Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 7, 2025

Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cellular machine) is strongly really useful for utilizing this data-heavy instrument.

Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.

Notice: The information cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on August 7. ISW will cowl subsequent reviews within the August 8 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.

US and Russian officers proceed to supply updates a couple of doable assembly between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin within the close to future, however precise particulars stay unsure. A White Home official informed ABC Information, Bloomberg, and the New York Publish on August 7 that america and Russia haven’t but set a location for the assembly, and a White Home supply informed CNN on August 6 that the assembly might happen throughout the subsequent two weeks (by about August 21).[1] The White Home official informed Western information retailers that Trump set the situation that Putin should agree to satisfy bilaterally with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky earlier than Trump would meet with Putin. Putin said on August 7 that he’s not towards assembly with Zelensky “normally” however that “sure circumstances should be created” earlier than such a gathering.[2] Trump later clarified, nonetheless, that Putin doesn’t have to satisfy with Zelensky earlier than Trump will meet with Putin.[3]

Putin proposed the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a doable location to satisfy with Trump.[4] Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed on August 7 that US Particular Envoy to the Center East Steve Witkoff proposed a trilateral assembly between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin throughout Witkoff’s August 6 go to to Moscow however that Russia didn’t touch upon this “possibility” throughout the go to.[5] Ushakov said that Russia desires to first deal with a bilateral Trump-Putin assembly and claimed that america and Russia have set a location or this assembly. The Kremlin has tried to set the tempo and sequence of negotiations about momentary ceasefires and a everlasting peace in Ukraine because the begin of the US effort to carry negotiations to finish the warfare in February 2025.[6] Putin’s efforts to posture himself as amenable to US peace proposals and significant negotiations whereas refusing to satisfy with Zelensky within the near-term are makes an attempt to obfuscate the fact that Putin stays bored with ending his warfare and is trying to extract bilateral concessions from america with out meaningfully partaking in a peace course of.

Zelensky reiterated his willingness on August 7 to satisfy with Trump and Putin and decide to a ceasefire.[7] Zelensky listed Ukraine’s prime priorities as ceasing casualties and reaching a ceasefire settlement with Russia; a gathering between the heads-of-state to attain an enduring peace; and guaranteeing long-term safety with help from america and Ukraine’s European companions.

Putin could have used his assembly with Witkoff to suggest a long-range strikes moratorium, which might enable Russia to stockpile long-range drones and missiles and renew devastating large-scale strikes towards Ukraine after the moratorium expires. A strikes moratorium may even handicap Ukraine’s capacity to proceed its long-range strike marketing campaign aimed toward attriting the Russian protection industrial base and wartime financial system. Bloomberg reported on August 5, citing individuals accustomed to the scenario, that Russia thought of accepting a moratorium on long-range strikes with a view to mitigate the specter of secondary US sanctions.[8] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who typically reiterates Kremlin rhetorical strains to help the Kremlin’s goals, claimed on August 1 that he lately informed US representatives that Russia is excited by one other long-range strikes moratorium.[9] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed on August 6 that Putin gave Witkoff a ceasefire proposal however didn’t specify the contents of the proposal.[10] Rubio said {that a} ceasefire is a crucial a part of the negotiation course of as a result of it’s tough to barter a everlasting peace deal whereas beneath fireplace — reiterating Trump’s most popular timeline of creating a ceasefire in Ukraine earlier than beginning formal peace negotiations to finish the warfare.[11]

Russia has considerably scaled up its drone and missile manufacturing in 2025, permitting Russia to quickly improve the dimensions of its strike packages that it launches towards Ukraine. Ukraine’s Foremost Army Intelligence Directorate (GUR) assessed on June 9 that Russia can produce roughly 170 Shahed-type drones per day and that Russia plans to extend manufacturing capability to 190 drones per day by the top of 2025.[12] Ukrainian outlet Kyiv Impartial reported on June 24 that it acquired GUR intelligence in early June 2025 that indicated that Russia had stockpiled roughly 600 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 300 Iskander-Okay cruise missiles — a stockpile that will final about two years, ought to Russia maintain its present tempo of missile strikes towards Ukraine.[13] Russia continues to closely put money into its long-range drone and missile manufacturing capabilities, together with by leaning on companions and allies like Belarus, Iran, the Folks’s Republic of China (PRC), and North Korea for weapons provisions, joint manufacturing efforts, and sanctions evasion schemes.[14] Russia will solely proceed to put money into its drone and missile manufacturing capabilities and lean on its allies because it prepares for a chronic warfare effort in Ukraine and potential future battle towards NATO. The dimensions of Russia’s strike packages towards Ukraine will subsequently seemingly solely proceed to extend, as will the harm to civilian infrastructure and civilian casualties.[15] Russia in 2025 has already performed over 10 of the largest-ever drone and missile strikes within the warfare up to now and reportedly seeks to extend the dimensions of its strike packages to include as much as 2,000 drones.[16] A short lived strikes moratorium would additionally degrade Ukraine’s long-range strike marketing campaign focusing on Russia’s protection industrial amenities and vitality infrastructure — a marketing campaign that’s aimed toward focusing on Russia’s protection manufacturing and vitality revenues, versus the solely civilian infrastructure that the Russian marketing campaign typically strikes.[17] Any settlement lower than a full and long-term cessation in long-range strikes towards civilian infrastructure will pose an ideal menace to Ukraine’s civilian inhabitants and infrastructure upon the expiration of the settlement and resumption of long-range Russian strikes.

