Africa File, May 1, 2025: AU, Turkey, and United States Surge to Halt al Shabaab; DRC Peace Talks; Uganda’s Role in the Eastern DRC

Somalia

Creator: Kathryn Tyson with Liam Karr

Members of the African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission in Somalia referred to as to surge troop numbers in Somalia to the very best ranges since 2022 to fight al Shabaab.[1] Leaders from Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda mentioned latest al Shabaab army good points and the AU Assist and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) throughout high-level conferences in Uganda on April 24.[2] The AUSSOM companions mentioned that there’s an “pressing want” to extend AUSSOM by 8,000 troopers.[3] AUSSOM succeeded the earlier AU peacekeeping mission in January 2025 and has roughly 11,900 troopers in Somalia to fight al Shabaab, help the event of Somali safety forces, and facilitate the switch of safety tasks to the Somali authorities by 2029.[4] The AUSSOM companions additionally proposed growing Somalia’s air property and capabilities, fortifying AUSSOM bases, and strengthening civil-military relations to discourage and degrade al Shabaab.[5]

The AUSSOM companions are “deeply involved” about al Shabaab good points since January 2025 that threaten to reverse the primary profitable Somali-led counterterrorism offensive in 2022.[6] Al Shabaab has made main advances in central Somalia, which has enabled it to relink its help zones in central and southern Somalia for the primary time since 2022 and threaten the principle roads linking Mogadishu to central Somalia.[7] Al Shabaab individually captured villages south of Mogadishu in March which can be essential for Somali forces to defend the capital from al Shabaab vehicle-borne improvised explosive gadgets.[8] CTP continues to evaluate that al Shabaab is unlikely to launch an offensive on Mogadishu to grab energy within the brief time period, however its good points in central and southern Somalia will enable the group to extend financial and army strain on Mogadishu and thus destabilize the Somali Federal Authorities (SFG) and undermine its legitimacy.[9]

The potential deployment of 8,000 extra troops would symbolize the most important AU presence in Somalia because the finish of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in early 2022. The earlier AU mission—the AU Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)—succeeded AMISOM in April 2022 with 18,500 troops and drew right down to round 12,500 troops by the tip of 2024.^[10] AMISOM had been in Somalia since 2008, when al Shabaab managed virtually all of southern Somalia and almost toppled the Somali authorities.[11] The mission had 20,000 troops within the nation in 2021 and early 2022 when al Shabaab was final at a excessive level, together with al Shabaab’s first multiday marketing campaign inside Ethiopia.[12]

Different worldwide companions, corresponding to Turkey and the US, have already elevated army help to Somali safety forces. Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the US have coordinated an elevated variety of airstrikes in Somalia amid the al Shabaab offensive. The SFG and these worldwide companions have coordinated a minimum of 76 airstrikes in 2025, in response to Armed Battle Location and Occasion Information.[13] America has carried out a minimum of 9 airstrikes throughout Somalia in 2025.[14] Turkey despatched extra floor forces to assist prepare and coordinate drone strikes in April.[15]

Determine 1. Worldwide Companions’ Airstrikes in opposition to al Shabaab in Somalia: September 2024–April 2025

Supply: Kathryn Tyson; Armed Battle Location and Occasion Information.

The AU mission faces vital funding gaps that undermine its capability to extend its presence. AUSSOM’s logistics and provide strains are severely stretched resulting from a $96 million funding deficit.[16] America has signaled that it’s going to not help the proposed funding mannequin for AUSSOM in an upcoming UN Safety Council vote in Could.[17] Analysts agree that this funding impediment is unlikely to finish the peacekeeping mission, however extended negotiations may trigger additional funding gaps.[18]

Al Shabaab threatens US regional pursuits within the Pink Sea by its collaboration with the Yemeni Houthis. US intelligence officers advised CNN in June 2024 that the Houthis and al Shabaab mentioned a deal for the Houthis to offer weapons to al Shabaab.[19] Al Shabaab may use Houthi-provided assault drones and surface-to-air missiles to focus on US drone programs and allied personnel in Somalia.[20] Al Shabaab assaults on US drones would degrade US and partnered intelligence assortment and strike capabilities, which might strengthen al Shabaab’s freedom of motion all through Somalia. The group may alternatively use assault drones to focus on US ships within the Gulf of Aden from its small enclaves in northern Somalia to spice up its propaganda and not directly help the Houthi assault marketing campaign on Pink Sea transport.[21]

Determine 2. Somalia-Yemen Arms Smuggling Community within the Gulf of Aden

Notice: “ISS” stands for IS Somalia Province.

