Katherine Wells, Ben Schmida, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Carolyn Moorman, Avery Borens, Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, and Brian Carter
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The Important Threats Mission (CTP) on the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Examine of Battle (ISW) publish the Iran Replace, which supplies insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored actions that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and pursuits. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Replace each weekday.
Click on here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the continuing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli floor operations. The Syria map is up to date every day alongside the static Syria maps on this report. CTP-ISW ended every day maps of Israeli floor operations in February 2025.
We don’t report intimately on struggle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t immediately have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We completely condemn violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes in opposition to humanity despite the fact that we don’t describe them in these experiences.
A wide range of Syrian armed teams, together with these related to the brand new transitional authorities, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic teams, have dedicated a sequence of extrajudicial killings for the reason that fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW completely condemns these extrajudicial killings.
An unsanctioned oil tanker that’s operated by a US-sanctioned entity and has in all probability illicitly transported oil to the Individuals’s Republic of China (PRC) from Iran issued a false misery name within the Strait of Hormuz on Might 20.[1] The Panamanian-flagged oil tanker the Themir possible issued a misery name that claimed it had been hijacked.[2] A British maritime safety agency stated that the misery name occurred 51 nautical miles northwest of Bandar-e Jask, which is in keeping with the Themir’s place. The agency confirmed on Might 21 that the hijacking name was a false alarm.[3] It stays unclear on the time of writing why the Themir issued the false misery name, however the vessel is linked to Iranian efforts to illicitly switch oil.[4] America sanctioned the Themir’s Malaysia-based proprietor, IMS Ltd, on February 24 for aiding the Iranian oil export community, as a part of US President Donald Trump’s ”most stress” coverage.[5]
The Themir’s sample of conduct suggests it might have performed a ship-to-ship switch at a while whereas off the coast of Iran.[6] Iran and the PRC use ship-to-ship transfers to obfuscate the transportation of PRC purchases of Iranian oil, and ships journey in round holding patterns when conducting ship-to-ship transfers.[7] The Themir was in a round holding sample 51 nautical miles northwest of Bandar-e Jask Port on the southern coast of Iran on the time of the misery name, based on maritime information.[8] The ship and its two sister ships—the Peterpaul and the Chamtang—have frequently sailed between the Gulf of Oman and the PRC.[9] Each the Peterpaul and the Chamtang are sanctioned for illicit transfers of Iranian oil to the PRC.[10] The ships normally enter round holding patterns within the Gulf of Oman earlier than crusing eastwards to PRC ports. Round holding patterns can point out that the ships are executing ship-to-ship transfers.[11] The Themir additionally beforehand travelled from the Gulf of Oman to the PRC’s greatest oil offloading port, Shandong Port, in September 2024.[12] The US Treasury Division not too long ago sanctioned refineries in Shandong for importing billions of {dollars} in Iranian oil.[13] The Themir has additionally travelled alongside comparable routes as its two sanctioned sister ships from close to Bandar-e-Jask Port to japanese PRC by means of the Gulf of Oman and Malacca Strait 5 occasions since January 2024, suggesting that the Themir has beforehand illicitly transported Iranian oil to the PRC.[14]
The fifth spherical of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations will happen in Rome on Might 23.[15] Two unspecified diplomatic sources in Iran informed anti-regime media on Might 21 that Iran requested Omani mediators to persuade the US to ease US calls for in negotiations, possible referring to the US demand for zero uranium enrichment.[16] The difficulty of zero uranium enrichment is the primary sticking level within the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[17] The Trump administration’s negotiating place seems to have cohered round zero uranium enrichment, however Iranian Supreme Chief Ali Khamenei explicitly rejected the US demand for zero uranium enrichment throughout a speech on Might 20.[18] CTP-ISW beforehand assessed that disagreements between Iran and the US in regards to the situation of zero uranium enrichment could stall the negotiations or delay a deal.[19]
