Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Brysen Winthrop of the Institute for the Examine of Warfare;
Alexis Turek and Alex Chou of the American Enterprise Institute
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Nicholas Carl of the American Enterprise Institute
Information Cutoff: July 16, 2025
The China–Taiwan Weekly Replace is a joint product from the Institute for the Examine of Warfare and the American Enterprise Institute. The replace helps the ISW–AEI Coalition Protection of Taiwan undertaking, which assesses Chinese language campaigns towards Taiwan, examines different methods for the USA and its allies to discourage the Chinese language Communist Get together’s (CCP) aggression, and—if essential—defeat the Folks’s Liberation Military (PLA). The replace focuses on the Chinese language Communist Get together’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
Taiwan continued its yearly Han Kuang navy workout routines by July 18, introducing new workout routines and techniques reflective of President William Lai Ching-te’s effort to enhance Taiwanese defensive capabilities and resilience towards PRC aggression. The offshore Taiwanese islands of Penghu, Matsu, and Kinmen all hosted drills, reflecting the important thing position that these islands would play in a cross-strait battle. Taiwanese infantry and armor participated in an amphibious touchdown drill on Penghu on July 15.[1] A PLA seize of Penghu would doubtless permit the PLA to make use of it as a staging floor for additional offensive operations towards the Taiwanese mainland.[2] Workouts on Matsu simulated a PRC assault starting with harassment by drones and fishing boats and escalating right into a PLA try and seize the island.[3] Taiwanese forces drilling in Kinmen deployed over 30 armored autos and fired over 30,000 rounds.[4] A July 15 drill featured a simulated amphibious assault on Kinmen Bridge, a sea bridge connecting Kinmen’s most important island to Lesser Kinmen.[5] Drills on Taiwan’s most important island targeted on websites deemed at-risk within the occasion of a PRC assault. Taiwanese forces simulated a PRC incursion across the Tamsui River in New Taipei on July 12.[6] The Tamsui River connects the Taiwan Strait to Taipei and has been an space of concern for Taiwanese officers following the apprehension of PRC nationals illegally transiting into the Tamsui. [7]
The 2025 Han Kuang workout routines spotlight the Lai administration’s growing emphasis on the significance of societal resilience and concrete infrastructure in a cross-strait battle. Taiwanese officers integrated current infrastructure and techniques into the drills.[8] Taiwanese forces practiced utilizing Taipei’s Mass Fast Transit (MRT) metro system to move Javelin missiles and meals throughout the capital on July 14.[9] Taiwan held sweeping air-raid and evacuation drills encompassing quite a few main cities between July 15-18.[10] Taiwan has additionally taken steps to inoculate its residents towards potential disinformation campaigns, a vital aspect of PRC coercion. Taiwanese protection officers warned towards misinformation concerning the drills and mentioned that they believed the PRC can be watching Han Kuang intently.[11]
US-made techniques performed a key position within the Han Kuang workout routines. Taiwan deployed US-made Stingers, Patriots, and Excessive Mobility Artillery Rocket Methods (HIMARS) throughout drills, the latter for the primary time. Drills involving Stingers targeted on low-altitude protection throughout an amphibious touchdown state of affairs.[12] Taiwan additionally deployed US-made Abrams tanks on the Hsinchu navy base.[13] Taiwan is predicted to obtain a second batch of HIMARS in 2026.[14] Taiwan additionally simulated escorting US provide ships into the Port of Hualien, though US ships didn’t take part on this train. The Taipei Occasions cited nameless officers who mentioned that the USA might feasibly resupply Hualien “with minimal danger” in a wartime state of affairs.[15]
PRC Protection Ministry spokesperson Jiang Bin criticized US arms gross sales to Taiwan in a July 14 press convention and accused Taiwan of constructing “struggle provocations.”[16] Taiwan Affairs Workplace (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua delivered comparable criticisms of the Han Kuang workout routines on July 9 and accused Taiwanese authorities of “separatism” and efforts to “incite cross-strait confrontation.”[17] The PRC will doubtless preserve such framing as a method of criticizing Democratic Progressive Get together (DPP) officers and denigrating Taiwan’s self-defense efforts.