Supply: Liam Karr; International Initiative Towards Transnational Organized Crime.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Authors: Yale Ford and Liam Karr

The next textual content is tailored from “Congo Struggle Safety Assessment Particular Version: Sluggish and Regular—What to Make of DRC-M23 Peace Talks”

Qatar and the US have superior peace talks between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda over the battle within the japanese DRC since March. Qatar mediated a ceasefire between the DRC and Rwanda on March 18.^[22] Rwandan International Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe mentioned that Qatari-mediated peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda resulted in “vital progress towards peace” on April 15.^[23] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, DRC International Minister Thérèse Wagner, and Nduhungirehe signed a declaration of rules settlement on April 25, which “outlines a pathway to peace, stability, and built-in financial improvement” within the japanese DRC.^[24] US President Donald Trump’s senior adviser for African affairs, Massad Boulos, had met with a number of heads of state within the Nice Lakes area and the Qatari overseas minister in April to put the groundwork for the settlement.^[25]

The DRC and Rwanda agreed to 6 factors as a part of the US-mediated peace framework. The DRC and Rwanda agreed to “acknowledge one another’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” and discover options to the battle within the japanese DRC “by peaceable means.”[26] The DRC and Rwanda acknowledged one another’s “official safety considerations of their shared border area” and dedicated to “limiting the proliferation of nonstate armed teams” and “refraining from offering army help to nonstate armed teams.”[27] The 2 events agreed to a “phased regional financial integration framework” backed by “vital investments,” together with from the US in infrastructure, mining, and hydropower, amongst different sectors.[28] The DRC and Rwanda additionally agreed to facilitate the return of Congolese refugees dwelling in Rwanda to the japanese DRC and internally displaced individuals within the japanese DRC to their areas of origin.[29] The 2 events dedicated to help UN-backed peacekeeping forces within the japanese DRC.[30] The 2 events dedicated to formalize these commitments right into a complete peace settlement and coordinate an preliminary draft “for mutual assessment” by Could 2.[31] Representatives from the DRC, France, Qatar, Rwanda, Togo, and the US met in Qatar on April 30, presumably to work on the preliminary draft settlement.^[32]

Peace efforts have led to a lower in preventing between the Congolese military (FARDC) and the 1000’s of Rwandan forces within the DRC and FARDC and Rwanda-backed M23 rebels since early April. Armed Battle Location and Occasion Information (ACLED) reported in early April that Rwandan forces had ceased direct operations after the ceasefire and that FARDC’s involvement in engagements in North and South Kivu provinces declined to twenty p.c of all clashes.^[33]

Separate negotiations between the DRC and M23 have made a lot slower progress. The DRC and M23 launched a joint assertion on April 23 after a number of weeks of negotiations.^[34] The 2 events collectively dedicated to “a direct cessation of hostilities” for the primary time publicly and a “categorical rejection of any hate speech.”^[35] The joint assertion added that the DRC and M23 “agreed to work towards a truce that may facilitate a broader ceasefire.”^[36]

The joint assertion represents a minor DRC concession. The DRC had beforehand rejected M23’s calls for for direct negotiations and labeled the group as “terrorists” earlier than the Qatar-mediated talks.^[37] The joint assertion marks a shift on this stance by publicly recognizing M23 as a peace accomplice.^[38] The joint assertion mirrored some speaking factors typically repeated by M23, together with “addressing the basis causes” of the battle and refraining from focused hate speech in opposition to ethnic communities.^[39]

