Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, Justin Younger, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 15, 2025, 9pm ET
Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date every day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
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Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces every day by displaying a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.
Word: The information cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on August 15, apart from experiences concerning the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska. ISW will cowl subsequent experiences within the August 16 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.
US President Donald Trump met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15. Trump and Putin initially deliberate to fulfill one-on-one, however the talks expanded to a three-on-three format, together with Russian Overseas Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and US Particular Envoy for the Center East Steve Witkoff, for unspecified causes.[1] Main Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Funding Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev claimed that the talks went “remarkably properly” following the three-on-three discussions.[2] Trump and Putin then held a joint press convention. Putin addressed the group first and spoke in Russian, reiterating a number of long-standing Kremlin info operations concerning the battle in Ukraine, Russian historical past, and the US-Russia relationship.[3] Putin invoked the geographical closeness of Alaska and the Russian Federation and referred to as again to US-Soviet navy cooperation through the Second World Struggle to be able to artificially spotlight bilateral US-Russia relations. Putin emphasised the significance of fixing the “root causes” of the battle in Ukraine, which the Kremlin has outlined as NATO’s eastward enlargement and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination towards Russian-speakers.[4] Putin additionally accused European states of making an attempt to undermine the negotiation course of. These statements are two customary narrative strains that the Kremlin employs to be able to justify its unlawful invasion of Ukraine and to drive a wedge between america, Europe, and Ukraine.[5] Trump then spoke for a shorter time than Putin and emphasised that the assembly had been “productive,” however that the US and Russian delegations reached “no deal.” Putin concluded by addressing Trump in English and welcoming him to Moscow.[6] Trump and Putin left the press convention stage with out taking any viewers questions, and a luncheon deliberate for after the assembly was reportedly cancelled.[7]
Putin mentioned nothing within the joint press convention to point that he has moderated both his battle goals or his willingness to compromise on them and reiterated language he has used since 2021 to justify Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine. Putin once more demonstrated that he has not modified his views on Ukrainian sovereignty since 2021 and stays disinterested in critical peace negotiations with Ukraine. Putin used the joint press convention following the August 15 Alaska summit to evoke the Kremlin’s long-standing narrative that Russia and Ukraine share the “identical roots” and that Russia considers Ukraine to be a “brotherly” nation.[8] Putin printed an essay on the “Historic Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” in July 2021, during which he equally ideologized that Ukrainians and Belarusians have at all times belonged to the Russian nation due to their shared “historic and religious area.”[9] ISW beforehand assessed that the essay, which Putin printed lower than a month after assembly with then-US President Joe Biden in Geneva in June 2021, was an ultimatum to Kyiv because it overtly questioned Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Putin said within the essay that Ukraine was a ”product of the Soviet period formed on the lands of historic Russia,” and reiterated these arguments in his February 2022 declaration of battle towards Ukraine as a justification for his full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[10] The continuity between Putin’s statements on the August 15 press convention with Trump and his earlier statements demonstrates that he stays dedicated to the view that Ukraine’s existence as a state and territorial integrity rely upon Ukraine’s alignment with Russia.
Trump said that america and Russia didn’t come to a agency settlement concerning the battle in Ukraine. Trump reported that he and Putin “made nice progress” and agreed on “many factors,” however didn’t agree on different factors.[11] Trump didn’t elaborate on the specifics of what the US and Russian delegations mentioned, upon what factors the delegations agreed, and which factors stay in rivalry. Trump said that “there is no deal till there is a deal” and said that he’ll inform Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and NATO states concerning the dialog and that an settlement on Ukraine is “in the end as much as them.”[12] Trump reiterated his timeline that any bilateral financial agreements with Russia will come after the battle is “over with.”
