Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 26, 2025

Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Daria Novikov, and Kateryna Stepanenko with Nate Trotter

March 26, 2025, 6:30pm ET

Observe:
The information cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on March 26. ISW will
cowl subsequent reviews within the March 27 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign
Evaluation.

The main points of the ceasefire
agreements on power strikes and maritime operations within the Black Sea
that US, Ukrainian, and Russian officers reached on March 24 and 25
stay unclear. Russia and Ukraine seem to agree {that a}
ceasefire towards strikes on power infrastructure is energetic as of March
25, however US and Ukrainian statements proceed to clarify that
technical negotiations are ongoing.[1] Ukrainian Presidential Workplace
Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa acknowledged on March 26 that Ukraine remains to be
working to develop monitoring mechanisms for the ceasefires, which is
per US, Russian, and Ukrainian statements on March 25
collectively agreeing to develop measures to implement the power
infrastructure ceasefire.[2] Palisa acknowledged that each ceasefires on Black
Sea operations and strikes towards power infrastructure got here into
pressure upon the publication of the joint US-Ukrainian assertion on March
25.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on March 26 that
Russian forces are implementing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s March
18 order to stick to the ceasefire on power infrastructure
strikes.[4] The absence of formally revealed joint texts of the
agreements that Ukraine and Russia signed continues to make evaluating
the specifics of those ceasefires troublesome, and the ceasefire phrases
stay unclear.[5]

Russia and Ukraine exchanged accusations of strikes and ceasefire violations, though the ceasefire phrases stay unclear.
The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) accused Ukrainian forces of
trying to strike power infrastructure in Kursk Oblast on March 25,
fuel infrastructure in occupied Crimea in a single day on March 25 to 26, and
electrical infrastructure in Bryansk Oblast on March 26.[6] The
Ukrainian Normal Employees responded on March 26 and denied the Russian
MoD’s accusations.[7] Kursk Oblast Appearing Governor Alexander Khinshtein,
Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov, and Bryansk Oblast Governor
Alexander Bogomaz notably didn’t report Ukrainian drone strikes in
their respective areas. Russian governors and occupation officers
sometimes publicly announce when Ukrainian drones try and strike
infrastructure of their areas. Ukrainian Presidential Communications
Advisor Dmytro Lytvyn acknowledged on March 25 that Russian forces have
carried out eight strikes on Ukrainian power amenities since March 18,
when Putin claimed to have ordered the Russian army to cease strikes
towards Ukrainian power infrastructure amenities.[8] Ukrainian
officers have reported that Russian in a single day strike sequence have
broken civilian infrastructure throughout Ukraine nearly each evening since
March 18 however haven’t specified which strikes particularly broken
power infrastructure.[9]

Russian officers
explicitly rejected US President Donald Trump’s latest suggestion that
america could possibly be concerned in working the Russian-occupied
Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant (ZNPP). Trump acknowledged on March
19 throughout a telephone name with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that
america is eager about taking management of the ZNPP, which
Russian forces at present occupy — implying that Russia must
cede this territory in Zaporizhia Oblast earlier than america can
take management of the ZNPP.[10] The Russian Ministry of Overseas Affairs
(MFA) acknowledged on March 26 that the switch of the ZNPP’s territory or
management over it to Ukraine or some other nation is “unattainable” and that
the potential for Russia collectively working the ZNPP with any nation
is “unacceptable.”[11] The Russian MFA added that it will be “absurd”
to permit any worldwide group to assist function the ZNPP. The
Russian MFA tried to justify Russia’s unlawful occupation of the ZNPP
by claiming that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s October 2022 decree
legally introduced the ZNPP below Russian jurisdiction. Russian Deputy
Prime Minister Alexander Novak additionally acknowledged on March 26 that Russia is
not contemplating collectively working the ZNPP with america.[12]
The Kremlin routinely falsely portrays itself as the one protected operator
of the ZNPP, regardless of having endangered the ZNPP since Russian forces
occupied the world in March 2022.[13] Russia has notably saved army
tools close to the ZNPP reactors and within the turbine halls and used ZNPP
grounds to launch strike drones.[14] The Kremlin additionally routinely accuses
Ukraine of endangering the ZNPP and will try to accentuate these
narratives to spoil ongoing US-Ukrainian negotiations.[15]

