.html
[13] https://www.reuters.com/enterprise/aerospace-defense/hezbollah-chief-says-missiles-will-fall-israel-if-it-resumes-war-lebanon-2025-08-05/
[14] https://www.fdd.org/evaluation/2024/10/26/israel-demolishes-massive-hezbollah-underground-bunker-in-southern-lebanon/; https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/troops-destroy-tunnels-equipped-for-long-term-stays-in-south-lebanon/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-4-2024; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-faces-long-recovery-officials-fear-thousands-fighters-lost-israel-2024-11-27/
[15] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/information/1404/05/14/3370075/
[16] https://president dot ir/fa/144196
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[19] https://iranwire.com/en/information/142494-exclusive-senior-officials-cannot-reach-khamenei-ali-larijani-wants-to-rescue-iran/
[20] https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/tags/1681/1/%D8percentB9percentD9percent84percentDBpercent8C-%D9percent84percentD8percentA7percentD8percentB1percentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentACpercentD8percentA7percentD9percent86percentDBpercent8C
[21] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/larijani-has-the-credentials-but-not-the-charisma-to-be-irans-president/
[22] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/larijani-has-the-credentials-but-not-the-charisma-to-be-irans-president/
[23] https://nournews dot ir/fa/information/238301
[24] https://www.thetimes.com/world/middle-east/article/iran-russia-nuclear-talks-deal-lfzbdh7z7
[25] http://en.kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/77474
[26] https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-larijani-possible-candidate-of-reformist-for-president/29614673.html ; https://previous.iranintl.com/en/world/larijani-appointed-pursue-iran-china-strategic-cooperation-deal ; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/27/world/middleeast/china-iran-deal.html
[27] https://apnews.com/article/israel-hezbollah-lebanon-iran-ceasefire-beirut-larijani-4659bd568a65da4511852a34f54fbc17;
https://defapress dot ir/fa/information/705726
[28] https://donya-e-eqtesad dot com/%D8percentA8percentD8percentAEpercentD8percentB4-%D9percent81percentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentAF-%D8percentB3percentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentA7percentD8percentB3percentDBpercent8C-81/4202267-%D9percent85percentD8percentA7percentD9percent85percentD9percent88percentD8percentB1percentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentAA-%D9percent85percentD9percent87percentD9percent85-%D8percentB9percentD9percent84percentDBpercent8C-%D9percent84percentD8percentA7percentD8percentB1percentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentACpercentD8percentA7percentD9percent86percentDBpercent8C-%D8percentAFpercentD8percentB1-%D8percentB4percentD9percent88percentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7percentDBpercent8C-%D8percentB9percentD8percentA7percentD9percent84percentDBpercent8C-%D8percentA7percentD9percent85percentD9percent86percentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentAA-%D9percent85percentD9percent84percentDBpercent8C-%D8percentA7percentD8percentB2-%D9percent86percentDApercentAFpercentD8percentA7percentD9percent87-%D8percentB1percentD9percent88percentD8percentB2percentD9percent86percentD8percentA7percentD9percent85percentD9percent87-%D9percent86percentD8percentB2percentD8percentAFpercentDBpercent8CpercentDApercentA9-%D8percentA8percentD9percent87-%D9percent82percentD8percentA7percentD9percent84percentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentA8percentD8percentA7percentD9percent81 ; https://www.mehrnews dot com/information/6552516/
[29] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/information/1404/05/12/3368567
[30] https://www.etemadonline dot com/%D8percentA8percentD8percentAEpercentD8percentB4-%D8percentB3percentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentA7percentD8percentB3percentDBpercent8C-9/727655-%D8percentB4percentD9percent88percentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7percentDBpercent8C-%D8percentAFpercentD9percent81percentD8percentA7percentD8percentB9-%D8percentACpercentD9percent86percentDApercentAF-%D8percentB1percentD8percentA6percentDBpercent8CpercentD8percentB3
[31] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/standing/1952099738142335280
[32] https://www.criticalthreats.org/evaluation/iran-update-august-4-2025#_edne8611b6bce627cec544b9a970b7e712e10
[33] https://www.criticalthreats.org/evaluation/iran-update-july-31-2025 ; https://nournews dot ir/fa/information/237258/
[34] https://nournews dot ir/fa/information/237258/
[35] https://www.ft.com/content material/00f6f94c-d584-430c-b6d7-cc85933fc3e6
[36] https://www.ft.com/content material/00f6f94c-d584-430c-b6d7-cc85933fc3e6
[37] https://www.ft.com/content material/00f6f94c-d584-430c-b6d7-cc85933fc3e6
[38] https://www.ft.com/content material/00f6f94c-d584-430c-b6d7-cc85933fc3e6
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[40] https://www.ft.com/content material/00f6f94c-d584-430c-b6d7-cc85933fc3e6
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[44] https://www.ft.com/content material/00f6f94c-d584-430c-b6d7-cc85933fc3e6
[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-17-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/websites/default/recordsdata/Thepercent20Russia-Iranpercent20Coalitionpercent20Deepenspercent20013025.pdf pp. 24.
[46] https://www.thetimes.com/world/middle-east/article/iran-russia-nuclear-talks-deal-lfzbdh7z7 ; http://en.kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/77474
[47] https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/the-rearers-of-the-franks-pigs
[48] https://x.com/Minalami/standing/1952488690921717816
[49] https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/the-rearers-of-the-franks-pigs
[50] https://x.com/Minalami/standing/1947748575984947213
[51] https://x.com/Minalami/standing/1952488693220139500
[52] https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/the-rearers-of-the-franks-pigs
[53] https://x.com/Minalami/standing/1952488690921717816
[54] https://x.com/Minalami/standing/1952488690921717816 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-23-2025
[55] https://x.com/Minalami/standing/1947748585585484111
[56] https://x.com/Minalami/standing/1952488693220139500
[57] https://x.com/Minalami/standing/1952488693220139500
[58] https://x.com/Minalami/standing/1952488688732242127
[59] https://x.com/Minalami/standing/1947748585585484111
[60] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/islamophobia-what-islamic-state-really-wants
[61] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/islamophobia-what-islamic-state-really-wants
[62] https://t.me/abualaskary/137
[63] https://understandingwar.org/area/baghdad-belts
[64] https://t.me/abualaskary/137
[65] https://t.me/abualaskary/137
[66] https://t.me/abualaskary/137
[67] https://www.skynewsarabia dot com/middle-east/1452489-البوعيثة-مناهضة-القاعدة-معقل-حزب-الله-المفضل
[68] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-28-2025
[69] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-28-2025
[70] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-28-2025
[71] https://www.bloomberg.com/information/articles/2025-08-05/china-s-iran-oil-imports-drop-in-july-as-demand-ebbs-kpler-says?embedded-checkout=true
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[77] https://hawarnews dot com/ar/126630
[78] https://hawarnews dot com/ar/126630
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[84] https://www.newarab.com/information/syrian-govt-slams-kurdish-move-reopen-qamishli-airport
[85] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/149427
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[87] https://israel-alma dot org/renewed-russian-entrenchment-in-northeastern-syria-qamishli/
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