Russian Overseas Minister Sergei Lavrov falsely accused the Syrian transitional authorities of “ethnic [and sectarian] cleaning,” which helps the goals of the pro-Assad Alawite insurgency in western Syria.[20] The Coastal Protect Brigade, a pro-Assad Alawite rebel group in western Syria, stated in March 2025 that it seeks to undermine worldwide assist for the transitional authorities by triggering mass reprisal killings of Alawites in response to its assaults. Lavrov stated that Russia is deeply involved in regards to the state of affairs in Syria and claimed that “radical militant teams are finishing up actual ethnic cleaning and mass killings of individuals primarily based on their nationality and faith.”[21] Lavrov additionally claimed that Western international locations ignore crimes around the globe so long as they don’t battle with the West’s world agenda.[22] Lavrov characterised the violence on the Syrian coast in March 2025 as “ethnic cleaning,” which echoes false Russian state media claims that over 1,500 folks had been killed in the course of the coastal violence.[23] This quantity is double the quantity recorded by Syrian human rights organizations.[24] Lavrov made these feedback regardless of a marked lower in sectarian violence on the Syrian coast since March.[25] There have been no main massacres since early March, regardless of continued sectarian killings and different murders in western Syria. These killings and murders, whereas critical and regarding, should not systematic” cleaning” as Lavrov implies. The Syrian transitional authorities additionally didn’t in March 2025 and nonetheless doesn’t exert full management over numerous armed factions that make up the Ministry of Protection (MoD), which signifies that the March 2025 violence was spontaneous and significantly threatened Syria’s stability, but it surely was not systematic.[26] The Syrian transitional authorities took steps in the course of the insurgency to restrict violence, which included the removing of navy items concerned in massacres in addition to the institution of an impartial committee to analyze the occasions on the coast.[27] The federal government, regardless of these steps, nonetheless should take actual, tangible steps to arrest, attempt, and convict these accused of sectarian massacres alongside Syria‘s coast.
A gaggle of unspecified fighters attacked Russian forces stationed at Hmeimim air base, Latakia Province, on Might 20.[28] The Syrian transitional authorities is extraordinarily unlikely to have sanctioned any assault on Russian forces at Hmeimim, given Syria and Russia’s lively negotiations over the 2 international locations’ financial and navy cooperation. The militants attacked the southwest perimeter of the airfield however retreated after Russian forces killed a minimum of three fighters.[29] The fighters killed two Russian troopers on the base.[30] Russian sources on the time of the assault claimed that the attackers had been Uzbek overseas fighters who had been unaffiliated with Syrian safety forces.[31] Syrian sources later claimed that the attackers had been overseas navy trainers for HTS who attacked the Russians with out orders, nevertheless.[32] Uzbek nationals and Central Asians have traditionally made up an essential portion of HTS’s navy construction, together with coaching HTS particular forces.[33] HTS-allied Central Asian and Caucasian armed teams comparable to Katibat al Tawhid wa Jihad (KTJ), the Turkistan Islamic Get together (TIP), and Ajnad al Kavkaz (Troopers of the Caucasus) are recognized for his or her excessive loyalty to HTS.[34] It’s unlikely that these factions and their related non-public navy corporations would act independently of HTS’s chain of command, on condition that HTS has built-in overseas fighters into the transitional authorities’s navy.[35] Overseas fighters in HTS are significantly unlikely to disobey HTS leaders as a result of they’ve few choices in the event that they disobey orders and are deported or imprisoned. A return to their dwelling international locations would lead to jail time at a minimal.
Key Takeaways:
- Iranian Exercise within the Persian Gulf: An unsanctioned oil tanker that’s operated by a US-sanctioned entity and has in all probability illicitly transported oil to the Individuals’s Republic of China (PRC) from Iran issued a false misery name within the Strait of Hormuz on Might 20. The tanker’s sample of conduct suggests it might have performed a ship-to-ship switch at a while whereas off the coast of Iran. Iran and the PRC use ship-to-ship transfers to obfuscate the transportation of PRC purchases of Iranian oil.
