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    Home » CyCon 2025 Series – AI-Enabled Offensive Cyber Operations: Legal Challenges in the Shadows of Automation
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    CyCon 2025 Series – AI-Enabled Offensive Cyber Operations: Legal Challenges in the Shadows of Automation

    morshediBy morshediAugust 23, 2025No Comments20 Mins Read
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    CyCon 2025 Series – AI-Enabled Offensive Cyber Operations: Legal Challenges in the Shadows of Automation
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    Editors’ be aware: This submit is a part of a sequence that options displays at this 12 months’s seventeenth International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon) in Tallinn, Estonia. Its topic will likely be explored additional as a part of a chapter within the forthcoming ebook Worldwide Legislation and Synthetic Intelligence in Armed Battle: The AI-Cyber Interaction. Kubo Mačák’s introductory submit is out there here.

    As could be noticed from the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, the usage of synthetic intelligence (AI) in navy operations is right here to remain, whether or not within the air, on land, at sea, in area, or in our on-line world. AI is already used for real-time surveillance, goal recognition, autonomous navigation, logistics optimization, and resolution help. It enhances velocity, effectivity, and precision past what human operators alone can obtain.

    Nonetheless, AI comes with inherent vulnerabilities. AI programs are extremely delicate to the standard of the information on which they’re educated or function. Biased, incomplete, or adversarial information can distort decision-making processes in unpredictable methods. Furthermore, many AI programs, notably these primarily based on deep studying, function as opaque “black containers” and supply little or no perception into how choices are made. Human-machine interplay additionally introduces dangers of automation bias or overreliance on computational programs that won’t absolutely perceive the context or subtleties of advanced fight environments.

    Quite a few stories, conferences, and coverage papers warn due to this fact that AI introduces novel—and probably unmanageable—challenges to worldwide legislation, particularly to worldwide humanitarian legislation (IHL) and worldwide human rights legislation (IHRL). Whereas a lot of this consideration focuses on the usage of AI in additional standard fight operations, so far, comparatively little systematic consideration has been paid to the interaction between worldwide legislation, on the one hand, and AI in navy cyber operations, then again.

    To deal with this hole, a number of analysis initiatives have been launched, together with a book-project entitled, Worldwide Legislation and Synthetic Intelligence in Armed Battle: The AI-Cyber Interaction, beneath auspices of the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. The ebook endeavors to cowl this interaction with respect to various kinds of cyber operations, together with a chapter on the usage of AI in offensive cyber operations (OCO) in armed battle, of which we’re the principal authors.

    This submit displays our principal exploratory findings on this matter, as they had been offered in the course of the 2025 CyCon in Tallinn, Estonia.

    Framing the Subject

    The central query on this early-stage analysis was to determine the scope and nature of the potential challenges of AI-use in OCO to IHL. A standard reflex is that as quickly as AI enters the equation, particularly within the safety realm, it’s rapidly scapegoated and seen as the principle trigger for authorized issues. We do, nonetheless, have an instructional accountability to ask whether or not these issues are at all times grounded in the suitable assumptions. We don’t purpose to downplay them. However we intend to make clear the place challenges actually originate in an effort to higher isolate what challenges to IHL are uniquely attributable to the inclusion of AI in OCO.

    When taking a better take a look at the thing of our research—the usage of AI in OCO’s in armed battle—we determine three layered matters that require additional examination. These three layers are: 1) challenges inherent within the relevant authorized framework; 2) challenges posed by the interaction of traits of our on-line world with an relevant authorized framework; 3) challenges inherent to AI itself, that change into manifest no matter the kind of navy operations.

    Unpacking these three matters permits us to look at a sharper, as but unresolved, query. Particularly, are the remaining challenges to IHL actually distinctive to the usage of AI in OCO? We’ll focus on these layers under. Nonetheless, earlier than we accomplish that, allow us to briefly clarify what OCO are and the way AI is utilized in them.

    OCO and AI

    Throughout the broader class of navy cyber operations, navy doctrine and State methods and insurance policies generally distinguish between OCO and defensive cyber operations (DCO). Whereas DCO are reactive, OCO are aimed toward a particular goal, whether or not bodily or digital, on the initiative of an actor. Varied authorized, navy, and coverage contexts use the time period OCO. However it lacks a single, universally accepted (authorized) definition. Definitions usually differ relying on the actor and the needs of the outline.