Putin seemingly claimed to Witkoff that Russia’s territorial ambitions are restricted to the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Putin is probably going trying to border Russia’s seizure of the 4 oblasts as inevitable with a view to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Kremlin calls for. Kremlin sources lately implied to Reuters that Putin stays dedicated to his demand that Russia occupy all 4 oblasts earlier than he could be keen to determine a ceasefire — a reiteration of Putin’s June 2024 demand that he and different Kremlin officers have since publicly repeated.[18] A Kremlin supply additionally informed Reuters that the Russian Normal Workers lately informed Putin that the frontline in Ukraine will seemingly “crumble” in two to a few months. ISW assessed that the Kremlin is probably going leaking this data to attempt to challenge confidence in Russia’s navy capabilities and, in flip, to undermine Ukrainian and Western morale.

Russia’s occupation of the 4 oblasts is neither inevitable nor imminent, as Russian forces will face severe operational obstacles in what are prone to be multi-year endeavors. ISW assesses that Russia has but to grab roughly 6,500 sq. kilometers of Donetsk Oblast, or about 25 p.c of the area. Russian advances aimed toward enveloping Pokrovsk have accelerated in latest weeks, however Russian forces have spent the final 18 months making an attempt to grab an space of about 30 sq. kilometers.[19] Russian forces have been combating to grab Chasiv Yar (pre-war inhabitants of 12,000) since April 2024, and it took Russian forces 26 months to advance 11 kilometers from western Bakhmut to western Chasiv Yar.[20] Russian forces within the Chasiv Yar and Toretsk instructions are more and more threatening the southern tip of Ukraine’s fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast at Kostyantynivka.[21] Kostyantynivka is roughly 30 kilometers from Slovyansk, the northern tip of the fortress belt, and the cities within the fortress belt (Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk) collectively had a pre-war inhabitants of roughly 373,000. Russian forces haven’t demonstrated the capability to grab cities of this measurement since mid-2022, and ISW continues to evaluate that the seizure of the fortress belt shall be a tough, multiyear effort.[22]

Future Russian operations to grab the whole lot of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts would require vital river crossing operations that Russian forces have traditionally struggled to finish since 2022. Russian forces nonetheless should seize roughly 7,200 sq. kilometers of Zaporizhia Oblast (about 26 p.c of the area) and roughly 7,000 sq. kilometers in Kherson Oblast (about 26 p.c of the area). Russian features within the Zaporizhia path prior to now two years have principally consisted of advances in areas that Ukrainian forces liberated throughout their Summer time 2023 counteroffensive, and Russian forces have but to grab Orikhiv (roughly 35 kilometers southeast of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis). Russian forces look like making an attempt to advance alongside the Kamyanske-Stepnohirsk line (west of Orikhiv on the financial institution of the Dnipro River) northward towards Zaporizhzhia Metropolis however are roughly 20 kilometers from the southern outskirts of the town. Zaporizhzhia Metropolis had a pre-war inhabitants of 706,000 individuals, and the seizure of the town and the remainder of the oblast would require Russian forces to cross the Dnipro River, which runs by way of the town and separates northwestern Zaporizhia Oblast from the remainder of the area. Zaporizhzhia Metropolis is a closely fortified metropolis like these of the Donetsk Oblast fortress belt, and the Russian navy command must commit a major contingent of Russian personnel and gear to the seizure of those cities. The seizure of Kherson Oblast would additionally require operations to cross the Dnipro River, set up a lodgment on the west (proper) financial institution of the river, and seize Kherson Metropolis (pre-war inhabitants of 275,000). Russian forces would additionally should deal with vital defenses that Ukrainian forces have established on west financial institution Kherson Oblast since liberating this space in 2022. Russian forces haven’t performed a profitable cross-river operation at scale throughout the Dnipro River since Russian forces withdrew to east (left) financial institution Kherson Oblast in November 2022, and this river crossing occurred as Russian forces tried to quickly retreat from oncoming Ukrainian forces. Russia would seemingly wrestle to pursue simultaneous efforts in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts, significantly contemplating the impacts of three years of warfare on Russian fight capabilities.

Russian goals will not be restricted to the occupation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, nonetheless, regardless of Kremlin makes an attempt to border Russia’s warfare goals as such in an effort to make its calls for appear extra affordable. Russia has not deserted its extra intensive, unique warfare goals. Statements from Kremlin officers, together with Putin, have repeatedly indicated that Russia has extra expansive territorial goals in Ukraine past the 4 oblasts.[23] Putin lately claimed that “all of Ukraine” is Russia’s, Russian officers have referred to as for Russia to grab Sumy Metropolis, and Kremlin officers routinely label Odesa and Kharkiv cities as “Russian” cities, for instance.[24] Russia can be committing vital forces and means to offensive operations past the 4 oblasts, additional casting doubt on claims that Russia solely seeks to occupy these 4 areas. Russian forces are presently conducting offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast and northern and jap Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian navy command has dedicated components of its comparatively extra “elite” airborne (VDV) and naval infantry forces to combating in northern Sumy Oblast and has been intensifying efforts to grab Kupyansk in latest months.[25] The deployment of VDV and naval infantry forces to those sectors counsel some degree of prioritization throughout the Russian Normal Workers — prioritization that’s incongruent with the declare that Russia is barely involved with the seizure of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts.

Putin’s warfare goals are additionally not restricted to territory. Kremlin statements proceed to point that Putin stays dedicated to changing the democratically elected Ukrainian authorities with a pro-Russian puppet authorities, decreasing Ukraine’s navy such that Ukraine can’t defend itself from future aggression, abolishing NATO’s long-held Open Door Coverage, and altering the Ukrainian structure to commit Ukraine to neutrality.[26] Putin stays dedicated to destroying the Ukrainian state, identification, and tradition and subjugating the Ukrainian individuals.[27] Russian efforts to beat all of Ukraine by way of battlefield features would take a long time ought to the present fee of advance proceed, however Putin’s concept of victory is contingent on the speculation that the West will abandon Ukraine lengthy earlier than he should.[28] Putin continues to consider that point is on Russia’s facet and that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West. Financial measures coupled with Western navy help that permits Ukraine to inflict battlefield setbacks on Russian forces stay essential to altering Putin’s calculus and bringing him to the negotiating desk keen to make compromises to finish the warfare.