- US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: The fifth spherical of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations will happen in Rome on Might 23. Two unspecified diplomatic sources in Iran informed anti-regime media on Might 21 that Iran requested Omani mediators to persuade the US to ease US calls for in negotiations, possible referring to the US demand for zero uranium enrichment.
- Syria and Russia: Russian Overseas Minister Sergei Lavrov falsely accused the Syrian transitional authorities of “ethnic [and sectarian] cleaning,” which helps the goals of the pro-Assad Alawite insurgency in western Syria. Lavrov made these feedback regardless of a marked lower in sectarian violence on the Syrian coast since March.
- Russians in Syria: A gaggle of unspecified fighters attacked Russian forces stationed at Hmeimim air base, Latakia Province, on Might 20. Syrian sources claimed that the attackers had been overseas navy trainers for HTS who attacked the Russians with out approval from HTS.
Iranian Choice-Making, Inside Dynamics, and Overseas Coverage
The Iranian Overseas Affairs Ministry introduced on Might 21 that Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli has been appointed as Iran’s new ambassador to China.[36] This appointment suggests Iran could purpose to strengthen political and safety cooperation with China, given Rahman Fazli’s background in inside safety and his connections to the 2021 China-Iran cooperation settlement. Rahmani Fazli beforehand served because the Iranian Inside Minister underneath former President Hassan Rouhani and held senior safety positions, together with Regulation Enforcement Command Deputy Commander in Chief and the Nationwide Safety Council head.[37] America sanctioned Rahmani Fazli in 2020 for authorizing deadly pressure in opposition to protestors in the course of the November 2019 protests, which killed a whole bunch of Iranians, together with minors.[38] Rahman Fazli has a powerful relationship with senior Supreme Chief Adviser Ali Larijani, who performed a key position in elevating Rahmani Fazli to Inside Minister in 2013. Larijani and Rahman Fazli cooperated within the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), the Nationwide Safety Council, and the Iranian Parliament.[39] Rahmani Fazli’s appointment as ambassador to China aligns with Larijani’s long-standing position overseeing the Iranian strategic partnership with China, together with the 25-year cooperation settlement signed in 2021.[40] Rahmani Fazli’s background in inside safety and high-level state coordination could mirror an Iranian goal to strengthen political and safety cooperation with China.
Iranian Artesh Commander Main Normal Abdol Rahim Mousavi met with Belarusian Deputy Chief of the Normal Workers Main Normal Vladimir Kupriyanyuk on Might 21 to debate protection cooperation.[41] Each side emphasised the significance of strengthening ties in key areas, together with navy coaching, experience-sharing, and broader protection coordination. Iran and Belarus beforehand signed two memoranda of understanding on protection and commerce cooperation in March and April 2024, respectively. Iran has begun work on establishing a navy drone manufacturing facility in Belarus since Might 2023 to assist the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[42] Cooperation between Iran and Belarus, a key Russian ally, comes amid elevated engagement and protection coordination between Iranian and Russian protection officers since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[43]
Iranian Armed Forces Normal Workers (AFGS) Chief Main Normal Mohammad Bagheri inspected ongoing efforts to fortify Iran’s japanese border throughout a go to to Sistan and Baluchistan Province on Might 21.[44] Bagheri acknowledged that sealing the japanese frontier stays a prime precedence with the intention to counter terrorism, drug trafficking, and unlawful border crossings. The venture consists of four-meter-high concrete partitions geared up with drones, 360-degree cameras, and good sensors. Border safety will finally cowl 300 kilometers. Iran’s ongoing efforts to fortify its southeastern border are possible motivated partially by an uptick in assaults by anti-regime teams, particularly Jaish al Adl. Jaish al Adl is a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group that has focused Iranian safety personnel and infrastructure in Sistan and Baluchistan Province since December 2023.[45]
The Iranian rial appreciated from 843,000 rial to at least one US greenback on Might 20 to 841,000 rial to at least one US greenback on Might 21.[46]
Syria
