Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, April 19, 2025
Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Daria Novikov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan with William Runkel
April 19, 2025, 4:40 pm ET
Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cell machine) is strongly really useful for utilizing this data-heavy software.
Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day by displaying a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.
Be aware: The info cut-off for this product was 11am ET on April 19. ISW will cowl subsequent reviews within the April 20 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky proposed extending Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 30-hour unilateral truce on Russian army operations in Ukraine to an entire and unconditional 30-day ceasefire. Putin ordered Russian Chief of the Common Workers Military Common Valery Gerasimov to formally halt all Russian army actions in Ukraine on April 19, efficient from 1800 Moscow time on April 19 till 0000 Moscow time on April 21.[1] Putin said that Russia will “assume that the Ukrainian facet will observe [Russia’s] instance” whereas ordering Russian forces to “be able to repel attainable violations of the truce” by Ukrainian forces. Zelensky responded to Putin’s order in a while April 19 and proposed that Russia and Ukraine prolong Putin’s 30-hour truce to a “full and unconditional” 30-day ceasefire if Russian forces really stop all army operations.[2] Zelensky said that Ukraine will “mirror” Russia’s response and accused Russia of imposing the 30-hour truce for “headlines” moderately than demonstrating real confidence-building measures. Zelensky reported that, in accordance with Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Common Oleksandr Syrskyi, Russian forces proceed assault operations and shelling in a number of unspecified areas of the frontline. This truce is unlikely to carry provided that Russian forces seem to have continued restricted offensive operations and indiscriminate shelling throughout the frontline within the first few hours of the truce and given Russia’s continued rejection of a full ceasefire. The USA and Ukraine collectively proposed implementing a direct 30-day full ceasefire to Russia on March 13, however Putin and different Russian officers have repeatedly rejected the proposal since then.[3]
Putin said that the momentary truce will reveal whether or not Ukraine is prepared to adjust to agreements and take part in peace negotiations “aimed toward eliminating the basis causes of the Ukrainian disaster.”[4] Russian officers usually invoke the “root causes” phrase to allude to Russia’s unyielding calls for for NATO to desert its open-door coverage and for regime change in Ukraine.[5] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces will observe the Easter truce supplied that Ukrainian forces reciprocate.[6] It’s unlikely that Russian officers and army commanders successfully communicated plans to implement the momentary truce to frontline items or Ukrainian officers previous to Putin’s announcement. Russia’s prior well-evidenced conduct concerning the momentary moratorium on long-range strikes towards vitality infrastructure signifies that Russian officers doubtless intend to proceed making unsubstantiated allegations of Ukrainian truce violations.[7] Russia, on this sense, is probably going leveraging its unilateral implementation of a brief truce in Ukraine to introduce informational circumstances that may act as a pretext to help Russia’s continued efforts to undermine and discredit Ukraine. Russia might exploit unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian truce violations to undermine help for the proposed peace framework that america offered in Paris, France, on April 17. Russia can be doubtless making an attempt to curry favor with america and painting itself as an agreeable negotiating accomplice in direct response to US President Donald Trump’s current remarks that america will rethink its function in brokering peace in Ukraine, relying on how the peace course of develops within the coming days.[8]
US officers are reportedly rising pissed off with the Kremlin’s rejections of US proposals to finish the conflict in Ukraine. The New York Instances (NYT), citing European officers who had been aware of the US discussions in Paris on April 17, reported on April 18 that the US stance on a ceasefire stays largely the identical however that Russian officers have “dragged their toes” and insisted on further circumstances for US President Donald Trump’s proposed unconditional common ceasefire, together with the “denazification” of Ukraine.[9] Russian President Vladimir Putin named “denazification” as considered one of his fundamental targets in launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and Russian officers have beforehand outlined “denazification” because the “liquidation of those that instill” Russophobia in different individuals.[10] Putin and different Kremlin officers have since reiterated this demand for “denazification” to name for regime change in Ukraine and the set up of a pro-Russian proxy authorities.[11] Axios reported on April 18 that two European diplomats said that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio instructed UK, German, and French diplomats that President Trump is “dropping his persistence” and will withdraw from the peace course of if a peace deal will not be concluded “quickly.”[12] Trump said on April 18 that he hopes to conclude a peace deal in Ukraine “rapidly” and that if both Ukraine or Russia “makes it very troublesome,” then “we’re simply going to take a go.”[13] CNN reported on April 18 {that a} supply aware of the Trump administration said that the Trump administration is making an attempt to plan one other assembly between US Particular Envoy to the Center East Steve Witkoff and Russian authorities to debate the proposed framework.[14]
Ukraine and Russia carried out the biggest prisoner of conflict (POW) alternate on April 19 for the reason that begin of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on April 19 that Ukrainian authorities returned 277 Ukrainian POWs, comprised of members of the Ukrainian forces, Nationwide Guard, State Transport Service, and Border Guard, from Russian captivity.[15] Zelensky thanked the United Arab Emirates for mediating the POW alternate with Russia and famous that Ukrainian authorities have returned a complete of 4,552 Ukrainian civilians and troopers from Russian captivity for the reason that begin of the conflict in February 2022. The Russian MoD claimed on April 19 that Russia and Ukraine carried out a 246-to -246 POW alternate and that Russia transferred an extra 31 wounded Ukrainian POWs to Ukraine in alternate for 15 wounded Russian POWs.[16]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky proposed extending Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 30-hour unilateral truce on Russian army operations in Ukraine to an entire and unconditional 30-day ceasefire.