    For instance, the U.S. Division of Protection (DoD) defines offensive cyber operations on the strategic degree as “cyber operations meant to venture energy in and thru our on-line world” however on the operational and tactical degree as “actions taken to realize entry, manipulate, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy info or info programs of adversaries” (U.S., DoD Cyber Technique; U.S., DoD, Our on-line world Operations, Joint Publication 3-12).

    Worldwide legislation doesn’t outline cyber operations or OCO. Nonetheless, the time period positive factors authorized significance if it reaches sure thresholds inside worldwide legislation, comparable to that of an “armed assault” beneath the jus advert bellum or, related for our examination, that of “armed battle” and “assault” as understood beneath Article 49(1) of Further Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (AP I), for the needs of applicability of (sure elements of) IHL. We’ll return to that facet in additional element under.

    We outline OCO as navy operations on the initiative of an actor to govern, deny, disrupt, alter, degrade, or destroy the bodily community layer (i.e. the {hardware} and infrastructure, comparable to computer systems, servers, routers, cables and satellites), the logical layers (information, protocols, and software program) or the digital persona layer of our on-line world (the digital representations of human customers, e.g. e mail addresses, IP identities, on-line content material), to realize a navy benefit. For brevity, we restrict this contribution to cyber operations that undermine or sabotage our on-line world and won’t cowl affect operations that merely make use of our on-line world as a vector.

    AI-powered OCO could use various kinds of AI to automate, speed up, or improve varied elements and phases inside the operational planning cycle. For instance, for coaching and simulation, reinforcement studying (RL) and generative adversarial networks (GANs) are used to create adaptive red-teaming environments the place AI brokers mimic real-world attackers to check responses to dynamic threats. To boost work efficiency, machine studying (ML) and pure language processing (NLP), fashions automate time-consuming duties comparable to scanning for vulnerabilities, writing code, or crafting phishing messages tailor-made to particular person targets’ work processes.

    AI additionally performs a rising function in resolution making as AI-Choice Help Methods (AI-DSS) instruments help commanders, planners, and cyber operators in making quicker, extra knowledgeable, and extra exact choices all through the cyber mission lifecycle. These programs don’t execute assaults autonomously however increase human decision-making within the planning and execution of OCO. Examples are: AI-DSS for goal evaluation and prioritization; to generate potential assault pathways and simulate a number of programs of motion; and to combine information on civilian-military interdependencies and to make use of predictive modelling to evaluate the proportionality and feasibility of assaults.

    Lastly, within the realm of cyber weapons, varied kinds of AI are included to boost their autonomy, adaptability, and stealth. Examples are: MLs to create malware to evade detection by analyzing and adapting to a system’s defenses in actual time; RLs to allow autonomous malware to discover networks, to find optimum assault paths, and to dynamically regulate ways with out human enter; NLPs that automate social engineering by crafting convincing phishing content material or impersonating trusted people; and Generative AI (GenAI) that may produce polymorphic code that repeatedly mutates, to keep away from detection and reverse-engineering. Extra theoretical or experimental, however not inconceivable, is the (future) use of swarm intelligence to coordinate distributed assaults, comparable to adaptive botnets or self-organizing malware clusters.

    The usage of AI provides an extra layer to an already difficult discourse on the authorized framework relevant to actions our on-line world as an working (navy) atmosphere. It’s a realm that’s not void of authorized challenges, no matter whether or not AI is used. To find out what precisely these authorized challenges are, it’s essential to first assess which authorized framework, out there inside worldwide legislation, could apply to a selected OCO. In that regard, the designation of a cyber operation as “offensive,” or its substantive which means as an exercise that “assaults” one thing, could also be considerably misleading, as will likely be defined under.

    Relevant Authorized Framework

    As talked about, the idea OCO has no authorized definition beneath worldwide legislation; it’s merely a doctrinal qualification. Although our focus lies on the usage of AI in OCO in armed battle and—because the principal authorized regime regulating armed battle—on an examination of IHL, neither the generally used reference to OCO as cyber assaults, nor its offensive character must be thought to be suggesting that they solely happen within the context of an armed battle and that solely IHL applies to them (and to the usage of AI in them). On the contrary, it may be fairly assumed that the overwhelming majority of OCO takes place exterior the context of an armed battle (peacetime), through which case they don’t seem to be ruled by IHL, however by IHRL and different (peacetime) regimes of worldwide legislation.