The DRC-M23 joint assertion signifies that the 2 sides haven’t but reached a secure ceasefire or made vital steps towards a long-term peace settlement. The joint assertion is imprecise, unclear, and lacks tangible particulars. The joint assertion dedicated each events to proceed to look at the casual pause in preventing, which has not truly stopped preventing within the japanese DRC, as they proceed negotiations towards a “truce” that can help the broader ceasefire.^[40] The assertion didn’t transcend earlier African-led peace initiatives’ readouts, which have failed to supply a secure peace deal. French media characterised the joint assertion as a fragile “assertion of intent” slightly than a binding ceasefire settlement.^[41] CTP continues to evaluate that either side will stay open to short-term and nonbinding ceasefires as they search to handle worldwide strain and set army circumstances for future offensives.^[42]

The DRC and M23 probably disagree on a number of preconditions for extra substantive discussions. Preliminary talks in late March failed to supply “concrete outcomes,” and the newest talks had been briefly postponed in early April.^[43] A number of Congolese and French media sources reported that a number of “deep disagreements” impeded negotiations as early as April 13.^[44] M23 rejected the DRC’s demand that M23 demobilize and disarm earlier than additional discussions.^[45] M23 moreover claimed that the DRC had not met its preconditions to grant amnesty to a selected listing of people and had as an alternative launched detainees who weren’t on the listing.^[46] The DRC rejected M23’s demand that the Congolese military (FARDC) and pro-Congolese authorities militia fighters demilitarize Walikale city—a district capital from which M23 withdrew in early April as talks started in a gesture of “goodwill.”^[47]

These disputes have considerably impeded progress towards a ceasefire or a broader peace deal, almost derailed the joint assertion, and are an impediment to future talks. Reuters reported on April 23 that the DRC and M23 delegations had been annoyed with the tempo of negotiations.”^[48] The French journal Jeune Afrique on April 24 cited a “supply near the Qatari mediation” group who mentioned that M23 officers used the experiences that talks had been shifting slowly to strain the DRC delegation.^[49] Continued negotiations and plans to launch the joint assertion had been reportedly in jeopardy for almost per week, and M23 had even left Qatar because of the disagreements earlier than both facet had signed the doc^.[50] DRC authorities spokesperson Patrick Muyaya mentioned on April 24 that “some factors stay to be resolved to permit for vital progress” in DRC-M23 negotiations.^[51] The Congolese media outlet Radio Okapi reported April 23 that M23 conditioned one other spherical of talks on the DRC changing its negotiating group.^[52] It stays unclear when the subsequent spherical of negotiations will happen.

The Congolese authorities is probably going unable and unwilling to comply with M23’s maximalist calls for, which makes a long-term peace settlement far off. M23 goals to a minimum of legitimize management over the areas that it has captured in North and South Kivu, together with in two provincial capitals, Goma and Bukavu, and sure desires to develop its affect within the DRC as a official political social gathering.^[53] The group has given conflicting statements on its need to take over Kinshasa instantly, however has repeatedly signaled it desires to oust present DRC President Félix Tshisekedi.^[54]M23 has demanded that the DRC implement the 2013 Nairobi peace deal, which stipulated that M23 would demilitarize and change into a political social gathering and that the DRC would facilitate the return of refugees, amongst different provisions.^[55] Tshisekedi is unlikely to help a deal that legitimizes M23 management of japanese DRC as a result of such a deal would severely undermine his legitimacy and energy base in Kinshasa, particularly given M23’s threats to unseat him.^[56] M23 additionally at the moment doesn’t pose a direct existential menace, because it must journey roughly 500 miles to succeed in the DRC’s financial engine within the mineral-rich Katanga area and almost 1,000 miles to Kinshasa throughout poor roads. Reuters quoted a “Congolese authorities supply” on April 23 who mentioned that the Qatari-mediated talks had confronted obstacles as a result of M23 “requested for an excessive amount of” and the DRC “couldn’t give in to each whim.”^[57]

The DRC has pushed nonstarter circumstances for M23 regardless of M23 holding vital leverage within the japanese DRC. The DRC demanded that M23 and “different armed teams” in its alliance disarm with out reintegration into FARDC.^[58] This stance is a requirement for M23 to capitulate with not one of the financial, safety, or political advantages that reintegration would convey and is at odds with M23’s advantageous place within the japanese DRC. The group at the moment controls Goma and Bukavu, plus half of the district capitals throughout the 2 provinces. Professional-Congolese authorities militias have pressured M23-controlled areas in latest weeks, however these militias and FARDC haven’t proven that they will recapture key M23-held inhabitants facilities.^[59]