Prime Syrian officers met with the Turkish intelligence chief, possible primarily to debate the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).[47] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara, Syrian Overseas Minister Asaad al Shaibani, and Syrian Intelligence Chief Hussein Salama met with Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin in Damascus on Might 20.[48] The officers mentioned the mixing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian state, border safety, and counter-ISIS actions, together with transferring supervision of detention camps in northeastern Syria to the Syrian state.[49] Salama, who was a key HTS chief, has been answerable for negotiations with the SDF and its constituent militias throughout Syria, together with in Aleppo Metropolis and Deir ez Zor Province.[50] Turkey has not too long ago expressed concern in regards to the sluggish integration of the SDF.[51] Salama’s presence means that the SDF was a significant level of focus in the course of the discussions. Counter-ISIS actions and the switch of detention camps to authorities management would fall underneath the umbrella of SDF points as a result of the SDF performs a really distinguished position in counter-ISIS operations and controls the detention camps the place ISIS fighters are held.[52] Syrian and Turkish officers have met since January 2025 to debate joint protection considerations, together with Turkey’s navy presence in Syria and Turkish help to the Syrian military.[53]
Turkey and Israel reportedly established a de-confliction line in April 2025, based on a current report by a Turkish journalist.[54] The de-confliction line seeks to forestall misunderstandings or navy incidents between Turkey and Israel, based on two sources conversant in the matter.[55] Latest Turkish tensions with Israel could have delayed a number of Turkish initiatives to develop a navy presence in Syria.[56] Israel struck a number of Syrian bases in March and April 2025 as a ”warning” to Turkey earlier than it positioned its property on the bases.[57] Syrian navy sources informed Western media on April 7 that Turkish navy groups deliberate to go to the T4 and Palmyra air bases in Syria however needed to cancel the go to after Israel struck each bases hours prior, thus making them unusable.[58] Turkey and Israel held their first ”technical“ assembly in Azerbaijan on April 9 to ascertain a de-confliction mechanism.[59] Turkey and Israel have reportedly held a number of conferences since April 9 and are scheduled to satisfy later this month to debate a broader de-confliction deal.[60] This open line of communication between Turkey and Israel might presumably stop a possible stand-off between the 2 events, which each have strategic pursuits in Syria. Syrian authorities representatives and the top of the Israel Protection Forces (IDF) Operations Directorate Oded Basyuk additionally reportedly held direct talks in Azerbaijan to resolve joint considerations.[61]
America and Turkey held a brand new spherical of the Syria Working Group in Washington, DC, on Might 20.[62] The Syria Working Group is a high-level US and Turkish working group that goals to synchronize coverage and deepen bilateral cooperation in Syria between the 2 international locations.[63] The US and Turkish delegations mentioned shared priorities in Syria, together with sanctions aid and combating terrorism.[64] A number of US and Turkish officers attended the assembly, together with US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, Turkish Deputy Overseas Affairs Minister Nuh Yilaz, US Ambassador to Turkey Thomas Barrack, Jr., and Turkish Ambassador to the US Sedat Onal.[65] Barrack was reportedly tapped because the US particular envoy to Syria on Might 21.[66] US and Turkish officers affirmed their dedication to growing cooperation and coordination on Syria’s stability and safety.[67] US President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have each beforehand burdened the significance of a US-Turkey partnership for Syria’s stability and safety.[68]
America introduced on Might 21 that it’s going to start to revive regular diplomatic relations with Syria.[69] Unspecified diplomatic sources informed Western media that the US would appoint present US Ambassador to Turkey Thomas Barrack Jr. as a particular envoy for Syria.[70] Trump administration officers additionally introduced that the US will situation a short lived sanctions waiver that covers a lot of the Syrian economic system earlier than the US Congress passes a brand new regulation to repeal sanctions focusing on Syria.[71] The Caesar Syria Civilian Safety Act of 2019, which is essentially the most stringent of US sanctions imposed on Syria, would require an act of Congress to take away. The Caesar Act targets anybody who supplies assist to the Syrian authorities, helps the Syrian oil and fuel trade, exports plane or navy tools to Syria, or supplies development or engineering providers immediately or not directly to the Syrian authorities.[72] The difficult legislative steps in the US and many years of US sanctions focusing on Syria imply that it’s going to take time for the US to completely elevate sanctions on Syria.[73] A earlier short-term US sanctions waiver issued in January 2025 didn’t result in important funding in Syrian industries, partly because of confusion over what actions had been included within the waiver.[74] Inside instability and uncertainty concerning Syria’s future could equally deter funding within the short- to medium-term. It’ll subsequently possible take weeks or months earlier than the removing of sanctions generates seen and tangible financial results all through the nation.