At the least 4 China Coast Guard (CCG) ships operated within the restricted waters of Taiwan’s Pratas Island in the course of the Han Kuang workout routines, mirroring techniques used round Kinmen. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) reported that it intercepted two CCG ships that individually entered Pratas’ restricted waters on July 9 and 11. One ship, CCG 3101, turned off its Computerized Identification System (AIS) in waters west of Pratas between July 7-11, in accordance with information from Starboard Maritime Intelligence. The ship was doubtless going “darkish” to conduct its patrol round Pratas. The opposite ship, CCG 5303, sailed in a straight line by Pratas’ restricted waters on July 10 with out stopping.[18] Starboard information confirmed {that a} third ship known as CCG 607 could have approached Pratas Island on July 11 and turned its AIS off till July 16, however the CGA didn’t point out it in its reviews. The CGA reported that two extra ships, CCG 3103 and 3105, collectively patrolled inside Pratas’ restricted waters the night time of July 16 with their AIS turned off.[19] The CGA didn’t rule out that the CCG was making an attempt to devour Taiwan’s legislation enforcement power in the course of the Han Kuang workout routines. The unusually excessive variety of CCG ships round Pratas in a single week helps this rationalization.
The CCG’s “darkish” patrols round Pratas seem like a brand new development according to normalized CCG incursions round Taiwan’s outlying Kinmen Islands since 2024. The current Pratas patrols coincided with CCG patrols into Kinmen’s restricted waters on July 10 and 11.[20] Turning off AIS is probably going meant to impede Taiwan’s means to watch and reply to CCG incursions and keep away from worldwide consideration on the PRC’s coercive actions. The CCG beforehand carried out six consecutive patrols that absolutely circled Pratas with AIS turned on between Might 28 and July 2, in addition to earlier incursions that adopted completely different patterns.[21]
The CCG’s experimentation with completely different techniques and gradual normalization of patrols round Pratas intently resembles the development of the “Kinmen mannequin” in 2024. The “Kinmen mannequin” is an idea launched in PRC state media in Might 2024 that refers to normalizing CCG “legislation enforcement” patrols round Taiwan’s outlying islands, beginning with Kinmen, to say PRC authorized jurisdiction there and erode Taiwan’s management of these waters. [22] The mannequin would ostensibly be justified within the identify of defending PRC fishermen, however might set situations for a future quarantine or seizure of the islands from Taiwan.
PRC International Affairs Minister Wang Yi attended the Affiliation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus International Ministers Conferences, profiting from favorable geopolitical situations to additional the PRC’s regional agenda. The China-ASEAN International Ministers Assembly occurred in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, from July 10 to 11.[23] Wang met together with his counterparts from Southeast Asia, the USA, and Russia, amongst others. Wang’s statements following these conferences included rhetoric concerning the significance of elevated commerce and cooperation inside worldwide organizations, reflecting the PRC’s want for elevated affect over ASEAN states and not less than tacit alignment on geopolitical points.[24] Statements from ASEAN international ministers lacked references to factors of competition, such because the South China Sea, which have been evident in earlier high-level engagements between the PRC and ASEAN.[25] ASEAN rhetoric and the said curiosity in financial engagement with the PRC are doubtless pushed by US tariffs and a perceived lack of US curiosity in Southeast Asia. ASEAN states have more and more appeared to the USA and different international locations as an alternative choice to the PRC amid rising PRC affect within the area. The PRC has characterised the USA’ financial and international coverage choices beneath the Trump administration as “destabilizing” to the worldwide financial system.[26] ASEAN states could also be much less prone to problem PRC aggression and coercion now than in earlier years as a result of concern of additional worsening their financial state of affairs. ASEAN states could presently view the PRC as a extra dependable financial associate than the USA, which might lead to nearer PRC-ASEAN alignment.
Key Takeaways
- Taiwan: Taiwan continued its annual Han Kuang navy workout routines, emphasizing the protection of offshore islands, utilizing new US-made techniques, and getting ready civilian infrastructure for battle. The train displays the Lai administration’s effort to enhance Taiwanese defensive energy and resilience towards PRC aggression.
- Taiwan: The CCG has continued crusing vessels into the restricted waters of the Taiwanese Pratas Island, mirroring the CCG harassment round Kinmen Island. The PRC has normalized such harassment round Kinmen Island, prone to take a look at Taiwanese response protocols and thresholds and degrade Taiwanese menace consciousness.