The
European Union (EU) will seemingly keep sanctions on Russia regardless of
Russian calls for for Western sanctions aid as preconditions for a
momentary ceasefire with Ukraine within the Black Sea. European
Fee’s Overseas Affairs Spokesperson Anitta Hipper acknowledged on March
26 that the EU would take into account lifting or amending sanctions towards
Russia if Russia “finish[s] its unprovoked aggression in Ukraine” and
“unconditonal[ly] withdraw[s]” all Russian forces from Ukraine.[16]
Hipper’s assertion is probably going a response to the Kremlin’s latest demand
that it’ll not implement the phrases of the ceasefire within the Black Sea
with Ukraine till the US lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned
agricultural financial institution Rosselkhozbank and different unspecified monetary
organizations concerned in worldwide meals and fertilizer commerce.[17]
The USA will seemingly require EU cooperation with the intention to elevate
some sanctions and restrictions on Russian agricultural, monetary, and
commerce entities to reconnect Russia to worldwide agricultural and
fertilizer markets.

Key Takeaways:

• The
  particulars of the ceasefire agreements on power strikes and maritime
  operations within the Black Sea that US, Ukrainian, and Russian officers
  reached on March 24 and 25 stay unclear.
• Russia and Ukraine exchanged accusations of strikes and ceasefire violations, though the ceasefire phrases stay unclear.
• Russian
  officers explicitly rejected US President Donald Trump’s latest
  suggestion that america could possibly be concerned in working the
  Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant (ZNPP).
• The
  European Union (EU) will seemingly keep sanctions on Russia regardless of
  Russian calls for for Western sanctions aid as preconditions for a
  momentary ceasefire with Ukraine within the Black Sea.
• Russian forces not too long ago superior in Kursk Oblast, close to Toretsk, Velyka Novosilka, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces not too long ago superior in Belgorod Oblast and close to Toretsk.
• Russia
  continues reorganize drone detachments into new models seemingly as a part of
  an ongoing effort to determine the Russian Unmanned Techniques Power
  (USF).

We
don’t report intimately on Russian warfare crimes as a result of these actions
are well-covered in Western media and don’t straight have an effect on the
army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We’ll proceed
to guage and report on the results of those prison actions on
the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on
fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn Russian violations
of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
towards humanity though we don’t describe them in these reviews. 

Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation

Russian forces not too long ago superior in Kursk Oblast amid continued assaults in Kursk Oblast and the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border space.

Assessed
advances: Geolocated footage revealed on March 26 signifies that
Russian forces not too long ago superior east of Oleshnya (southwest of
Sudzha).[18]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger
claimed that parts of the Russian thirty fourth Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty ninth
Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) and
unspecified Russian Airborne (VDV) parts superior close to Veselivka
(northeast of Sumy Metropolis alongside the worldwide border).[19]

Russian
forces attacked west of Sudzha close to Gogolevka, close to the Sudzha
checkpoint alongside the worldwide border southwest of Sudzha, and
northeast of Sumy Metropolis alongside the worldwide border close to Veselivka and
Zhuravka.[20]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian
177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), the “Arctic” Battalion
of the fortieth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and twenty second and thirtieth
Motorized Rifle Regiments (each of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division,
forty fourth Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) are reportedly
working close to Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[21] Parts of the Russian
83rd VDV Brigade are reportedly working close to Zhuravka.[22]

Ukrainian forces not too long ago superior alongside the worldwide border in northwestern Belgorod Oblast.