Syrian Protection Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra met with the sixtieth Division to debate the division’s current deployments in Aleppo on Might 21.[75] Qasra met with sixtieth Division commander Brigadier Normal Awad Mohammad (Abu Qutayba al Shami) and different division commanders and personnel.[76] Abu Qutayba was a commander inside HTS’s predecessor group, Jabhat Fateh al Sham, since a minimum of 2016.[77] Abu Qutayba then oversaw HTS’s Aleppo Sector and commanded an HTS brigade in 2020.[78] The Syrian MoD acknowledged that Qasra and the sixtieth Division commanders mentioned the division’s current deployments to northern and japanese Aleppo Province.[79] The sixtieth Division deployed to villages west of Tishreen Dam on April 14 to watch the world and conduct de-mining operations after the SDF withdrew from its positions there as a part of its settlement with the transitional authorities.[80] It’s notable that Qasra met with this pressure, which is managed by HTS personnel, after SNA forces reportedly clashed with the SDF on Might 19.[81] Qasra could have mentioned these clashes and ways in which the sixtieth Division can reply to them sooner or later.
Iraq
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani introduced on Might 21 that his Reconstruction and Growth Coalition will contest the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[82] The coalition consists of events led by Common Mobilization Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh and former Common Mobilization Forces (PMF) spokesperson Ahmed al Asadi. The coalition notably doesn’t embody Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Badr Group head Hadi al Ameri, whose absence follows experiences that Ameri left Sudani’s coalition over disagreements with Sudani.[83] Iran not too long ago urged unity amongst Shia Coordination Framework leaders (presumably together with Sudani) forward of the elections to enhance the chance that Iranian-backed events will keep management of the Iraqi authorities.[84] The Shia Coordination Framework is a unfastened coalition of Shia political events, a few of which Iran backs. The Coordination Framework supported Sudani for prime minister in 2022. State of Regulation coalition head Nouri al Maliki and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq chief Qais al Khazali will reportedly run separate lists in opposition to Sudani.[85]
The Iraqi Unbiased Excessive Electoral Fee rejected the Sunni-led United Anbar Coalition’s participation within the upcoming parliamentary elections.[86] The celebration is against main Sunni politician Mohammad al Halbousi. Prime Sunni politicians shaped the United Arab Coalition in 2022 in opposition to former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi.[87] It consists of former Finance Minister Rafai al Issawi. Former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s administration charged Issawi with corruption in 2013 after Issawi condemned Maliki’s insurance policies.[88] Maliki weaponized the IHEC in opposition to his political opponents throughout his administration.[89]
A Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated Iraqi parliamentarian known as for the dismissal and trial of the Sadrist Basra governor on Might 21 after the governor tried to demolish houses in an space through which Iranian-backed events could have substantial financial pursuits.[90] Kataib Hezbollah is a key Iranian proxy in Iraq.[91] Prime Minister Sudani despatched a letter to Basra Governor Asad al Eidani on Might 19 through which Sudani requested that Eidani delay the demolition of homes in Basra Province. The pinnacle parliamentarian of the committee shaped to analyze Eidani famous that the Basra provincial authorities has taken steps to take away encroachments for years and implied that the provincial authorities is presently working to take away encroachments in al Zubair District.[92] Al Zubair District hosts an oil subject that produces about 200,000 barrels per day, and the district is a stronghold for Iranian-backed Iraqi political events, who’ve repeatedly tried to create a separate province for the district.[93] The involvement of al Zubair District and its oil rents could have motivated Iranian-backed actors to behave in opposition to Eidani. A number of parliamentarians stated that the committee’s investigation of Eidani and name for his dismissal falls outdoors of parliament’s jurisdiction.[94] One other Iranian-backed parliamentarian praised the creation of the committee and subsequent name for his dismissal.[95]