- PRC: PRC International Affairs Minister Wang attended a collection of high-level ASEAN conferences and delivered speeches that promoted PRC narratives. ASEAN member states could also be extra receptive to PRC overtures given uncertainty relating to the US position in Southeast Asia, particularly economically.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
The passage of a Kuomintang (KMT)-backed particular price range could bolster the celebration’s recognition forward of recall votes towards KMT legislators. Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) handed a KMT-backed particular price range on July 11.[27] The invoice provides roughly 18.5 billion US {dollars} to the price range, together with 5.1 billion {dollars} for “nationwide safety resilience.”[28]
The DPP-controlled Government Yuan created the unique model of the particular price range, which the KMT amended and handed on April 24.[29] The KMT initially opposed the appropriation of funds for nationwide safety however in the end integrated the measures from the DPP’s model.[30] The Ministry of Nationwide Protection introduced on July 3 that it could direct the funds towards leasing new satellites, constructing drones, and integrating radar techniques right into a common imaging platform.[31] The ministry said that these funds would additionally assist Taiwan’s means to reply to threats.[32]
The KMT’s passage of the supplemental price range, together with protection spending, could enhance the probability that its legislators will survive the upcoming mass recall elections. Taiwan will maintain recall elections towards 31 KMT lawmakers on July 26 and August 23.[33] The recall motion has argued that the KMT is impeding Taiwan’s means to withstand CCP coercion, and a few recall organizers brazenly accused the KMT of being a CCP “puppet.”[34] Latest polling information means that the notion that the KMT is “pro-CCP” is one among its vulnerabilities, and the identical notion has pushed a gaggle of historically pro-KMT navy veterans to marketing campaign in favor of the recollects on July 15.[35] KMT Vice Chairman Andrew Hsia reaffirmed the KMT’s continued assist for a cross-strait coverage primarily based on the idea of “One China” and the 1992 Consensus on July 10, nonetheless.[36]
China
The New York Occasions reported that the PRC has been conducting in depth seabed mapping close to Taiwan and Guam since 2023, which might allow submarine operations and undersea countermeasures in a future battle. This report aligns with earlier Coalition Protection of Taiwan (CDOT)-ISW evaluation in regards to the potential for PRC seabed mapping to facilitate submarine navigation. PRC analysis ships considerably expanded their bathymetric survey operations off Taiwan’s east coast in 2024. At the least six PRC analysis ships carried out systematic seabed mapping operations utilizing exact grid and parallel line patterns all through 2024. This marked a considerable enhance from the one PRC analysis ship noticed within the space in 2023. These ships mapped the waters off Taiwan’s coast and approached Taiwan’s 12-nautical-mile territorial boundary however didn’t cross into territorial waters.[37] The Xiang Yang Hong 05, Xiang Yang Hong 06, and different PRC analysis ships additionally carried out in depth surveys in 2024 and 2025 instantly east and west of the US Unique Financial Zone (EEZ) round Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. One such survey has been ongoing east of Guam since June 2025. Transponder information from Starboard Maritime Intelligence confirmed the ships’ paths. Guam hosts a US air base and naval base that might very doubtless play a key position in defending Taiwan from a PRC invasion.
The PRC’s bathymetric surveys round Taiwan and Guam could facilitate submarine operations and naval warfare.[38] Some PRC analysis ships are geared up with superior sonar tools, deep-sea sampling know-how, and unmanned submarines.[39] PRC universities have printed reviews on the viability of Pacific Ocean options, such because the Kuroshio present, for submarine techniques.[40] The Kuroshio present’s robust speeds and distinct thermal layers, in addition to different oceanic situations the PRC is surveying, would supply tactical benefits for underwater navigation and concealment. PRC analysis ships are primarily operated by civilian authorities companies and universities, permitting them to conduct operations in international unique financial zones with diminished scrutiny.[41]
CDOT-ISW beforehand reported comparable PRC bathymetric survey operations at each ends of the Luzon Strait/Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines in April and Might 2025.[42] The Bashi Channel is a strategic waterway that the PRC will doubtless search to manage in a blockade or invasion of Taiwan.
Northeast Asia
Japan
The PRC issued a powerful protest towards Japan’s Protection White Paper 2025, as a result of its characterization of PLA actions. The Japanese Ministry of Protection (MOD) submitted its annual Protection White Paper to the Prime Minister’s Cupboard on July 15. The MOD expressed robust issues over PLA actions all through the Indo-Pacific and PRC makes an attempt to unilaterally change the established order, which “might critically impression Japan’s safety.”[43] The report listed particular PLA actions that current unprecedented and important strategic challenges, to which Japan ought to reply comprehensively and in cooperation with allies and companions. This record included intrusions into Japanese airspace, elevated navy cooperation between the PRC and Russia, and actions inside and past the primary island chain. The MOD additionally assessed that the PRC seeks to create a fait accompli within the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea by growing navy and gray zone actions.