Assessed
advances: A number of Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces
superior into northern Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod Metropolis).[23]

Russian
milbloggers claimed that combating continued in Demidovka and Popovka
(west of Demidovka).[24] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 26 that
the depth of combating within the Belgorod worldwide border space has
decreased because of unfavorable climate circumstances.[25]

Order
of Battle: Parts of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty fourth
AC, LMD) and “Aida” Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly working
close to Popovka (west of Demidovka).[26] Ukrainian army observer
Kostyantyn Mashovets acknowledged that the Russian army command has
deployed parts of the Russian third Motorized Rifle Division (twentieth CAA,
Moscow Army District [MMD]), 88th and eighty fifth motorized rifle brigades
(each of the third CAA, previously 2nd Luhansk Individuals’s Republic [LNR] AC,
SMD), and unspecified parts of the sixth CAA (LMD) to Belgorod
Oblast.[27] Mashovets added that the Russian army command already
moved part of its sixth CAA (LMD), twentieth CAA, and third CAA reserves to
Belgorod Oblast from Kupyansk, Lyman, and Siversk-Chasiv Yar instructions,
respectively.

Russian Predominant Effort – Japanese Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border
with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of
Kharkiv Metropolis

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kharkiv course on March 26 however didn’t advance.

Ukraine’s
Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 26 that Russian forces
carried out a bolstered platoon-sized mechanized assault with 4
armored automobiles towards Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis) and that
Ukrainian forces destroyed three armored automobiles and broken one
armored car.[28] Russian forces carried out floor assaults northeast
of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk and Tykhe on March 25 and 26.[29]

Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk course on March 26 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the
outskirts of Mala Shapkivka (northwest of Kupyansk).[30]

Russian
forces continued floor assaults north of Kupyansk alongside the
Zapadne-Kalynove line; northeast of Kupyansk close to Dvorichna, Sahunivka,
and Holubivka and towards Kamyanka; and east of Kupyansk close to
Petropavlivka on March 25 and 26.[31]

Ukrainian Khortytsia
Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on March
26 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a column of Russian armored automobiles,
seemingly trying to dismount infantry, within the Kupyansk course on
March 25 and that Russian forces lose as much as 50 armored automobiles per
week.[32] Trehubov reported that Russian forces within the Kupyansk
course repeatedly use armored car columns to move infantry to
the frontline somewhat than to conduct mechanized assaults.

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova course on March 26 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Russian
forces continued floor assaults northeast of Borova close to Zahryzove,
east of Borova close to Kopanky and Nadiya, and southeast of Borova in the direction of
Olhivka, Nove, and Katerynivka on March 25 and 26.[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Lyman course on March 26 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian supply claimed that Russian forces superior 500 meters close to Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman).[34]

Russian
forces continued floor assaults northeast of Lyman close to Yampolivka and
Kolodyazi and east of Lyman close to Torske and Zarichne on March 25 and
26.[35]

Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk course on March 26 however didn’t advance.

Russian
forces carried out offensive operations northeast of Siversk close to
Bilohorivka, east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of
Siversk close to Ivano-Darivka on March 25 and 26.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar course on March 26 however didn’t advance.

Russian
forces carried out offensive operations close to Chasiv Yar itself and south
of Chasiv Yar towards Predtechyne, and close to Bila Hora, Stupochky, and
Dyliivka on March 25 and 26.[37]

Order of Battle: Parts
of the Russian “Sever-V” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps)
and 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are
reportedly working close to Chasiv Yar.[38]

A spokesperson
of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Chasiv Yar course acknowledged on
March 26 that Russian forces have elevated the variety of guided glide
bomb and fiber-optic drone strikes within the space.[39] An officer of a
Ukrainian brigade working within the Chasiv Yar course acknowledged that
Russian personnel working within the space are poorly educated and that
Russian forces normally assault in smaller teams.[40]

Russian and Ukrainian forces not too long ago superior within the Toretsk course.

Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on March 23 signifies
that Ukrainian forces not too long ago superior alongside Odeska Road in
northwestern Toretsk and alongside Darhomyzhskoho Road in northern
Toretsk.[41]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage
revealed on March 25 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago superior
within the Toretska mine in northern Toretsk and westward alongside the O0524
freeway northwest of Toretsk.[42]

Unconfirmed claims: A
Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior 2.5 kilometers
west of Niu York (south of Toretsk), in northern Toretsk, and towards
Avanhard Stadium in central Toretsk, and within the Fomikha Mine waste heap
(northern Toretsk).[43] One other Russian milblogger claimed that parts
of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (one hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth
Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) and the twentieth
Motorized Rifle Regiment (presumably a reformed Soviet unit) are clearing
Olesksandropil and Panteleymonivka (each southwest of Toretsk).[44]

Russian
forces carried out offensive operations close to Toretsk itself; north of
Toretsk close to Dyliivka and Dachne; and east of Toretsk close to Krymske; and
southwest of Toretsk close to Sukha Balka on March 25 and 26.[45]

A
spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Toretsk course
acknowledged on March 26 that Russian forces use inexperienced tape identification
marks to imitate identification marks utilized by the Ukrainian army in
order to forestall Ukrainian drone operators from simply figuring out and
hanging them.[46] Such misleading techniques might quantity to acts of perfidy –
a warfare crime below the Geneva Conference.[47] The Geneva Conference
defines perfidy as “acts inviting the boldness of an adversary to steer
him to imagine that he’s entitled to, or is obliged to accord,
safety below the foundations of worldwide regulation relevant in armed
battle, with intent to betray that confidence.” Russian Ministry of
Protection’s (MoD) Predominant Army-Political Directorate Deputy Head and
Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Main Normal Apti Alaudinov, not too long ago
claimed that Russian forces equally used blue electrical tape
identification marks – which he claimed Ukrainian forces additionally use –
throughout an assault in Kursk Oblast to “stop the Ukrainian army from
understanding what was taking place.”[48]

Order of Battle:
Parts of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 238th
Artillery Brigade (each of the one hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA,
SMD) are reportedly working close to Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Pokrovsk course on March 26 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces superior
north of Uspenivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[50] Russian milbloggers
claimed that Russian forces superior close to Lysivka (southeast of
Pokrovsk) and in northwestern Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[51]

Russian
forces carried out offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk close to
Tarasivka and towards Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk close to Zelene Pole,
Yelyzavetivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka; south of
Pokrovsk close to Shevchenko, Novopavlivka, and Vidrodzhennya (fomerly Novyi
Trud); and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Kotlyne, Udachne, Preobrazhenka,
Bohdanivka, Uspenivka, Novoukrainka, Kotlyarivka, Novoserhiivka,
Pishchane, and Novooleksandrivka on March 25 and 26.[52] Russian
milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Lysivka,
Solone, and Uspenivka.[53]

Order of Battle: Parts of a
tank battalion of the Russian 1st “Slavic” Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st
CAA, previously 1st Donetsk Individuals’s Republic [DNR] Military Corps [AC], SMD)
reportedly proceed working within the Pokrovsk course.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kurakhove course on March 26 however didn’t make confirmed advances. 

Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior north
of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove) and 1.5 kilometers close to Rozlyv
(southwest of Kurakhove).[55]

Russian forces continued
floor assaults west of Kurakhove close to Kostyanynopil and Andriivka and
southwest of Kurakhove close to Rozlyv on March 25 and 26.[56] Russian
sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked
close to Rozlyv.[57]

A Russian milblogger claimed that
combating within the Kurakhove course is extra energetic for the reason that seizure of
Kostyantynopil has allowed Russian forces to press on Rozlyv from the
north and south.[58] ISW assessed that Russian forces seized
Kostyantynopil as of March 9.[59]

Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Velyka Novosilka course.

Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on March 26 signifies
that Russian forces not too long ago superior to jap Vilne Pole (northwest
of Velyka Novosilka).[60]

Russian forces attacked north of
Velyka Novosilka close to Dniproenerhiya, Vesele, and Skudne; northwest of
Velyka Novosilka close to Vilne Pole and Pryvilne; and west of Velyka
Novosilka close to Novopil and Novosilka on March 25 and 26.[61] Ukrainian
sources reported on March 25 that Ukrainian forces not too long ago repelled a
lowered company-sized mechanized assault close to Velyka Novosilka.[62] A
Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to
Vilne Pole.[63]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions and safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported floor exercise within the Hulyaipole course on March 26.