The underlying disagreements between the DRC and M23 parallel earlier collapses in negotiations the place the DRC refused to accede to M23’s calls for. Former Congolese President Joseph Kabila initially agreed to the 2013 Nairobi peace deal however by no means applied it. Negotiations stalled in November 2021 after the DRC refused to implement the 2013 Nairobi peace settlement.^[60] The core components of the DRC’s and M23’s present calls for embrace points of the 2013 deal, together with M23 amnesty and demobilization with out integration.^[61] This saga reveals that Congolese politicians will negotiate with M23 and even agree in precept to power-sharing settlements however are finally unwilling to accede to M23’s calls for and decide to lasting options to the battle resulting from home political constraints and the group’s distance from extra politically delicate areas of the DRC.

Qatar and the US have helped drive the little progress that DRC-M23 talks have made. Reuters reported on April 9 that the US “instantly” pressured M23 to withdraw from Walikale city and FARDC to not assault as M23 retreated.^[62] Boulos met individually with Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in early April and mentioned on April 17 that US strain on Rwanda and M23 halted M23’s offensive towards Kisangani—the DRC’s fourth largest metropolis and 265 miles west of its furthest advance—and led it to withdraw from Walikale city.^[63]

Qatari mediation efforts have additionally contributed to progress within the negotiations. Qatar contributed to M23’s withdrawal from Walikale city.^[64] M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka claimed on April 3 that M23 withdrew from Walikale city to foster goodwill for the deliberate talks on April 9.^[65]Jeune Afrique reported in late March that Qatar had “opened a channel of communication” with M23 and “despatched discreet messages to decelerate their advance [in the eastern DRC]” and see M23 “present good religion.”^[66] Reuters cited diplomatic sources on April 23 who mentioned that Qatar pressured the 2 sides to launch the joint assertion and decide to working towards a truce.^[67]

The détente between the DRC and Rwanda will probably restrict the size of violence within the japanese DRC, however proxy preventing between the assorted pro-Congolese militia teams and M23 will virtually definitely proceed within the absence of a broader settlement with M23. Professional-Congolese authorities militia teams—referred to as Wazalendo—have attacked M23 positions throughout the japanese DRC in April regardless of the DRC-Rwanda ceasefire. ACLED recorded a big enhance in Wazalendo involvement in preventing since late March, and Wazalendo teams launched offensives on M23 positions close to Goma and Bukavu in mid-April.^[68]

Determine 3. M23 Advances in Japanese DRC

Supply: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.

M23 has launched counterattacks in opposition to pro-Congolese authorities militias and mentioned that it might proceed preventing regardless of the peace talks. M23 has already carried out clearing operations north of Goma and round Bukavu in March and April in response to the militia assaults.^[69] M23 attacked militia forces on the highway (RP529) between M23-controlled Masisi city and Wazalendo-controlled Walikale because the M23 delegation left Doha on April 22 for the primary time since M23 withdrew from Walikale city in early April.^[70] M23 attacked Wazalendo positions close to Nyabiondo—about 10 miles west of Masisi city on the RP529—on April 25 after redeploying forces from Masisi city.^[71] Congolese media have reported a number of instances in late April that M23 has massed forces and army gear on the RP529.^[72] M23 individually recaptured the operationally vital space of Kaziba in central South Kivu after a number of days of preventing on April 27 and has since superior westward towards Mwenga district and southward towards the Fizi highlands.^[73] The FARDC reportedly repositioned its forces round Uvira and within the Fizi highlands to guard Uvira from a possible M23 offensive in town on April 24.^[74] The chief of M23’s political coalition, Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), mentioned on April 29 that the AFC will preserve preventing regardless of peace negotiations and rejects any long-term ceasefire that comes from DRC-Rwanda negotiations.[75]

Determine 4. M23 Advances Westward Towards DRC Inside

Supply: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.

Determine 5. M23 Advances Southward in South Kivu Province

Supply: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.