The Kremlin is engaged in a fragile balancing act between feigning curiosity in negotiations to Trump and conditioning Russian society to just accept nothing in need of Putin’s desired full victory in Ukraine, regardless of how lengthy it takes. Russian State Duma Deputy and former 58th Mixed Arms Military Commander Lieutenant Normal Viktor Sobolev claimed on August 7 that “on no account” ought to one count on talks between Putin and Trump to finish Russia’s warfare towards Ukraine.[29] Sobolev claimed that Russia won’t be able to perform its warfare objectives with a ceasefire or truce. Sobolev reiterated claims that any peace settlement should remove the “preliminary causes” of the warfare — a variation on the phrase that Kremlin officers typically invoke to check with NATO enlargement and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination towards Russian-speakers.[30] Sobolev repeated Putin’s unique warfare objectives to “demilitarize” and “denazify” Ukraine — that’s, to considerably constrain the Ukrainian navy and change the Ukrainian authorities. Sobolev claimed that Russia seeks management over Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Russian forces will create “buffer zones” in Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts. Russian forces presently solely occupy minuscule elements of Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv oblasts, and Sobolev seems to be demanding that Russia seize extra territory. Russian forces are additionally notably not working in Chernihiv and Odesa oblasts, indicating that Sobolev is asking for Russia to launch fully new offensive operations. State Duma Protection Committee First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on August 7 that Russia will “clearly” not be happy with freezing the frontline and that Trump should perceive that Russia “can’t be defeated.”[31] State Duma Worldwide Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on August 7 that Russia has at all times been prepared for peace talks however famous that Russia’s place has not modified since Russia’s pre-war ultimatums in 2021 (when Russia demanded that NATO and america stop NATO enlargement and restrict navy exercise in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia).[32] Russian ultranationalist outlet Tsargrad revealed an op-ed on August 7 claiming that the warfare in Ukraine is an “inside affair” for Russia.[33] The article claimed that Russia doesn’t need peace with Ukraine, “however peace with out Ukraine,” as “there needs to be no Ukraine.” Russian state media additionally amplified narratives from Russian officers on August 7 about Ukrainian authorities’ alleged disregard for Ukrainian prisoners of warfare (POWs) and civilians.[34]

Russian deputies’ statements are largely meant for home consumption, and Kremlin-affiliated Russian oligarch, Orthodox nationalist, and Tsargrad founder Konstantin Malofeev typically works to situation the Russian nationalist group to help Russia’s warfare effort.[35] These statements from Russian officers and Russian media are a part of the Kremlin’s efforts to arrange Russian society for negotiations to fail and for the warfare to proceed. The Kremlin is setting circumstances to accuse Ukraine of not caring about its personal inhabitants within the occasion of Ukrainian disagreements with Russian calls for in future negotiations. The Kremlin will seemingly attempt to use this narrative to shift the blame for failed negotiations onto Ukraine — not Russia — and to justify a chronic warfare to the Russian individuals.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance teams are seemingly working west of Kupyansk, indicating that Russian forces could not but preserve enduring positions on the settlement’s western outskirts in Sobolivka. ISW reported on August 6 that geolocated footage exhibiting two Russian servicemembers transferring on foot in fields and windbreaks in Sobolivka (instantly west of Kupyansk) indicated that Russian forces lately superior to the western outskirts of Kupyansk and seized Sobolivka.[36] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on August 7 that Russian forces haven’t seized Sobolivka.[37] The milblogger claimed that the footage could present a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group and referenced one other milblogger’s declare from late July 2025 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance teams are working close to Kupyansk.[38] Russian forces are more and more utilizing sabotage and reconnaissance teams to infiltrate behind Ukrainian positions into settlements as a part of bigger envelopment efforts.[39] ISW assessments of Russian advances primarily based on geolocated footage replicate the noticed presence of Russian forces inside a given space. ISW’s “Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine” map layer is distinct from the “Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory” layer, for which ISW makes use of the doctrinal definition of management that imposes a excessive bar to substantiate the exclusion of enemy forces from an space.[40] ISW will proceed to observe the scenario for additional reporting about Russian exercise close to Sobolivka.

Key Takeaways:

• US and Russian officers proceed to supply updates a couple of doable assembly between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin within the close to future, however precise particulars stay unsure.
• Putin could have used his assembly with Witkoff to suggest a long-range strikes moratorium, which might enable Russia to stockpile long-range drones and missiles and renew devastating large-scale strikes towards Ukraine after the moratorium expires. A strikes moratorium may even handicap Ukraine’s capacity to proceed its long-range strike marketing campaign aimed toward attriting the Russian protection industrial base and wartime financial system.
• Russia has considerably scaled up its drone and missile manufacturing in 2025, permitting Russia to quickly improve the dimensions of its strike packages that it launches towards Ukraine.
• Putin seemingly claimed to Witkoff that Russia’s territorial ambitions are restricted to the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Putin is probably going trying to border Russia’s seizure of the 4 oblasts as inevitable with a view to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Kremlin calls for.
• Russia’s occupation of the 4 oblasts is neither inevitable nor imminent, as Russian forces will face severe operational obstacles in what are prone to be multi-year endeavors.
• Russian goals will not be restricted to the occupation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, nonetheless, regardless of Kremlin makes an attempt to border Russia’s warfare goals as such in an effort to make its calls for appear extra affordable. Russia has not deserted its extra intensive, unique warfare goals.
• Putin’s warfare goals are additionally not restricted to territory.
• The Kremlin is engaged in a fragile balancing act between feigning curiosity in negotiations to Trump and conditioning Russian society to just accept nothing in need of Putin’s desired full victory in Ukraine, regardless of how lengthy it takes.
• Russian forces superior within the Toretsk path and certain accomplished the seizure of Toretsk.