    For these OCO that do happen within the context of an armed battle, their qualification as an “assault” as outlined in Article 49(1) of AP I is essential in figuring out which guidelines of IHL apply. To recall, Article 49(1) defines assaults as “acts of violence in opposition to the adversary, whether or not in offence or defence.” The time period “acts of violence” refers to an act or acts, the results of which could be fairly anticipated to trigger harm or demise to individuals or harm or destruction to things. This embodies the traditional threshold for distinguishing assaults from strange navy operations, comparable to reconnaissance or a convoy. Within the context of cyber operations, this threshold has been topic of debate for a very long time, as a consequence of the truth that cyber operations are typically directed in opposition to information and predominantly end in non-physical results.

    In essence, this debate revolves round questions of whether or not non-physical results of cyber operations qualify as “harm” and whether or not information qualify as objects. Whereas this submit isn’t the place to elaborate on varied viewpoints, nor to stipulate the controversy, the statement we need to increase right here is that, in view of the results they generate, OCO may qualify as each assaults and as strange navy operations.

    The significance of this evaluation is that OCO that qualify as assaults should adhere to IHL, together with a physique of particular attack-rules, which culminate in a variety of particular affirmative precautionary measures stemming from the core IHL-principles of distinction and proportionality (AP I, arts 51, 52, and 57). In distinction, OCO that don’t qualify as assaults usually are not certain by these assault guidelines, and differing viewpoints exist as as to whether IHL applies to such operations in any respect and, in that case, which guidelines.

    Authorized Challenges Inherent to Relevant Authorized Regimes 

    No matter the usage of AI, every authorized framework relevant to an OCO is troubled by its personal deficiencies, ambiguities, and unsettled interpretations of key notions inherent to them, notably when utilized to navy operations. Notable examples of inherent and lasting points inside IHL are the edge of armed battle, the interaction of IHL with non-State armed teams, and debates on the interpretation and software of phrases and ideas in regards to the ideas of distinction and proportionality and the obligations on precautionary measures in assault.

    These phrases and ideas, nonetheless, are intentionally summary. IHL was designed as a technology-neutral framework, allowing its guidelines to use to evolving strategies and technique of warfare. This flexibility isn’t a flaw, however a foundational energy that does away with the frequent assumption that IHL is a authorized framework that’s ill-suited to new developments (take, for instance, the submit 9/11-debates on IHL’s applicability to transnational terrorism) or fashionable applied sciences, comparable to cyber and AI.

    On the identical time, it signifies that these abstractions usually are not new however mirror present interpretative dynamics inside IHL. Therefore, the challenges addressed right here usually are not distinctive to AI per se. Take AP I, Article 57(2), which obliges events to take a variety of affirmative precautionary actions to spare civilians from the results of an assault. The problem in assembly these affirmative obligations doesn’t primarily lie within the expertise, however within the ambiguity of the assorted components inside the guidelines, comparable to “extreme” in balancing anticipated civilian hurt with “direct and concrete navy benefit,” or “possible precautions.” Nonetheless, a good query to ask (and a supply of additional exploration) is whether or not and, in that case, how the usage of AI may influence these on-going points, notably when utilized in operations in our on-line world.

    Authorized Challenges from Our on-line world as Operational Area

    Traits of our on-line world itself as an operational area add an extra layer of complexity. Our on-line world is basically immaterial, borderless, uneven, and non-kinetic. In the meantime, actions in or by means of our on-line world are typically nameless, digital (digitalized), and happen at excessive velocity. This creates friction with IHL’s deal with tangible options of armed battle, comparable to bodily territory, actual objects and individuals, and observable hurt, all appearances of conventional armed conflicts.