Wazalendo and different anti-Tutsi militias are a big impediment to peace- and trust-building efforts—no matter DRC-M23-Rwanda negotiations—as a result of the militias will not be concerned in these talks and the DRC is probably going unable to regulate the militias. M23 and Rwanda have demanded that FARDC activate Wazalendo and suspected militants from the ethnic Hutu armed group Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR)—a gaggle linked with the 1994 Rwandan genocide and continued anti-Tutsi exercise—as a part of any long-term peace settlement.^[76]Jeune Afrique reported on April 24 that the Wazalendo assault on Goma contributed to “heightened tensions” between the 2 sides in Doha and virtually led the M23 delegation to return to the DRC.^[77] FARDC has confronted long-standing difficulties in constraining, demobilizing, or integrating militia fighters into its ranks.^[78] Home and worldwide efforts to demobilize and reintegrate Mai-Mai militias, which had been the predecessor to the Wazalendo militias, failed and led to persistent violence within the japanese DRC within the a long time after the Second Congo Struggle.^[79] The UN reported in December 2024 that FDLR fighters are embedded into pro-Congolese authorities militia items and that the DRC authorities “continued to systematically depend on and cooperate with [pro-Congolese government militias] and FDLR.”^[80]

These militias have continued attacking M23 regardless of the latest negotiations and joint assertion. The United Nations reported in April 2025 that FDLR “intensified its collaboration” with Wazalendo militia teams allied to the FARDC.^[81] A Wazalendo militia chief mentioned in mid-April that Wazalendo fighters “don’t agree on the discussions happening in Doha” and that the talks don’t “concern us.”^[82] A Congolese politician from the Walikale district tried to declare a ceasefire on behalf of Wazalendo fighters as a part of the Doha talks in mid-April, however the fighters mentioned that they might preserve preventing.^[83] Wazalendo fighters reportedly rejected the DRC-M23 joint assertion and mentioned that they might preserve preventing on April 24.^[84] Wazalendo fighters reportedly clashed with their FARDC allies in Uvira city and the encompassing hills in South Kivu on April 24 and April 25 after Wazalendos rejected the DRC-M23 joint assertion.^[85]

Uganda

Creator: Yale Ford and Liam Karr

The next textual content is from “Africa File Particular Version: Uganda within the DRC’s M23 Battle—Buddy to All, Enemy to None“

Learn a one-page Government Abstract of the Report Right here

Uganda is utilizing its partnership with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to focus on anti-Ugandan insurgent teams and strengthen its sphere of affect within the japanese DRC. Uganda and the DRC have carried out mixed operations in opposition to the Islamic State Central Africa Province, which was initially a Ugandan insurgent group that’s identified regionally because the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), as a part of Operation Shujaa since 2021.^[86] Uganda elevated its counterterrorism cooperation with the DRC in response to ADF assaults into Uganda that yr.^[87] The Ugandan military (UPDF) and Congolese military (FARDC) expanded their operations to new elements of North Kivu Province and neighboring Ituri province in 2024 and 2025, respectively.^[88]

Uganda supported the growth of Operation Shujaa to Ituri province in 2025, prone to battle Coopérative pour le développement du Congo (CODECO)—one other insurgent group—along with ADF. CODECO is a unfastened coalition of ethnic Lendu militias that function primarily within the Djugu and Mahagi districts of Ituri province.^[89] The UPDF and the FARDC agreed to focus on “all armed teams” in northeastern Ituri province once they agreed to develop Operation Shujaa in late March.^[90] ADF and CODECO are the 2 most deadly armed teams for civilians within the japanese DRC.[91]

Uganda has signaled that it partially views CODECO as a part of its battle in opposition to ADF, which continues to be Uganda’s principal goal, and is open to co-opting CODECO. The UPDF spokesperson claimed on March 21 that CODECO fighters “struck a pact” with ADF, however the spokesperson didn’t present proof.^[92] UPDF Commander Muhoozi Kainerugaba (Muhoozi) and several other senior UPDF officers met with a delegation of leaders from one CODECO faction in late April for negotiations.[93] The UPDF readout of the assembly claimed that the CODECO leaders mentioned they’d been “misled by some unfavorable forces,” which might be a reference to ADF.[94] There is no such thing as a unbiased proof that ADF and CODECO are coordinating their exercise, nonetheless. Muhoozi highlighted the historic cooperation between the UPDF and locals in opposition to Ugandan rebels, together with ADF, and urged CODECO to ally with the UPDF in the course of the assembly.[95] The French journal Jeune Afrique cited a “army supply” on April 23 who mentioned that the UPDF is probably going utilizing creating relations with CODECO to sign to ADF rebels that Uganda is open to negotiations.[96]