We don’t report intimately on Russian warfare crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t instantly have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those legal actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity regardless that we don’t describe them in these reviews.  

• Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Foremost Effort – Japanese Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate primary efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Foremost Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis
• Russian Subordinate Foremost Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Foremost Effort #3 – Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
• Important Exercise in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 6 and August 7 however didn’t advance.[41]

Ukrainian forces proceed to strike Russian navy infrastructure and protection industrial base (DIB) amenities within the Russian deep rear. The Ukrainian Normal Workers reported on August 7 that Ukrainian drones struck the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai, in a single day on August 6 to 7.[42] Geolocated footage revealed on August 7 reveals a drone strike and subsequent fireplace at a fuel and fuel condensate processing unit of the Afipsky Refinery.[43] The Ukrainian Normal Workers reported that the refinery refines 6.25 million tons of oil yearly, which is 2.1 p.c of Russia’s complete oil refining capability.[44] The Ukrainian Normal Workers said that Ukrainian forces additionally struck different unspecified Russian protection industrial amenities and are clarifying outcomes. Krasnodar Krai authorities reported that falling drone particles brought about a fireplace that burned down a fuel processing unit on the Afipsky Oil Refinery.[45] Russian opposition outlet Astra revealed footage of a fireplace at Russian navy unit quantity 61661 in Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai and said that native authorities reported a drone strike on the navy unit.[46] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence-focused channel said on August 7 that drone strikes towards the bottom of unit quantity 61661 brought about a fireplace at a gas and lubricant warehouse reportedly belonging to the Russian 76th Separate Restore and Restoration Battalion.[47] Astra additionally revealed footage on August 6 of a fireplace at a railway station in Surovikino, Volgograd Oblast, following a reported Ukrainian drone strike.[48] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrey Bocharov reported on August 7 that Russian air protection repelled drone strikes towards Volgograd Oblast and {that a} fireplace broke out at an unspecified railway station.[49]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border and method to inside tube artillery vary of Sumy Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 7 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior on the east (left) financial institution of the Loknya River in Sumy Oblast (northeast of Sumy Metropolis).[50]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy Metropolis close to Kindrativka, Kostyantynivka, and Novokostyantynivka; northeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Yunakivka and Sadky; and southeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Lukashivka (close to the Sumy-Kharkiv Oblast administrative border) on August 6 and seven.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy Metropolis close to Andriivka, Oleksiivka, Novokostyantynivka, and Stepove; and northeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Yunakivka, Varachyne, and Sadky.[52]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that the Russian navy command deemed components of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade unfit for assault duties and despatched the brigade to dig trenches and maintain defensive positions close to Yunakivka in areas beneath menace by Ukrainian drones.[53] The milblogger additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces broke by way of defensive positions of the Russian 104th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) in Yunakivka, compelling Russian navy command to divert components of the 234th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) from assault missions to bolster the 104th VDV Regiment.[54] The milblogger said that there are roughly three such Ukrainian breakthroughs per day. The milblogger famous that the Russian navy command is utilizing assault troops to carry fortifications whereas common infantry conduct assaults. The milblogger added that components of the fortieth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) lately refused to take up assigned positions of their space of duty (AOR).[55] ISW noticed reviews of the fortieth Naval Infantry Brigade working close to Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy Metropolis) as of August 6.[56]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly working on the jap financial institution of the Loknya River.[57] Components of the first Battalion of the thirtieth Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, forty fourth Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) are reportedly working in Oleksiivka.[58] Components of the 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) reportedly proceed to function close to Sadky.[59] Components of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz, eleventh Separate VDV Brigade, and artillery components of the a hundred and fifty fifth Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly working within the Sumy path.[60] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces close to Velyka Berizka (northwest of Sumy Metropolis), Kindrativka, Mohrytsya (northeast of Sumy Metropolis), and Luhivka (southeast of Sumy Metropolis).[61] Drone operators of the Rubikon Middle for Superior Unmanned Applied sciences are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces close to Mykilske (northeast of Sumy Metropolis).[62]

Russian Foremost Effort – Japanese Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Foremost Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 7 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces superior close to Vovchansk and Synelnykove (each northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis).[63]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk, Synelnykove, and Vovchanski Khutory on August 6 and seven.[64]

The commander of a Ukrainian border guard brigade working in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported that the Russian navy command is consistently concentrating forces for fight operations within the Vovchansk path and that Russian forces launch day by day assaults in fireteams of three to 5 personnel with help from giant numbers of strike and reconnaissance drones.[65] The commander added that Russian forces are touchdown fiber-optic cable drones in fields close to Ukrainian floor strains of communication (GLOCs), setting the drones to attend, after which activating the drones to strike passing Ukrainian autos.[66] The officer additionally reported that Russian forces nonetheless discipline tanks, armored combating autos, and armored personnel carriers to move infantry throughout larger-scale assaults.[67]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces close to Chervona Zorya, Neskuchne, and Hoptivka (all north of Kharkiv Metropolis).[68]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk close to Milove.[69]

Russian Subordinate Foremost Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk path on August 7 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior towards Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[70]