PRC spokesperson Lin Jian criticized the White Paper for spreading incorrect concepts about PRC conduct and the “China menace.” [44] Lin added that the Taiwan query is the PRC’s “inner affair,” and burdened that PLA actions are reliable, justified, and per worldwide legislation. Lin additional steered that Japan was “speaking up” regional tensions to justify its navy buildup. The PRC Ministry of Nationwide Protection (MND) spokesperson Jiang Bin echoed Lin’s assertion. Jiang additional criticized Japan of undermining the post-war worldwide order by strolling away from its Pacifist Structure, together with elevating Japan’s protection price range, loosening restrictions on arms exports, and suggesting revisions to the Three Non-Nuclear Ideas.[45]
Japan protested harmful PLA plane maneuvers for the second time in a month. Japan’s MOD reported that PLA JH-7 fighter-bombers made two “uncommon approaches” close to the Japan Air Self-Protection Power’s (JASDF) YS-11EB digital intelligence plane on July 9 and 10.[46] The YS-11EBs had been conducting surveillance operations over the worldwide waters of the East China Sea when the PLA plane got here inside 60 meters of the JASDF plane. Japanese Vice Minister for International Affairs Takehiro Funakoshi expressed Japan’s “critical issues” to PRC Ambassador to Japan Wu Jianghao.[47] Funakoshi urged the PRC to halt these actions to forestall scary unintended collisions. Japan additionally filed a grievance with the PRC over PLA J-15 fighter jets’ harmful maneuvers close to a Japan Maritime Self-Protection Power P-3C patrol plane in June 2025.[48]
PRC MND spokesperson Jiang Bin defended the PLA’s actions, claiming that the JH-7s had been merely “verifying, figuring out, following, and monitoring” the JASDF plane that had been flying throughout the air protection identification zone (ADIZ) that the PRC established in 2013.[49] Jiang additional accused the JASDF of “getting into the PRC’s East China Sea ADIZ a number of instances for shut reconnaissance,” and attributed Japan’s shut reconnaissance operations as the basis reason for maritime and air collision dangers.
North Korea
The PRC and North Korea held two high-profile and extremely publicized commemorations of their mutual protection treaty, indicating a strengthening of relations between the 2 states. The PRC Embassy in Pyongyang celebrated the 64th anniversary of the signing of their mutual protection treaty on July 9.[50] North Korean state media reported that a number of high-level North Korean officers, together with Vice Chairman of the Supreme Folks’s Meeting (SPA) Kang Yun Sok, Vice Division Director of the Central Committee of the Staff Get together of Korea Pak Myong Ho, and the Vice Minister of International Affairs Ri Chang Sik, had been all in attendance.[51] The earlier 12 months’s celebration included solely a lower-ranking official as its most important consultant, in stark distinction to the 2025 record of attendees. North Korea hosted the same commemoration in Beijing on July 10.[52] Vice Chairman of the PRC Nationwide Folks’s Congress Wang Dongming was the celebration’s visitor of honor, reflecting the elevated standing of attendees at the day gone by’s occasion.[53] PRC official protection of the occasion was much more detailed than its protection of the earlier 12 months’s celebration, doubtless supposed to convey the elevated stage of significance for North Korean-PRC alignment.
PRC-North Korean ties might be returning to 2023 ranges of coordination, primarily based on the extent of participation and protection of those occasions. North Korean-PRC commerce has elevated 27 p.c since 2024, in accordance with official PRC customs information.[54] The PRC doubtless seeks to keep up its financial affect over North Korea, which has lessened considerably as North Korea-Russia relations have deepened.