Russia carried out drone and missile strikes in Ukraine within the hours earlier than the August 15 Alaska summit, inflicting civilian casualties and harm to civilian infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Voronezh and Bryansk oblasts and 97 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the path of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast on the evening of August 14 to August 15.[13] Russian forces used drones to focus on frontline areas of Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Chernihiv oblasts, and the missiles to focus on Kharkiv and Chernihiv oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Ukrainian forces shot down or suppressed 63 Shahed-type and decoy drones over northern and japanese Ukraine.[14] The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that the 2 Iskander-Ms and 34 drones struck 13 areas all through Ukraine. Ukrainian officers reported that the ballistic missiles hit automobiles in Dniprovskyi Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and an agricultural enterprise in Koryukivka Hromada, Chernihiv Oblast, killing and wounding civilians.[15] Russian drones hit an ambulance and a civilian automotive in Velykapyskarivka Hromada, Sumy Oblast, on the morning of August 15, killing one civilian.[16] Ukrainian officers and media sources reported on the night of August 15 {that a} Russian drone hit the Sumy Metropolis Central Market, damaging shops, an academic establishment, and different buildings.[17] A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces carried out drone strikes towards Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts “on the eve of the [Alaska] assembly.”[18] US President Donald Trump responded to the August 15 Russian strikes whereas en path to Alaska, noting that Russian President Vladimir Putin is “attempting to set a stage” forward of the summit.[19] Trump said that the Russian strikes will “harm” Putin’s potential to make a cope with Trump. Russia continues to conduct drone and missile strikes that lead to excessive civilian casualties whilst Trump has repeatedly referred to as on Russia to cease strike sequence that disproportionately have an effect on civilian areas.[20] The United Nations (UN) reported on August 13 that Russian air and drone strikes in July 2025 contributed to the very best complete month-to-month casualty toll since Might 2022.[21]
Ukrainian officers proceed to point that Ukrainian counterattacks are stabilizing the state of affairs east and northeast of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk). Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces have stabilized Russian penetration close to Pokrovsk and Dobropillya.[22] Trehubov said that Ukrainian forces proceed to destroy the Russian assault teams within the space and that Russian forces haven’t been in a position to redeploy extra troops to the world. A Ukrainian corps working within the Pokrovsk path reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces cleared Pokrovsk of Russian teams and particular person troopers who had beforehand infiltrated the settlement.[23] A Ukrainian corps working within the Pokrovsk path reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces cleared Hruzke, Rubizhne, Novovodyane, Petrivka, Vesele, and Zolotyi Kolodyaz (all northeast of Dobropillya).[24] A Ukrainian supply reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian navy intelligence reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces have partly stabilized the state of affairs alongside the Vesele-Zolotyi Kolodyaz-Kucheriv Yar line (northeast of Dobropillya).[25] ISW has not noticed broader reporting about Ukrainian forces clearing settlements within the Russian penetration close to Dobropillya at the moment. Ukrainian navy observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 15 that components of the Russian fifth, a hundred and tenth, and 132nd separate motorized rifle brigades (the entire 51st Mixed Arms Military [CAA], previously 1st Donetsk Folks’s Republic Military Corps [DNR AC], Southern Army District [SMD]) initially superior a number of hundred meters east of Pankivka (east of Dobropillya) however that Ukrainian counterattacks from Volodymyrivka and Shakhove (each north of Pankivka) pushed again the Russian advance.[26] Mashovets said that components of the Russian 114th and 132nd separate motorized rifle brigades (each of the 51st CAA) have been making an attempt to carry Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya) and to repel Ukrainian counterattacks within the Ivanivka-Zapovidne path (north to east of Dorozhnie) since August 13.[27] A Russian milblogger additionally acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking close to Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[28] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces had tactical successes close to the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk freeway.[29] One other milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior in Volodymyrivka and Shakhove.[30] ISW has not noticed affirmation of those claimed Russian advances, nonetheless.