Russian forces attacked towards Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk close to Sobolivka and Myrove; northwest of Kupyansk close to Tyshchenkivka; north of Kupyansk close to Holubivka, Kindrashivka, and Radkivka; northeast of Kupyansk close to Fyholivka, Krasne Pershe, and Kamyanka; east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk close to Stepova Novoselivka and towards Kurylivka on August 6 and seven.[71]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Azimut-31 Detachment (Belgorod Oblast’s volunteer unit) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian positions in Kupyansk.[72]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova path on August 7 however didn’t advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova close to Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove and southeast of Borova close to Olhivka on August 6 and seven.[73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Lyman path on August 7 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces superior northwest of Lyman close to Karpivka, Serednie, and Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman close to Kolodyazi and Myrne; and east of Lyman close to Zarichne and within the Serebryanske forest space.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that at the least a part of Zarichne is a contested “grey zone.”[75]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman close to Karpivka and towards Serednie and Shandryholove; north of Lyman close to Ridkodub, Lypove, and Zelena Dolyna and towards Stavky; northeast of Lyman close to Kolodyazi, Myrne, and Yampolivka; and east of Lyman close to Torske, Dibrova, and within the Serebryanske forest space on August 6 and seven.[76]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Lyman path said on August 7 that the Russian navy command is sending poorly geared up and equipped personnel to conduct attritional infantry-led assaults.[77]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian sixteenth Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Normal Workers’s Foremost Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces within the Lyman path.[78]

Russian Subordinate Foremost Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk path on August 7 however didn’t advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk close to Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk close to Vyimka; south of Siversk close to Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk close to Fedorivka on August 6 and seven.[79]

Ukrainian eleventh Military Corps Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets, working within the Siversk path, said that Russian forces lately intensified their offensive exercise and try to bypass Siversk from the instructions of Hryhorivka, Serebryanka, and the Serebryanske forest space.[80] Zaporozhets said that Ukrainian forces are anticipating that Russian forces will quickly resume offensives within the Siversk path from the Toresk path in an effort to consolidate the frontlines and put extra strain on Ukrainian defenses in Kostyantynivka. Zaporozhets added that Russian forces are presently taking a tactical pause within the Siversk path and will not be conducting energetic assaults towards Kostyantynivka however are as an alternative launching artillery and air strikes towards the town. Zaporozhets added that Russian shelling elevated from 5 to 10 artillery fires per day to between 150 and 180.

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (third Mixed Arms Military [CAA], previously 2nd Luhansk Folks’s Republic Military Corps [LNR AC], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly working close to Serebryanka.[81]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar path on August 7 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior west of southern Chasiv Yar.[82]

Russian forces attacked north of Chasiv Yar close to Novomarkove and south of Chasiv Yar close to Stupochky and Predtechyne on August 6 and seven.[83]

Russian forces lately superior within the Toretsk path.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on August 7 signifies that Russian forces superior to central Katerynivka (instantly northwest of Toretsk) and central Shcherbynivka (instantly west of Toretsk) throughout a strengthened company-sized mechanized assault, indicating that Russian forces seemingly lately accomplished the seizure of Toretsk.[84]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior east and southeast of Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk), east of Nelipivka, and northeast and southwest of Rusyn Yar (each northwest of Toretsk).[85]

Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk close to Pleshchiivka; north of Toretsk towards Oleksandro-Shultyne; west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka; and northwest of Toretsk close to Popiv Yar, Poltavka, Katerynivka, Yablunivka, Oleksandro-Kalynove, and Rusyn Yar on August 6 and seven.[86]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade working within the Toretsk path said that the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment (each of the third CAA, SMD) and the a hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division (eighth CAA, SMD), together with its 68th Tank Regiment, are comparatively well-trained models and that components of those models lately redeployed to the Toretsk path.[87] The spokesperson said that Russian forces are solely conducting infantry assaults and never fielding heavy navy gear, and that Russian forces are actively working fiber-optic and reconnaissance drones within the Toretsk path.

A Russian milblogger revealed footage purportedly exhibiting a Russian FAB-3000 glide bomb strike close to Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[88]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian navy observer Kostyantyn Mashovets said that components of the Russian thirty ninth Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Japanese Army District [EMD]) are attacking towards Rusyn Yar (northwest of Toretsk) from Poltavka.[89] Drone operators of the Berkut Group of the 238th Artillery Brigade (eighth CAA) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian targets close to Kostyantynivka.[90]

Components of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (a hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly working close to Shcherbynivka.[91] Drone operators of the Rubikon Middle for Superior Unmanned Applied sciences are reportedly hanging Ukrainian positions close to Oleksandro-Kalynove.[92] Components of the twentieth Motorized Rifle Regiment (probably a reformed Soviet unit) are reportedly working close to Toretsk.[93] Components of the sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (third CAA) are reportedly combating close to Oleksandro-Shultyne.[94]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Pokrovsk path on August 7 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets said that Russian forces try to grab Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces could have retaken some or the entire settlement.[95] ISW assessed that Russian forces seized Kotlyne as of January 24, and a Ukrainian brigade working within the Pokrovsk path reported on February 26 that Ukrainian forces had retaken Kotlyne.[96] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior in southern Pokrovsk.[97]

Russian forces attacked north of Pokrovsk close to Rodynske and Sukhetske and towards Krasnyi Lyman; northeast of Pokrovsk close to Volodymyrivka, Mayak, Novoekonomichne, Boykivka, Nykanorivka, Zatyshok, and Mykolaivka; east of Pokrovsk close to Myrolyubivka and towards Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk close to Novoukrainka and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and towards Molodetske on August 6 and seven.[98] Mashovets said that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Mayak and Udachne.[99]