- US officers are reportedly rising pissed off with the Kremlin’s rejections of US proposals to finish the conflict in Ukraine.
- Ukraine and Russia carried out the biggest prisoner of conflict (POW) alternate on April 19 for the reason that begin of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces just lately superior close to Pokrovsk, and Russian forces just lately superior close to Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
We don’t report intimately on Russian conflict crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t straight have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We’ll proceed to judge and report on the consequences of those prison actions on the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity although we don’t describe them in these reviews.
- Alleged Ceasefire Violation
- Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Most important Effort – Jap Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate fundamental efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis
- Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #3 – Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Drive Era Efforts
- Russian Technological Variations
- Vital Exercise in Belarus
Alleged Ceasefire Violations
Ukrainian officers have agreed to “mirror” Russia’s implementation of a common ceasefire following the expiration of the momentary ceasefire on vitality infrastructure strikes. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov introduced the tip of the momentary ceasefire on vitality infrastructure strikes on April 18, and Ukraine and Russia haven’t concluded agreements for a maritime ceasefire within the Black Sea or common ceasefire in Ukraine.[17] Russian President Vladimir Putin introduced a unilateral Easter truce from 1800 Moscow time on April 19 to 0000 Moscow time on April 21.[18] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky agreed to “mirror” Russia’s implementation of the Easter truce and proposed increasing this truce to a 30-day full ceasefire, as US authorities first proposed on March 18, a proposal to which Russian authorities haven’t but responded and have repeatedly rejected.[19]
The Russian MoD continued to assert with out proof on April 19 that Ukrainian strikes broken vitality infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine over the previous day, however it’s unclear why, provided that the Kremlin introduced the tip of the vitality infrastructure strikes ceasefire on April 18.[20]
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian forces continued efforts to push Ukrainian forces from restricted positions in Kursk Oblast on April 19 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD and a few Russian milbloggers claimed on April 19 that Russian forces seized Oleshnya (west of Sudzha), though one other Russian milblogger denied this declare.[21] Russian Chief of the Common Workers Military Common Valery Gerasimov instructed Russian President Vladimir Putin on April 19 that parts of the Russian 51st and 137th airborne (VDV) regiments (each of the 106th VDV Division) seized Oleshnya and are clearing the Gornal Monastery (probably referring to the St. Nicholas Monastery northeast of Gornal [south of Sudzha]).[22]
Russian forces continued assaults close to Oleshnya and Gornal on April 18 and 19.[23]
Order of Battle: Gerasimov claimed that parts of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are working in Gornal.[24] Parts of the a hundred and fifty fifth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly working in Kursk Oblast.[25] Parts of the “Pitersky” Battalion of Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly combating within the Kursk Oblast border space.[26]
Combating continued close to Demidovka and Popovka (each northwest of Belgorod Metropolis) on April 18 and 19 however Russian forces didn’t advance.[27]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking close to Demidovka and Popovka.[28]
Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces have pushed Ukrainian forces from Demidovka and are destroying small teams of Ukrainian forces within the forests south of Popovka.[29]
Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian thirty fourth Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty ninth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly working in Demidovka.[30]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Sumy Metropolis)
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported floor exercise in Sumy Oblast on April 19.