The Russian navy command is reportedly attempting to redeploy forces and means to bolster and exploit the penetration close to Dobropillya however has to date been unsuccessful. Mashovets said that small infantry teams of the Russian fifth, a hundred and tenth, and 132nd separate motorized rifle brigades (all three of the 51st CAA) carried out the preliminary penetration, however that the entire variety of Russian forces that carried out the tactical breakthrough didn’t exceed 300 to 350 personnel.[31] Mashovets said that the Russian navy command tried to consolidate the penetration by redeploying components of the 114th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) to close Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and Zapovidne.[32] Mashovets said that the Russian navy command requested senior commanders within the space to supply extra forces and means by redeploying as much as two battalions with armored autos from the eighth CAA (SMD), which is essentially working within the Toretsk path, to assist the opposite components of the 51st CAA that carried out the tactical breakthrough.
Ukrainian officers proceed to conduct evacuations of settlements close to the Russian penetration space, nonetheless, possible reflecting the elevated Russian drone menace as a result of Russian advance close to Dobropillya. Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Army Administration Head Vadym Filashkin introduced on August 14 the obligatory evacuation of households with youngsters from Druzhkivka (northeast of Dobropillya) and villages in Andriivka Hromada, northeast, north, and northwest of Zolotyi Kolodyaz, noting that roughly 1,800 youngsters dwell in these settlements.[33] ISW continues to evaluate that Russia’s use of drone strikes to generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) results within the Ukrainian close to rear is severely hindering Ukrainian evacuation efforts within the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya space.[34]
Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike marketing campaign towards Russian navy and power infrastructure in a single day on August 14 to fifteen. The Ukrainian Basic Employees reported on August 15 that Ukrainian Particular Operations Forces (SSO) and different Ukrainian components carried out a drone strike towards the Rosneft Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast, inflicting explosions and fires.[35] The Ukrainian Basic Employees reported that Syrzan Oil Refinery is one in all Rosneft’s largest refineries and produces a variety of gasoline merchandise, together with aviation kerosene for the Russian navy. Ukrainian Heart for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who typically experiences on profitable Ukrainian drone strikes, posted photos on August 15 displaying smoke over the Syzran Oil Refinery.[36] Ukrainian forces beforehand struck the Syzran Oil Refinery in February 2025.[37] The Ukrainian Basic Employees reported on August 15 that the Ukrainian SSO and different Ukrainian forces additionally struck the Russian Olya Seaport in Astrakhan Oblast, together with the Port Olya 4 vessel, which was carrying Shahed-type drone elements and ammunition from Iran.[38] The Ukrainian Basic Employees reported that the Russian navy makes use of the Olya Seaport as a logistics provide level for navy items from Iran. The Ukrainian SSO Command reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed the Port Olya-4.[39] Astrakhan Oblast Governor Igor Babushkin claimed that Russian air defenses downed Ukrainian drones focusing on the Olya Seaport and that drone particles broken a ship.[40]
Russian opposition outlet Baza reported on August 15 that there was an explosion on the Elastik Gunpowder Manufacturing unit in Ryazan Oblast.[41] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov confirmed that there was an “emergency state of affairs” at a plant within the space that killed 5 and injured 100 others and declared a state of emergency within the municipality.[42] The Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) opened an investigation into the violation of security procedures following the explosion.[43] Kovalenko posted footage on August 15 displaying an explosion at a gunpowder plant in Ryazan Oblast, famous that there have been roughly 50 employees on the plant, and said that “one thing unusual” occurred on the plant.[44] Ukrainian sources haven’t but claimed duty for the strike, nonetheless, and ISW can not affirm its causes at the moment.
Key Takeaways:
- US President Donald Trump met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15.
- Putin mentioned nothing within the joint press convention to point that he has moderated both his battle goals or his willingness to compromise on them and reiterated language he has used since 2021 to justify Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine.
- Trump said that america and Russia didn’t come to a agency settlement concerning the battle in Ukraine.
- Russia carried out drone and missile strikes in Ukraine within the hours earlier than the August 15 Alaska summit, inflicting civilian casualties and harm to civilian infrastructure.
- Ukrainian officers proceed to point that Ukrainian counterattacks are stabilizing the state of affairs east and northeast of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk).
- The Russian navy command is reportedly attempting to redeploy forces and means to bolster and exploit the penetration close to Dobropillya however has to date been unsuccessful.
- Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike marketing campaign towards Russian navy and power infrastructure in a single day on August 14 to fifteen.
- Ukrainian forces lately superior close to Toretsk, and Russian forces lately superior close to Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka.
We don’t report intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t instantly have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to guage and report on the results of those prison actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity regardless that we don’t describe them in these experiences.
- Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Principal Effort – Jap Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate foremost efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Principal Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis
- Russian Subordinate Principal Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Principal Effort #3 – Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
- Important Exercise in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Restricted combating continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 15.[45]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked southwest of Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) alongside the Seim River shore.[46]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Sumy Metropolis)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 15 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger, citing unnamed Ukrainian navy analysts, claimed that Russian forces superior into Novokostyantynivka (close to the worldwide border north of Sumy Metropolis) and that the settlement is a contested “grey zone.”[47]
Russian forces attacked north of Sumy Metropolis close to Kindrativka and Novokostyantynivka and northeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Yunakivka and towards Sadky on August 14 and 15.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Novokostyantynivka, Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy Metropolis), Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy Metropolis), and Sadky.[49]
A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that components of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) proceed to face the specter of encirclement in an unspecified forest space, possible referring to earlier experiences of the Russian navy command abandoning components of the regiment close to Sadky on August 12.[50] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces superior on two flanks and from the rear, forcing Russian forces to unexpectedly retreat to unprepared positions. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are fighting logistics and are unable to resolve provide issues with unmanned aerial autos (UAVs) in forested environments. The milblogger added that Ukrainian forces are actively focusing on components of the regiment with drones.
Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (probably referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are working with components of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) within the Sumy path.[51]
Russian Principal Effort – Jap Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Principal Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 15 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk, Hlyboke, Synelnykove, and on the south (left) financial institution of the Vovcha River on August 14 and 15.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Synelnykove.[53]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working in northern Kharkiv Oblast said that Russian forces working within the Vovchansk path largely leverage small infantry teams for assaults as a result of Ukrainian strikes towards Russian armored tools have pressured the Russian navy command to drag Russian materiel, similar to tanks and artillery methods, again to Russia.[54]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk close to Ambarne on August 15 however didn’t advance.[55]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working in northern Kharkiv Oblast said on August 15 that the depth of Russian navy exercise within the brigade’s space of duty (AOR) decreased in comparison with the primary half of July 2025, notably close to Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burlyk).[56]
Russian Subordinate Principal Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk path on August 15 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked close to Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk close to Sobolivka; north of Kupyansk close to Radkivka and Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk close to Kamyanka; and east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka on August 14 and 15.[57]
Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (eleventh Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) reportedly proceed to function close to Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[58]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova path on August 15 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked close to Borova itself; northeast of Borova close to Zahryzove; and southeast of Borova close to Hrekivka and Olhivka on August 14 and 15.[59]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Ivan Group of the 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Military [GTA], Moscow Army District [MMD]) are placing Ukrainian positions southwest of Lozova (northeast of Borova).[60]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Lyman path on August 15 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian supply claimed that Russian forces superior towards Stavky (north of Lyman) and into western Zarichne (east of Lyman).[61]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman close to Serednie, Shandryholove, and Karpivka; north of Lyman close to Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman close to Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman close to Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman towards Yampil and within the Serebryanske forest space on August 14 and 15.[62]