It’s notable that Iranian-backed parliamentarians have known as for the removing of a Sadrist governor forward of the upcoming elections.[96] Eidani can be reportedly an ally of Sudani, who has shaped a coalition that can oppose different Shia Coordination Framework events.[97] A Basra parliamentarian implied that the investigation intends to politically goal Eidani as a result of he’s a contender for the premiership.[98]
Arabian Peninsula
Axis of Resistance goals:
- Harden the Houthi regime in opposition to inside dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
- Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition with the intention to management all of Yemen
- Erode Israeli will to proceed the struggle within the Gaza Strip
Nothing important to report.
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
Nothing important to report.
CTP-ISW won’t be masking the brand new Israeli operation within the Gaza Strip. We’ve reprioritized our Center East protection to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, Iranian home safety, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, together with the Palestinian Territories. On condition that Israel and its companions have destroyed Hamas’ navy group and severed the group’s capability to resupply itself, we are actually centered on how Iran seeks to rebuild its strains of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas by means of Syria.
The Iran Replace supplies insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored actions overseas that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and pursuits. It additionally covers occasions and developments that have an effect on the soundness and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Important Threats Mission (CTP) on the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Examine of Battle (ISW) supplies these updates frequently primarily based on regional occasions.
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” because the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated within the Center East for the reason that Islamic Republic got here to energy in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to safe their collective pursuits. Tehran considers itself to be each a part of the alliance and its chief. Iran furnishes these teams with various ranges of monetary, navy, and political assist in change for some extent of affect or management over their actions. Some are conventional proxies which are extremely attentive to Iranian path, whereas others are companions over which Iran exerts extra restricted affect. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic goals, which embody eroding and finally expelling American affect from the Center East, destroying the Israeli state, or each. Pursuing these goals and supporting the Axis of Resistance to these ends have change into cornerstones of Iranian regional technique.
[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hijack-call-ship-off-iran-false-alarm-security-firm-ambrey-says-2025-05-21/; Knowledge out there by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence; https://dwelling.treasury.gov/information/press-releases/sb0026
[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hijack-call-ship-off-iran-false-alarm-security-firm-ambrey-says-2025-05-21/ ; Knowledge out there by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence;
[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hijack-call-ship-off-iran-false-alarm-security-firm-ambrey-says-2025-05-21
[4] Knowledge out there by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence
[5] https://dwelling.treasury.gov/information/press-releases/sb0026
[6] Knowledge out there by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence
[7] https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-iran-south-china-sea-oil-trade
[8] Knowledge out there by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence
[9] Knowledge out there by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence
[10] https://dwelling.treasury.gov/information/press-releases/sb0026
[11] https://documentation.spire.com/weblog/port-events-api-upgrades-summer-2024
[12] Knowledge out there by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence
[13] https://www.state.gov/sanctioning-a-china-based-teapot-refinery-to-pressure-iran-further/#:~:textual content=Thepercent20Unitedpercent20Statespercent20ispercent20today,includingpercent20topercent20Chinapercent2Cpercent20topercent20zero.