Russian Most important Effort – Jap Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)
Russian forces continued assaults within the Kharkiv route on April 19 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Kharkiv Metropolis within the route of Zolochiv, north of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Lyptsi, and northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk on April 18 and 19.[31] A Russian supply claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking close to Vovchansk.[32]
An officer in a Ukrainian brigade working within the Kharkiv route said on April 19 that Russian forces haven’t used armored autos on this route in a very long time.[33]
Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk route on April 19 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior south of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk) and entered southeastern Mala Shapkivka (southeast of Zapadne).[34] A milblogger claimed that central Mala Shapkivka is a contested “grey zone.”[35]
Russian forces continued floor assaults northeast of Kupyansk close to Kamyanka, north of Kupyansk close to Kindrashivka, east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk close to Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka on April 18 and 19.[36]
Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian twenty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Military [GTA], Moscow Army District [MMD]) are reportedly placing Ukrainian forces close to Zapadne, and parts of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (eleventh Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) reportedly proceed working within the Kupyansk route.[37]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova route on April 19 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces continued floor assaults northeast of Borova close to Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka, east of Borova close to Nadiya, and southeast of Borova towards Hrekivka and Olhivka on April 18 and 19.[38]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Lyman route on April 19 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Lyman close to Novomykhailivka, Nove, Zelena Dolyna, and Hlushchenkove; northeast of Lyman close to Kolodyazi and Yampolivka; and east of Lyman close to Torske on April 18 and 19.[39]
Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk route on April 19 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces carried out floor assaults east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske and southeast of Siversk close to Spirne on April 18 and 19.[40]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar route on April 19 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces carried out floor assaults close to Chasiv Yar itself; southeast of Chasiv Yar west of Andriivka; south of Chasiv Yar towards Bila Hora and Stupochky; and southeast of Chasiv Yar close to Ozaryanivka on April 18 and 19.[41]
Russian forces just lately superior within the Toretsk route.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on April 16 and 18 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior west of Toretsk and east of Dachne (northeast of Toretsk), respectively.[42]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior from Niu York (south of Toretsk) towards Sukha Balka (southwest of Toretsk).[43]
Russian forces carried out floor assaults close to Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk close to Dachne and Dyliivka; east of Toretsk close to Druzhba and Krymske; southwest of Toretsk close to Sukha Balka, Oleksandropil, and Valentynivka; and west of Toretsk close to Leonidivka on April 18 and 19.[44]
A Ukrainian supply reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian army intelligence said on April 18 that Russian forces redeployed unspecified drone items from the Kursk route to the realm southwest of Toretsk close to Kalynove and that these items at the moment are working within the Kostyantynivka route.[45] That is the primary time that ISW has noticed reviews of Russian redeployments from Kursk Oblast, and this report is in step with ISW’s evaluation that Russian forces might prioritize offensive operations within the Kostyantynivka route in Spring and Summer season 2025.[46]
Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on April 19 that Russian forces just lately modified ways within the Toretsk route and are more and more conducting motorized assaults on bikes.[47] Zaporozhets said that Russian forces are attacking in teams of three to 5 bikes and that Russian forces use troopers on bikes for various capabilities, together with to conduct assaults, to clear mines, and to tow infantry. Zaporozhets said that Russian forces are trying to make use of these motorbike forces to quickly advance by fields and consolidate positions with out further reinforcements.
Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian a hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division (eighth CAA, SMD) are reportedly working close to Sukha Balka.[48]
Ukrainian and Russian forces just lately superior within the Pokrovsk route.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on April 19 signifies that Ukrainian forces just lately superior in southwestern Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[49]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on April 19 signifies that Russian forces seized Novotoretske and superior in central Myrolyubivka (each east of Pokrovsk) throughout a strengthened company-sized mechanized assault on April 17.[50] Further geolocated footage revealed on April 19 signifies that Russian forces superior alongside the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezhova freeway northeast of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[51]
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized Shevchenko, which a number of Russian milbloggers claimed is referring to the outdated title for the jap a part of Kalynove (east of Pokrovsk) versus the settlement of Shevchenko south of Pokrovsk.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior to the outskirts of Leontovychi (previously Pershe Travyna, simply southwest of Pokrovsk).[53]
Russian forces attacked Pokrovsk close to Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk close to Svyrydonivka, Yelyzavetivka, Stara Mykolaivka, Myrolyubivka, Vodyane Druhe, Novotoretske, Malynivka, Myrne, Promin, and Stara Mykolaivka; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk close to Shevchenko and Pishchane; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Zvirove, Kotlyne, Novooleksandrivka, and Udachne on April 18 and 19.[54] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Udachne, Kotlyne, and Pishchane.[55]
A Ukrainian brigade working within the Pokrovsk route reported on April 19 that Ukrainian forces destroyed 24 armored combating autos, 99 bikes, and two different autos and killed 229 and wounded 34 Russian personnel in the course of the Russian strengthened company-sized mechanized assault close to Pokrovsk on April 17.[56]
The commander of a Ukrainian artillery battalion working within the Pokrovsk route said that Russian forces are deploying well-trained contract troopers and mobilized personnel with out enough coaching within the space.[57]
One other Ukrainian brigade working within the Pokrovsk route reported on April 19 that it destroyed a Russian locomotive transporting tools between Russia and occupied Ukraine within the Pokrovsk route with a drone.[58]
Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian one hundred and twentieth Artillery Brigade (forty first CAA, Central Army District [CMD]) are reportedly working close to Lysivka.[59]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Novopavlivka route on April 19 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Novopavlivka close to Solone and Uspenivka, east of Novopavlivka close to Kotlyarivka and Preobrazhenka, and southeast of Novopavlivka close to Bohdanivka on April 18 and 19.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked close to Solone.[61]
Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian sixth and eightieth tank regiments (each of the ninetieth Tank Division, forty first CAA, CMD) are reportedly working close to Kotlyarivka.[62]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kurakhove route on April 19 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces continued assaults west of Kurakhove close to Kostyantynopil and Andriivka on April 18 and 19.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove).[64]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velkya Novosilka route on April 19 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces continued floor assaults northeast of Velyka Novosilka within the route of Odradne, north of Velyka Novosilka close to Vesele and Dniproenerhiya, northwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Pryvilne and Vilne Pole, and west of Velyka Novosilka close to Novosilka.[65]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions, safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 19 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces continued floor assaults southwest of Orikhiv close to Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, Novoandriivka, and Shcherbaky; and southeast of Orikhiv close to Mala Tokmachka on April 18 and 19.[66]
Order of Battle: Parts of the 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (seventh VDV Division) are reportedly working close to Stepove, and parts of the 108th VDV Regiment (seventh VDV Division) are reportedly working close to Mali Shcherbaky.[67]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported floor exercise within the Dnipro route on April 19.
The “Atesh” Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on April 19 that the majority households of senior Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) army officers left occupied Sevastopol.[68] Atesh reported that Russian forces obtained a brand new directive in early April 2025 to implement further safety measures, together with elevated patrols of BARS (Russian Military Fight Reserve) personnel and cancelling go away for army personnel stationed in occupied Crimea.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces carried out a sequence of missile and drone strikes towards Ukraine in a single day on April 18 and 19. The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M ballistic missiles and two Onyx anti-ship cruise missiles from occupied Crimea, and three Kh-31P anti-radar missiles from an unspecified location.[69] The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Russian forces additionally launched 87 Shahed and decoy drones from Kursk Metropolis; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Ukrainian forces downed 33 Shahed drones over Ukraine and that 36 decoy drones had been “misplaced,” doubtless on account of Ukrainian digital warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officers reported that Russian strikes broken civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Odesa, Sumy, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[70]
Russian Mobilization and Drive Era Efforts (Russian goal: Increase fight energy with out conducting common mobilization)
ISW is suspending Russian technological variations protection in its day by day Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a brand new product line monitoring Russian mobilization, power era efforts, and technological variations. Click here to learn the Russian Drive Era and Variations Replace.
Russian Technological Variations (Russian goal: Introduce technological improvements to optimize methods to be used in Ukraine)
ISW is suspending Russian technological variations protection in its day by day Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a brand new product line monitoring Russian mobilization, power era efforts, and technological variations. Click here to learn the Russian Drive Era and Variations Replace.
Vital exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing vital to report.
Be aware: ISW doesn’t obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly obtainable data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially obtainable satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the premise for these reviews. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.