The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Lyman path said on August 15 that Russian forces on this path are trying to set situations for a mechanized assault through the use of engineering detachments to construct river crossings, together with throughout the Chornyi Zherebets (Zherebets) River.[63] The officer added that Russian forces within the Lyman path are conducting motorbike assaults in small fireteams of 4 to eight soldiers. The officer famous that Russian forces are utilizing anti-heat imaginative and prescient cloaks and tents to evade detection and always reinforcing components of the Russian third (Southern Army District [SMD]) and twentieth (MMD) mixed arms armies (CAAs) working within the Ukrainian unit’s space of duty (AOR) with drone detachments. The officer added that Russian forces working close to Lyman are rising air strikes with guided glide bombs and different munitions and drone strikes, suggesting that Russian forces are intensifying their offensive tempo. A Ukrainian brigade working within the Lyman path reported on August 15 that Russian forces within the Lyman path are leveraging small infantry teams in day and evening assaults, anticipating that among the teams will attain assigned rally factors within the Ukrainian close to rear.[64]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian eleventh Tank Brigade (twenty fifth CAA, Central Army District [CMD]) are reportedly working within the Serebryanske forest space.[65] Drone operators of the sixteenth Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Basic Employees’s Principal Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly working within the Lyman path.[66]
Russian Subordinate Principal Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk path on August 15 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked towards Siversk itself; northeast of Siversk close to Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk close to Vyimka; south of Siversk close to Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk close to Fedorivka, and Vasyukivka on August 14 and 15.[67]
The Ukrainian Dnipro Grouping of Forces reported on August 15 that Russian forces within the Siversk path elevated their use of guided glide bomb strikes from eight to 22 previously three days (since August 12).[68]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar path on August 15 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 15 that Russian forces superior in Mykolaivka (simply west of Chasiv Yar).[69]
Russian forces attacked north of Chasiv Yar close to Minkivka and Orikhovo-Vasylivka and south of Chasiv Yar close to Bila Hora on August 14 and 15.[70]
Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 1065th Artillery Regiment (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions close to Mykolaivka.[71]
Ukrainian forces lately superior within the Toretsk path.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 14 signifies that Ukrainian forces lately superior northwest of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[72]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior northwest of Poltavka, south of Rusyn Yar, and towards Sofiivka (all northwest of Toretsk).[73]
Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk close to Oleksandro-Kalynove, Katerynivka, Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka and towards Stepanivka and Pleshchiivka; and west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka on August 14 and 15.[74]
A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Toretsk path reported that Russian forces have been combating for Toretsk for multiple yr and that the brigade has killed or wounded greater than 50,000 Russian forces in that point – roughly 5 divisions’ price.[75]
Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (one hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) and twentieth Motorized Rifle Division (eighth CAA) are reportedly working close to Shcherbynivka and the Kleban Byk reservoir.[76] Drone operators of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly placing Ukrainian logistics within the Kostyantynivka path.[77]
Russian forces lately superior within the Pokrovsk path.
See topline textual content for experiences of exercise east and northeast of Dobropillya.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 15 signifies that Russian forces lately superior west of Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[78] Ukrainian navy observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces possible withdrew from Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[79] Mashovets reported that components of the Russian 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment (shaped through the 2022 partial reserve call-up), with assist from components of the fifteenth Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Army District [CMD]), superior from Udachne towards Zvirove (east of Udachne).[80]
Russian forces carried out offensive operations close to Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk close to Volodymyrivka, Fedorivka, Novoekonomichne, Zapovidne, Mayak, Shakhove, Krasnyi Lyman, Zaytshok, and Vesele; north of Pokrovsk close to Rodynske, Sukhetske, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, and Rubizhne; east of Pokrovsk close to Promin, Myrolyubivka, and Mykolaivka and towards Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Zvirove, Udachne, and Kotlyne and towards Molodetske on August 14 and 15.[81]
A servicemember of a Ukrainian drone battalion working within the Pokrovsk path reported that Russian forces are attacking throughout each the day and evening and proceed to make use of ways to build up small teams of 1 to 2 personnel for additional assaults.[82] The commander of a drone crew working within the Pokrovsk path said that Russian forces proceed to conduct repeated extremely attritional, infantry-led assaults to assault the identical positions.[83] An aerial reconnaissance officer in a Ukrainian brigade working within the Pokrovsk path said that Russian forces proceed to assault in teams of two to 6 personnel.[84] A Ukrainian brigade working within the Pokrovsk path reported that Ukrainian forces are utilizing “Hiyena” unmanned floor autos (UGVs) that may carry 26 kilograms of explosives to assault Russian fortified positions or infantry in buildings.[85]
Mashovets reported that the world of duty (AoR) of the 2nd CAA (CMD) extends roughly from the southern outskirts of Pokrovsk to Myrolyubivka.[86] Mashovets said that the AoR of the forty first CAA (CMD) extends roughly from Kotlyne to north of Oleksiivka (southeast of Novopavlivka) and that the AoR of the 51st CAA (previously 1st Donetsk Folks’s Republic Military Corps [DNR AC], SMD), which incorporates personnel from occupied Ukraine, is roughly from Myrolyubivka to Popiv Yar (northeast of Pokrovsk and northwest of Toretsk).