The chief sergeant of a Ukrainian drone platoon working within the Pokrovsk path said that Russian forces try to bypass and envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and famous that Russian forces are utilizing bikes, buggies, and first-person view (FPV) and fiber-optic drones in assaults.[100] The communications division head of one other Ukrainian brigade working within the Pokrovsk path said that Russian forces are using injured personnel in makes an attempt to infiltrate Pokrovsk.[101] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Pokrovsk path said that Russian forces typically put on civilian garments or garments with Ukrainian patterns to evade detection and merge with the terrain.[102] Sporting civilian clothes in fight operations is perfidy beneath worldwide legislation, which prohibits killing, injuring, or capturing an adversary by resort to perfidy.[103]

Order of Battle: Mashovets said that components of the Russian thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Japanese Army District [EMD]) are reportedly attacking towards Volodymyrivka and Mayak.[104] Mashovets said that components of the first and ninth motorized rifle brigades (each 51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk Folks’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly working northeast of Pokrovsk close to Fedorivka and Razine and north of Pokrovsk towards Rodynske. Mashovets said that components of the 1441st Motorized Rifle Regiment (seemingly comprised of mobilized personnel) are concurrently trying to retain management over Zvirove. Components of the Russian Somali Battalion of the ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly working within the Pokrovsk path.[105]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Novopavlivka path on August 7 however didn’t advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces superior northeast of Yalta (south of Novopavlivka).[106]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka close to Muravka and Novomykailivka; southeast of Novopavlivka close to Horikhove and close to Zelenyi Kut; south of Novopavlivka close to Zaporizhzhia; and southwest of Novopavlivka close to Zelenyi Hai and Tovste and towards Filiya on August 6 and seven.[107] Mashovets and a Russian milblogger said that Ukrainian forces counterattacked between Kotlyarivka and Horikhove (each northeast of Novopavlivka) and close to Filiya and Dachne (south of Novopavlivka).[108]

Order of Battle: Mashovets said that components of the Russian ninetieth Tank Division (forty first CAA, Central Army District [CMD]) are working close to Kotlyarivka and Horikhove.[109] Mashovets said that components of the thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, EMD) are working towards Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka (each southwest of Novopavlivka).[110] Components of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty first CAA, CMD) are reportedly working within the Dnipropetrovsk (Novopavlivka) path.[111]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velykomykhailivka path on August 7 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets said that components of the Russian thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, EMD) superior 1.5 kilometers northeast of Oleksandrohrad (northeast of Velykomykhailivka) with help of components of the 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (twenty ninth CAA).[112] Mashovets said that Russian forces additionally seized Voskresenka (east of Velykomykhailivka) and consolidated positions throughout the settlement.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka close to Piddubne and towards Oleksandrohrad and Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Novomykhailivka close to Voskresenka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka close to Maliivka and Novopil and towards Zaporizke on August 6 and seven.[113]

Order of Battle: Mashovets said that components of the Russian thirty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, EMD) are working close to Voskresenka, Maliivka, and Sichneve (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[114] Mashovets said that components of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, fifth CAA, EMD) and the 69th Cowl Brigade (thirty fifth CAA, EMD) are working close to Shevchenko and Komyshuvakha (each southeast of Velykomykhailivka). Mashovets said that components of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade or sixtieth Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (each fifth CAA, EMD), are working southeast of Velykomykhailivka close to Novopil and Temyrivka. Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Normal Workers’s Foremost Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces close to Zaporizke, Sichneve, Berezove, and Kalynivkse (each south of Velykomykhailivka).[115]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions, safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported floor exercise in jap Zaporizhia Oblast on August 7.

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian eleventh Air Pressure and Air Protection Military (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Japanese Army District [EMD]) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces close to Ternove (southeast of Hulyaipole).[116]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 7 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces lately superior to northern Plavni and made advances northeast of Kamyanske and close to Stepnohirsk (all west of Orikhiv).[117]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv close to Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka; and west of Orikhiv close to Novoandriivka and towards Plavni and Stepnohirsk on August 6 and seven.[118] Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Stepnohirsk.[119]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (forty second Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly working close to Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv).[120] Components of the 108th and 247th Airborne (VDV) regiments (each seventh VDV Division), are reportedly working close to Kamyanske.[121]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kherson path on August 7 however didn’t advance.[122]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces on the suitable (west) financial institution of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[123]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian navy targets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Foremost Intelligence Directorate (GUR) revealed footage on August 7 exhibiting Ukrainian drones hanging Russian Nebo-SVU, Podlyot Okay-1, and 96L6E radar stations, a Raptor-class challenge 02510 touchdown craft, and the air protection base of the Russian third Radio Engineer Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces’ [VKS] radio engineering troops) in unspecified areas in occupied Crimea.[124]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces performed a collection of drone strikes towards Ukraine in a single day on August 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Russia launched 112 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones from the instructions of Kursk Metropolis; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[125] The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Ukrainian forces downed 89 strike and decoy drones and that 23 Russian drones struck 11 unspecified areas in Ukraine. Ukrainian officers reported that Russian strikes broken residential buildings and transportation infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[126]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on August 7 that Russian forces presently launch about 200 guided glide bombs towards Ukraine per day.[127]

Important exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Belarusian Ministry of Protection (MoD) submitted a draft legislation to the Belarusian Home of Representatives on August 7 that proposes amending the standards for adopting martial legislation in Belarus to incorporate assaults on the Union State and CSTO member states.[128]

Notice: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorized materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly obtainable data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially obtainable satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the premise for these reviews. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.

