Earlier this 12 months, a Russian Su-57 fighter jet roared throughout Indian skies, capturing consideration on the Aero India exhibition. The Kremlin’s aspirations for the showcase have been clear: Moscow supplied to sell its fifth-generation fighter jet to New Delhi the following day.
That is nothing new. Protection ties between the 2 nations return decades. For the Biden administration, these ties have been each an irritant and a puzzle: an irritant as a result of India’s purchases undercut U.S. sanctions after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and a puzzle as a result of whilst Moscow drew right into a “no limits” friendship with Beijing and New Delhi took an apparent Westward-tilt, Russia by no means deserted India to attain factors with China. Russia might have exacerbated India’s navy vulnerabilities at a time of significant border tensions with China. It by no means did.
Quick ahead to the current: The Trump administration now negotiates immediately with Russia over Ukraine and a host of other issues and has softened its stance to the purpose of leaving Russia off its tariff target list. Clearly, weaning India off Russian arms purchases can be a lesser precedence for the US, even when the White Home will undoubtedly search extra protection offers of its personal with New Delhi. Does this imply that Russo-Indian protection ties are poised for takeoff, or will India proceed to steer the connection into “managed decline?”
Neither.
As an alternative, Russo-Indian protection ties are headed for a way forward for managed equilibrium. It is because the connection is dictated primarily by the pursuits of those two nations themselves, which frequently lie past Washington’s affect. At its core, the connection is resilient and sturdy. Foundational Russian and Indian pursuits set its flooring and ceiling. The ground explains why India won’t abandon Russia for the US, in addition to why Russia won’t promote India out for China. The ceiling explains why sure sorts of bilateral protection cooperation are more likely to be dominated out, even when a near-term uptick in protection ties is believable.
The extra U.S. policymakers admire each the ground and the ceiling of Russo-Indian protection ties, the higher they are going to be at anticipating the doubtless trajectory of this geopolitical pairing that’s solely more likely to develop into extra essential within the a long time to come back.
The Present Baseline in Russo-Indian Arms Ties
Moscow and New Delhi’s navy relationship is primarily outlined by arms gross sales, and to a lesser extent, by co-production preparations. Over the previous twenty years, India bought $60 billion of Russian arms, amounting to 65 % of its complete weapons imports. Over that very same interval, Indian purchases declined in relative phrases because it diversified its suppliers. Russia stays India’s largest single arms provider, however over the previous 5 years, the US, France, and Israel collectively supplied India with 55 percent of its complete weapons imports.
But, Russian techniques usually are not only a Chilly Struggle legacy for India. Over the previous decade, India’s navy, military, and air drive have made main investments in Russian-built platforms and munitions that play important roles in defending towards existential threats and are nearly sure to be in service for many years to come back.
For its navy, India has agreed to buy 4 stealth frigates from Russia, two as imports and two to be constructed by India’s Goa Shipyard Restricted with Russian assist. India commissioned the primary Russian frigate in December 2024, with the second anticipated in 2025. India will build the final two between 2026 and 2027. India expects so as to add a Russian nuclear-powered assault submarine by 2028, below a ten-year lease of the INS Chakra III. And India’s indigenously constructed ballistic missile submarines, which it sees as a necessary piece of its nuclear deterrent, reportedly additionally required intensive Russian know-how and technical help.
To defend its skies, India took supply of three extremely succesful Russian-made S-400 air protection squadrons in 2023 and expects two extra by 2025. India’s air drive at the moment operates 259 Russian-designed Su-30 MKIs, and in 2024, New Delhi awarded Hindustan Aeronautics Restricted a contract to supply twelve extra.
On land, India’s major tank fleet is comprised of two,400 Russian-made T-72 tanks. In 2025, New Delhi and Moscow agreed to a $248 million contract for brand spanking new 1,000 horsepower engines to spice up mobility and lethality. Indian troops more and more use the Russian AK-203 assault rifle, inbuilt India by way of a joint-production deal. By July 2024, that deal delivered 35,000 new assault rifles to the Indian Military.
One in every of India’s most succesful missile techniques, the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, is the product of a three way partnership with Russia. India equips its Su-30 MKI fighter jets with BrahMos missiles and deploys them alongside the disputed border with China. The missile is one in every of India’s few arms export success tales. In 2022, the Philippines signed a $375 million contract, with the primary supply happening in 2024. Gross sales to Vietnam and Indonesia are additionally within the works.