[14] Knowledge out there by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence
[15] https://x.com/badralbusaidi/standing/1925221902991097994
[16] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202505218603
[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-envoy-witkoff-cites-us-red-line-with-iran-against-uranium-enrichment-2025-05-18/ ; https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/standing/1924483539325616490 ; https://www.mehrnews dot com/information/6466382 ; https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=60234
[18] https://www.criticalthreats.org/evaluation/iran-update-may-19-2025 ; https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=60234
[19] https://www.criticalthreats.org/evaluation/iran-update-may-15-2025
[20] https://tass dot ru/politika/23990807
[21] https://tass dot ru/politika/23990807
[22] https://tass dot ru/politika/23990807
[23] https://tass dot ru/politika/23990807 ; https://www.enabbaladi dot web/743680/%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB4percentD8percentA8percentD9percent83percentD8percentA9-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB3percentD9percent88percentD8percentB1percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentA9-%D8percentAApercentD9percent88percentD8percentABpercentD9percent82-803-%D9percent82percentD8percentAApercentD9percent84percentD9percent89-%D8percentA8percentD8percentA3percentD8percentADpercentD8percentAFpercentD8percentA7percentD8percentAB-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB3percentD8percentA7/ ; https://snhr dot org/arabic/2025/03/11/%d9percent85percentd9percent82percentd8percentaapercentd9percent84-803-%d8percenta3percentd8percentb4percentd8percentaepercentd8percenta7percentd8percentb5-%d8percentaepercentd8percenta7percentd8percentb1percentd8percentac-%d9percent86percentd8percentb7percentd8percenta7percentd9percent82-%d8percenta7percentd9percent84percentd9percent82percentd8percenta7percentd9percent86percentd9percent88percentd9percent86-%d8percenta8percentd9percent8apercentd9percent86-6-%d9percent8810-%d8percenta2percentd8percentb0/
[24] https://www.enabbaladi dot web/743680/%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB4percentD8percentA8percentD9percent83percentD8percentA9-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB3percentD9percent88percentD8percentB1percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentA9-%D8percentAApercentD9percent88percentD8percentABpercentD9percent82-803-%D9percent82percentD8percentAApercentD9percent84percentD9percent89-%D8percentA8percentD8percentA3percentD8percentADpercentD8percentAFpercentD8percentA7percentD8percentAB-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB3percentD8percentA7/ ; https://snhr dot org/arabic/2025/03/11/%d9percent85percentd9percent82percentd8percentaapercentd9percent84-803-%d8percenta3percentd8percentb4percentd8percentaepercentd8percenta7percentd8percentb5-%d8percentaepercentd8percenta7percentd8percentb1percentd8percentac-%d9percent86percentd8percentb7percentd8percenta7percentd9percent82-%d8percenta7percentd9percent84percentd9percent82percentd8percenta7percentd9percent86percentd9percent88percentd9percent86-%d8percenta8percentd9percent8apercentd9percent86-6-%d9percent8810-%d8percenta2percentd8percentb0/
[25] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-12-2025
[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025
[27] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/standing/1898507756807790846 ; https://english.enabbaladi dot web/archives/2025/03/investigation-committee-for-coastal-events-clarifies-its-work-mechanism/
[28] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1924879322877247834 ; https://www.impartial.co.uk/information/bashar-assad-syrian-observatory-for-human-rights-sergey-lavrov-moscow-united-states-b2755512.html
[29] https://www.impartial.co.uk/information/bashar-assad-syrian-observatory-for-human-rights-sergey-lavrov-moscow-united-states-b2755512.html ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1925267030099341435
[30] https://www.impartial.co.uk/information/bashar-assad-syrian-observatory-for-human-rights-sergey-lavrov-moscow-united-states-b2755512.html ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/standing/1925267030099341435
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