Uganda co-opts its partnership with the DRC to advance its personal pursuits within the japanese DRC. UPDF counterterrorism deployments enable Uganda to keep up a buffer zone on the DRC-Uganda border and restrict the power of ADF and different armed teams to conduct cross-border assaults into Uganda.^[97] The UN and Armed Battle Location and Occasion Information report that Operation Shujaa has degraded ADF and pushed the group from the border however has didn’t lower the depth of ADF assaults on Congolese civilians.^[98] Muhoozi mentioned in February 2025 that the UPDF will proceed to develop its personal “sphere of affect” and “seize your complete DRC border with Uganda.”^[99]

Determine 6. Uganda Deploys to Japanese DRC to Counter CODECO

Supply: Yale Ford; Armed Battle Location and Occasion Information.

Ugandan operations within the japanese DRC help Ugandan financial pursuits as effectively, a few of that are mutually helpful for the DRC. Uganda started repairing roadways on key cross-border commerce routes in late 2021 with a purpose to export extra to the DRC, which is already Uganda’s second most necessary export market.^[100] Improved highway infrastructure additionally helps increase the native economic system. UPDF troopers have deployed beneath Operation Shujaa to guard the development of those roadways in addition to Ugandan oil websites on Lake Albert in western Uganda from CODECO and different insurgent assaults.^[101]

The UPDF probably elevated its army involvement in opposition to CODECO in 2025 as a result of CODECO assaults have considerably disrupted regional financial exercise and affected the Hema folks, with whom Uganda has ethnic kinship ties and has traditionally supported.[102] The UPDF had already escalated operations in opposition to CODECO in mid-March 2025 in response to CODECO assaults that killed a minimum of 80 civilians in Djugu district a number of weeks prior.^[103] Uganda beforehand had as much as 7,000 troops within the japanese DRC and commenced deploying a minimum of 3,000-4,000 extra troops to Ituri province in late January.^[104] UPDF officers, together with Muhoozi, declare that CODECO has explicitly focused Hema folks within the japanese DRC.[105]

Uganda co-opts Operation Shujaa to realize entry to Congolese assets, corresponding to gold and timber. Gold is amongst Uganda’s most profitable exports and comprised virtually 45 p.c of Uganda’s whole export earnings in 2023.^[106] Uganda acquires a good portion of this gold from the DRC by way of smugglers, in response to the United Nations.^[107] Equally, virtually 80 p.c of timber smuggled from the DRC goes to Uganda.^[108]Operation Shujaa affords Uganda a pretext to function round and safe the smuggling routes with a purpose to guarantee continued Ugandan entry to Congolese assets.^[109]

Uganda individually maintains ties to the Rwandan-backed M23 insurgent motion, which has captured vital parts of the japanese DRC and threatens to topple the Congolese authorities. M23 is an armed rebel that emerged in 2012 following the failed integration of predominantly Tutsi ex-Rwandan-backed rebels into FARDC.^[110] The M23 rebels reemerged in November 2021—after a number of years of dormancy—when negotiations between M23 and the DRC collapsed.^[111] Rwanda has deployed 1000’s of troops within the japanese DRC that “de facto management” M23 operations and supply M23 with superior army {hardware}.^[112] The group controls the North and South Kivu provincial capitals—Goma and Bukavu, respectively—plus half of the district capitals throughout the 2 provinces after a serious offensive in early 2025.

Determine 7. M23 Advances in Japanese DRC

Supply: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.