[1] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23728811 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23728581 ; http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76727
[2] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/standing/1913657947311210556 ; https://suspilne dot media/998973-zelenskij-pogodivsa-na-velikodne-peremira/
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2025 ; https://archive.ph/TlZny ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025
[4] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23728811 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23728581 ; http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76727
[5] https://archive.ph/Gnv1q ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025
[6] https://t.me/mod_russia/51492
[7] https://t.me/mod_russia/51240 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/51049; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2025; https://t.me/mod_russia/50824; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2025
[9] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/18/us/politics/trump-rubio-putin-ukraine.html
[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2024;
[12] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/18/trump-russia-ukraine-rant-walking-away
[13] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-ready-abandon-efforts-broker-russia-ukraine-peace-deal-rubio-says-2025-04-18/
[14] https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/19/europe/trump-administration-crimea-peace-talks-intl/index.html
[15] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13907 ; https://abcnews.go.com/Worldwide/wireStory/russia-retaken-village-kursk-region-ukrainian-forces-120970664 ; https://suspilne dot media/998655-ukraina-ta-rosia-proveli-obmin-polonenimi-2/
[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/51493
[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2025
[18] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76727
[19] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/standing/1913657947311210556; https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/standing/1913663147363164509
[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2025; https://t.me/mod_russia/51483;
[21] https://t.me/mod_russia/51472 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27193 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34383 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90229 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26019
[22] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76727
[23] https://t.me/dva_majors/69383 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34388 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/311153 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26019 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27193
[24] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76727
[25] https://t.me/milinfolive/146452 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/19097 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/standing/1913585668996931734 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27181
[26] https://t.me/readovkanews/95307
[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/26012 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/69383
[28] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12958
[29] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76727
[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27169 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161854
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12958
[32] https://t.me/tass_agency/311142
[33] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/19/namagayutsya-prosochuvatysya-na-harkivskomu-napryamku-vorog-atakuye-vyklyuchno-pihotoyu/
[34] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90201; https://t.me/dva_majors/69383; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161857
[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27190
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297; G8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34372; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12958
[37] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34379; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34380; https://t.me/dva_majors/69390
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/69383 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63612
[40] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263
[41] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8305
[42] https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1913582477693591740; https://www.fb.com/watch/?v=1186100979723376; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1913614644704432551; https://www.tiktok.com/@kombi052/video/7494679867162774790
[43] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63622; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63610
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl; https://t.me/dva_majors/69383; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63610; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63622
[45] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21681
[46] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-16-2025
[47]https://suspilne dot media/998479-novi-sankcii-proti-rosian-u-kievi-pobili-vijskovogo-a-tramp-ozvuciv-umovu-vihodu-ssa-z-peregovoriv-1151-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1745059146&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[48] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63610; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63622
[49] https://geoconfirmed.org/ukraine/9df0e6b5-0d74-42c2-f01f-08dd7a063b7c; https://x.com/Bielitzling/standing/1913036202799771894; https://t.me/YourVaccineZ/13665
[50] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8944; https://t.me/ChervonaKalynaBrigade/2768
[51] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27426; https://t.me/ewoks152bbs/167; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/standing/1913492119219556604; https://x.com/blinzka/standing/1913533040074150081
[52] https://t.me/mod_russia/51476 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34390 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90242
[53] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63613
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263 ; https://t.me/rybar/69751 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63613 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63623 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22722 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26012
[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63613
[56] https://t.me/ChervonaKalynaBrigade/2768; https://suspilne dot media/998479-novi-sankcii-proti-rosian-u-kievi-pobili-vijskovogo-a-tramp-ozvuciv-umovu-vihodu-ssa-z-peregovoriv-1151-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1745065302&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/19/jdut-zarady-odnogo-postrilu-yak-odnorazovi-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-ne-zvazhaye-na-svoyi-vtraty/
[58] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BMZvLufR2zQ ; https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/information/ukrayinski-viyskovi-vpershe-znishchili-vorozhiy-1745060064.html#goog_rewarded
[59] https://geoconfirmed.org/ukraine/9df0e6b5-0d74-42c2-f01f-08dd7a063b7c; https://x.com/Bielitzling/standing/1913036202799771894; https://t.me/YourVaccineZ/13665
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297 https://t.me/motopatriot78/34365
[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34365
[62] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34384
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26012
[64] https://t.me/wargonzo/26012
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26012
[66]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26012 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34376
[67] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34376
[68] https://t.me/atesh_ua/6775
[69] https://t.me/kpszsu/32847
[70] https://t.me/kpszsu/32847; https://t.me/synegubov/13927; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2393; https://www.fb.com/mykoda/posts/1072685391559940?ref=embed_post; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/998523-rf-zavdala-raketnogo-udaru-po-odesini-poskodzeno-fermerski-gospodarstva/ ; https://x.com/MVS_UA/standing/1913457526416228837 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12359; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18450; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18454