    Cyber operations can disrupt programs with out bodily damaging infrastructure, triggering interpretative questions on notions comparable to “assault,” as highlighted above. Hurt could also be cumulative, oblique, or purely purposeful, which complicates the dedication of potential civilian hurt ensuing from an assault. The twin-use nature of a lot of our on-line world’s infrastructure and our on-line world’s capability to obscure the id of actors exacerbates difficulties within the dedication of the standing of a possible goal beneath IHL and causes attribution to be usually advanced, gradual, and unsure. Furthermore, the inherent velocity of OCO could negatively influence the capability for human management and overview and trigger rigidity in relation to compliance with guidelines on precautions in assault.

    These difficulties, nonetheless, weren’t triggered by means of AI, however originate from the confrontation of present IHL with the novelties that our on-line world brings. As soon as once more, a good query to ask is how AI itself interacts with the options of our on-line world and, consequently, what this suggests for IHL.

    IHL Challenges Intrinsic to the AI Itself

    As famous within the introduction, AI is used all through all the spectrum of navy operations. A standard assumption is that AI creates uniquely tough authorized challenges in cyber operations due to its benefits and vulnerabilities. Whereas they’re particular to AI, they don’t seem to be distinctive to the cyber area. Additionally they have an effect on compliance with IHL in conventional navy operations.

    Autonomous drones, automated sensor fusion, and AI-supported concentrating on programs all increase questions that equally apply to the usage of AI in cyber operations, comparable to: how one can conduct a proportionality evaluation with AI-generated information; whether or not “those that plan and resolve upon an assault” (AP I, art. 57(2)) keep efficient oversight; or whether or not AP I, Article 36 critiques can adequately take care of the notion that AI-systems are adaptive (and thus could act in a different way after a overview).

    Whether or not AI is used to information a drone strike or to determine vulnerabilities in a digital community, these core issues stay fixed. It might due to this fact be analytically imprecise to deal with the usage of AI in cyber operations as uniquely problematic beneath IHL. On this sense, the authorized predicaments AI creates usually are not domain-specific; they’re intrinsic to the expertise itself.

    IHL Challenges from AI-Use in OCO?

    To date, now we have argued that many authorized issues that could be attributed to AI originate from three layers: the abstractness of IHL; the intangible nature of our on-line world; and the overall properties of AI expertise.

    If we strip away these layers or matters, what stays? Are there challenges to IHL which are actually distinctive to the usage of AI in OCO, and in that case, what are they? In different phrases, does the usage of AI in OCO nonetheless put IHL to the check? The truth that the thing of our research, the interaction of IHL with the usage of AI with OCO’s within the context of an armed battle, inherently places the attributes of those three matters in a novel melting pot suggests an affirmative reply.

    Nonetheless, exactly how AI challenges IHL when utilized in OCO will depend upon the particular software of AI, when it comes to its meant function (e.g. to boost, optimize, or automate the planning, execution or adaptation of an OCO) and its interaction with the traits of our on-line world, in addition to whether or not the OCO in query qualifies as an assault beneath Article 49(1) of AP I, or not.

    Let’s discover this with the next illustration. State A and State B use the identical AI-driven malware in opposition to a typical enemy. This malware can autonomously determine, adapt to, and exploit a number of targets, with out human intervention and in close to real-time. Its use leads to purposeful lack of a number of enemy navy programs, with reverberating results into civilian programs with extreme penalties for the civilian inhabitants, on account of which their help for the battle plunges. Because of their totally different interpretations of IHL, State A would possibly contemplate this operation as an assault beneath Article 49(1) of AP I, whereas State B regards it as an strange navy operation.

    The usage of AI on this illustration challenges IHL, however in numerous methods. To start, whereas States A and B are agency of their qualification of the operation as an assault or not, the illustration highlights how AI permits cyber operations that sit within the gray zone—not violent sufficient within the kinetic sense, but strategically harmful—however extra importantly, it underlines the necessity for a universally accepted understanding of the idea of assault beneath Article 49(1) of AP I when utilized within the context of AI-enabled cyber operations. Secondly, whereas each States have an obligation of fixed care to spare the civilian inhabitants, civilians and civilian objects (AP I, artwork. 57(1)), State A should assess the usage of this AI in opposition to the assault guidelines inside Articles 51, 52 and 57(2) of AP I, whereas State B doesn’t contemplate itself certain by these guidelines.

    The operationalization of those concentrating on guidelines in conventional navy operations with out the usage of AI could be difficult, each factually (making use of them to the info on the bottom) and legally (as phrases and ideas are ambiguous) however typically includes human oversight.