The United Nations has reported repeatedly on the shut relationship that M23 additionally has with Uganda.^[113] Uganda has allowed M23 to make use of Uganda’s territory for a number of functions since M23’s resurgence in late 2021.^[114] Corneille Nangaa—the pinnacle of Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), which is M23’s political department—often travels to Uganda.^[115] Uganda has denied its hyperlinks with M23 and reiterated its dedication to its safety partnership with the Congolese authorities.^[116] The DRC has but to brazenly criticize Uganda for its hyperlinks to M23, probably due to the DRC’s heavy reliance on the UPDF and Operation Shujaa to weaken ADF.^[117] M23 has additionally reached out to a number of armed teams in Ituri, together with the dominant faction of CODECO, to affix the AFC coalition, which incorporates Ugandan-linked teams.[118]

Uganda has probably cultivated ties with M23 to counterbalance Rwandan domination of the group as a part of its complicated rivalry with Rwanda for affect within the DRC. Rwandan and Ugandan elites have deep private ties courting again to their insurgent origins.[119] Rwandan President Paul Kagame grew up in exile in Uganda and was a part of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s Nationwide Resistance Military insurgent group in the course of the Ugandan Bush Struggle within the Eighties, which ended with Museveni changing into president and appointing Kagame as Uganda’s head of army intelligence.[120] Museveni then allowed Kagame and his Rwandan Patriotic Entrance to make use of Uganda as a staging and coaching floor to launch an insurgency in opposition to the Hutu-led Rwandan authorities within the early Nineties and finish the Rwandan genocide in 1994.[121] The 2 companions then had been the important thing backers of the victorious Congolese rebels within the First Congo Struggle within the mid-Nineties.^[122]

Rwanda and Uganda have developed a “frenemy” relationship because the First Congo Struggle, because the ruling elites consolidated energy domestically and have become rivals for affect within the japanese DRC.^[123] Rwanda’s and Uganda’s relationship reached a relative low level between 2019 and 2021 however has improved since 2022.^[124] Belgium sought Uganda as an interlocutor to restore its relationship with Rwanda in April 2025, highlighting that Uganda continues to be a key Rwandan accomplice in addition to rival.^[125]

Ugandan help for M23 partly displays divisions throughout the Ugandan ruling household regarding Rwanda. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, on one hand, has prioritized regional financial integration and avoided brazenly aligning with M23. Museveni’s son, UPDF Commander Muhoozi, then again, usually touts Uganda’s army muscle within the japanese DRC and posts pro-M23 and pro-Rwandan statements on social media, corresponding to calling Rwandan President Paul Kagame “uncle.”^[126] Muhoozi’s social media posts have prompted stress throughout the ruling presidential household on a number of events.^[127] Muhoozi additionally posted constructive feedback in regards to the DRC president on April 25 and April 26, nonetheless, highlighting Muhoozi’s often-erratic public diplomacy.^[128]

Uganda has established proxy teams within the japanese DRC as effectively. Thomas Lubanga—a convicted battle prison and former chief of the Ugandan-linked Union des patriotes congolais (UPC) in the course of the Second Congo Struggle—fashioned a brand new insurgent group referred to as the Conference pour la Révolution Populaire (CRP) in March 2025.^[129] The United Nations reported in December 2024 that Lubanga had been primarily based in Uganda since July 2024.^[130]Jeune Afrique reported on April 3 that the insurgent group had occupied a number of villages on Lake Albert and plans to function throughout Ituri province.^[131] Lubanga’s CRP has confronted resistance from FARDC forces, nonetheless, which have carried out operations in opposition to CRP militants north of Tchomia—a army and cross-border buying and selling hub with Uganda on Lake Albert about 35 miles southeast of Bunia, which is the Ituri provincial capital.^[132]

One other former UPC determine—Harmless Kaina—fashioned a separate insurgent group, referred to as the Coalition Nationale pour la Libération du Congo (CNLC), in southeastern Ituri in March 2025.^[133] Kaina is a sanctioned battle prison and has shut ties to Uganda and Lubanga.^[134] The CRP and CNLC be a part of Zaïre/Auto-défense des communautés victimes de l’Ituri (ADCVI)—generally referred to as Zaïre—as Ugandan-linked armed teams working in northeast Ituri. Zaïre has fought CODECO for years and has 1000’s of fighters and ties to former UPC members, Uganda, Rwanda, and ethnic Hema communities.^[135]

Determine 8. Uganda Performs All Sides within the Japanese DRC

Supply: Yale Ford; Essential Threats Challenge on the American Enterprise Institute.

