The standard of political management is a central determinant of institutional efficiency and state capability. Political events choose competent politicians relying on their incentives (Nannicini and Galasso 2009), with related penalties for public coverage (Baránek and Titl 2024). Then again, institutional designs would possibly matter for politicians’ behaviours, as rent-seeking is affected by monitoring and electoral behaviours (Daniele and Giommoni 2021).
A rising literature has highlighted the position of politicians’ private traits – significantly integrity – in shaping public belief, bureaucratic high quality, and the supply of public items (Besley 2005, Dal Bó and Finan 2018, Daniele et al. 2023). In response, a number of international locations have applied authorized restrictions disqualifying people with felony convictions – or, in some circumstances, pending prices – from holding elected workplace (Transparency Worldwide 2016).
In a current research, we offer first proof on whether or not people with felony prices are overrepresented amongst elected officers, specializing in Brazil. We then assess the causal results of their election on coverage outcomes. We mix individual-level administrative knowledge on felony prices, electoral participation, and public service provision to doc each choice patterns and downstream penalties. Our findings point out that criminally charged candidates are usually not solely disproportionately represented in native politics but in addition have measurable antagonistic results on public well being outcomes when elected to workplace.
Overrepresentation of criminally charged people in politics
Utilizing nationwide electoral and judicial data, we present that people with a historical past of felony prices are considerably extra prone to contest – and win – native elections than can be anticipated primarily based on their inhabitants share. To make sure that the fees predate political careers and are usually not a consequence of holding workplace, we limit our evaluation to first-time candidates, thereby isolating choice into politics from potential authorized publicity after election. Particularly, the chance of operating for workplace is roughly twice as excessive for people with felony prices relative to the overall grownup inhabitants (Determine 1). These patterns persist throughout a number of election cycles and are significantly pronounced on the municipal degree, the place monitoring capability is commonly restricted.
Importantly, many of those candidates face prices for crimes straight associated to the abuse of public workplace, reminiscent of fraud, embezzlement, and corruption. This means that their participation in politics just isn’t random however could also be strategic, reflecting an try to entry rents or keep away from prosecution. Furthermore, criminally charged candidates differ systematically from their non-charged counterparts alongside a number of observable dimensions. They are usually older, predominantly male, and fewer educated.
Determine 1 The share of people with prior felony prices in all the Brazilian inhabitants (yellow bar) and amongst candidates and elected people (blue and crimson bars)
Coverage penalties: Public well being deterioration
To evaluate the affect of criminally charged politicians on coverage outcomes, we exploit shut mayoral elections between candidates with and with out felony prices. This empirical technique permits us to determine causal results by evaluating municipalities which can be ex ante comparable however differ in the kind of candidate elected. We discover that municipalities ruled by criminally charged mayors expertise a big deterioration in public well being indicators. Particularly, these municipalities exhibit an 8% improve within the incidence of underweight births and a 21% improve in toddler mortality charges.
These results are usually not noticed in such coverage areas as schooling, the place municipal governments have comparable administrative duties. This heterogeneity means that the well being sector could also be significantly susceptible to political appointments and managerial selections, probably resulting from its organisational complexity.
Mechanism: Patronage in well being sector appointments
Apparently, we determine political patronage as a central mechanism driving the noticed results. Mayors with felony prices usually tend to interact in discretionary hiring and appoint political associates to key administrative positions within the public well being system. This behaviour is per the usage of public employment as a reward for political loyalty reasonably than a method of bettering service supply.
By disaggregating public employment knowledge, we discover that the rise in politically motivated hiring is most pronounced amongst high-ranking positions (e.g. hospital administrators), the place selections have wider operational implications. This sample helps the interpretation that even a small variety of poorly chosen appointments can have cascading results on public service high quality.
Electoral audits and strategic candidacy
We additional examine whether or not institutional oversight impacts the chance that criminally charged people run for workplace. To this finish, we leverage the randomised audit programme performed by the Brazilian federal authorities, which publicly discloses findings of economic misconduct amongst municipal politicians (Ferraz and Finan 2008).
Our evaluation signifies that audits performed throughout election years result in a big discount within the candidacy of people with felony prices. This impact just isn’t noticed for audits performed in non-election years, suggesting that the timing of publicity interacts with strategic candidacy selections.
Implications for political choice and institutional design
Our findings contribute to the literature on political choice and governance by offering causal proof on the implications of electing candidates with felony backgrounds. In addition they underscore the restrictions of relying solely on authorized disqualifications or episodic oversight to make sure candidate high quality. Whereas pre-election audits can deter some types of entry, their results are transitory and could also be circumvented by strategic timing.
Extra broadly, the outcomes recommend that weak political screening mechanisms – mixed with low ranges of institutional accountability – can generate substantial social prices, significantly in coverage areas the place mismanagement has quick and extreme penalties. Addressing these points requires sustained investments in institutional capability, transparency, and professionalisation of the general public sector.
References
Baránek, B and V Titl (2024), “Politicians on corporate boards and the cost of public procurement”, VoxEU.org, 4 November.
Besley, T (2005), “Political Choice”, Journal of Financial Views 19(3): 43–60.
Dal Bó, E and F Finan (2018), “Progress and Views within the Examine of Political Choice”, Annual Evaluation of Economics 10: 541–75.
Daniele, G and T Giommoni (2021), “Corruption under Austerity”, VoxEU.org, 10 Could.
Daniele, G, A Aassve and M Le Moglie (2023), “Always remember the primary time: The persistent results of corruption and the rise of populism in Italy”, Journal of Politics 85(2): 468–83.
Ferraz, C and F Finan (2008), “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Results of Brazil’s Publicly Launched Audits on Electoral Outcomes”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(2): 703–45.
Nannicini, T and V Galasso (2009), “Competing on Good Politicians”, VoxEU.org, 22 September.
Transparency Worldwide (2016), International Corruption Barometer Report.