Order
of Battle: Drone operators and artillery parts of the Russian 1198th
Motorized Rifle Regiment and sixty fourth Motorized Rifle Brigade (each of the
thirty fifth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Japanese Army District [EMD]) are
reportedly hanging Ukrainian targets within the Polohy course.[64]

Russian forces not too long ago superior in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on March 25 signifies
that Russian forces not too long ago superior alongside the T-0812 Vasylivka-Orikhiv
freeway in western Stepove (northwest of Robotyne).[65]

Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 26 that Russian forces,
together with parts of the Russian 108th and 247th Airborne (VDV)
regiments (each of the seventh VDV Division), superior north, west, and east
of Lobkove (northwest of Robotyne) and inside central Lobkove.[66]

Russian
forces attacked north of Robotyne close to Mala Tokmachka and northwest of
Robotyne close to Lobkove, Maly Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, Stepove, and
Kamyanske on March 25 and 26.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed on March
26 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Stepove, Lobkove, and
Shcherbaky.[68]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the
Russian seventieth Motorized Rifle Regiment (forty second Motorized Rifle Division,
58th CAA, Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly working
close to Mala Tokmachka, and drone operators of the Russian BARS-Sarmat
Unmanned Techniques Particular Objective Heart (previously BARS-Sarmat
Detachment, Russian Fight Military Reserve) are reportedly hanging
Ukrainian positions within the Kamyanske course.[69]

Russian forces carried out restricted offensive operations within the Dnipro (Kherson) course on March 25 and 26 however didn’t advance.[70]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)

Russian
forces carried out a sequence of drone strikes towards Ukraine on the evening
of March 25 and 26. The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Russian
forces launched 117 Shahed and decoy drones from the instructions of Kursk
Metropolis; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and
occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[71] The Ukrainian Air Power reported that
Ukrainian forces downed 56 drones and that 49 had been ”misplaced,” seemingly due
to Ukrainian digital warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officers
reported that Russian forces struck infrastructure in Sumy,
Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, and Cherkasy oblasts and carried out the
largest Shahed strike towards Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast since
the beginning of the warfare in February 2022.[72]

Ukrainian
Heart for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko
reported on March 26 that Russian forces are getting ready new Shahed launch
websites and increasing Shahed crews to extend the variety of Shahed
strikes towards Ukraine.[73]

Russian Mobilization and Power Era Efforts (Russian goal: Increase fight energy with out conducting basic mobilization)

Russia
continued to reorganize drone detachments into new models seemingly as half
of an ongoing effort to determine the Russian Unmanned Techniques Power
(USF). Former Roscosmos (Russian area company) head and Zaporizhia
Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin introduced on March 25 that
Russian authorities have reorganized the BARS-Sarmat Detachment into the
BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Techniques Particular Objective Heart.[74] Rogozin additionally
famous that the BARS-Sarmat Heart added two new fight testing
battalions. The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) started efforts to
set up a separate department for unmanned methods inside the Russian
Armed Forces in mid to late 2024 by reorganizing casual drone
detachments into MoD-controlled models.[75]

The Kremlin
continues efforts to militarize Russian youth as a part of long-term pressure
era efforts. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the board
of the “Motion of the First” youth military-patriotic group on
March 26 and claimed that 11 million individuals have joined the
group since its founding in 2022.[76] The Kremlin makes use of the
Motion of the First to militarize society in Russia and occupied
Ukraine, notably amongst youngsters, and Motion of the First’s Board
Chairperson Artur Orlov acknowledged that the group goals to draw up
to 18 million individuals by 2030.[77]

Russian Technological Variations (Russian goal: Introduce technological improvements to optimize methods to be used in Ukraine)

Russian
drone designer VVZ Drones acknowledged on March 26 that it developed the
“Sifa” first-person view (FPV) drone, which might strike helicopters and
different drones.[78] VVZ Drones claimed that the Sifa drone has a payload
of as much as 0.7 kilograms and a flight pace of over 225 kilometers per
hour.

Actions in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed
areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian residents into Russian sociocultural,
financial, army, and governance methods)

ISW will not be publishing protection of actions in Russian-occupied areas as we speak.