Order of Battle: Mashovets said that components of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are combating within the Surove-Bilytske path (north of Pokrovsk) and that components of the ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are combating close to Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[87] Mashovets said that components of the fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are combating in southern Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk).[88] Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Heart for Superior Unmanned Applied sciences are placing Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk and Rodynske.[89]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Novopavlivka path on August 15 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior north and northwest of Andriivka-Klevtsove (southeast of Novopavlivka).[90]
Russian forces attacked towards Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka close to Dachne and Novoukrainka; south of Novopavlivka towards Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka close to Zelenyi Hai, Tovste, Zirka, Andriivka-Klevtsove, and Ivanivka on August 14 and 15.[91]
Russian forces lately superior within the Velykomykhailivka path.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 15 reveals components of the Russian thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, Jap Army District [EMD]) elevating a flag in western Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka), indicating that Russian forces lately seized Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka (southeast of Oleksandrohrad).[92]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Vorone (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) and superior west of Oleksandrohrad to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk Oblast border space.[93
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Myrne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka, and toward Novoselivka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka and Zelene Pole, and toward Zaporizke, Komyshuvakha, and Novoheorhiivka on August 14 and 15.[94]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Basic Employees’s Principal Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly placing Ukrainian forces close to Vorone, Sichneve (southeast of Velykomykhailivka), and Sosnivka (south of Velykomykhailivka).[95] Parts of the eleventh Air Drive and Air Protection Military (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly conducting unguided glide bomb strikes towards Ukrainian positions in Novoselivka.[96]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions, safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in japanese Zaporizhia Oblast on August 15 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger posted a map on August 15 that claimed that Russian forces superior into central Temyrivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[97]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole close to Olhivske, Novodarivka, and Temyrivka on August 14 and 15.[98]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the thirty eighth Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty fifth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Jap Army District [EMD]) are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions in Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[99]
Russian forces continued restricted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 15 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 15 that Russian forces are advancing from the southeastern aspect of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) to be able to interdict Ukrainian floor strains of communication (GLOCs) between Orikhiv and Zaporizhzhia Metropolis.[100] One other milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing on the southeastern aspect of Mala Tokmachka.[101]
Russian forces carried out offensive operations southeast of Orikhiv close to Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv close to Stepnohirsk and towards Prymorske on August 15.[102] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked inside Stepnohirsk.[103]
Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov said that Russian forces struck a freeway close to Orikhiv with a first-person view (FPV) drone, injuring one civilian.[104]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (seventh VDV Division) are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions close to Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[105] Parts of the seventieth Motorized Rifle Regiment (forty second Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly working close to Mala Tokmachka.[106]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kherson path on August 15 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked within the Kherson Metropolis path, together with east of Kherson Metropolis close to the Antonivsky street bridge and southeast of Kherson Metropolis close to Bilohrudyi Island on August 14 and 15.[107]
Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly working on unspecified islands of the Dnipro River Delta.[108] Drone operators of an unspecified Russian VDV artillery brigade, possible the 52nd VDV Artillery Brigade, are reportedly placing Ukrainian forces on the west (proper) financial institution of the Dnipro River with Lancet loitering munitions.[109]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)
See topline textual content for immediately’s report on Russian air, missile, and drone marketing campaign,
Important exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
US President Donald Trump referred to as Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on August 15 forward of the Alaska summit and thanked Lukashenko for releasing 16 prisoners.[110] Trump said that america and Belarus mentioned the discharge of 1,300 extra prisoners, the Alaska summit, and plans for a future Trump-Lukashenko assembly. Belarusian state information company Belta claimed that Lukashenko invited Trump and his household to go to Belarus and that Trump agreed.[111] Belta added that Trump and Lukashenko mentioned bilateral relations, regional affairs, and battle in Ukraine. Lukashenko lately met with US Particular Envoy to Ukraine Basic Keith Kellogg on June 21 and requested an interview with Time Journal printed on August 8.[112]
Word: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorized materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly accessible info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially accessible satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the idea for these experiences. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.