Sturdy and Resilient Ties
Each India and Russia have clear pursuits in preserving bilateral protection ties. Their lengthy historical past of cooperation engenders familiarity and belief. All through the Chilly Struggle, the Soviet Union supplied political, financial, and navy support to India. Throughout the Nineteen Sixties, Soviet arms accounted for about 70 percent of Indian weapons imports. In 1971, the 2 nations additional strengthened their ties by signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. Historic reminiscence and well-worn institutional ties are essential foundations for the up to date Russo-Indian relationship.
India’s instant safety issues additionally maintain it tethered to Russia. New Delhi faces a perpetually hostile Pakistan and an more and more threatening China. India’s border tensions with China spiked in 2020, when forces clashed within the Galwan Valley, killing twenty Indian and at the least 4 Chinese language troopers. Throughout India’s neighborhood, China’s navy presence is rising. Since 2008, China’s navy has deployed to the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy missions. In 2014, China’s navy despatched its first submarines to the Indian Ocean, surfacing in Sri Lanka. A couple of years later, China established a navy base in Djibouti. Indian strategists are concerned about Chinese language entry to ports all through the area, together with Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Chittagong in Bangladesh. China justifies its rising navy presence within the area by declaring: “the Indian Ocean is not India’s ocean.”
Going through such instant issues, India doesn’t have the posh of time or assets to interchange its Russian equipment. Nor can it rely on different suppliers for probably the most delicate and technologically superior platforms, equivalent to nuclear submarines or missile protection techniques. Furthermore, India’s leaders pursue a “multi-alignment or multi-vector” technique by which they construct and preserve various relationships in an more and more multipolar world order as a technique to greatest protect India’s autonomy and extract advantages. New Delhi anticipates that Russia will stay an important energy in that order, so sustaining shut ties with Moscow — whereas additionally strengthening cooperation with Washington — is a precedence.
The Kremlin likewise recognizes its pursuits in preserving its relationship with India, particularly after Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Laboring below U.S. and European sanctions, Russia has turned to Chinese and Indian markets. Along with India’s vastly elevated oil purchases, Indian arms imports present Russia with better financial stability within the close to time period and a viable progress alternative for the long run. In that respect, Russia can be making a calculated guess on India’s rising energy and wealth. “India ought to undoubtedly be added to the checklist of superpowers,” Putin said, “We’re growing relations with India in all instructions. India is a good nation, now the biggest by way of inhabitants.”
On the similar time, the Kremlin’s assist for the Indian navy displays Russia’s agency willpower to defend its autonomy even because it turns into extra depending on China. Within the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the 2 revolutionary states declared a “friendship” with “no limits.” Each nations proceed to share an curiosity in undermining U.S. affect, however because the warfare in Ukraine grinds on, Beijing and Moscow’s relationship has develop into more and more asymmetrical. Western sanctions have made Russia depending on trade with China for financial stability. Attritional warfare additionally compelled the Russian protection industrial base to depend on Chinese language dual-use technologies and machine tools. Moscow is undeniably the weaker participant within the relationship however is unlikely to be happy residing in Beijing’s shadow. It hopes to protect its freedom of motion and to take care of unbiased relations with different world powers. With this goal in thoughts, Russia doubtless perceives its ties with India as an important different and counterbalance to China over the lengthy haul.
Lastly, the Kremlin’s present slate of arms gross sales to India doesn’t pose a critical menace to China. They don’t alter the general navy steadiness of energy, which stays closely tilted in China’s favor. This asymmetry is very seen alongside the contested Line of Actual Control, the place Chinese language infrastructure outpaces India’s by an estimated 25 years. This benefit permits China to station troops and deploy weapons techniques extra successfully, guaranteeing fast mobilization alongside the border. Russia, subsequently, can revenue off gross sales to India, guess on its future, and symbolically shield its autonomy with out posing an actual menace to its extra essential buddy in Beijing.
Buddies with Limits
Regardless of the sturdy navy ties between Russia and India, there are clear limitations to their relationship, each from New Delhi’s facet and Moscow’s. India’s ceiling is basically pushed by its need to diversify its weapons sources. India’s objective of strategic autonomy requires entry to a broad vary of navy companions in addition to a extra succesful indigenous protection trade. India, subsequently, is hesitant to tie itself too carefully to any single supply, particularly one as troubled as Russia.
The warfare in Ukraine has highlighted different dangers of over-reliance on Russian arms as properly. Some distinguished Indian analysts voiced issues in regards to the efficiency of Russian weaponry within the battle. “How come the Patriots took down the Kinzhal missiles that have been touted as invincible? How come Russian ships have gotten such simple targets from a rustic that doesn’t have a navy? Its spy planes equivalent to A-50s, and fighter jets equivalent to Sukhois have been downed so successfully,” one Indian protection analyst noted. Furthermore, deliveries to India seem to have been delayed resulting from COVID-19 provide chain disruptions and the warfare in Ukraine. Russia delayed manufacturing and supply of its stealth frigates, nuclear-power assault submarine, S-400 regiments, and AK-203 assault rifles to India. Within the instant aftermath of the Russian invasion, fearing plodding manufacturing, India additionally backed out of offers to buy Mi-17 V5 helicopters and Kamov Ka-31 airborne early warning helicopters.