    Their software in OCO, with out AI, is much more troublesome. For instance, compliance with the obligation of goal verification (AP I, art. 57(2)(a)(i)) could be advanced, as targets are sometimes digital infrastructure (e.g. servers, IP addresses, networks) with no clear visible or bodily hyperlink to their customers of operate. Our on-line world infrastructure can also be usually dual-use. However this operate is usually opaque or dynamic. And obfuscation strategies (e.g. proxies, VPNs, anonymizers) make attribution to an adversary State or navy unit tough.

    Comparable difficulties are present in relation to different provisions of Article 57(2). Usually, people stay within the loop in the course of the planning section, however the high quality or diploma of human oversight degrades in phases of goal choice, execution, and monitoring, posing challenges to the requirement of Article 57(2) of API that precautionary measures have to be taken by “those that plan and resolve upon an assault.”

    The size and velocity concerned with the usage of AI can considerably cut back and even get rid of significant human involvement. AI in our on-line world acts throughout a number of time zones, jurisdictions, or community layers, which is inconceivable to trace for people. This not solely impacts compliance with Article 57(2), however total accountability for the usage of AI, which is additional exacerbated by its inherent vulnerabilities, comparable to system opacity (black-box).

    In distinction, authorized and oversight challenges change into much more advanced—and arguably extra harmful—with respect to State B’s view that the operation doesn’t qualify as an assault. Whereas the results on this explicit illustration are fairly clear, the usage of AI in different OCO could end in results which are extra silent, gradual, and delicate and due to this fact additional obscure intent, scale, and attribution, however should trigger vital strategic and humanitarian hurt.

    As beforehand famous, the attack-specific obligations in AP I don’t apply to State B’s operation, however precisely what guidelines do apply in that scenario inside an armed battle however under the edge of an assault stays topic of debate. In impact, it could solely encourage States to design operations to remain slightly below the edge of assault, in order to make use of AI to maximise influence whereas avoiding authorized accountability. This not solely creates a grey-zone of high-impact, low-visibility operations, but additionally a threat that IHL’s object and function are hollowed out from under.

    Conclusion

    This submit supplied our fundamental preliminary observations in dissecting the potential influence of AI-enabled OCO on IHL, as offered throughout CyCon 2025. It demonstrates, firstly, that an examination of the potential of AI in OCO to problem worldwide legislation first requires an understanding of the totally different authorized frameworks which will apply to those operations. Whereas our analysis concentrates on OCO within the context of an armed battle and due to this fact on IHL, different frameworks could apply, relying on the context (peace or armed battle) and the qualification of an OCO as an assault beneath Article 49(1) of AP I or not.

    Secondly, this submit illustrated that many authorized challenges discover their origin in three layers: the relevant authorized framework; the intangible nature of our on-line world; and the overall properties of AI expertise. This isn’t to say that the usage of AI in OCO does put IHL to the check. How, precisely, will likely be topic of exploration in our forthcoming ebook chapter, however will, in any case, depend upon the query whether or not a selected OCO qualifies as an assault, in addition to on how the actual traits of the AI used will work together with the traits of our on-line world.

    ***

    Colonel Eric Pouw is an Affiliate Professor of Navy Legislation on the Conflict Research Division of the College of Navy Sciences of the Netherlands Protection Academy. He’s additionally affiliated to the Amsterdam Middle of Worldwide Legislation, College of Amsterdam.

    Brigadier General Peter Pijpers is a Professor of Cyber Operations and Vice-Dean of Schooling on the College of Navy Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy. He’s additionally affiliated to the Amsterdam Middle of Worldwide Legislation, College of Amsterdam.

    The views expressed are these of the authors, and don’t essentially mirror the official place of the US Navy Academy, Division of the Military, or Division of Protection. 

    Articles of Conflict is a discussion board for professionals to share opinions and domesticate concepts. Articles of Conflict doesn’t display screen articles to suit a explicit editorial agenda, nor endorse or advocate materials that’s printed. Authorship doesn’t point out affiliation with Articles of Conflict, the Lieber Institute, or the US Navy Academy West Level.

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Photograph credit score: U.S. Area Pressure, Ethan Johnson



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