[1] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-putin-alaska-summit/card/top-putin-aides-will-join-trump-meeting-AAWryfNUXRFLA6qJJf1o ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/63871
[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/updates-trump-putin-meet-alaska-summit-war-ukraine-2025-08-15/
[3] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-putin-alaska-summit?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAgDtYYBoHGseNzklHvHtk1TURzZ0KSHNmP21v9MG8m_XImpjI4NLv9X5BdH5nIpercent3D&gaa_ts=689fc8c1&gaa_sig=lqBHP6Jl4yS655aH2kk0wEQU3lcfdQGiTb0jeXFT_SqEUJkDVooxf7pZCrbjnAS7nMINZOdLDF-hL8MlgUEM4Apercent3Dpercent3D
[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325
[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080225; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924
[6] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-putin-alaska-summit?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAgDtYYBoHGseNzklHvHtk1TURzZ0KSHNmP21v9MG8m_XImpjI4NLv9X5BdH5nIpercent3D&gaa_ts=689fc8c1&gaa_sig=lqBHP6Jl4yS655aH2kk0wEQU3lcfdQGiTb0jeXFT_SqEUJkDVooxf7pZCrbjnAS7nMINZOdLDF-hL8MlgUEM4Apercent3Dpercent3D
[7] https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/trump-putin-meeting-alaska-ukraine/#post-update-4b3acefa
[8] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/77793
[9] http://en.kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/66181
[10] http://en.kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/67843
[11] https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-putin-meeting-news-08-15-25#cmedgbprz00053b6vgezqijf0
[12] https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-putin-meeting-news-08-15-25#cmedgbprz00053b6vgezqijf0
[13] https://t.me/kpszsu/40434
[14] https://t.me/kpszsu/40434
[15] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/23635 ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1091620-raketna-ataka-po-dniprovskou-rajonu-e-poranenij/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/okupanty-vdaryly-balistychnoyu-raketoyu-po-selu-na-chernigivshhyni/; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/23420
[16] https://t.me/prokuraturasumy/4475; https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/432; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1091144-rosijskij-dron-atakuvav-civilnu-avtivku-na-ohtirsini-zaginuv-colovik/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/na-sumshhyni-vorozhyj-bezpilotnyk-atakuvav-mashynu-medykiv-ye-zagyblyj/;
[17] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1091688-armia-rf-vdarila-po-centru-sum-zdijnalas-pozeza/; https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/433
[18] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472
[19] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-putin-alaska-summit/card/trump-says-drone-attacks-are-negotiating-strategy-ahead-of-talks-mI67MUFTzjj3gofLyPeV
[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar07292025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070825 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025
[21] https://ukraine.ohchr.org/websites/default/information/2025-08/Ukrainepercent20-%20protectionpercent20ofpercent20civilianspercent20inpercent20armedpercent20conflictpercent20percent28Julypercent202025percent29_ENG.pdf
[22] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/zhaliyutsya-v-telegrami-shho-hlopczi-goli-j-bosi-rosijsku-infiltracziyu-poblyzu-dobropillya-zupynyly-j-vidsikly/
[23] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/224
[24] https://t.me/azov_media/7159
[25] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22318
[26] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921
[27] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921
[28] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507
[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507
[30] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176012
[31] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921
[32] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2922
[33] https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/10352
[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27842
[36] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9628
[37] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021925
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27823
[39] https://www.fb.com/usofcom/posts/1138440454766888?ref=embed_post
[40] https://t.me/babushkin30/8726
[41] https://t.me/bazabazon/40058 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/40063
[42] https://t.me/tass_agency/331268
[43] https://t.me/tass_agency/331262
[44] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9632
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822
[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32481
[47] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97755
[48] https://t.me/rybar/72833 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4832 ;
[49] https://t.me/severnnyi/4832 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472 ; https://t.me/rybar/72833
[50] https://t.me/severnnyi/4836 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2025
[51] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97758
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507; https://t.me/severnnyi/4832; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472
[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472; https://t.me/severnnyi/4832
[54] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/yak-tilky-vyyavlyayut-zhyrnu-czil-tudy-praczyuyut-usi-na-harkivshhyni-rosiyany-ne-ryzykuyut-pokazuvaty-tehniku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0