[1] https://version.cnn.com/2025/08/06/europe/putin-witkoff-meeting-constructive-kremlin-says-intl; https://www.bloomberg.com/information/articles/2025-08-07/russia-says-putin-trump-meeting-to-take-place-in-next-few-days; https://nypost.com/2025/08/07/us-news/trump-to-meet-putin-in-coming-days-with-venue-to-be-announced-later-kremlin-says/; ttps://abcnews.go.com/Worldwide/kremlin-trump-putin-agreed-meeting-coming-days/story?id=124438908&cid=social_twitter_abcn

[2] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/77728

[3] https://x.com/Archer83Able/standing/1953555552627576928; https://x.com/annmarie/standing/1953554705277497696; https://x.com/christopherjm/standing/1953561690118766911?s=46

[4] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/77728

[5] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/77725; https://t.me/tass_agency/329676; https://t.me/tass_agency/329678; https://t.me/MID_Russia/63555 ; https://meduza dot io/information/2025/08/07/kreml-rossiya-i-ssha-dogovorilis-o-vstreche-putina-i-trampa-v-blizhayshie-dni

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072425; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625

[7] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15536; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15551; https://www.president dot gov.ua/information/prezidenti-ukrayini-ta-franciyi-obminyalisya-detalyami-konta-99393

[8] https://www.bloomberg.com/information/articles/2025-08-05/russia-weighs-ukraine-air-truce-offer-to-trump-without-ending-war

[9] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/24688783

[10] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/08/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-with-larry-kudlow-of-fox-business-network

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225;

[12] https://mezha dot media/oboronka/chi-bude-1000-shahediv-za-nich-302439/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2025

[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025; https://kyivindependent dot com/investigation-russia-expands-strategic-plant-producing-icbms-with-chinas-help/

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072625

[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2025

[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-battlefield-air-interdiction; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2025

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070725; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070525

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073125

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar053125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925

[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071225; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025

[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125

[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825

[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025 https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2025 https://isw.pub/UkrWar061424

[29] https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/information/2025/08/07/26444930.shtml

[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024

[31] https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/13436 ; https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/13434

[32] https://lenta dot ru/information/2025/08/07/v-rossii-vyskazalis-ob-ozhidaniyah-ot-vstrechi-putina-i-trampa/

[33] https://tsargrad dot television/articles/ukraina-raspolzjotsja-do-urala-esli-peregovory-neizbezhny-bej-pervym_1330855

[34] https://t.me/MID_Russia/63567; https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/13428; https://t.me/tass_agency/329569; https://t.me/tass_agency/329570; https://t.me/tass_agency/329663; https://t.me/tass_agency/329574; https://t.me/tass_agency/329575; https://t.me/tass_agency/329776; https://t.me/tass_agency/329769

[35] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/primer-russian-cognitive-warfare

[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9758

[37] https://t.me/rybar/72676

[38] https://t.me/kcaebirds/1820

[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072725; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072225;

[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/websites/default/recordsdata/Cartographicalpercent20Methodologypercent20Explanationpercent20ISWpercent20CTPpercent202022.pdf

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27522; https://suspilne dot media/1085219-gur-ta-sili-oboroni-urazili-naftopererobnij-zavod-u-krasnodaskomu-krai-rf/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/88909 ; https://meduza dot io/information/2025/08/07/drony-vsu-atakovali-krasnodarskiy-kray-proizoshel-pozhar-na-neftepererabatyvayuschemzavode

[43] https://t.me/supernova_plus/42433; https://x.com/99Dominik_/standing/1953435619348103417; https://x.com/99Dominik_/standing/1953435701699051918; https://x.com/neonhandrail/standing/1953314750084874734; https://x.com/wartranslated/standing/1953413656068215217

[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27522

[45] https://t.me/opershtab23/13899

[46] https://t.me/astrapress/88886 ; https://t.me/astrapress/88881 ; https://t.me/astrapress/88898

[47] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/11872

[48] https://t.me/astrapress/88878 ; https://t.me/astrapress/88880 ; https://t.me/astrapress/88882

[49] https://x.com/666_mancer/standing/1953340389148053703 ; https://t.me/rgn_34/9609 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/standing/1953341054062637162; https://t.me/tass_agency/329632

[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32163

[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/severnnyi/4752; https://t.me/rusich_army/25084; https://t.me/tass_agency/329670

[52] https://t.me/tass_agency/329670; https://t.me/severnnyi/4752; https://t.me/rusich_army/25084  

[53] https://t.me/severnnyi/4753

[54] https://t.me/severnnyi/4756

[55] https://t.me/severnnyi/4752

[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025

[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32163; https://t.me/severnnyi/4753

[58] https://t.me/severnnyi/4752

[59] https://t.me/severnnyi/4752

[60] https://t.me/dva_majors/76910; https://t.me/severnnyi/4753;

[61] https://t.me/bear007/73394; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175105

[62] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/380; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175151

[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32152; https://t.me/severnnyi/4752

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/tass_agency/329641

[65] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wn0NmT8f2mg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/07/sidayut-na-dorozi-chekayut-na-tehniku-zasyllya-vorozhyh-dronnyh-zasidok-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/

[66] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wn0NmT8f2mg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/07/sidayut-na-dorozi-chekayut-na-tehniku-zasyllya-vorozhyh-dronnyh-zasidok-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/

[67] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wn0NmT8f2mg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/07/sidayut-na-dorozi-chekayut-na-tehniku-zasyllya-vorozhyh-dronnyh-zasidok-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/

[68] https://t.me/bear007/73394; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175105

[69] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32152

[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32178

[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40084; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32178; https://t.me/rybar/72676; https://t.me/dva_majors/76903

[72] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13772

[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176

[74] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32180; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66487; https://t.me/milinfolive/154239; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97240; https://t.me/tass_agency/329635