South Korea
The USA, South Korea, and Japan held the primary Trilateral Chiefs of Protection assembly of the Lee Jae-myung administration on July 11. Official statements unnoticed any reference to the PRC or Taiwan, which might characterize South Korea’s want to distance itself from US-Japan efforts to counter the PRC.[55] South Korean authorities officers confirmed that references to the PRC and Taiwan had been intentionally unnoticed of the joint assertion, however said that such issues had been nonetheless lined beneath the joint assertion’s reference to “peace and stability throughout the area.”[56] The 2024 joint assertion, launched whereas the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol administration was in energy in Seoul, explicitly decried the PRC’s “aggressive, harmful conduct” within the South China Sea and the significance of sustaining “peace and stability throughout the Taiwan Strait.”[57] Related sentiments had been additionally made in Japan-United States-South Korea trilateral statements in 2023.[58] The choice to omit references to the PRC and Taiwan might illustrate a South Korean rhetorical shift and presumably point out main shifts in South Korean protection priorities. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung made clear his want to keep away from involvement in a battle in Taiwan and pursue a extra “pragmatic” international coverage that might enhance ties between Seoul and Beijing.[59] South Korean Protection Minister nominee Ahn Gyu-back said on July 15 his want to finish the switch of wartime operational management (OPCON) from the USA to South Korea.[60] OPCON switch would permit South Korea to command mixed US-South Korean forces throughout wartime.[61] OPCON switch and different main adjustments in South Korean protection posture haven’t but been mirrored in Lee’s insurance policies. These coverage adjustments, coupled with current rhetorical adjustments, would additional point out a rising divergence in South Korean and US international coverage priorities, which might doubtlessly hurt the USA’ means to counter PRC aggression within the Indo-Pacific.
Southeast Asia
Philippines
The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) intercepted two PLA Navy (PLAN) warships patrolling throughout the Philippine unique financial zone (EEZ). The PRC is imposing its “9-Sprint Line” boundary claims in defiance of a 2016 Everlasting Court docket of Arbitration ruling, which Beijing rejects. The PCG flagship Teresa Magbanua tailed the PLAN surveillance ship Tianwangxing and the CCG ship 4203 on July 11 as they traced the PRC-claimed “9-Sprint Line” east of the disputed Scarborough Shoal. The PLAN destroyer Guilin joined the opposite ships partway by their journey and carried out helicopter touchdown drills, in accordance with PCG spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea Jay Tarriela. Tarriela mentioned that the warships ignored the PCG’s communications, whereas the CCG ship replied to say that the PRC has sovereignty and jurisdiction over the waters.[62] Scarborough Shoal is an uninhabited atoll that the PRC seized from the Philippines in 2012 and has managed with CCG ships ever since. It has been a frequent web site of PRC-Philippines confrontations. Beijing is more and more utilizing the CCG and naval ships to patrol and surveil its 9-Sprint Line boundary declare that surrounds almost your entire South China, not simply round particular islands.[63] It has additionally considerably elevated CCG presence round Scarborough Shoal since 2024.[64] The primacy of the CCG on this effort is meant to offer the impression that the PRC’s actions are regular legislation enforcement operations inside PRC waters, slightly than navy coercion towards different international locations.
The PRC Ministry of International Affairs (MFA) issued an announcement on July 12, the ninth anniversary of the 2016 Everlasting Court docket of Arbitration ruling, explaining its opposition to the ruling and the Philippine feedback commemorating it.[65] The ruling, which resulted from a Philippines-filed go well with to problem Beijing’s expansive claims within the South China Sea, decided that the PRC’s 9-Sprint Line and “historic claims” to land and assets within the South China Sea don’t have any authorized foundation.[66] The MFA reiterated its place that the ruling is an “unlawful, invalid, and non-binding piece of paper” as a result of the PRC didn’t conform to take part within the arbitration and since the ruling was allegedly inconsistent with worldwide maritime legislation. [67] It burdened that it was dedicated to implementing the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Events within the South China Sea, nonetheless, and negotiating a binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea with ASEAN.
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[62] https://x.com/jaytaryela/standing/1943941459658330367
[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-june-27-2025 ;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-july-11-2025 ;
https://amti.csis.org/holding-the-line-chinas-expanding-patrols-around-scarborough-shoal/
[64] https://www.sealight.stay/posts/china-s-expanding-control-over-scarborough-shoal
[65] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/wjbzhd/202507/t20250711_11669705.shtml ; https://www.pna.gov dot ph/articles/1254088
[66] https://www.uscc.gov/websites/default/information/Analysis/Issuepercent20Brief_Southpercent20Chinapercent20Seapercent20Arbitrationpercent20Rulingpercent20Whatpercent20Happenedpercent20andpercent20Whatpercent27spercent20Next071216.pdf
[67] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/wjbzhd/202507/t20250711_11669705.shtml ; https://www.pna.gov dot ph/articles/1254088