[55] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507
[56] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/yak-tilky-vyyavlyayut-zhyrnu-czil-tudy-praczyuyut-usi-na-harkivshhyni-rosiyany-ne-ryzykuyut-pokazuvaty-tehniku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507
[58] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40868
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507
[60] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/standing/1956027445997658237; https://t.me/privet_iz_doma152/16823; https://x.com/UAControlMap/standing/1956353186375016773
[61] https://t.me/tass_agency/331172; https://t.me/tass_agency/331195
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32490
[63] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/vorog-vykorystovuye-kytajski-namety-rosiyany-hochut-peretyagty-tehniku-cherez-chornyj-zherebecz/
[64] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/kill-zony-popovnyuyutsya-tilamy-rosiyan-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-okupanty-nevdalo-pidkradayutsya-vnochi/; https://t.me/ombr66/1930percent5C
[65] https://t.me/operationall_space/5777; https://t.me/voin_dv/16465;
[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/16464
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32490
[68] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/na-siverskomu-napryamku-okupanty-vtrychi-zbilshyly-vykorystannya-kabiv/
[69] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507
[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822
[71] https://t.me/mod_russia/55597
[72] https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1956107606587793677 ; https://t.me/z4lpr/1171
[73] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32223
[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472
[75] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/zamist-pereglyadu-futbolu-rosiyany-obraly-pomerty-v-toreczku-staleva-sotka-peremolola-kilka-vorozhyh-dyvizij/
[76] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40868 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40813 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97743
[77] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32467
[78] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30272; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9802; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/22120
[79] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2922
[80] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2922
[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507
[82] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/15/vidsotkiv-50-vedut-ptashky-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosiyany-pokladayutsya-na-karty-v-telefoni/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O14SWvrF1AU
[83] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/nazad-ty-200-vpyerod-uvidim-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-u-rosiyan-nevelykyj-vybir/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScdUZNkwcYc
[84] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/zhodnyh-genialnyh-planiv-tilky-kilkist-operator-droniv-pro-shturmy-okupantiv/
[85] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/giyena-na-kolesah-ukrayinskyj-robot-kamikadze-znis-ukriplennya-voroga-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/; https://www.fb.com/share/v/1BvAKBx5sY/
[86] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2919
[87] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921
[88] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921
[89] https://x.com/Bielitzling/standing/1956353087708205220; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/413
[90] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40865; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66705
[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678
[92] https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1956275486776287456; https://t.me/voin_dv/16472; https://t.me/osintpen/1627; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9797
[93] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40865; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66705
[94] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66705; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175932; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507
[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/16468
[96] https://t.me/voin_dv/16478
[97] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97767
[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822
[99] https://t.me/voin_dv/16476
[100] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472
[101] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507
[102] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507
[103] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507
[104] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/23798
[105] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32467
[106] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97747
[107] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822
[108] https://t.me/mod_russia/55578
[109] https://t.me/mod_russia/55571
[110] https://t.me/pul_1/17844; https://t.me/sotaproject/101786; https://t.me/bbcrussian/84217; https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115033133751064517
[111] https://t.me/pul_1/17844; https://t.me/sotaproject/101786; https://eng.belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-invites-trump-and-family-to-visit-belarus-170549-2025/
[112] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2025