Moreover, assuming India continues to hunt a stronger strategic partnership with the US, it might want to weigh any new ties to Moscow towards Washington’s doubtless response. Below the Biden administration, India ran the chance of antagonizing a White Home keen to place the screws to Russia and to defend Ukraine. Below the Trump administration, India runs a better danger of disappointing a president who prioritizes commerce balances and is eager on promoting extra U.S.-made arms to the world. Both approach, India faces a troublesome balancing act.
Lastly, buying new Russian techniques might exacerbate issues of interoperability throughout the Indian armed forces the place U.S. and European techniques are additionally used, given their incompatible communications and software program protocols. Equally, Washington — already somewhat wary about sharing sure sorts of know-how and intelligence with New Delhi due to its shut ties with Moscow — will doubtless proceed to limit cooperation, particularly if India doubles down on shopping for new Russian arms.
For Russia, the ceiling of its gross sales to India is about by the Kremlin’s relationship with China. At the moment, Beijing is Moscow’s most essential strategic accomplice and the second-largest purchaser of Russian arms, including superior capabilities such because the Sukhoi Su-35 fight plane and S-400 air protection techniques. Over the previous 20 years, 30 % of all Russian arms exports went to India, whereas 20 % went to China. The story has remained pretty fixed, whilst China’s complete arms imports have declined whereas its home arms trade has grown. Over the previous 5 years, India’s share of complete Russian arms exports rose to 34 %, however China’s nonetheless amounted to 18 %. Though Russia’s arms trade is most reliant on Indian purchases, it is usually depending on Chinese language purchases. India is a major purchaser, however its assets are restricted and can’t singlehandedly assist Russia’s whole protection trade. This leaves Moscow weak to Beijing’s strain.
Russia will subsequently doubtless stay cautious about getting into into new protection offers with India which may antagonize China. To this point, Beijing doesn’t seem to have used its appreciable leverage towards Moscow to halt arms transfers to New Delhi. However Russia and India’s agreements for superior capabilities all pre-date Beijing and Moscow’s “no limits” friendship (the frigate deal was inked in 2016, the S-400s in 2018).
China might conceivably warn Russia towards transferring extra state-of-the-art know-how. As an example, the sale of fifth-generation plane to India and the collectively developed BrahMos missile to South China Sea claimants might cross a purple line, as these strikes might restrict Chinese language ambitions throughout the Indo-Pacific. Below such circumstances, Russia would doubtless trim its plans for brand spanking new offers with India, significantly avoiding giant transactions at politically delicate moments for Beijing. Absolutely conscious of all these dynamics, India is more likely to pursue solely these offers with Russia that it anticipates gained’t run too far afoul of China. In sum, whereas Moscow will proceed to promote arms to New Delhi, each side additionally admire the constraints of their relationship.
U.S. Coverage in a Multipolar World
Between the ground and ceiling of Russo-Indian protection ties is a vital window for continued cooperation. India can’t afford to cease buying essential items of its arsenal from Russia, however neither can it afford to intensify that dependence. Equally, Russia has sturdy incentives to show itself a dependable provider, however neither can it danger crossing a line with Beijing.
U.S. policymakers want to understand each the ground and the ceiling of Russo-Indian relations. Their ties are advanced and mirror particular bilateral dynamics. In addition they mirror the rising actuality of a multipolar world by which states needn’t be “with or towards” one another however might be “with and towards.” That Russia continues arming India is proof. In any case, Moscow is arming New Delhi towards its “no limits” buddy in Beijing. China and Russia will proceed to deepen their relationship for the foreseeable future. All of the whereas, China and India will stay bitter rivals. Regardless of the obvious contradictions, this triangle is sturdy. The three powers have discovered an equilibrium.
In an more and more multipolar world, U.S. policymakers also needs to be taught to maintain a number of opposing concepts of their minds on the similar time. Managing such contradictions will not be solely potential — will probably be essential.
Daniel S. Markey is a senior fellow on the International Coverage Institute, Johns Hopkins Faculty of Superior Worldwide Research. He was, until March 28, a senior advisor on the U.S. Institute of Peace.
David Brostoff was, until March 28, a South Asia analysis analyst on the U.S. Institute of Peace.
Picture: Ministry of Defence of India through Wikimedia Commons.