Uganda probably makes use of these proxies as one other counterweight to Rwandan affect within the japanese DRC, which embeds the Ugandan-Rwandan competitors deeper into the japanese DRC. The UN reported that Ugandan officers performed a key position in forming M23’s AFC coalition, which incorporates CNLC, CRP, and Zaïre.^[136] Uganda probably supported the launch of AFC in December 2023 in response to M23’s territorial growth in 2022 and 2023 with a purpose to dilute Rwandan domination of the strengthening rebel.^[137] CRP chief Lubanga and CNLC chief Kaina have private ties to M23 leaders and helped enhance collaboration between M23 and Zaïre in recent times.^[138]

Rwanda’s and Uganda’s proxy competitors within the japanese DRC contributes to the perpetual violence within the japanese DRC. This rivalry has led to widespread battle between Rwandan and Ugandan proxies because the Second Congo Struggle and even between Rwandan and Ugandan forces in uncommon cases.^[139] American and Congolese consultants consider Rwanda relaunched M23 initially to guard its sphere of affect within the japanese DRC a minimum of partially in response to tensions with Uganda.^[140] Uganda’s countermobilization of its proxies is the newest iteration of this cycle. This proxy competitors proliferates armed actors within the japanese DRC and provides regional pursuits to already complicated native conflicts.

Uganda moreover probably goals to make use of its proxies to unilaterally advance Ugandan pursuits in Congolese affairs. This tactic additional complicates conflicts and peace efforts within the japanese DRC. Uganda has traditionally superior its pursuits in Ituri by concurrently arming militia teams and supporting peace frameworks involving these proxies.^[141] Uganda mediated peace talks in Kampala in 2012–13 between the DRC and M23 and often advocates direct dialogue.^[142] Uganda has been a key actor in an African Union-sponsored peace framework for the Nice Lakes area since 2013.^[143]

Uganda might use its proxy teams to advertise Ugandan pursuits in inter-Congolese dialogues, which dangers complicating these peace efforts. Lubanga met with a coalition of non secular leaders on March 4, who’ve met with main actors within the DRC to barter restructured power-sharing preparations.^[144] Kahwa Panga Mandro—one other sanctioned Congolese warlord in Ituri with hyperlinks to Hema communities and historic ties to Lubanga—claimed in mid-April 2025 that Lubanga fashioned the CRP to “glean his share of the pie” in negotiations.^[145]

Uganda might have mobilized its proxy networks to determine native army companions within the japanese DRC separate from FARDC. FARDC-UPDF collaboration has been turbulent at instances as a result of the UPDF has carried out unilateral operations within the japanese DRC, refused to share info and intelligence with FARDC, and didn’t respect FARDC checkpoints.^[146] The UN mentioned in December 2024 that the FARDC “hesitated to develop” Operation Shujaa’s space of operations, “fearing a hidden agenda from Uganda tied to its historic pursuits in Ituri.”^[147] The proliferation of Ugandan proxies and the growth of Operation Shujaa have expanded the pro-Ugandan army presence in Ituri province. The CRP and Zaïre each function in areas of Djugu district which can be exterior of Operation Shujaa’s zone of operations.^[148]

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[2] https://igad.int/communique-of-the-extra-ordinary-summit-of-the-troop-contributing-countries-to-the-african-union-support-and-stabilization-mission-in-somalia-and-the-federal-government-of-somalia/

[3] https://igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/ES-Assertion-Extraordinary-AUSSOM-TCC-Ministerial-Assembly-24.04.2025.pdf

[4] https://au-ssom.org/about-aussom/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

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[6] https://igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/ES-Assertion-Extraordinary-AUSSOM-TCC-Ministerial-Assembly-24.04.2025.pdf

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[8] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250327-fears-mount-over-resurgence-of-al-shabaab-jihadists-in-somalia

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[10] https://atmis-au.org/military-component; https://theglobalobservatory.org/2024/12/as-atmis-looks-to-withdraw-the-risk-of-large-scale-al-shabaab-success-in-southern-somalia-is-high

[11] https://www.iar-gwu.org/print-archive/fighting-for-peace-in-somalia-history-and-analysis-of-the-african-union-mission-amisom-20072017

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[13] Armed Battle Location and Occasion Information (ACLED) database, accessible at https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool

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