[75] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97240

[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66487; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32180; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22276; https://t.me/milinfolive/15423; https://t.me/dva_majors/76903; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97240

[77] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/prosto-jdut-u-pustyh-bronikah-poblyzu-lymanu-rosiyany-pryrecheno-chvalayut-vmyraty-z-minimumom-amunicziyi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GuRX3eyVWyA&ab_channel=%D0percentA1percentD1percent83percentD1percent81percentD0percentBFpercentD1percent96percentD0percentBBpercentD1percent8CpercentD0percentBDpercentD0percentB5percentD0percent9DpercentD0percentBEpercentD0percentB2percentD0percentB8percentD0percentBDpercentD0percentB8

[78] https://t.me/voin_dv/16354

[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176

[80] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-yak-vorog-zastosovuyu-taktyku-tysyachi-poriziv/

[81] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40119

[82] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66512

[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176

[84] https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1953363367231377818; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30102; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1449; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9761

[85] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66512; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40100; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40137; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175106; https://t.me/dva_majors/76903; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324

[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66512

[87] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/zayihaty-na-bud-yaki-pozycziyi-cze-fart-na-toreczkomu-napryamku-drony-lyutuyut-v-kilzoni/

[88] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175132

[89] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907

[90] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14157

[91] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40100

[92] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/379

[93] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97261

[94] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40144

[95] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907

[96] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025

[97] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40106

[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40106; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907

[99] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907

[100] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/drg-ta-vulychni-boyi-okupanty-namagayutsya-vzyaty-pokrovsk-v-kilcze/

[101] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/probuvav-na-mylyczyah-prosuvatysya-pid-pokrovskom-menshaye-rosiyan-vidpravlyayut-atakuvaty-poranenyh/

[102] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/maskarad-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-protyvnyk-pochav-chastishe-zminyuvaty-taktyku/

[103] https://casebook dot icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/perfidy?afd_azwaf_tok=eyJraWQiOiJCMERCQzkzNTgwRTlCM0FCNzJBRUMyRDQ4RjU0MDYwRkI5Rjc2ODIzMEE5OUJDOEEyQUE0MUEwMkE0RjIzNTUzIiwiYWxnIjoiUlMyNTYifQ.eyJhdWQiOiJjYXNlYm9vay5pY3JjLm9yZyIsImV4cCI6MTc1NDYxMTExNywiaWF0IjoxNzU0NjExMTA3LCJpc3MiOiJ0aWVyMS04NGZiZjk3ODU5LXZoOTI0Iiwic3ViIjoiMTI2OjUyMDE6MjAyOmQwZDY6OWM3Yjo4OTgyOjVjYmE6NTg2IiwiZGF0YSI6eyJ0eXBlIjoiaXNzdWVkIiwicmVmIjoiMjAyNTA4MDdUMjM1ODI3Wi0xODRmYmY5Nzg1OXZoOTI0aEMxQkwxcTMwczAwMDAwMDA2ZjAwMDAwMDAwMDd2cjAiLCJiIjoieEJoNDRvS0VKcUFFSktkVWMzMm1fUkJreEZqLTE2enJIZk41a0RQU1VhRSIsImgiOiJtUkdoZzJvaUNsSU9SSzJwanctNmFieFYyUmRjZXVqRWpyTnhacEZybHlNIn19.be5B7dfTWqsKZ1MIYH9FAs3_CFJZKwKIls7kBcCyi8vpWduHztz9L0jZiMePWLKGugJqmVuikjuvgBT8m9_jviF1Sr76dx3HCdSW6E0Tb6RVCiUCHfp9moi3eZCaN3rlsnC2Rz_CaJP8XUuC79BWRp5_fBZ34MWIKgoebYcTJJwqZ4knKkt-0PaoGLx2J1cXQU_POnMu6nXPg6NZKogtmVnLlm_xg-hHx6L8k7_deyyAO1teP5ddja7_GENEslr4QrL6Xc8wHkFx9odDVG06UxlCTgFmf47DB6Le4VueZrDgqWMK0g7L_sEKDUHEZ7DeTWASBkREiJRoOlZem-R6Og.WF3obl2IDtqgvMFRqVdYkD5s

[104] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907

[105] https://t.me/basurin_e/20296

[106] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32154

[107] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32154

[108] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32154; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2908

[109] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2908

[110] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2909

[111] https://t.me/dva_majors/76913

[112] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2909

[113] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324

[114] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2909

[115] https://t.me/voin_dv/16357; https://t.me/voin_dv/16357

[116] https://t.me/voin_dv/16363

[117] https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175106; https://t.me/rusich_army/25089

[118] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/dva_majors/76903; https://t.me/rusich_army/25089; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32192  

[119] https://t.me/rusich_army/25089; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32192

[120] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97260

[121] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32192

[122] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02hpJQkC51M21tFvcKjfmJrfmWXHk6G2JtK9np1WBQTkFATLwDdmdzTX5ocZPqaEhQl

[123] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32163

[124] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6583; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1085223-gur-pokazalo-rezultati-roboti-u-krimu-urazeno-bazu-ppo-na-aj-petri-desantnij-kater-ta-radiolokacijni-stancii/; https://gur dot gov.ua/content material/vorozhi-rls-u-kupolakh-desantnyi-kater-baza-ppo-na-aipetri-cherhova-zdobych-rozvidnykiv-u-krymu.html

[125] https://t.me/kpszsu/40028

[126] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/23430; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1084861-masovana-dronova-ataka-po-dnipropetrovsini-cetvero-poranenih-gorili-avto-i-budinki-zniseno-33-bpla/

[127] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15537

[128] https://belta dot by/society/view/deputat-polozhenija-voennoj-doktriny-budut-zakrepleny-zakonodatelno-730736-2025/